BULGARIA'S WORLD WAR 11 PARTISANS AND THEIR INFLUENCE TODAY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900360001-7
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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CLASS IFICATION
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I NTI L1 IGRNCR REPORT Control No. OCI No. 1714/86
SUBJECT: Bulgaria's World War 11 DATE:
Partisans and Their In-
fluence Today
Copy No. Recipient
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REPORT
BULGARIA'S WORLD WAR II
PARTISANS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ' TODAY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
GROUP 1 .
Exclud.d from automatic
downgrading and
dedassifkatiorv
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This document contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents' to or receipt by an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
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FOREWORD
Bulgaria's World War II Partisans and Their Influ-
ence Today is one of a series of Intelligence Reportspre
pared by the Office of Current Intelligence which seek to
make new contributions on long- standing US security
problems.
Valuable assistance in the preparation of this re-
port has been received from the staff of the FlIstorzcal.
Intelligence Collection in the CIA Library.. In addition
this report has profited from the efforts and assistance
of personnel of the Directorate of Plans and the Bio-
graphic Register/Office of Central Reference of the Di-
rectorate of Intelligence.
Comments should be directed to the Office of Current
Intelligence.
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Page
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. BULGARIA'S WORLD WAR II PARTISAN MOVEMENT.,. 3
III'. POSTWAR BULGARIAN COMMUNISM. . . . . . . . . 11
IV. FACTIONALISM IN THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST
PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Annexes
I. The Gavril Genov Battalion . . . . . . . . . 29
II'.: Ex-Partisans Holding National-Level Party
or Governmental Positions. . . . . . . . . 31
III. Map of the Twelve Partisan Zones in Bulgaria
During World War II. . . . .
IV. List of Revolutionary Operational Zones (VOZ),
Their Centers, Dates of Establishment, and
Principal. Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
V. Brigades and Battalions by the VOZ to which
Attached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe
was dramatically shown to have penetrated the tradi-
tionally conservative Bulgarian Communist Party,
when in April 1965 the Bulgarian regime crushed a
nationalist-oriented conspiracy led by dissident
Communist Party members, some of them highly placed
in the military and party bureaucracy. The conspir-
ators reportedly enjoyed considerable party and pop-
ular support and received comparatively light sen-
tences for their act of high treason.
Bulgarian documents show that many of the pres-
ent top Bulgarian leaders, as well as the April con-
spirators, were active participants in the national
partisan movement in World War II. Almost half of
the Bulgarian party politburo and secretaries and
over one third of its central committee in early 1966
were identifiable as ex-partisans. This contrasts
markedly with the situation immediately following
World War II when the Soviet Union installed Moscow-
trained Bulgarian. Communists throughout the Bulgarian
party and government hierarchy.
From an analysis of the pattern of internal
political developments in the Bulgarian Communist
Party since the end of World War II, certain con-
clusions emerge which may be useful in interpreting
future party developments:
1. "Nativist" Communists, who played the lead-
ing role in the wartime partisan movement,
but who lost the immediate postwar battle
for control of the party to those Bulgarian
Communists who spent the war years in the
Soviet Union, appear to have been making
a slow comeback in recent years in the Bul-
garian party hierarchy.
2. For a number of historical reasons, most
of the ex-partisans have developed national-
ist outlooks.
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3. Among those Bulgarian Communists who favor
more nationally oriented and pragmatic po-
litical and economic policies, the ex-parti-
sans, while not having any known organiza-
tion, almost certainly constitute a like-
minded group and could speak with the single
most powerful voice by virtue of the high-
level party and governmental positions many
of them have attained.
4. Personal ties among many ex-partisans in
Bulgaria. apparently have remained very
strong throughout the postwar period.
5. With the trend among Eastern European re-
gimes of loosening their ties with the So-
viet Union, Bulgaria's ex-partisans could
well serve as the leading force in the
party for launching Bulgaria on a more in-
dependent course. Such a development
could take the form either of a new coup
attempt or of more nationalist policies
adopted by the government to avoid such
an attempt.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1965 the conservative and slavishly
pro-Moscow regime in Bulgaria crushed a nationalist-
oriented conspiracy led by dissident Communist Party
members, some of them highly placed in the military
and the party bureaucracy. The conspirators, who
reportedly enjoyed considerable party and popular
support, received comparatively light sentences for
an act of high treason. Available Bulgarian docu-
ments show that most of the conspirators, as well
as many of the present top Bulgarian leaders, were-
active participants in the national partisan move-
ment in World War II. Some of the conspirators
and present Communist Party leaders served together
in the Gavril Genov battalion, which operated in
the Vratsa district of Bulgaria and frequently in
Yugoslavia. (See Annex I, The Gavril Genov Battal-
ion.)
Although forced into political eclipse by the
Soviets who installed Moscow-trained ("Muscovite")
Communists in the Bulgarian leadership following
World War II, the ex-partisan party members appear
to have been making a slow comeback in recent years.
Bulgarian national traditions, contact with Yugoslav
partisans, and the dearth of Soviet leadership inside
the country during World War II all combine to make
most Bulgarian partisans highly nationalist in their
outlook. The nationally minded ex-partisans are in
a minority in the Bulgarian leadership, but they
nevertheless do appear to have influenced some re-
gime policy decisions.
In early 1966 ex-partisans accounted for 46 of
the 101 members of the Bulgarian party cbfttral com-
mittee, 12 of the 66 candidate central committee
members, 6 of the 1.1 politburo members, 4 of the 7
party secretariat members, and at least 48 of the
416 members in the National Assembly. (See Annex
II, a list of ex-partisans holding national level
party or governmental positions.) Together with
the increasing strength of nationalist forces
throughout Eastern Europe and the inevitable demise
of the older, Moscow trained and Moscow-oriented
leaders, the presence of this number of ex-partisans
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within the hierarchy of the Bulgarian leadership
suggests that Premier and party leader Tod.or Zhivkov,
who has never succeeded in consolidating his position,
will face further nationalist pressures.
The roots of the strong nationalism of the ex-
partisans and the deep bonds which have continued
between them for so :Long are found in their expe-
riences during and after World War II. Despite the
small importance accorded by Marxist doctrine to
personal ties as factors determining historical events,
the evidence of persona: associations, given in some
detail in the discussion that follows, suggests that
these factors have been no less important in the his-
tory of the Bulgarian Communist Party than, in many
institutions of the Western World.
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IL , BULGARIA'S WORLD WAR II PARTISAN MOVEMENT
Bulgarian partisan activity during World War II
falls into three main periods. It was very limited
prior to 22 June 1941, the date Nazi Germany at-
tacked the Soviet Union. For the next two years it
grew markedly but continued to be troubled by seri-
ous supply problems. From the summer of 1943 on,
material help from the Allied Middle East and Medi-
terranean commands permitted further expansion of
activities. On Liberation Day--9 September 1944--
there were an estimated 9,000 to 10,000 full-time
partisans in the country, plus an estimated 20,000
supporters who sometimes participated in larger
scale partisan activities. Except in the first pe-
riod, a majority of the full-time partisans were
Communist in their political allegiance, and the
other political parties represented in the movement
were effectively dominated by the Communists through
the formal organization of the "Fatherland Front."
Little is known of the social and educational
background of the rank-and-file partisans, but it
can be assumed that most of them had the native in-
telligence and peasant toughness needed for living
off the country amid physical hardships. Their sup-
ply problems were compounded by problems of organi-
zation and personnel, but these difficulties, once
surmounted, were such as to foster a sense of self-
reliance, military camaraderie and high morale.
