INDONESIAN YOUTH GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900410001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

FORM 2024_ AJ' l4 i S? 1 G7 R .~a7
' 2. sz L CI -1~5T1 E OF SPECIAL PAPER
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SUBJECT la'' e` 'romth Groups
REQUESTED BY
PURPOSE
DESIRED LENGTH
SPECIAL DISSEM
COORDINATION
OUTSIDE OCI
STATINTL ASSIGNED TO i
OAD REVIEW
1. O/DCI 4. CS/II
gid acterrafRAPHICS?
6. WA 7. AA 8. SSBA
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DISTRI1~UTION LIST
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SUBJECT: n4epjgtk ' !tb
ul
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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I?C Y)REJCN DISSEM
a';I"I2.~TON
(WFJCF or CUPfE' TT INTELLIGENCE
MEMO TIO.: 1586/66
JHJEC'I' Indonesian fi"wtt i G Soups
I1EQUE TED OR ORIGINATED B": Self-initiated to provide a brief
back ;round on the ro _c o" s udent and youth groups in the Indo-
ne,,;ian nationalis-; mr,vcm 'nt and to assess the current status
and alignments of t.lir, -na for groups now operating.
i' TSSET' INATI?N: P -c ?. min try to DDI, D/OCI, and their ;;taf is .
ADI)ITIONAAL COMMENTi : i D/OCI : Suggest routine internal
and eternal disscminati,) 1 .
f t) F Y!7r:I ;Iv DI SSEM
.e. L .,,A LION
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INDONESIAN YOUTH GROUPS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 June 1966
No; 1586/66
Copy No. 2
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
d.c a~tiifi etion
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INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE AID
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 1586/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 June 1966
Indonesian Youth Groups
Non-Communist Indonesian student groups played
a significant role in the massive purge of the
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) following the
abortive Communist-oriented coup on 1 October 1965.
They also helped create the climate which made pos-
sible the subsequent curtailment of President Su-
karno's power. In performing these functions, the
student groups displayed an unprecedented degree
of unity, and more normal divisive tendencies now
are beginning to reassert themselves. Student and
youth elements mirror their parent political and
religious groups in their complexity and diversity;
under normal circumstances, they cannot of them-
selves be said to constitute a coherent, unified
national political force. However, another national
crisis could cause them to submerge their differ-
ences again to push for specific common objectives.
The purpose of this niemorandum is to provide
a brief background on the role of student and youth
groups in the Indonesian nationalist movement and
to assess the current status and alignments of the
major groups now operating.
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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Background
1. Student and youth groups have been active
in Indonesia since the early days of the preinde-
pendence nationalist movement. Their significance
increased during the Japanese occupation and the
subsequent four-year struggle against the Dutch.
After independence was achieved, they maintained
themselves and even proliferated.
2. Most of these groups are affiliates of po-
litical parties, and as such they reflect the three
major orientations that are found in Indonesian
political life--religion, nationalism, and socialism
or Marxism.
3. Prior to October 1965, the three major Indo-
nesian parties were the Moslem Nahdatul. Ulama (NU),
the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and the Indo-
nesian Communist Party (PKI). President Sukarno's
gradual move toward the left facilitated the growth
and influence of Communist and leftist national
groups while moderate nationalist and religious
groups found themselves increasingly on the defen-
sive. In 1963 the move to the left greatly intensi-
fied, and by mid-1965 only the army offered resist-
ance--and that was relatively slight--to the nation's
move into a Sukarnoized version of Communism.
4. Communist elements were deeply involved in
the abortive coup of 1 October 1965, and the army
used this involvement to justify a campaign to de-
stroy the PKI. The most active support for the
army's anti-Communist program came from the reli-
gious--predominantly Moslem--youth and student
groups. Sometimes spontaneously and sometimes with
army encouragement, youth and students demonstrated
or took physical action against the Communists, Com-
munist Chinese installations, and the Overseas Chi-
nese community.
5. By December 1965 the PKI and its front
groups, including the Communist youth front, Pemuda
Rakjat, had been destroyed as overt national organi-
zations. Army leaders and their supporters believed
they should turn their attention to reorganizing the
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government and attacking economic problems. Again
the youth groups were in the forefront in dramatizing
the need for reform. In March 1966 the students
briefly emerged as a highly significant political
force, having been a major factor in preparing the
way for army demands to Sukarno which, in turn, re-
sulted in a reorganization of the government.
