"FRANCE, THE USSR, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY (DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO THE USSR)"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001000010045-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: July 20, 1966
• Content Type: IM

04,0000401-11
FRANCE, ,\THE' USSR, AND,EUROPEAN SECURITY
(DE GAULLE-'S VISIT TO,THE;USSR)
GROUP 1
Ekcludedi from automatic
downgrading and
- / declassification
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This I Document contains information affecting the Na-
tions Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing o Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
ame ded. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to o receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 July 1966
France, the USSR, and European Security
(De au e s Visit to the USSR)
Summary
The main aim of both sides during De Gaulle's
visit to the USSR from 20 June to 1 July 1966 was to
encourage a pattern of bilateral rather than alli-
ance diplomacy between. Eastern and Western. Europe.
The extent to which they will draw others to their
example remains to be seen. Western. Europe's rising
interest in detente is such that it may be difficult
to contain it within the North Atlantic framework
where the interests of all the NATO nations includ-
ing the US can. receive due concern.. At the same
time, there may also be more independent initiatives
by the Eastern European states.
Moscow was careful not to rush its rapproche-
ment with France lest it founder on areas of dis-
agreement or be carried too far too fast. Never-
theless, the very fact of De Gaulle's visit plus
the prospects for future cooperation that were held
out contributed to the aura of reasonableness and
responsiveness that the Soviets have tried to create
around themselves.
repare y the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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De Gaulle probably saw the visit as a milestone
in the process of detente in Europe. He was able to
demonstrate that Europeans themselves could work for
a European settlement, but he avoided making conces-
sions that would have damaged his position in Western
Europe.
No attempt was made to conceal continuing dif-
ferences on the key issues of European security anda
German settlement, although the general lines of
agreement on the proper function of the UN, the South-
east Asian situation, and disarmament were confirmed.
The practical significance of the great number of
bilateral agreements and pledges noted in the end-of-
the-visit joint declaration will depend, for the most
part, on the extent of their implementation.
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Atmospherics
1. The Soviets displayed exceptional public
cordiality and deference toward De Gaulle. Not only
was De Gaulle given frequent opportunities to make
public statements, including one on. Soviet tele-
vision, but he was also allowed to make a visit--
unprecedented for a Westerner--to the Tyuratam
launch site and to observe the launch of a Cosmos
satellite and an ICBM firing. In general, the So-
viets turned out large crowds for both De Gaulle's
public and private appearances. A French Foreign
Ministry official who made the trip was impressed
by the warmth and spontaneity of: De Gaulle's recep-
tion, especially outside Moscow and Leningrad, and
by the number of people, beyond the organized bus
loads, who turned out, apparently voluntarily.
2. For the most part, De Gaulle responded in
kind. He flattered the Soviet Union on. its achieve-
ment and frequently referred to the historic ties
between the two countries and the prospects open to
them for future cooperation. Nevertheless, there
were times when he appeared to disregard Soviet
sensitivities with his use of "Russia" rather than
the "Soviet Union" and his description of France as
"a country of freedom and a Western nation." De
Gaulle was surely pleased by the friendly reception
and, in light of his efforts to portray NATO as of
diminished importance, he may well value this dem-
onstration. of comradery as having practical sig-
nificance.
Europe and the German Question
3. While some Soviet and French officials may
have hoped at one time that there would be a signi-
ficant breakthrough on a European settlement, it
was clear even before the visit that both sides had
scaled down their expectations.
4. De Gaulle considered the visit a symbol of
the process of detente in Europe and a way of giving
his benediction to that process. His arrival state-
ment called for a French-Soviet effort to begin to
find "ways and means" to bring about the conditions
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which would "one day" enable the great problems of
Europe to be settled. The joint declaration. at the
end of the visit also referred to the bilateral con-
tribution. that France and the Soviet Union. could
make to the settlement of European problems and
said that it could be "decisive." Furthermore, the
declaration said that in working for the "normaliza-
tion of the situation in Europe" France and the
Soviet Union. Will strive "to draw gradually all the
European countries to their efforts."
5. At the same time, the declaration took note
of the differences between Paris and Moscow with the
phrase that the two sides "exchanged their views" on
Europe and Germany. A French Foreign Ministry offi-
cial who was directly involved in formulating the
declaration said that this was the only real stick-
ing point in. the negotiations over the wording of
the declaration.
6. The general references to "the incipient
feeling of trust in Europe" and the "gradual de-
velopment of relations between all European states"
apparently satisfied Moscow's interest in continuing
to project an image of reasonableness and responsive-
ness without altering the essentials of its policy.