Activities were considerably stepped up and
targets became more varied with the influx of sup-
plies from the Allies through Yugoslavia, but most
Bulgarian partisan targets were of comparatively
little importance, reflecting perhaps the relative
military weakness of the partisan movement. The
partisans fought against the Bulgarian police, and
in certain cases also against small Bulgarian Army
units. They damaged communications facilities, de-
stroyed a number of trains carrying war material to
and from Germany, frequently raided and destroyed
local official archives, and engaged in kidnapings
and executions of "fascist" elements, i.e., progov-
ernment mayors and village officials sympathetic to
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the Nazis. The partisans also occasionally attacked
small contingents of German soldiers. The real im-
portance of the movement lay in its sustaining Bul-
garian national morale during 1941-44, in its giving
the Communists political links with the other par-
ties which they were to exploit most successfully in.
1944-47, and in influencing the Bulgarian Communist
Party's (BCP) course of development many years later.
Three particular aspects of the Communists' wartime
partisan activity were to be of special significance
for future developments in the BCP: the way their
movement was organized, its relations with Tito's
Yugoslav partisans; and the nature of its political
indoctrination program.
The Organization of the Partisan Movement
Although the first Communist partisans unit was
formed at Razlog in July 1941, nearly 21 months
passed before the Communists established a, nation-
wide partisan organization with a central headquar-
ters in the Sofia area. Several major problems ac-
counted for this delay. The police forces of the
pro-German Bulgarian Government were extremely ef-
fective; the Allies were deeply committed in crucial
areas of conflict far from Bulgaria and were not
able to provide assistance; German victories brought
on a spurious economic revival in Bulgaria. which
prompted the people to give scant cooperation to the
partisans; and the Bulgarian political scene was a
highly complex one in which Bulgaria's many non-Com-
munist political parties found it difficult enough
to cooperate with each other let alone with such a
radical and unpopular group as the Communists.
During the latter part of 1941, as a result of
having received directions from party boss. Georgi
Dimitrov, the Communist Party's central committee in
Bulgaria established a Central Military Commission.
This commission, headed by Tsvyatko Radoynov from
its inception until his execution by the pro-Nazi
government on 25 April 1942, was responsible for es-
tablishing an underground militarized resistance or-
ganization. That nationalist feeling was already of
some importance in the party is suggested by the
subsequent history of certain leaders prominent at
that time. One of Radoynov's closest associates was
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Anton Yugov, chief' of the central committee's mili-
tary department during much of the war and in 1962
ousted from the premiership of Bulgaria, presumably
because he posed a threat to Zhivkov's leadership
of the party. Even more prominent in the early
partisan movement was Traicho Kostov, leader of the
Communist Party in Bulgaria until his arrest by the
government in 1942, who in 1949 was attacked by
"Muscovite" Communists as a "Titoist" and executed
for "nationalist deviations."
By April 1942, the Central Military Commission
had prepared a training manual which provided gen-
eral guidelines for operating partisan warfare un-
der conditions in Bulgaria and for conducting com-
prehensive programs in political indoctrination. By
early 1943 a competent cadre of partisan leaders--
overwhelmingly Communist in political outlook--had
been developed, and during March and Aprila general
staff was established at the People's Liberation
Revolutionary Army (NOVA) headquarters in Sofia. The
country was divided into 12 revolutionary opera=
tional zones (vustanicheski operativni zoni--VOZ),
each with its own military staff, but tightly con-
trolled through a system of party committees and
political commissars. (See Annex III, a map of the
12 VOZ divisions, and Annex IV, a list of command
personnel in each zone.)
Unlike their Communist Yugoslav counterparts
who were uniformly organized along military lines,
Bulgarian partisan units did not maintain an or-
ganizational structure within a VOZ that was con-
sistent throughout the country. The following or-
ganizational structure was generally observed
within each VOZ: in descending order of importance,
Bulgarian partisan units were designated brigades
(brigada), battalions (otryad), detachments (cheta),
and independent units.
Independent units varied widely in personnel
strength depending on the terrain in which they op-
erated and their assigned functions. Detachments
conventionally comprised from 20 to 50 men each. A
battalion generally included two or more detach-
ments, but some battalions had fewer personnel than
some detachments. A brigade usually consisted of
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two or more battalions; no brigade is known to have
exceeded 400 personnel, The first brigade was formed
on 25 April 1944. Designated the "Chavdar" brigade,
it was at one time commanded by Todor Zhivkov, the
present party chief and Premier of Bulgaria.
Most partisan units were named after Bulgarian
revolutionary heroes, mainly Communists. Some units,
however, bore designations reflecting the regions
in which they operated., (See Annex V for a list of
brigades and battalions for each revolutionary op-
erational zone.)
As the national partisan movement grew, it de-
veloped leaders not merely for the wartime struggle,
but also for the postwar period. Those who were
partisan leaders in early 1943 and likewise leading
figures in the postwar Bulgarian Communist Party,
with the rank of central committee member or higher,
included: Todor Zhivkov, Anton Yugov, Georgi Chankov,
Georgi Tsankov, Slavcho Trunski, Dobri Terpeshev,
Yanko Panov, Ivan Buchvarov, Boris Taskov, Ivan
Todorov-Gorunya, Dobri Dzhurov, Dimo Dichev, Pencho
Kubadinski, and Diko Dikov.
Cooperation With Yugoslav Partisans
At least five battalions of Bulgarian partisans
were formed on Yugoslav soil, and they engaged in
operations in both Tygoslavia and Bulgaria. The
first such battalion was composed of deserters from
the Bulgarian Army and was called the "International,"
because it also contained some Yugoslavs and Poles.
Shteryu Atanasov, at one time the BCP's representa-
tive in Yugoslavia, led the "International" and was
assisted by several aides from the BCP's :Foreign
Bureau. The other four Bulgarian partisan battalions
formed in Yugoslavia were the "soldiers' 'Battalion,"
"Sava Rakovski,," "Dimitur Blagoyev," and 'Vasil
Kolarov."
In 1941, after the Soviet Union had been at-
tacked, the leadership of the BCP sought to estab-
lish close ties with, the peoples of Greece and Yugo-
slavia. Links were eventually established with
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partisans in both countries, but those with the
Greeks proved largely ineffectual. Relations with
Tito's Yugoslav partisans, on the other hand, en-
joyed an initial advantage by virtue of the Commu-
nist orientation of Tito's partisans (the Greek par-
tisans were predominantly anti-Communist) and be-
cause a large portion of the Yugoslav populace spoke
a south Slavic language akin to Bulgarian. Bulgarian
partisans reportedly had little if any contact with
Yugoslav guerrillas under General Mikhajlovic.
When the Allies decided in the summer of 1943
that the Bulgarian partisans were of value to the
Allied war effort and deserving of material help,
British liaison officers were sent to Yugoslav and
Greek units in Serbia and Thrace, respectively, with
instructions to contact the Bulgarians. The Serbian
base turned out to be by far the more important.
Thereafter, those Yugoslav partisans that were under
the command of Tito greatly assisted Bulgarian units
operating along their frontiers and served as a sup-
ply line by which the Bulgarians received British
and American aid.
Because the BCP attached special importance to
building military cooperation between Bulgarian and
Yugoslav partisan units, the party central committee
sent representatives to Macedonia and Yugoslavia.
One such representative was Boyan Bulgaranov (now a
member of the BCP Politburo), who was on the general
staff of the Macedonian Peoples' Liberation Troops
from sometime in 1942 until the beginning of 1944.
These groups operated in an area contiguous to that
of the "Gavril Genov" Battalion, in which a number
of leading Communists as well as the leaders of the
conspiracy of April 1965 served.
The Trunski Battalion (named after a Bulgarian
region and from which the battalion commander, Slav-
cho Trunski, took his name) was the main means of
creating a bond of military camaraderie between Bul-
garian and:Yugoslav partisans, and the association
seems to have had lasting significance. General
Trunski himself is now chief of the Bulgarian Air
Force and a central committee member, and available
evidence strongly suggests he was involved in the
antiregime conspiracy of April 1965 despite government
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denials of his complicity. Previously linked to an
opposition group in March 1961, Trunski a.iso was
required to write a self-criticism paper in 1958.