6. The unity that characterized the anti-Communist
student movement from October through March, however,
now is giving way to internal dissension and fragmen-
tation. With the PKI rendered ineffective and the
government at least partially reorganized, anti-Com-
munist elements are thinking in terms of strengthening
their respective roles within the general political
movement. Dissension appears to have begun within
the youth movement and is spreading into the political
parties themselves.
7. Present disputes both within and among youth
groups and political parties are fragmenting the sup-
port available to military and civilian government
leaders and complicating their task of recasting Indo-
nesian domestic and foreign policy. Present domestic
complexities, however, are likely to characterize the
Indonesian scene for the foreseeable future.
Major Student and Youth Groups
8. The following is a descriptive list of today's
major youth and student organizations, grouped accord-
ing to their religious, nationalist, or socialist
orientations. It attempts to show those groups that
were important after the coup attempt and their major
activities, and points out the present sources of
contention which are causing realignment of loyalties,
revival of old antagonisms, and intraparty feuding,
factors which have always been. much a part of Indo-
nesian political life. For the most part membership
figures have been omitted since there are few avail-
able and they are often open, to question.
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NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS
(Both KAMI and KAPPI, although drawing their
strength from religious youth organizations, appear
to regard themselves as nationally rather than re-
ligiously motivated. Official guidance and support
appear to have come from the army and from Deputy
Prime Minister Adam Malik, one of Indonesia's tri-
umvirs.)
KAMI--University Students Action Command ("Kesatuan
Aksi azasiswa Indonesia"). This is a confederation
of Indonesia's university student groups which grew
out of the anti-Communist movement following the
1 October incident and appears to have been organ-
ized in December 1965. It has a rotating leadership;
the present secretary general is Kosmos Batubara,
who is also chairman of The Catholic University
Students Association. The bulk of KAMI membership
is made up of Moslem and Catholic elements.
KAMI proved to be quite effective in the Dja-
karta area but less so in Central and East Java
owing to the pro-Sukarno and pro-leftist sympathies
of police and army units in the area. It now has
been generally accepted that KAMI in the Djakarta
area had the early support and encouragement of
the army, which protected KAMI demonstrations and
supplied the students with certain small arms.
Although the government's assessment of the
hard-core membership of KAMI in February 1966 was
only 7,500, the group was effective in rallying
thousands of students and gaining the support of
many labor and professional groups.
President Sukarno banned the organization as
of 26 February, but KAMI simply refused to accept
this, and the ban did little to restrict its ac-
tivities. Many members melded into the high school
counterpart, KAPPI, and took a strong role in
guiding its activities during this period. In the
Surabaja area, following the ban, KAMI elements
formed the Progressive Revolutionary Students Co-
operation Group (PRSCG) which was, in effect, merely
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a renaming of the organization. The only KAMI mem-
ber group failing to participate was the local branch
of the Christian ULii`er.sity Students Movement. On
the whole, the PRSCG proved rather ineffectual in
the face of strong opposition from the National Stu-
dents Movement and the military.
With the reorganization of the Indonesian cabinet
and the downgrading of Sukarno in March, KAMI resumed
activities under its own name.
KAPPI--Secondary School Students Action Command
("Kesatuan Aksi Perhimpunan Perhimpunan Indonesia")
is the high school counterpart of KAMI. It became
particularly active when KAMI was banned, and it
worked in close unison with moderate university stu-
dent forces. The bulk of its membership, like that
of KAMI, was made up of Moslem and Catholic forces.
Although quite effective in carrying out its programs
in the Djakarta area, it suffered the same diffi-
culties as KAMI in Central and East Java in the face
of military antagonisms, leftist, pro-Sukarno senti-
ment, and competition from other. Moslem groups.
It has recently suffered from an internal feud
that threatened to spread throughout the entire student
movement, affecting KAMI and other organizations as
well.
Factionalism was prompted in late
May when a.
proposal by the Islamic Students (.PII)
for a perma-
nent committee to govern KAPPI, rather
than a ro-
tating committee, was rejected,
Other
groups saw
this proposal as a threat by a
single
Moslem group
to take over the organization,
On 25 May the PH was expelled from KAPPI on
charges that it was trying to intimidate and dominate
KAPPI. The situation was further aggravated by the
arrest on 28 May of former KAPPI chairman Husni
Thamrin, a member of the PH and a vehement anti-
Sukarnoite. During this period PII was supported by
the Moslem university student group and student
affiliates of the National Party. ANSOR and Catholic
factions stood in opposition, and the Protestant
students took a neutral stand.
