RAINER BARZEL AND HIS GERMAN UNIFICATION PLOY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900440001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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SUBJECT . Radn RM*1 and Its 0GMRU Unificate P3.a7
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PURPOSE : t t" aazt 1Da zal turdfication proposal.
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CATEGORY E - ROUTINE
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OCI Special Paper Notice No. Control No. No. 1587/66
SUBJECT: Rainer Bartel and his German
iz '~. t. in Ic y Da to 30 June 1966
EXEC. REG.
EXEC. DIR.
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DEFENSE
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C LASS IFICATION
MEMO NO.:
OFFIC . OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
I587/6t
SUBJECT: Rainer Barzel and his German Unification P1
REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY: Belf-initiated by the European
Area, OCI, to explain the
Motivation behind the recent
Barzel unification proposal.
DISSEMINATION: Routine internal and external diseem
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
S E C R E T
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CLASSIFICATION
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
30 June 1966
No. 1587/66
Copy No.
RAINER BARZEL AND HIS GERMAN UNIFICATION PLOY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
GROUP I
Excluded from outomatic
downgrading and
declossificotion
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt' by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 1587/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
30 June 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
German Unification Ploy
The unification plan presented by Rainer Barzel
in a New York City speech of 17 June has earned the
Bundestag "majority leader" a stiff rebuff from his
fellow Christian Democrats. Barzel claims that he
wished to test Soviet intentions and seize the unifi-
cation initiative from the Social Democrats, but his
overriding aim appears to have been the promotion of
his own chances to succeed Ludwig Erhard as chancellor.
Instead, Barzel'has suffered a sharp, though probably
not an enduring defeat.
*repared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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1. The German unification program presented
recently by Bonn "majority leader" Rainer Barzel has
been looked on by some commentators as a major new
initiative, and has been hailed in some quarters as
an act of courageous statesmanship. This roseate
view is at odds both with the history of previous
unification proposals and with the nature of Barzel
himself.
2. The heart of the Barzel proposals is remi-
niscent of most other unification plans, including
those sponsored in the past by the "big three" West-
ern Allies--the US, the UK, and France. East - West
German commissions would be formed to deal with the
practical matters connected with unification. The
commissions would be responsible to a "big four"
standing group (the Western three plus the USSR),
which would review the efforts of the commissions
and work out the over-all unification scenario.
3. As an inducement to Moscow, Barzel offers
a takeover of the East German trade agreement with
the Soviet Union, and suggests an annual increase
of five percent in the shipment of "advantageous
supplies" over the next 20 years. This proposal is
clearly a variation of the idea, prevalent for years
in German intellectual circles, that the Soviets may
be seduced into a political deal by economic wiles,
Erhard himself, shortly following his accession to
the chancellorship, seemed enchanted by this concept,
and even talked in terms of billions of dollars in
reparations for Moscow. US officials advised Erhard
against such an approach on the grounds that the
Soviets would be repelled by it.
4. Apparently striving for a touch of originality,
Barzel suggested that Soviet troops could remain in
a reunited Germany as part of a general European se-
curity arrangement. It has been fairly commonplace
for West Germans to speak in terms of "sacrifices"
in behalf of unification, but normally they speak
only of such measures as a large reparations outlay
or a shrinkage of Germany's national boundaries.
Rarely do they go as far as Barzel and suggest both
a partially neutralized and a less than fully sover-
eign German state. It is this aspect of the Barzel
thinking which has grabbed the headlines and left
his fellow Christian Democrats in a state of stifled
outrage.
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5. There remains the question as to why Barzel
felt it necessary to go as far as he did, in view of
the current "stand-pat" position of the Erhard govern-
ment on the German question. It is true that Foreign
Minister Schroeder has had his experts studying the
issue, but they have yet to put forth any new initi-
atives. Nor has Schroeder himself proposed any new
projects--such as a personal trip to Moscow--as had
been rumored earlier this year.
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9, Following the March CDU convention, Barzel
did little to help his cause by speaking on all sides
of one of the most important issues of the day--the
proposed speaker exchange between the Social Democrats
and the East German SED, Subsequently, Barzel, plead-
ing illness and the need for a rest cure, went into
political hibernation.
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10. Barzel's re-emergence has been spectacular.
Riding a vehicle already set into gear by the opposi-
tion Social Democrats, Barzel has attempted to jump
ahead of all others on the unification issue. He has
done so--with apparent deliberateness--during a Wash-
ington visit, and thus given his views more immediacy
and resonance than they might otherwise have had.
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17. In addition, Barzel, has earned himself plau-
dits elsewhere, including some from the camp of the
enemy. A sizable number of press commentators have
viewed the Barzel program as a timely effort to over-
come the "sterility" of the Erhard position, and
many were aggrieved that Barzel received such rough
treatment at the hands of his party, The press
service of the SPD paid Barzel a backhanded compli-
ment by greeting his effort as a welcome if belated
endorsement of the Social Democratic viewpoint.
18. Barzel has claimed that it was his aim to
demonstrate that the opposition SPD was not the only
group capable of new ideas on German unification,
Willy Brandt, speaking at the early June convention
of the SPD, had trumpeted a multiplicity of ideas on
how best to approach the German question, and had
dwelt with particular fondness on SPD plans for a
speaker exchange with the East German Communist Party.
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This latter initiative found 'widespread favor in West
Germany, much to the annoyance of the CDU, which felt
it had been upstaged by its rival on the import Ger-
man question. Barzel, exercising his usual self-
assurance, was not above trumping the opposition.
19. Another aim of the New York speech, according
to its author, was to call the Soviet bluff on the
German issue by demonstrating willingness to meet the
the main Soviet objections to unification, Barzel
said he had anticipated the quick Soviet rejection,
which, when it came, apparently helped save Barzel
from even sharper criticism within his own party.
It is unclear to what extent the De Gaulle visit to
Moscow may have been a factor in Barzel's planning,
but it seems probable that Barzel felt it unwise to
allow a Frenchman alone to put the spurs to the Soviet
leadership on this single most important issue for
the German Federal Republic.
20. It comes as no surprise that Barzel in. order
to make the largest possible political splash would
choose the topic of German unification. 'Unfortunately
for his sake, he overstepped the boundaries of "con-
ventional wisdom," particularly with regard to the
proposal for stationing Soviet troops on the soil of
a reunified Germany. There is endemic in this thought
the prospect of a neutralized, demilitarized Germany,
and as the US Embassy Bonn points out, there has
thus far been no perceptible sentiment for accepting
this end as a price for German unification.
21. Barzel may hope, however, that in the long
run such sentiment will come to life and proliferate,
and that among responsible Bonn politicians he will
be recognized as a pioneer of this point of view,
In the meantime, he can dedicate himself to rebuild-
ing his parliamentary and party positions. As a
young political careerist, he can afford to wait.
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