In addition, Trunski spent 1951 in prison for "Kos-
tovite (i.e.,.nationalist) revisionism" and was "out
of favor" in party circles until 1954.
Official regime sources also list other Bulgar.-o
ian partisans as having had very close connections
with Yugoslav partisans. Characterizing the follow-
ing Bulgarians as "our well known professional rev-
olutionaries," one regime writer describes Vlado
Trichkov, Yordanka Chankova, Georgi Chankov, Georgi
Avramov, Nacho Ivanov, Gocho Gopin, and Dimo Dichev
as having served extensively with Bulgarian parti-
sans in Yugoslavia.
Under the combined. auspices of the Communist
Party and the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front,
political indoctrination of partisan units was per-
vasive and continuous. The training manual for
partisan units contained a long subsection on po-
litical indoctrination entitled "Duties, Training,
Tactics, and Methods and Means."
The principal document dealing with political
indoctrination was, however, a directive of the Na-
tional Liberation Revolutionary Army (NOVA) General
Staff issued on 27 November 1943 and entitled "The
Character, Organization, and Tasks of the NOVA."
The following extract from that directive is partic-
ularly illustrative: "Besides military training,
political and cultural enlightenment activities will
be organized in all partisan units. Political train-
ing must put forward a unified world outlook cor-
responding to the programs and tasks of the Father-
land Front."
Although such training had a strong pro-Soviet
bias, most Communist partisans adhered more strongly
to their self-taught version of Marxist-Leninist
doctrine and emphasized. doctrinal ideals which they
intended to adapt to postwar Bulgaria's problems.
The USSR tried to keep closer control on develop-
ments by returning 55 "Muscovite" Communists to
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Bulgaria from the Soviet Union in the latter part
of 1941 to provide political indoctrination and mil-
itary training to the fledgling partisan groups.
Parachuted into Bulgaria in two groups, these "Mus-
covites" were almost immediately apprehended by
Bulgarian governmental forces. Their capture. de-
stroyed the single most potentially effective in-
strument for ensuring a thorough pro-Soviet indoc-
trination of Bulgaria's Communist partisans by Mos-
cow.
The most important political indoctrination
meetings were presided over by Communist political
commissars or by party central committee represen-
tatives, many of whom in the postwar era have been
reported by clandestine sources to harbor an essen-
tially nationalist outlook. Persons who served in
this capacity during the war and who have since
achieved party central committee membership or
higher are Boyan Bulgaranov, Slavcho Trunski, and
Dimo Dichev, who have been mentioned previously,
and the late Titko Chernokolev. The late Dimitur
Ganov (politburo member and titular chief of state)
is the only member of this group known to have held
strong pro-Soviet views.
There were still other means of political indoc-
trination. The command staff of each revolutionary
operating zone included a political commissar. The
partisans printed and distributed pamphlets, bulle-
tins, and newspapers. There was individual and col-
lective reading of books and newspapers. Also avail-
able were lectures and reports, and broadcasts from
the Russian clandestine station, "Khristo Botev."
Political indoctrination of younger partisans
was carried on through the Workers' Youth Union
(RMS), a forerunner of the present Dimitrov Commu-
nist Youth Union. RMS chapters were established in
all partisan units and were explicitly designed "to
instruct young partisans in the spirit of the Bul-
garian Workers Party." The present Dimitrov Commu-
nist Youth Union (DEMS), a Communist Youth organiza-
tion, stems from the wartime RMS.
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III. POSTWAR BULGARIAN COMMUNISM
The Immediate Postwar Era
After the defeat and overthrow of Bulgaria's
pro-German government on 9 September 1944 by Bul-
garian partisans and the Red Army through the Fa-
therland Front, the Communists turned their atten-
tion to the task of consolidating their position in
the new "Fatherland Front" government. The Front's
initial program called for waging a "decisive strug-
gle" against anti-Front elements (i.e., anti-Commu-
nist figures) in the Fatherland Front parties, and
by 1947 the "Muscovite" Communists and the "nativ-
ists" (i.e., those who had remained in Bulgaria dur-
ing World War II) had together established the Com-
munist Party as the supreme political power in the
country. Anti-Communist elements remaining in the
government were thrown out, and the important Fifth
Party Congress was convened in Sofia in December
1948.
The probable principal reason for holding the
congress in 1948 was the need to define more clearly
the new orthodoxy required by the USSR as a result
of the Tito-Cominform break in June 1948. Inasmuch
as the Cominform's resolution expelling Tito sug-
gested only negatively the theory underlying a "peo-
ple's democracy," it was left to Bulgarian party
chief, Georgi Dimitrov, to give added weight to the
concept of the Cominform as a group of "equal broth-
erly parties."
How strongly the "Muscovite" Communists by then
dominated the "nativists" was indicated by the posi-
tion Dimitrov took on nationalism at that time. Di-
mitrov was undoubtedly the greatest figure among
postwar Bulgarian Communists and had achieved inter-
national stature as well because of his widely pub-
licized defiance. of the Nazis in the Reichstag fire
trial in 1933. Be had himself issued a statement
earlier in 1948 favoring the creation of a Balkan
federation with Yugoslavia. This statement, however,
had been violently attacked in Pravda--reportedly on
the explicit instructions of Stain--and he now made
the following statement to the December party don-
gress:
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Nationalism is incompatible with 'the peo-
ple's democracy. Nationalism, no matter
behind what mask, is an enemy of Communism.
This was clearly manifested by the anti-
Communist actions of Tito's group in Yugo-
slavia. Hence, combating nationalism is a
primary duty of Communists.
Dimitrov's warning was a portent of the campaign to
be waged within the ranks of the party against a
potential Bulgarian Tito, Deputy Premier Traicho
Kostov, who apparently had begun to question Moscoi"s
dictates. A long-time Communist of the nativist
school, Kostov was second only to Dimitrov in the
post World War II party hierarchy. Dimitrov's warn-
ing also was a harbinger of the party's coming cam-
paign against all nativist Communists, a campaign
that would strike particularly hard at the exparti-
s ans .
Before the fifth party congress, the Moscow-
trained wing of the Bulgarian party knew of Kostov:s
deviations from Communist orthodoxy, but it was not
until 18 January 1949, at a politburo meeting, that
the party formally accused him of an anti-Soviet at-
titude. Following a party central committee declara-
tion, Kostov was gradually stripped of his party and
governmental functions. Finally, on 20 July 1949,
shortly after the death of Dimitrov, the Bulgarian
People's Assembly voted to have Kostov indicted for
"economic sabotage." In December 1949, he was tried,
condemned, and executed by Bulgarian authorities but,
a firm nationalist to the end, he would not admit to
being guilty of anything at his trial.
Kostov's position in the party, although not
overshadowing that of Iimitrov, had been strong.
Since 1925, he had been the de facto leader of the
party within Bulgaria. He had personally erected the
party structure and grafted it to the governmental
machinery after the "liberation" in September 1944,
thus retaining an important measure of control over
the party's rank and file. The number of persons who
owed their positions to Kostov is suggested by the
fact that between 1944 and 1948 12,000 party members
became "the important cogwheels of our state appara-
tus," according to Iimitrov's statement at the Fifth
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Party Congress. Of this number, 3,533 were assigned
to the People's Army, 2,000 to the Ministry of In-
terior, 1,101 to the Ministry of Industry, and 5,366
to other governmental agencies. A very large pro-
portion of these positions were filled by prewar
Communist intellectual followers of Kostov and by
ex-partisans, almost all of whom maintained a na-
tionalist outlook.