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Recent reporting has announced a settlement of
the conflict, largely in favor of the PII. A char-
ter of unity signed by member groups on 13 June
reinstated Husni Thamrin as KAPPI chairman.
GMNI--Indonesian National Students Movement
("Gerkan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia"). This :is
the university students' affiliate of the Indonesian
National Party (PNI). During the period following
the attempted coup, the GMNI was aligned with the
leftist, pro-Sukarno Ali-Surachman faction of the
PNI, which brought it into direct confrontation with
Moslem forces.
Factionalism within the PNI led to a victory
for the moderate Osa-Usep group, led by Osa Maliki
and Usep Ranuwidjaja, and brought about a realign-
ment of GMNI elements. A newly aligned GMNI in
East Java split from the leftist faction of the PNI
and pledged its support, within reason, to KAMI.
On 24 May the GMNI formally renounced its affilia-
tion with the leftist PNI, and on 25 May the new
general chairman of the Surabaja branch, Imam San-
toso, declared that "all GMNI members now are mem-
bers of KAMI and support all KAMI programs and
actions provided they benefit the people."
However, the realignment of the GMNI is by no
means completed. Die-hard leftist elements, ap-
parently infiltrated by the PKI, are violently chal-
lenging moderates in the Jogjakarta area where the
issue is still centered around supremacy for Su-
kgrno rather than party maneuvering for political
advantage.
This new deveLopment casts some doubt on how
far the new GMNI leadership will be able to go. It
is not completely loyal to KAMI, and its coopera-
tion will probably always be limited, especially
since KAMI in East Java is dominated by Moslem stu-
dents.
BANRA--The GMNI paramilitary organization, pre-
sumably drawn from militant youth elements within the
organization, They reportedly were armed and trained
by leftist military units of the police and marines.
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Pemuda Pantjasila ("Youth of the Five Pillars")
is the youth a i iate of IPKI, the Association of
Supporters of Indonesian Independence, a minor po-
litical party with strong army connections. The
Pemuda Pantjasila was particularly active in PKI
purges and anti-PKI and anti-Chinese demonstrations
in North Sumatra after 1 October.
At present it is in some danger of being eclipsed
by other, more significant groups in the current
scramble for political advantage.
GERMINDO--Indonesian University Students Movement
("Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia"), is an affiliate of
Partai Indonesia (Partindo), a party which has been
Communist-penetrated almost since its inception in
the 1950s. GERMINDO must be assumed to be similarly
infiltrated. It was active through mid-March of
this year during the period of Sukarno's brief come-
back, and as late as May, its East Java headquarters
appears to have been a center for clandestine PKI
activities in that area. In mid-May the East Java
Partindo and GERMINDO were banned. Members will pre-
sumably work with Communist youth to develop an
underground organization.
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ANSOR--The youth affiliate of the Nahdatul
Ulama (NU) Party, the Moslem Scholars' Party. Al-
though active throughout Java and North Sumatra,
it has most of its strength in East Java, where it
has taken a strong anti-PKI., anti-Chinese position.
Before 1 October, ANSOR took a far more forthright
anti-Communist position than did its parent or-
ganization, the NU, which has a long record of
opportunism.
ANSOR youth elements participated in and some-
times led the bloody purges of the PKI in East Java.
They also took advantage of the situation to move
against other opposition elements, including mem-
bers of the leftist faction of the National Party
(PNI).
The bloodbaths antagonized marine (KKO) and
police (Mobrig) elements in the area,,since members
of these units were strongly pro-Sukarno and many
had relatives in the PKI and PNI who were lost in
the purges. Military support for leftist nationalists
in the area has added to present complexities in
East Java.
In recent weeks ANSOR has been feuding with other
Moslem youth groups. If it follows the lead of the
NU it can be expected--particularly in East Java,
an area of strong pro-Sukarno sentiment--to swing
more in line with this sentiment as one means of
maintaining an ascendancy over other Moslem organi-
zations.
