THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001000010063-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: July 27, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PREPARED FOR, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION:'
CONTAINED. HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED:..
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27 July 1966
The presidium of the Viet Cong's National Lib-
eration Front (NFLSV) has strongly condemned South
Vietnam's forthcoming September elections for a
constitutional assembly, according to a statement
broadcast by Hanoi on 25 July. The statement ex-
horted the people of the heavily-populated towns not
only to boycott the elections but also to "smash
this deceitful buffoonery."
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Viet Cong guerrillas attacked the Soc Trang Airfield
and the US 25th Infantry Division headquarters at
Cu Chi with mortars and recoilless rifle fire (Paras.
1-2). Status of major lines of communications in
South Vietnam (Para. 3). Weekly review of South
Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 4).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Prime Minister Ky suggested on 27 July that a useful
alternative to a ten-year or longer war of attrition
might be the "annihilation of the Communists in
their own sanctuary" (Para. 1). Ky and some of
his ministers presented a state of the nation ad-
dress to newsmen prior to being asked about his
views on invading the North (Para. 2). The Viet
Cong propaganda media have broadcast significant
commentaries designed to exploit the weaknesses of
the Ky-Thieu government (Paras. 3-4).
III. Military Developments in. North Vietnam:
A report on the organization and facilities of the
DRV Navy is given (Paras. 1-8).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The
content of Peking and Hanoi propaganda in recent
days has differed markedly on the status of the
Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Viet-
nam(Paras. 1-2).
South Vietnam Battle Statistics 17-23 July
Total Personnel Losses
Cumulative US Combat Casualties
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
South Vietnam Battle Statistics 17-23 July
Viet Cong Incidents
Viet Cong Attacks
Weapons Losses--GVN/VC
27 July 1966
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CURRENT SITUATION
0 25 50 75 100 Mtles
0 25 50 75 1 0 Kilometers
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1. In a continuation of the recently intensi-
fied Communist campaign against strategic allied
installations in South Vietnam, Viet Cong mortar
crews shelled the US air base at Soc Trang in the
delta province of Ba Xuyen early today. A total
of 20 shells struck the base. There were no
casualties and no damage reported. Armed heli-
copters and an AC-47 "Magic Dragon" attacked the
suspected enemy positions with unknown results.
2. Viet Cong guerrillas again struck the US
25th Infantry Division headquarters at Cu Chi, 18
miles northwest of Saigon, early this morning with
40 rounds of mortar fire. Eight hours earlier the
base was hit by 135 rounds of mortar and recoilless
rifle fire. Total American casualties in the two
attacks were 29 wounded. There was no significant
damage to equipment or facilities.
Status of Major Lines of Communications
3. The operational status of South Vietnam's
major highways remained about the same during the
week of 16-23 July. Another section of Route 14
was closed from Kontum to Dak To in Kontum Province.
There were no changes in the status of the railway
system.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
4. The week of 16-23 July compared with the
week of 9-16 July:
I. Viet Cong Incidents
Time At- Regimental Battalion Company Harass- Ter-
Period tacks size size size ment rorism
9-16 July 19 0 2 3 487
16-23 July 24
27 July 1966
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
- I I Section of operable railroad
Section of inoperable road
Note: Routes are inoperable primarily
because of Viet Cong sabotage/
interdiction efforts.
Note: Bridges are still out along
National Route I in
Quang Tri, Nin Thuan, and
Binh Thuan Pr' vinces; how-
ever, bypasses' re available.
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Information as of 23 July 1966
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I. Viet Cong Incidents (continued)
Period Sabotage Propaganda Aircraft Incidents
9-16 July 48 27 198 807
16- 23 July 35 11 91 642
VC/PAVN GVN
9-16 July
16-23 July
9-lE July
16-23 July
Killed
1,200
1,272
209
195
Wounded
-----
-----
371
361
Missing/Captured
116
120
39
42
TOTALS
1,316
1,392
619
598
9-16 July 16-23 July 9-16 July 16-23 July
Killed 65 136 5 3
Wounded 368 578 16 7
Missing/ Captured 4 2 0 0
III. Weapons Captured
VC/PAVN GVN
9-16 July 16-23 July 9-16 July 1
6-23 July
Individual
230 Not 152
151
Crew-served
23 Reported 3
0
151
27 July 1966
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Premier Ky, expressing doubts as to the
determination of the free world to continue its
aid to Vietnam for ten years or more, suggested
as an alternative that the Communists should
be annihilated in their own sanctuary at an
early date. The suggestion, which Ky labeled
as "only a view of the war in Vietnam," was in
the form of a response to a newsman's question
following a state-of-the-nation message on 27
July.in Saigon. The question was prompted by
the release in Washington on the 25th of an in-
terview by a US News and World Report correspond-
ent with the premier, during which Ky apparently
expressed the opinion that only an invasion of
the North would assure final victory over aggres-
sion and prolonged guerrilla subversion.