Prior to Kostov's trial, the greatest emphasis
had been placed on purging politicians in other par-
ties who opposed Communism or who thought they could
cooperate with the Communists while maintaining
their integrity. After the Kostov trial, however,
the Communists began a large-scale purge of the Com-
munist Party. Designed to eliminate those members
with nationalist tendencies, the purge included some
of the lowest party members as well as some of the
very top members of the party's hierarchy. Apart
from Kostov, nearly a dozen ministers, deputy minis-
ters, and generals as well as a large number of re-
gional party secretaries, lower army officers, and
police chiefs were involved by purging these last
three categories, the "Muscovites" also purged a very
large proportion of ex-partisans from the party-state
apparatus. According to published BCP sources, more
than 92,500 members of the Bulgarian party had been
expelled by June 1950.
Thus, by the early 1950s, the idealistic aspi-
rations of most Communist intellectuals and ex-par-
tisans for transforming postwar Bulgaria into a mod-
ern state by using the "scientific methods" of Com-
munism had been crushed. Moreover, their drive for
political hegemony over the "Muscovite" Communists
had been decisively defeated.
This purge of the ex-partisans turned out, how-
ever, to be not a permanent defeat but rather a post-
ponement of their progress toward the positions of
power which many ex-partisans in other East European
countries had attained in the immediate postwar pe-
riod. For example, the three ringleaders of the
antiregime conspiracy of April 1965 had been among
those purged some 15 years earlier as "Titoists" and
deviationists, but all three, along with many others,
had been rehabilitated by the end of 1956.
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Partisan's Influence in the Postwar Army
Although most of Bulgaria's "nativist" Commu-
nists did not :face the full onslaught of the "Mus-
covites" until the early 1950s, those ex-partisans
who entered the ranks of the Bulgarian Army in the
immediate postwar era were among the first to ex-
perience the militant aggressiveness of the return-
ing "Muscovites." Sovietization of the army began
shortly after September 1944 and continued until
early 1956 when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. Dur-
ing the period, Soviet--trained Bulgarian officers
replaced not only the "bourgeois-republican" offi-
cers who had initially been prepared to support the
postwar government, but also many of the Communist
partisan commanders who had distinguished them-
selves during the war. Although this process took
a particularly heavy toll among -those ex-partisan
military officers who held field grade rank and
above in the Bulgarian Army, many company grade of-
ficers also were replaced.
From 1960 until early in 1965, however, it be-
came quite noticeable that the remaining ex-parti-
sans were at last beginning to come into their own
in the Bulgarian Army. Quietly but steadily, they
were appointed to replace the older Soviet-trained
commanders in most of Bulgaria's important military
posts. This development may have simply reflected.
the fact that the prewar Frunze Academy graduates
were reaching retirement age and that the only
competent replacements for them were the ex-parti-
sans, most of whom were in their early fifties or
even younger, but there might also have been a po-
litical reason for that. trend.
Bulgarian party chief Todor Zhivkov had never
really consolidated his position in the party.
Without a safe bloc of support within the party,
he may have sought to buttress his position by
creating a coterie of army commanders whom he be-
lieved loyal to himself and above the vicissitudes
of party factionalism. In this respect, Zhivkov,
like some previous Bulgarian leaders, sought to use
the special positioncof the Bulgarian military in
the nation's history as the domestic guarantor of
his shaky position. In:addit'ion,.as a former partisan
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commander himself, Zhivkov may have believed that
this similarity of backgrounds and experience cou-
pled with his bringing the ex-partisans out of
their long period of political and personal obscu-
rity would assure him of their devotion. If this
assumption is true, however, Zhivkov took a grave
gamble supported neither by Bulgarian history nor
by the experience of most political leaders who
have created a body of Janissaries for future loy-
alty in return for present favors. Moreover, in
Bulgaria, there is a particularly strong political
reason why these ex-partisans should feel no obli-
gation toward Zhivkov as their benefactor.
Repeated reports as well as overt evidence of
factionalism, such as the conspiracy of April 1965,
indicate that Zhivkov is generally considered by
the "nationalist" as well as by some other segments
of the Bulgarian party to have "sold out" the war-
time resistance movement's ideals. In this connec-
tion, although Zhivkov is a home-trained Communist,
he also is a singularly impressive exception to the
concept that domestically trained Communists must
necessarily be less pro-Soviet than those who have
been schooled and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union.
Few, if any, "Muscovites" in the darkest days of
Stalinism were ever as obedient to Moscow as Zhiv-
kov. Moreover, during a period when virtually every
other Eastern European Communist country has sought
some loosening of the bonds with Moscow, Zhivkov
has until very recently seemed intent--for whatever
reasons--on making Bulgaria into a caricature of a
provincial backwater of the Soviet Union,
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IV. FACTIONALISM IN THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
With the struggle against the "Titoists,"
serious factionalism emerged in the Bulgarian re-
gime, Three major groupings--Stalinists, the party
neutrals, and nationalists--have come into being as
the party passed through three major periods: 1947
to 1950, 1950 to 1956, and 1.956 to the present.
Each of these periods has primarily reflected in-
ternal party dissension with respect to the nature
of the relationship between the BCP and the Soviet
party.
In the first postwar phase, the struggle was
the classic one between the "nativist" Communists
and the "Muscovites." As has been previously noted,
Traicho Kostov, the "nativist" leader, was executed
in 1949 and his supporters, among whom were many of
the now rehabilitated ex-partisan commanders, were
either imprisoned or intimidated.
The second postwar phase cannot so readily be
characterized as one of active factionalism, though
there were factions, as it can be regarded a period
of near absolute control by the Stalinist wing of
the party. Vulko Chervenkov, the Sovietized brother-
in-law of Georgi Dimitrov, became Bulgaria's "little
Stalin" and concentrated all power in his hands.
Initially holding both the posts of premier and
party first secretary, Chervenkov, as a result of
his Stalinist past, gave up the latter in March
1954 during the campaign against the personality
cult following Stalin's death, In retrospect this
was the beginning of the end for Chervenkov. In
giving up the position of party chief to Todor Zhiv-
kov, then barely over 40 years of age and a..Cherven-
kov proteg6, however, Chervenkov at the time remained
easily the most powerful political figure in the
country because he had packed the party hierarchy
with his Stalinist supporters, A period of relative
party calm prevailed until early 1956.
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February
1956 soon made Chervenkov's position untenable. At
the famous April 1956 Bulgarian party plenum, Cher-
venkov was ousted from the premiership and replaced
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by the ex-partisan Anton Yugov, who as a :former as-
sociate of Traicho Kostov had seen his career go
into eclipse after 1950 and who also was one of
Chervenkov's bitterest enemies.
In the years after 1956, Zhivkov moved, with
the aid of Khrushchev and his own personal patron-
age, to strengthen his position and to eliminate
one rival after another. He 'had former first deputy
premier Chankov dismissed in 1957; in the wake of
the 22nd Soviet party congress, he had Chervenkov
expelled from the Bulgarian party's central commit-
tee; and at the BCP's eighth party congress in
November 1962, Premier Yugov was dramatically re-
moved from office and disgraced, allegedly for
"Stalinist excesses and factional activity."
Despite his apparent success in eliminating
his main rivals, Zhivkov then as now could not count
on party loyalty. The middle and lower levels of
party officials were not reconciled either to him
or to his policies, and. he also could not count on
the implicit loyalty of the top party levels, even
though most were appointed by him. The stage was
set for a reemergence of the old factionalism but
with new dimensions, particularly in the "national-
ist/reformist" wing of the party. At the same
time, the factional parts were once again set
against one another with no one man being powerful
enough to stamp his authority on the whole. Broadly
speaking, three main groupings exist today: The
Stalinist Chervenkovist faction, a large middle
group of neutral party members, and the national-
ist/reformist faction.
All of these groupings have this much in com-
mon: each questions the regime's present relation-
ship to the Soviet Union and either implicitly or
explicitly distrusts Zhivkov's leadership as well
as the present leadership of the Soviet Union. At
the same time, however, each grouping supports the
leading role of the BCP in any future Bulgarian
government.