BANSER--The NU's paramilitary organization, pre-
sumabTy drawn from militant elements of ANSOR. It
has been principally mentioned as active in East
Java and North Sumatra.
HMI--Moslem University Students Association
("Himpun'an Mahasiswa Islam")--is a leading member
organization of KAMI, the confederation of university
student organizations. The student affiliate of the
banned Masjumi Party, HMI retained its legality and
has maintained an effective organization. Its strong
anti-PKI position never led it to the extremes of
ANSOR.
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HMI elements have been most effective in the
Djakarta area where they have been a guiding force
in general student activity. They have been active
but relatively ineffective in Surabaja, East Java.
Countered by ANSOR and the leftist sympathies of
marine and police units in that area, they have been
forced into competitive tactics and have been unable
to concentrate on their own objectives of political
and economic reform.
In May and June the HMI found itself involved
in a dispute over control of KAPPI, the confedera-
tion of high school students, and has sided with
its high school counterpart, the PII.
PII--Islamic Students of Indonesia ("Peladjar
Islam Indonesia")--is the still-legal high-school-
student affiliate of the banned Masjumi Party. It
is the largest and one of the most militant of high
school groups and--until its expulsion last May--
was the largest single group within KAPPI, the con-
federation of high school student organizations.
Following its expulsion, clashes--involving
kidnapings and beatings--between its members and
ANSOR youths threatened the entire moderate sttident
movement with factionalism. Masjumi affiliates,
supported by IPKI, an army-supported political party,
backed the PH while NU and Catholic-elements stood
in opposition. The moderate Osa-Usep faction of the
PNI, sympathetic to the Masjumi elements, refrained
from taking an active stand. It remains to be seen
just how effective the present settlement will prove
to be.
PKRI--Catholic Students Association of the Republic
of Indonesia ("Perhimpunan Katholik Republic Indo-
nesia"). The high school affiliate of the Catholic
Party (PK), it forms one of the larger and more in-
fluential groups within KAPPI and, along with the
Moslem students, was instrumental in leading the
protest activities in Djakarta.
Sukarno accused both it and the HMI of being dupes
of the US Central Intelligence Agency and threatened
both groups with dissolution. Despite the fact that
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the, Catholic Party
is
a minor party in Indonesian
politics, the PKRI
and
its university counterpart
wield an influence
on
the student scene out of
proportion to that
of
their parent organization.
PMKRI--Catholic University Students Association
of the Republic of Indonesia ("Perhimpunan Mahasiswa
Katholik Republik Indonesia")--is the university
affiliate of the Catholic Party and one of the
stronger elements within KAMI. It is especially
strong in West Java where, along with other moderate
and rightist student movements, it enjoyed military
sympathy and tacit military support. Its chairman,
Kosmos Batubara, is also currently secretary general
of KAMI.
GMKI--Christian University Students Movement
("Gera an Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia")--is an af-
filiate of the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo),
a minor party in Indonesian politics, and the party
of the Protestant Christian minority. The GMKI,
while a member organization of KAMI, failed to take
any effective role in that organization. It partici-
pated in anti-Communist Djakarta demonstrations
during the early post-October period but has been
considerably less active since then. In other parts
of Indonesia it had even less influence than in
Djakarta.
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SOCIALIST/MARXIST ORGANIZATIONS
CGMI (banned)--Concentration of Indonesian Uni-
versity Students Movements ("Consentrasi Gerakan
Mahasiswa Indonesia")--is controlled by the PKI.
Most of its members are believed to be non-Communist,
but it is suspected of having been a proving ground
for young Communists and an active recruiting arm
for new members. It was banned early in 1966; many
of its overt activities were taken over by GERMINDO.
Since 1 October, the CGMI has proved most effec-
tive in East Java where marine and police units were
sympathetic to the leftist position.
Pemuda Rakjat (banned)--Peoples Youth--is the
youth affiliate of the PKI. Before 1 October, it
was active in leading demonstrations and infiltrating
other student organizations. After the coup it ap-
parently lost a sizable number of its members in the
Army-Moslem purges of the party and its front groups.
It was officially banned in March along with the
PKI and other front organizations. Many of its mem-
bers reportedly went into the CGMI and GERMINDO.
At its peak, Pemuda Rakjat claimed three million
members. It is now said to be developing an under-
ground organization.
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