2. The state-of-the-nation message was pre-
sented by Ky and several of his key cabinet min-
isters to a large gathering of foreign and do-
mestic newsmen. Ky prefaced his remarks on rural
development by outlining the three primary ob-
jectives of his government in the past: to de-
feat the Communists and pacify the country, to
provide for the election of a constitutional
assembly, and to stabilize the economy. Ky
cited achievements of the past five months by
General Thang's Ministry of Revolutionary Devel-
opment, and reiterated the need for the government
to establish contact with the rural populace.
Reports by the other ministers on the state of
the war, the economy, cultural and educational
opportunities, and the right to free exchange of
public opinion were essentially optimistic.
27 July 1966
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Viet Cong Pronouncements
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3. The presidium of the Viet Cong's National
Liberation Front has strongly condemned South
Vietnam's forthcoming September elections for a
constitutional assembly, according to a state-
ment broadcast by Hanoi on 25 July. The state-
ment, in English, exhorted the people of the
heavily populated towns not only to boycott the
elections but also to "smash this deceitful
buffoonery." The importance the Communists
attach to the elections has apparently been
demonstrated in the Quang Tin Province capital
where a VNQDD Nationalist Party candidate was
injured in an attack by the Viet Cong on the
party headquarters.
4. The Communist psychological and informa-
tion apparatus has also made a pitch over the
Liberation Front radio to Generals Vinh Loc
and Dang Van Quang, the II and IV Corps com-
manders, advising them that they are the next
targets of a government purge. The commentary
cited the examples of the five ARVN generals
who were recently sentenced or retired as a
result of their antigovernment attitudes in
the wake of General Thi's dismissal as I Corps
commander on 10 March.
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The
Viet Cong warning to Vinh Loc and Quang prob-
ably represents more than a shot in the dark,
and suggests that they are well aware of the
weak spots among the military leaders.
27 July 1966
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M
ITES OF NAVAL ACTIVITY
NORTH VIETNAM
Port I \ --Z=FCam Pha
? Redon Uong Bi ,~ Port
NORTH VIETNA
Kien An
Ai,fild
tPho Cac Ba
ILE DU
BRANDON 1i
GULF OF TONKIN
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Bai Char
HONE'
VantHoa
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2. orth Viet-
nam's naval headquarters is located at Haiphong and
reportedly exercises close control over the,navy's
various operating bases and support sites. These
installations are situated in the inlets and islands
to the east of Haiphong.
the navy had moved its operations to the relative
safety of this area after losing five patrol boats
to US air attacks off the southern coast of the
DRV on 28 April 1965.
3. the DRV Navy is
now divided along functional lines of command. The
bulk of its ships are assigned a coastal patrol
and air defense role and are supervised by a naval
authority on Bai Chay Island, formerly identified
as Northern Fleet headquarters. The only vessels
with an offensive mission, believed to be the nine
remaining P-4 class motor torpedo boats, operate
under the control of a new facility on Cac Ba Is-
land. I these functional
commands have limited powers and that all ship
movements out of the immediate vicinity of Bai
Chay and Cac Ba have to be authorized by Haiphong.
27 July 1966
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4. DRV naval forces assigned to infiltrate
South Vietnam by sea are said to operate under
the direct control of naval headquarters in a chain
of command kept separate from the patrol and tor-
pedo boat activities. These units, known as "Group
125,"
supplies for the South from a pier at Do Son.
F infiltration boats are
regularly moored at Brandon Island.
and ma load
5. The Bai Chay naval installation appears to
be the most highly developed operating facility cur-
rently available to the DRV Navy. It reportedly
serves as the headquarters of the Northeast Mili-
tary Region as well as the principal base for North
Vietnam's patrol boat force of approximately 22
craft. The base is said to be equipped with a com-
munications station and a docking complex under con-
struction since 1957. Repair facilities include
four marine railways capable of handling craft up
to 100 tons. There are also two half-buried POL
tanks with a capacity of 300-800 tons which are re-
plenished by lighters from Haiphong. Nine 37-mm.
AAA guns and an unknown number of 12.7-mm. or 14.5-mm.
weapons are said to defend the port area.
6. Bai Chay is connected with the civil port
of Hon Gay by two motorized ferries with a capacity
of four trucks each. The DRV Navy reportedly has
no permanent installations in Hon Gay but occasion-
ally makes use of its superior docking and repair
facilities.
a torpedo boat division recently used a com-
mercial pier there to load torpedos in order to
avoid the possibility of air attack at Bai Chay.