The Stalinist Chervenkovist Faction
This is reportedly the smallest of the three
major party groupings, although its present size
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not known. A small percentage of its membership
reportedly consists of ex-partisans. In addition,
because Stalinism and China currently are in dis-
repute within the BCP, few members of this faction
openly acknowledge adherence to it. Although pro-
Soviet by inclination, the members of this faction
were completely out of sympathy with Khrushchev and
his reformism. They also view the present Soviet
leadership with considerable caution. They al-
legedly regard Zhivkov's leadership as a temporary
"deviation." Most members of this faction are cur-
rently in lesser positions in the party-state com-
plex, but some "Stalinists" are entrenched in the
party hierarchy, principally in the central commit-
tee where they customarily oppose not only Zhivkov
but also the nationalist/reformists.
The term neutralist is used for convenience
and refers only to the neutrality of a large segment
of the BCP's rank and file membership with respect
to the issue of the Stalinists versus the national-
ists. Although loosely knit, this group probably
constitutes the largest segment of the party.
One source reports that the neutralists in-
clude the "real proletariat" of the BCP--some
100,000 factory, agricultural, governmental, and
office workers who are rather vague on ideological
issues. Most neutralists have advanced educations
or technical training, but they systematically re-
sist party indoctrination and party work in favor
of concentrating on the benefits the regime can
provide for their daily lives and careers. Their
principal complaint concerning Zhivkov is the poor
economic status of the country. At present this
group is a passive supporter of the regime and ap-
pears to have only slight political influence and
ambition. It is expected that with the introduc-
tion of the new economic system and the concomitant
expanded need for technical specialists, this group's
political awareness will markedly increase.
The Nationalist Reformist Faction
This has traditionally been a large, but ill-
defined group. Recent reports indicate, however,
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that its cohesiveness is increasing. Its member-
ship reportedly consists principally of ex-partisans,
followers of the late Traicho Kostov, and former
political prisoners who were imprisoned by the "Mus--
covites" in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The group's increasing cohesiveness allegedly
stems not only from its common tribulations at the
hands of the "Muscovites" but also from its claim
to having some of the best educated Communists and
the best prepared ideological cadres. In addition,
one source indicates. that within the ex-partisan
element of this faction, there is a hard core cadre of
about 1,000 decisive and experienced men who are
capable of revolutionary political action,. and who,
though not formally organized, trust each other and
frequently exchange views. The April 1965 conspira-
tors came from this group. Central committee mem-
ber and chief of the Bulgarian Air Force, Col. Gen.
Trunski, also is a prominent member.
Nationalist members of this faction are angered
by Zhivkov's servility to the Soviet Union at a time
when almost every other Communist East European
country has gained added independence from Moscow.
The reformists are impatient with the snail-like
progress of political and economic reforms, even
though their agitation for Bulgaria's new system
of economic management allegedly resulted in the
new system's acceptance by the regime.
Whatever their precise attitude toward Zhivkov
at the moment , it is in any case clear that many ex-
partisans and "Kostovites" have now reached posi-
tions in the party-state complex from which they
can effectively influence changes in regime poli-
cies. As noted earlier, ex-partisans alone account
for 46 of 101 members of the central committee; 12
of the 66 candidate central committee members; 6 of
the 11-member politburo; 4 of the 7-member national
secretariat; and at least 48 of the 416 members in
the National Assembly. In the national governmental
apparatus, 17 of the 33 ministerial level positions
are currently held by ex-partisans.
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V. THE ANTI-REGIME CONSPIRACY OF APRIL 1965
The anti-regime conspiracy which Bulgarian and
Soviet authorities uncovered and squelched in April
1965 was led exclusively by dissident party members
having a "nationalist" outlook. It allegedly in-
tended to seize power through force of arms. Despite
the gravity of their actions, the conspirators re-
ceived relatively short prison terms.
The plot was allegedly planned exclusively by
Communist military figures or by Communists with a
military background, several of whom served in the
same Communist partisan unit--the Gavril.Genov bat-
talion--during World War II, One of the'three ring-
leaders. Ivan Todorov-Gorunya, a central committee
member and ex-partisan from the Vratsa area, appar-
ently was killed resisting arrest. Major General
Tsvetko Anev, commandant of the Sofia garrison, and
Tsolo Krustev, a former commander of Vratsa parti-
sans, were the remaining two identified ringleaders.
Among the seven others publicly implicated in the
plot were three individuals of general officer rank,
two lesser officers, and two civilians.
Although information on the plot is both contra-
dictory and fragmentary, the conspirators apparently
intended to take over key points in Sofia in mid-
April when a plenum of the BCP's central committee
was in session. The goal of the conspirators was to
persuade the plenum to adopt a more liberal political
and economic line on the Yugoslav pattern. Force
was to be used only if the central committee refused
to make the desired changes.
The conspiracy of April 1965 resembled in sev-
eral important respects the so-called "generals.
plot"'in early 1961 which was also aimed at Zhivkov.
In 1961,,as in 1965, there were rumblings of very
serious discontent inside the Bulgarian party. At
the core of the dissension in 1961 were former gen-
erals Dobri Terpeshev and Yonko Panov, who along
with former first deputy premier Georgi Chankov had
been expelled from the central committee in 1957.
Terpeshev and Panov along with Nikola Kufardzhiev,
a confederate, were former partisans. Bulgaria's
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foremost wartime partisan, Col. Gen. Slaveho Trunski,
also was implicated in the 1961 conspiracy.
Terpeshev and Panov were men of similar background
and'outlook to Todor,ov-Gorunya and General. Anev, and.
in neither the 1961 nor the 1965 case is it difficult
to identify Yugoslavia as the model which the conspira-
tors wanted Bulgaria to follow.
Although the regime squelched the conspiracy on.
the night of 6-7 April, the leadership seems to have
had some problem in deciding how and when to disclose
the conspirators' arrest. The first news of the
conspiracy reached the West on 8 April from a Bul-
garian citizen who was a minor employee in the For-
eign Office and. a stringer for a Western press ser-
vice. Although it is most unlikely that he could
have wired his report without the regime's knowledge,
the regime did not take public note of that or sub-,
sequent coup reports until 22 April, In the period
8 to 22 April, however, the regime acted to inform
party organizations of the conspiracy. According to
Western diplomatic sources in Sofia, a Bulgarian
party ideologist spoke of the plotters' activities
to a party central committee plenum on 14 April and
to a small select group of party leaders on 15 April.
Furthermore, most of the leading party figures--includ-
ing Zhivkov--addressed local party meetings in the im-
mediate wake of the regime crackdown.
When the regime did publicly disclose the arrest
of the plotters on 22 April, it denied that any
threat; to the "public order" or the "regime's sta-
bility" had been involved, and characterized the plot
as "pro-Chinese." This label, which has meager sup-
port in the BCP:, served as a convenient instrument
with which to mitigate the obvious anti-Soviet as-
pects of the conspiracy. As in the 1961 case, the
discovery of the conspiratorial group was almost im-
mediately followed by loud protestations from Zhivkov
of fealty to the USSR and its Communist Party.
A secret military tribunal in June 1965 passed
surprisingly mild sentences--ranging from three to
fifteen years--on the conspirators. Other Bulgarian
court actions in recent years have decreed. the
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death penalty for alleged embezzlement and sentences
of five years imprisonment for telling political
jokes.
The lightness of the conspirators' sentences
and the protracted appeal that the regime has made
to the army for its loyalty since the April con-
spiracy was uncovered raise an interesting specula-
tive point. Although several of the conspirators
held positions of some power, none would appear to
have had sufficient prestige or power in either the
party or state apparatus to rally widespread support
against Zhivkov. If they were part of a much more
broadly-based political opposition with perhaps
sympathizers close to Zhivkov, however, their chances
of
success would have been significantly enhanced.
The
reported strong ex-partisan and military charac-
ter
of
the conspiracy might well cause the regime
to
move
with circumspection against the conspirators
and
to
seek actively the loyalty of the military.