The prospect of fruitful relations between France
and the Soviet Union also served to substantiate the
Soviet claim that Washington and Bonn are perpetuat-
ing the notion of a menace from the East to sustain
European tensions and serve their own aggressive de-
signs.
7. Despite almost constant private contact with
De Gaulle during his 12-day visit, however, Soviet
officials made no serious effort to negotiate their
positions on outstanding East-West issues. This was
a mark both of Moscow's recognition that De Gaulle
has little to offer aside from encouraging a more
general movement away from NATO and toward dealing
with the USSR, and its determination to pursue the
dialogue with him toward that end. The Soviets
merely exchanged views with De Gaulle on. major
issues, and showed no inclination to bargain. with
him or make any concessions on well-known Soviet
positions.
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8. At the very outset, General Secretary Brezh-
nev made clear to De Gaulle that Moscow's position
on. Germany was not negotiable. He stressed the well-
worn doctrine that there are two German states, and
he indicated that any discussions with the West on
Germany would have to proceed from acceptance of that
"fact." The subject of a European security confer-
ence reportedly was raised in passing, but Brezhnev
did not press it. He gave the impression that the
Soviets did not consider such a conference near at
hand.
9. De Gaulle reportedly strongly defended Ger-
man reunification and refused to consider recognition
of East Germany. Given his oft-stated view that
German reunification is a long-term matter, however,
it is unlikely that either side extended itself on
this topic. The French held that a European security
conference should come at the end rather than the
beginning of a detente in Europe. De Gaulle's prob-
able awareness that other Western Europeans are not
yet ready for such a development probably contributed
to the ease with which this topic was dropped.
10. Although there was no breakthrough on the
basic political questions of Europe, both France
and the Soviet Union probably appraise the visit as
having contributed to attainment of certain of their
goals. Soviet press coverage was generally re-
strained on matters of substance, but Soviet media
did suggest that the present rapport was a promising
stage of a continuing process. Izvestia, for ex-
ample, described the visit as "a step toward use-
ful cooperation," but noted that "nobody expected
or expects all problems to be settled at once," and
that "there are still quite a few matters on which
our opinions differ." The Soviet-press emphasized
the "good, fruitful atmosphere" created by "the mu-
tual desire to look for ways to bring our stands
closer together," and praised De Gaulle for going
beyond declarations of interest in detente and taking
a practical step in that direction.
11. For De Gaulle, there was not only the op-
portunity to reinforce the appearance of detente,
but to do it while holding firm on matters of sub-
stance, particularly those of concern to West Ger-
many. De Gaulle could thus come out of the visit
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as a European who had demonstrated he could talk to
the Soviets and encourage another step in European
detente without being duped into concessions that
would have cost him not only in terms of the Franco-
German. relationship, but also in terms of France's
effort to win leadership in. Western Europe. The
sense of movement that was an element of the visit
and the agreements--yet to be implemented--that were
reached as well as the demonstration of firmness
particularly on Germany may well be just about what
De Gaulle sought in light of his European aims.
12. De Gaulle sought to emphasize the things
that could be done by the Europeans themselves.
He acknowledged, however, that the US would have
a role to play and thus avoided appearing to favor
the complete exclusion of the US from Europe--a
stance that even he probably considers premature
and the other Western Europeans would find unac-
ceptable.
The Forms of Bilateral Cooperation
13. To emphasize-.that..France and the Soviet
Union could together contribute to the creation. of
detente, the visit resulted in several agreements
to extend the consultative process. The joint
declaration's reference to mutual consultations on
worldwide as well as bilateral problems repeats an
idea included in the communiques issued at the end
of the foreign ministers' visits last year. Al-
though the declaration itself does not mention the
level or frequency of these consultations, French
sources say they will probably include semiannual
meetings of the foreign ministers. These apparently
are not intended as formal meetings, however, and
French sources indicate that the first "mutual
consultation" may take place between Couve de
Murville and Gromyko at the UN General Assembly
this fall. The open.-ended French invitation to
the top Soviet leadership to visit France is the
standard formulation. French sources indicate that
such a visit would not occur this year but might
possibly be scheduled for next year.