Seven miles east of Hon Gay there is said to be a
tidal basin used by the navy which is equipped with
wooden cradles capable of supporting craft during
hull inspection. A few miles further east a new
facility is reported to be under construction
which the navy will use as its main ammunition
storage site. A new road, boat channel, and dock
will serve the underground site and four German
88-mm. coastal defense guns are reported to be in
the area.
27 July 1966
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7. The new torpedo boat facility on the south-
eastern tip of Cac Ba Island provides the only of-
fensive element of the DRV Navy with a secluded
and advanced base in the offshore operating area.
Cac Ba and include an underground communications
and operational control center, mooring stations
for the torpedo boats, a beaching area for a
50-ton landing craft which regularly brings sup-
plies to the island, fresh water tanks, and an
the new facilities are concentrated at Pho
unknown number of AAA batteries.
a Chinese Communist engineering
regiment possibly 1,500 men) is building under-
ground fortifications and emplacing radar sta-
tions near Pho Cac Ba. four tun-
nels in this area which have
been constructed by the Chinese for coastal de-
fense weapons.
8. The only other significant installa-
tion mentioned by the DRV naval personnel was
the support site at Van Hoa. This is an isolated
facility, far from any civilian community, and
is apparently used as a repair and replenish-
ment base. Its usefulness is limited by its
distance from the main operating area and the
lack of concealment from air attack
The most important
aspect o t e Van Hoa base is its use as an am-
munition storage site, including the 60 Soviet-
supplied torpedoes said to be remaining in the
DRV inventory. The naval ordnance reportedly
is stored in two caves served by a small rail-
way capable of carrying heavy ammunition to the
two torpedo boat loading piers. It is possible
that Van Hoa's importance may diminish with the
completion of the new ammunition storage site
hear Hon Gay. Other facilities at the base in-
clude two camouflaged POL tanks, a supply ship
26 July 1966
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loading wharf, a marine railway and repair complex,
a torpedo maintenance shop, and various support
buildings. AAA defenses as of early 1966 were
said to consist of eight 37-mm. and eight 14.5-
mm. guns.
26 July 1966
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
27 July 1966
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1. The content of propaganda from Peking and
Hanoi has differed markedly in recent days on at least
one point--that of the status of the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Vietnam. Re-
cent statements by Chinese officials have echoed other
Peking pronouncements made as early as February of
last year to the effect that the DMZ no longer exists
because of the US "aggressive" acts against the North.
These statements have also strongly implied that the
North Vietnamese now have the right to strike into
the South in retaliation.
2. Hanoi propaganda, by contrast, has been
quite cautious in mentioning the DMZ and has avoided
making any statement similar to that from Peking. Re-
cent DRV statements have attempted to underscore the
buffer character of the DMZ and to point up North
Vietnamese compliance with it as outlined in the
Geneva agreements. Hanoi has, in fact, asserted that
US claims of North Vietnamese violations of the bor-
der region are merely a ruse to cover up planned
American "aggression" in that area. The North Viet-
namese are highly sensitive on this issue in view of
the revelation by the US of the recent infiltration
of the entire North Vietnamese 324th "B" Infantry
Division across the DMZ. By avoiding inflammatory
statements similar to the Chinese, Hanoi may well
hope to play down its own violation of the border
and at the same time forestall possible US retalia-
tory action in the region.
27 July 1966
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 SOUTH AV I t I IV4M L 00gfXfl - f
WEEKLY REPORT 17-23JULY 1966
Total Personnel Losses
(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)
GVN /US/other Free World
Viet Cong/PAVN
US only -
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam
(including North Vietnam)
Fatalities
Non-fatal Wounds
Captu red
Missing
Cumulative, 1961-1964
255
1524
10
12
Cumulative, 1965
1365
61 10
15
136
Cumulative, 1966 to date
2820
16723
38
77
TOTAL
4440
24357
63
225
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GVN/Other Free World)
F Missing or Captured in action
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
WEEKLY REPORT 17-23 JULY 1966
Viet Cong Incidents
250
AN
Viet Cong Attacks
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Weapons Losses
MAR I APR MAY
63184 vl JULY AUG I SEPT OCT I NOV I DEC I JAN I FES MAR APR MAY I JUN
Antiaircraft
Propaganda
Sabotage
Terrorism
Harassment
Attacks
APR
MAY JUNE JULY
Company and battalion sized attacks
- Battalion sized (and larger) attacks only j
I
F$
13
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