Zhivkov, in his attempts to consolidate his politi-
cal leadership, has largely surrounded himself with
ex-partisan and military individuals, who might at
some time offer strong opposition if seriously pro-
voked.
The unsuccessful conspiracy apparently has,
nevertheless, had several important repercussions
in the organization and leadership of the Bulgarian
military, security, and party-state control apparatus.
The establishment of a military department in the
central committee apparatus probably reflects the
fact that two generals in the conspiracy were closely
associated with efforts to maintain political control
over the military. In addition, the Ministry of
Internal Affairs was reorganized, although Minister
Dikov--a prominent: ex-partisan but also one who has
"sold out" to Moscow--was retained. The Committee
for State Security was removed from the Interior
Ministry and subsequently elevated to ministerial
level in March 1966. A '.number of political and
security officials were included in the list of gen-
eral officers promoted in September 1965, but signifi-
cantly none is known to have been a partisan. Finally,
there has been a reshuffling of party responsibilities
assigned to politburo members Boris Velchev and ex-
partisan Boyan Bulgaranov.
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Some of these changes may well have reflected
Zhivkov's awareness that historically the Bulgarian
army has been an active, and sometimes a decisive
factor in Bulgarian politics. Although not a mili-
taristic nation, the Bulgarians have accorded their
army a special and honored status among national in-
stitutions. This, and the army's own awareness that
it is often the most stable national element, has
led the army to intervene in political affairs sev-
eral times since the country's liberation from the
Turks in 1878. Moreover, Zhivkov cannot have for-
gotten that in the most recent instance of military
intervention, 9 September 1944, it was the Bulgarian.
Communist partisans, a Communist-infiltrated Bul-
garian army, and the 'Soviet Red Army which over-
threw the pro-German government. Inasmuch as the
present Bulgarian officer corps--particularly the
general officer ranks--includes so many ex-partisans
and in view pf the strong military character of the
April conspiracy, Zhivkov can be expected to face
increasing difficulties in maintaining his never
overly secure position.
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VI. THE ZHIVKOV DILEMMA
Although party chief Zhivkov has always ulti-
mately had support from Moscow in maintaining his
position, he has evidently attempted also to keep
in balance the influence of the remaining Stalinists
in the Bulgarian party and the nationalist/reformist
faction which has pressed for liberalization of cer-
tain aspects of the nation's political and economic
life. To achieve this balance, however, Zhivkov
has been unable to bolster his own weak position and
has had to settle for a coalition type party and
government. The regime's policy actions and reac-
tions, therefore, have come to reflect more the ebb
and flow in power between the Stalinists and nation-
alists than any ability of Zhivkov to control and
direct national and party affairs.
Although insufficient information is available
to judge accurately the over-all and specific influ-
ence of the nationalist/reformist faction, several
recent Bulgarian developments have been most unchar-
acteristic of the Zhivkov regime and suggest a basis
for speculation about the increasing power'of the
faction and the threat this may pose for Zhivkov.
Bulgaria's long-held conservative foreign and
domestic policies, for example, appear to have been
under intensive study by the regime during the fall
of 1965, and there have been indications that some
liberalizing revisions were made. Moreover, in a
dramatic speech to the National Assembly on 8 Decem-
ber 1965, Zhivkov pledged to employ all means "to
develop economic and cultural relations with all
countries and peoples on the basis of equality, mu-
tual advantage, and noninterference in domestic of-,
fairs."
Zhivkov's surprising use of this "Rumanian-
style" policy formulation probably reflected the So-
fia leadership's intention to alter its foreign pol-
icy to further its own national interests. Some
signs of this have already appeared in recent'reports
of Bulgarian political and economic overtures to the
West. Thus, late in 1965, Sofia made its first re-
quest to the UN for technical aid, with an expressed
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preference for US technicians. This initiative
closely followed Sofia's proposal to send a construc-
tion delegation to the US, its request for a US del-
egation of electric power specialists, and its re-
newed interest in negotiating a consular agreement
with Washington. Since the summer of 1965 Bulgaria
also stepped up its campaign for better economic and
cultural ties with Western Europe and its non-Commu?-
nist Balkan neighbors.
Zhivkov evidently concluded from observing his
Yugoslav and Rumanian neighbors that he could safely
and profitably expand contacts with the West as well
as with other non-Communist areas without basically
altering the support Moscow gives his regime. Never
a dynamic. nor imaginative leader, Zhivkov presumably
hoped to satisfy both political wings in his party
by indicating to the nationalists anew maneuverabil.-
ity in foreign relations, and to the Stalinists that
this is possibly without breaking the traditional
and comfortable support: from Moscow.
If this has been Zhivkov's goal, however, it
would almost certainly be doomed to failure.. Although
the moves Zhivkov has taken thus far are somewhat
surprising for Bulgaria, his extremely cautious ap-
proach to the over-a.tl problem of domestic and for-
eign policies has probably not bolstered hisposition.
with either the nationalists or the Stalinists. In
fact, this approach might encourage the nationalists
to step up their pressure while the Stalinists' poor
opinion of Zhivkov will only be reinforced.
Zhivkov's dilemma also was reflected in his de-
cision in March 1966 to retain the premiership, de-
spite numerous reports---including-Zhivkov's inter-
views with visiting journalists--to the contrary. It
seems probable that Zhivkov kept the premiership,
because in the face of party factionalism, he feared
the further eroding effect his resignation would
have on his insecure control of the BCP. Although
Zhivkov has only occasionally displayed bursts of
political acumen, he undoubtedly recognizes that re-
surgent nationalism in Communist Eastern Europe has
not gone unnoticed in the Bulgarian party. Given
this political fact of life along with the strong
nationalist faction in the BCP, Zhivkov also must
realize that his successor as premier probably will
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be more nationalistically inclined than he is and
will not be encumbered by Zhivkov's poor record. If
this is the case, his retention of the premiership
has offered no relief to the nationalist faction.
Under these circumstances, it should not be at all
surprising if new nationalist-oriented conspiracies
against the Zhivkov regime come to light.
Whether such plots materialize or not, it is
also likely that Zhivkov will keep trying to ensure
against them by pointing Bulgarian Government pol-
icy in an increasingly nationalist direction. The
ten cabinet level. visits which Bulgaria exchanged
with Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece between mid-
February and late May 1966 seem to be positive--if
still minor--moves in a nationalist direction.
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ANNEX J.
The Gavril Genov Battalion
The Gavril Genov Battalion is of special inter-
est because the three known members of the April
1965 antiregime conspiracy were at one time the bat-
talion's principal officers. Formed in the spring
of 1943, the Gavril Genov Battalion operated in
Vratsa district and frequently in Yugoslavia as a
component of the Twelfth Revolutionary Operational
Zone. Because the battalion often fought alongside
Tito's partisans, the battalion's veterans were sub-
sequently considered politically suspect by postwar
Bulgarian Communist Party leaders.
After the initiation of war between the Soviet
Union and Germany in 1941, the pro-German Bulgarian
Government attempted to apprehend all leading Commu-
nists in the country; it also rounded-up several
BCP district committees, including the Vratsa party
committee. Ivan Todorov-Gorunya (one of the plotters
in the April 1965 coup attempt) was the only Vratsa
committee member to escape. By the end of 1941,
however, the party central committee sanctioned the
formation of a new party committee with party au-
thority even encompassing the territories of Vratsa,
Byala Slatina, and Oryakhovo. Todorov-Gorunya was
named party secretary.
In early 1942, the central committee reinforced
its earlier action by sending several party emissaries
and representatives to assist the newly organized
district committee. Among those individuals were
Diko Dikov, now Minister of Internal Affairs; Dimo
Dichev, present chief of the central committee de-
partment for international relations and foreign
policy; and Dancho Dimitrov, deputy chairman of the
National Assembly's Presidium. Dikov and Dichev sub-
sequently became commander and political commissar,
respectively of the Twelfth Partisan Zone.