14. In. addition to the ministerial consulta-
tions, the visit produced agreement "in principle"
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on the creation of a joint commission "to study
regularly the practical questions of fulfilling
the existing trade, economic, and scientific-
technical agreements." The Soviets apparently at-
tached considerable weight to these aspects of co-
operation with France. The French deputy chief of
mission in. Moscow said that after Brezhnev alluded
to the desirability of improving methods of consul-
tation, Kosygin proposed the creation of the Franco-
Soviet standing commission for promoting trade and
technical relations that was announced in the
declaration, at the end of the visit. The Soviets
were said to have expressed satisfaction with So-
viet-Italian relations when stating their interest
in developing relations with France. Moscow's re-
lations with Rome have improved markedly in recent
months, but essentially have been confined to the
economic and technical plane.
15. According to the scientific, technical,
and economic accord which was signed during the
visit, the commission is charged with overseeing
the exchange of scientific personnel, the organiza-
tion of bilateral scientific and technical meet-
ings, joint research projects that may have an.
eventual industrial application, and joint studies
of modern technology and production techniques.
French officials appear aware that the Soviet in-
terest in this agreement stems from a desire to
tap French skills in modernizing Soviet industrial
plants. Despite the Soviet aim, however, it seems
unlikely that this agreement and the commission it
created will by themselves be able to overcome the
economic reasons for slow growth of French-Soviet
trade or the practical obstacles that have kept
French-Soviet scientific exchanges sporadic.
16. Probably the most obvious attempt at
status-seeking by the French was the agreement to
establish a "hot-line" between the Kremlin and the
Elysee. To avoid the implication that either side
is primarily concerned about heading off nuclear
war, however, the declaration said that it will be
"used for exchanging views and transmitting mes-
sages whenever it is found necessary."
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Space Cooperation
17. The second subsidiary agreement, signed by
the foreign. ministers, covered French-Soviet cooper-
ation in various space endeavors. This agreement
was worked out by technicians from both Countries
before De Gaulle's visit
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specify undertakings is the result of unresolved
problems on both sides. Four joint working groups
will be established to work on. the four substantive
areas of the agreement.
18. The most significant of these areas is
"space research" where there was "agreement in
principle" for the Soviet launch of a French satel-
lite. the "in principle"
wording means that questions such as the timing and
mission. of the launch, the apportionment of costs
and French access to information. on the Soviet
booster and ultimately to the launch site itself
remain unresolved.
19. The second area of cooperation is "space
meteorology" which reportedly will concentrate on.
sounding rockets, radar meteorology, and balloons.
The third area of cooperation is "space communica-
tion" where it is intended to continue the trans-
missions via the Molniya satellite. Several experi-
mental television transmissions between France and
the USSR were conducted before De Gaulle's visit.
The final area of space cooperation concerns the
exchange of space scientists.
Other Topics
20. De Gaulle told US Ambassador Kohler that
he and the Soviet leaders had talked a lot about
the US but that "the Russians talked without ani-
mosity." However, during a tour d'horizon of So-
viet relations around the world, Brezhnev said
Moscow's relations with the US were "frozen," and
described the McNamara nuclear planning committee
(but not Vietnam) as a "test" for Soviet-US rela-
tions. Moscow considers the committee a means of
giving Bonn. a greater nuclear role, and Brezhnev
apparently meant that implementation of it would
cause a further deterioration of Soviet-US rela-
tions.
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21. All available evidence indicates that Viet-
nam and Southeast Asia received minimal treatment
during the visit. The joint declaration says only
that "the situation in the Indochina peninsula
evokes increasing alarm because of the aggravation
of the war in Vietnam." Both governments agreed
that a settlement was possible only on the basis
of the 1954 Geneva Accords and that they would con-
tinue "to exchange information and compare their
points of view." there was
rapid agreement on is wording an very little
discussion of Vietnam or China. The general formu-
lation on Vietnam--considerably less pregnant with
implications of future joint efforts toward a
settlement than earlier French-Soviet statements--
reflects the awareness of both sides that a peace
effort at this time holds. little prospect of suc-
cess.
22. Disarmament and the United Nations re-
ceived vague treatment in the joint declaration.
On. the former, stress was placed on the danger of
nuclear proliferation and also on the need to de-
stroy existing stockpiles. France gave no indica-
tion, however, either that it would assume its
place in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Confer-
ence or that it would press its earlier call for
disarmament negotiations to be turned over to the
five nuclear powers. On the UN, satisfaction was
expressed with "the progress made in the sense of
realizing more exactly the role which belongs to
the organization in accordance with its charter"
and also with the "greater financial and administra-
tive strictness in its fun.ction.ing." According to
an official of the French Embassy in Moscow, both
sides agreed during their private talks to support
U Thant for re-election as secretary general.
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