HO CHI MINH'S CLANDESTINE TRIP TO CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001000010016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 6, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
6 July 1966
Copy No. 2 3
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HO CHI MINH'S CLANDESTINE TRIP TO CHINA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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GROUP I
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 July 1966
Ho Chi Minh's Clandestine Trip to China
1. A good case can be made that Ho Chi Minh
took a clandestine trip to Peking, probably in mid
or late May. It is doubtful, however, that he has
made a second such trip in recent weeks, as reported
in the Western press.
4:. There is no hint as to when Ho returned from
his trip to China, if he did make such a trip, and
no indication that he :h.a, made another such trip.
It seems unlikely that 1o would undertake two such
trips within the span of six weeks. He is not a man
to dash about involving himself personally in talks
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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with his allies. He prefers to remain. somewhat aloof,
dispatching his top lieutenants to perform such du-
ties instead. One measure of this aspect of Ho's
personality is the fact that his last known trip out-
side North Vietnam was in 1961, and that was to at-
tend the 22nd Soviet party congress.
5. The implication in the press reports of Ho's
second trip to Peking is that we may soon see North
Vietnam moving toward a negotiated settlement of the
war. All the available intelligence, however, sug-
gests that, for the present, Hanoi remains determined
to pursue the war. The infiltration of North Viet-
namese military personnel into South Vietnam this year
is higher than. ever and apparently is continuing at
a high rate. There was no indication
F that Hanoi was willing to lower its demands
for a settlement of the war. Recent public state-
ments by Hanoi officials certainly indicate no chan_:e
in their determination to continue the war.
6. This is not to deny that the cumulative ef-
fect of US air strikes on North Vietnam, the
recent US/GVN successes on the ground in. South Viet-
nam, have probably caused the Hanoi leadership to
take a more sober view of their prospects. The air
strikes in North Vietnam are causing the Hanoi re-
gime increasing difficulty, particularly in. keeping
open it::~ transportation routes, This, in turn, has
hampered Hanoi's efforts to supply its bomb damage
repair teams, areas of chronic food shortage, and
its troops in South Vietnam. Moreover, the con-
tinuing air strikes have doubtless begun to have a
negative effect upon popular morale, although the
-::--tent of this deterioration is difficult to assess.
It is likely, however, that the North Vietnamese re-
action to this situation. has been to request more
aid from Peking rather than. to seek Chinese acquies-
cense in a move toward a political settlement of
the war,
7, iIo's suspected trip to Peking in May might
be explained by a combination. Of factors which led
him to feel that his personal effort was required to
gain reassurance that there would be no slackening
of Chinese material support for North Vietnam, Ho
is also undoubtedly concerned over the implications
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for Vietnam of the internal party strife in. China
and over recent statements by Chinese leaders to
the effect that no real Communist can remain neutral
in the battle against "modern revisionism." It has
long been Ho's position that North Vietnam must have
aid from both Peking and Moscow if it is to success-
fully wage its war. Any 'threat, even, an. oblique one,
that the Chinese might attempt to pressure Hanoi in-
to backing away from its close relationship with
Moscow coulil draw a major reaction, from the North
Vietnamese, such as a visit by Ho to the Chinese
leadership,
8e Peking, for its part, wants the fighting to
drag on, and any approach by Ho indicating a desire
to damp down. hostilities and seek a negotiated settle-
ment in Vietnam would provoke a strong Chinese re-
action., Peking regards the Vietnam war as an, arena
where US military strength can be tied down and
punished. The Chinese, moreover, have publicly as-
serted and probably believe that time is on the Com-
munist side, and that the US, even if not defeated
in the fie:::.,:i , -c=,:.1i eventually lose heart and with-
draw. Peking would almost certainly urge upon Ho
the necessity for continuing the war.
9. The Chinese would insist that any modifica-
tion of the Communist negotiating position would
only encourage the US to hold to its terms for a
settlement. They would assert that the US could
not be trusted to abide by any compromise solution
and would resume the war at a later date under con-
ditions less favorable for Hanoi. Finally, they
would any appearance of Communist weaken-
ing would encourage Saigon. and strengthen South
Vietnamese determination to fight on. against the
Viet Congo
10, To reinforce these arguments the Chinese,
if pressed, would probably offer to increase their
logistic support of Hanoi, Peking, however, has
emphasized that the Vietnamese must carry the pri-
mary responsibility for continuing the war, and the
Chinese are unlikely to suggest direct military in-
volvement by Peking as an. in6,acement to persuade the
Vietnamese to hold to their present terms for a
settlement.
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