By late 1942, the Gavril Genov Battalion's first
detachment was formed, and Todorov-Gorunya was ap-
pointed its political commissar. The battalion's
second partisan detachment was established early in
1943 and, owing to previous shifts in personnel, the
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new detachment"s commahd staff was composed of the
three known participants in the antiregime plot of
April 1965, These officers were Tsolo Krustev,
commander; Todorov-Gorunya, political commissar;
and Tsvetko Anev, deputy commander. Two other de-
tachments also were formed under the Genov Battal-
ion during 1943.
Political activity also increased during 1943,
and in September of that year, the first conference
of the Vratsa District Communist Party committee
met. Attended by 12 delegates and by Dimo Dichev,
the zone's political. commissar, the conference dis-
cussed problems of international and domestic policy,
the development of the partisan movement, and the
objectives of the Fatherland Front. The conference
also chose a new district party committee with
Todorov-Gorunya as secretary, and Tsolo Krustev,
Dancho Dimitrov, Avram Mitev, and Boris Dilkov as
members.
During February 1944, the battalion's third
and fourth detachments were formed, and by May of
that year, the battalion numbered about 120 men, ac-
cording to regime sources. The fifth and sixth de-
tachments of the battalion were not established un-
til June and July 1944, at which time regime sources
indicate the battalion numbered more than 150 parti-
sans.
As the tempo of the war increased and the Red
Army advanced, the district's second Communist Party
conference was held between 8 and 14 May 1944. A
new district party committee was elected consisting
of Tsolo Krustev as secretary and the following mem-
bers: Todorov--Gorunya, Dancho Dimitrov, Avram Mitev,
and Petko Kanchev.
Immediately after the second party conference,
the leadership of the Gavril Genov Battalion was
realigned to conform with its leadership of 1943,
and Tsolo Krustev was reappointed commander; Tsvetko
Anev, deputy commander; and Todorov-Gorunya as polit-
ical commissar, This leadership remained unchanged
until liberation on 9.September 1944.
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ANNEX II
Ex-Partisans Holding National Level Party or Governmental Positions
ANGELOV, Lyubomir Unk Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
ANTANASOV, Grudi 11th Member of the central com-
mittee and Ambassador to
Yugoslavia
AVRAMOV, Luchezar Unk Member of the central commit-
tee and of the Secretariat;
Minister without portfolio;
and member of the National
Assembly
AVRAMOV, Ruben Unk Member of the central commit-
tee; BCP archivist; and,
member of the National As-
sembly
AVRAMOVA, Ekaterina Ist President of the Committee
for Friendship and Cultural
Relations with Foreign
Countries; and, member of
the National Assembly
BALKANDZHIEV, Nikola 2nd Member of the central commit-
tee and of the National As-
sembly
BASHEV, Ivan l.st
BOKOV, Georgi 4th
BONEV, Vladimir Ist
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Minister of Foreign Affairs
Member of the central commit-
tee and the National As-
sembly; chief editor of
the leading BCP newspaper,
Rabotnichesko Delo (Work-
ers Cause
Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee and member
of the National Assembly
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BOZHKOV, Tsvetko 12th Member of the central commit-
'tee; first secretary of the
Vratsa okrug BCP organiza-
tion and former member of
the Gavril Genov battalion;
also member of the National
Assembly
BUCHVAROV, Ivan Col. Gen. 8th Member of the central commit-
tee and Ambassador to East
Germany:
BUDINOV, Ivan Unk Minister of Foreign Trade
BULGARANOV, Boyan lst, 2nd Member of the politburo, sec-
and 10th retariat, and the central
committee, also a member
of the National Assembly
CHOBANOV, Yordan 9th Ministry of Foreign Affairs
official and former perma=nent representative to the
United Nations
DASKALOVA, Svetla
Unk Minister of Justice and mem-
ber of the National As-
sembly
DICHEV, Dimo 12th Member of the central commit-
tee; chief of its Foreign
Policy and International
Relations Department; and,
a member of the National
Assembly
DIKOV, Diko Col. Gen. 12th Member of the central commit-
tee; Minister of Internal
Affairs; and, a member of
the National Assembly
DIMITROV, Atanas 5th* Former member of the central
committee; Chairman of the
Committee for Food Industry
*The asterisk (*) indicates the VOZ with which an
ex-partisan was probably associated.
_32-
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DIMITROV, Dancho 12th Member of the central commit-
tee; former member of the
Gavril Genov battalion; and,
Deputy Chairman of the Na-
tional Assembly's Presidium
DIMOV, Dimitur 6th Candidate member of the Polit-
buro; member of the central
committee; Pres. BCP Con-
tfol Commiss.; and a member
of the National Assembly
DRAGOYCHEVA, Tsola 1st & 2nd Member of the central commit-
tee; deputy chairman of the
Executive Committee of the
Fatherland Front; and, a
member of the National As-
sembly
DZHUROV, Dobri Col. Gen. 1st Member of the central commit-
tee; Minister of National
Defense; former member of
the Chavdar Battalion, and,
a member of the National
Assembly
ELAZAR, David
1st Candidate member (if the cen-
tral committee and chief
of its Department of Agi-
tation and Propaganda; and,
a member of the National
Assembly
GANOVSKI, Sava 11th Member of the central commit-
tee and of the National As-
sembly
GEORGIEV, Zdravko Col. Gen. 1st Member of the central commit-
tee and Deputy Minister of
National Defense
GRASHNOV, Marin Unk Member of the central commit-
tee; Minister of Construc-
tion; and, a member of the
National Assembly
_- 31~
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Present Position
GYUAROV, Stoyan 1st & 2nd Member of the central commit-
tee and Chairman of the
Central Council of Trade
Unions
IGNATOV, Kiril 6th Minister of Public Health and
Social Welfare and a member
of the National Assembly
IVANOV, Petko 12th* Member of the National Assem-
bly
KANCHEV, Petko 12th Chairman of a committee di-
rectly subordinate to the
Council of Ministers; a
former member of the Gavril
Genov Battalion; and, a mem-
ber of the National Assembly
KARAPENEV, Pencho 8th. Member of the central commit-
tee and the National Assem-
bly; also first secretary
of the Gabrovo okrug BCP
organization
KORTSANOV, Gospodin
KOSEV, Kiril
5th. Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee; first sec-
retary of the Khaskovo
okrug BCP organization; and,
a member of the National
Assembly
8th Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee and a member
of the National Assembly
KUBADINSKI, Pencho 9th. Candidate member of the polit-
buro; member of the central
committee; deputy chairman
of the Council of Ministers;
and a member of the National
Assembly
KUNIN, Petko 11th Member of the central commit-
tee and the National Assem-
bly
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MINCHEV, Mincho 6th ,Member of the central commit-
tee and of the National As-
sembly
MISHEV, Misho
NACHEVA, Vera
ORLOVSKI, Khristo
PANAYOTOV, Petur
PAPAZOV, Nacho
PENEV, Blagoy Lt. Gen.
POPOV, Dimitur
PRAKHOV, Todor
lst* Member of the central, commit-
tee; chairman of the Com-
mittee for Labor and Wages;
and, a member of the Na-
tional Assembly
2nd Member of the central commit-
tee and deputy chief of its
Department for Foreign Pol-
icy and International Re-
lations
8th Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee and deputy
chief of its Department of
Transportation and Communi-
cations; and, a member of
the National Assembly
8th Member of the National Assem-
bly
Unk Member of the central commit-
tee, the secretariat, and
the National Assembly
2nd* Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee and Chair-
man of the Main Administra-
tion for Compulsory Labor
Unk Member of the central, commit-
tee; Minister of Finance;
andya member of the National
Assembly
Unk Chairman, central auditing
commission of the BCP, and
a member of the National As-
sembly's Presidium
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PRUMOV, Ivan
2nd
Member of the central commit-
tee, the secretariat, and
the National Assembly
RAYDOVSKI, Vasil
2nd
Member of the central auditing
commission of the BCP; also
a member of the National As-
sembly
SEMERDZHIEV, Atanas
3rd
Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee; Chief of
the Army's General Staff
SEMKOV, Velko
12t;h
Member of the central commit-
tee; first secretary of the
BCP in Vidin okrug; and, a
member of the National As-
sembly
STANOEV, Stoyu 1st; Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee; first sec-
retary of the BCP in Kyus-
tendil okrug; and, a mem-
ber of the National Assem-
bly
STEFANOV, Ninko
SYULEMEZOV, Stoyan
1st & 12th Member of the central commit-
tee; chairman of the Com-
mitee for State Security;
and a member of the Na-
tional Assembly
11th Candidate member of the cen-
tral committee; 'fir:?t deputy
chairman of the State Plan-
ning Committee
TAKOV, Peko llt;h Member of the central commit-
tee; Minister of Internal
Trade; and, a member of the
National Assembly
TARABANOV, Milko Unk Member of the central commit-
tee and Permanent Repre-
sentative to the UN
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Name VOZ
? TODOROV, Stanko 1st Politburo member; member of
the central committee; Bul-
garia?s permanent CEMA rep-
resentative; and, deputy
chairman of the Council of
Ministers
TODOROVA, Rada ].st* Member of the central commit-
tee and of the National As-
sembly
TRUNSKI, Slavcho Col. Gen. lst Member of the central commit-
tee; Commander of the Bul-
garian Air Force; Deputy
Minister of National De-
fense; and, a member of the
National Assembly
TSANEV, Angel Lt. Gen. 2nd Member of the central commit-
tee and chief of its Mili-
tary Department; also a
member of the National As&
sembly
TSOLOV, Tano
VACHKOV, Marin
11th Member of the central commit-
tee; candidate member of
the Politburo; Deputy
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers; and, a member of
the National Assembly
Unk Member of the central commit-
tee; Minister of Transpor-
tation; and, a member of
the National Assembly
VIDINSKI, Radenko 1st Member of the central commit-
tee; chairman of its Con-
struction Department; and,
a member of the National As-
sembly
VRACHEV, Ivan Col. Gen. Unk Member of the central commit-
tee and First Deputy Minis-
ter of National Defense
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VUTOV, Petur 11th Ambassador-designate to the UK
ZHIVKOV, Todor 1st Member of the central commit-
tee; Premier and party First
Secretary; politburo, member;
and, a member of.the Nf.~-
tibnal Assembly
ZHIVKOV, Zhivko Unk Member of the central commit-
tee and the politburo; and,
a member of the National
Assembly
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24
26
44
R U M
A N I A
VI in
4
use
Pleven
'
'~,, Shumen
sa
YUGOS AVIA"'k
r
"'~~
L
l
A n
pYXF~hovi sq b?f. 4
(
a
ovec
h
y ~ t dr
A
Pr+ t Iv?~'w Y
M x!
R
Y
d
'Illl l tl, r - '
.n
q SOFIA ~'
~tb
C
}
fi Yambgl
urgas
44 4,
a
t :, Nis .
s
Zagora
d
azad
0
z Plovdiv
hi
4
42.
~,." i.
awf
K askovo b*Q $ ; x
TURKEY
YUGOSLAVIA
Ty ,
lop
tit"
BULGARIA
PARTISAN ZONES
DURING WORLD WAR II
Limit of Revolutionary
Operational Zone (VOZ)
ti
0 VOZ headquarters
G
R E E C E
i"'
0 20 40 60 Mlles
a
~
0 20 40 60 Kilometers
24
APGF.
\
SEA
6
28
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ANNEX IV
List of Revolutionary Operational Zones (VOZ)
Their Centers, Dates of Establishment, and Principal Officers
I VOZ - Sofia - April 1943
Commander - PERENOVSKI, Toni
Deputy Commander - TRAYKOV, Ivan (until July 1943)
ZHIVKOV, Todor (after July 1943)
Chief of Staff - PEXCHEV, Stoyan
Political Commissar - GESHKOV, Angel
Deputy Political Commissar - DZHUROV, Dobri
II VOZ - Pldvdiv - Spring 1943
Commander - ZHECHEV, Georgi
Deputy Commander - TERZIEV, Vasil
Chief of Staff - IVANOV, Yanko
Political. Commissar - G.ROZGocho
Deputy Political Commissar - KIRKOV, Rayko
III VOZ - Pazardzhi.k - Autumn 1943
Commander - KHRISTOV, Marin D.
IV VOZ - Blagoyevgrad - March 1944
Commander - RADONOV, Krum
Deputy Commander - TRICHKOV, Ivan
Political Commissar - RACHEV, Nikola
Deputy Political Commissar - STOYCHEV, Krustyu
V VOZ - Stara Zagora - December 1943
Commander - CHOCHOOLU, Stoyu
Chief of Staff - DIMITROV, Velko
Political. Commissar - VULEV, Yordan
VI VOZ - Yambol - Spring 1943
Commander - DIMOV, Dimitur
Deputy Commander - KARAKACHANOV, Panayot
Chief of Staff - SYULEMEZOV, Stoyan
Political Commissar - YANET, Nikola
Deputy Political Commissar - CHANKOV, Velko
NOTE: Solid line underscoring indicates full membership in
the Central Committee
Double line underscoring indicates candidates member-
ship in the Central Committee
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VII VOZ - Khaskovo - Spring 1944
Commander* - ARAKLIEV, Ivan G.
Deputy Commander* - GEORGIEV, Yanko
Political Commissar* - KOSTOV, Yancho
Deputy Political Commissar* - SIMEONOV, Stefan
.VIII.VOZ - Gorna Oryakhovitsa - July 1943
Commander - KOPCHEV, Boris and ORLOVSKI, Khristo
Chief of Staff - Raykov, Ivan
Political Commissar - BUCHVAROV, Ivan
IX VOZ - Kolarovgrad - July 1943
Commander - DIMITROV, Grudi A.
Deputy Commander - VIDINSKI, Kiril
Chief of Staff - IVANOV, Ivan Marinov
Political Commissar - RADEV, Todor P.
Deputy Political Commissar - KUBADINSKI, Pencho
X VOZ - Varna - August 1943
Commander - TEOLOV, Lambo
Deputy Commander -- DOBREV, Ivan
Political Commissar ORRACHEV, I)emir
XI VOZ - Pleven - June 1943
Commander - PELOVSKI, Pelo
Chief of Staff - EDREV, Stoyan
Political Commissar - TAKOV, Peko
Deputy Political Commissar - TSVETANOV, Lyuben
XII VOZ - Vratsp. - Spring 1943
Commander - DIKOV, Diko
Deputy Political-Commissar - TASKOV,** Boris
*Tentative
**Removed from Central Committee in November 1962
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Brigades and Battalions by the VOZ to which Attached
VOZ - Sofia
Brigades
First Sofia
Second Sofia
Chavadar
Georgi Dimitrov
Brigades
Vasil Levski
Khristo Botev
Georgi Dimitrov
Vasil Kolarov
Chepinets
First Rodopski
Second Rodopski
III VOZ - Pazardshik
Brigades
Georgi Benkovski
Chepinets
IV VOZ - Blagoyevgrad
Brigades
Data not available
Monchil Voyevoda
Trun
Brezhnik
Srednohoretski
Dragovishtitsa
Georgi Benkovski
Kosta Petrov
Georgi Dimitrov
Shopski
Chavdar
Anton Ivanov
Kocho Chestimenski
Vasil Petleshkov
Georgi Zhechev
Lilyana Nikolova
Panayot Volov
Angel Kunchev
Battalions
Nikola Kalupchiev
Yano Sandanski
Anton Popov
Aneshti Uzanov
Nikola Parapunov
Rila-Pirin
N FQRE&DISSEM
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V VOZ - Stara Zagora
Brigades
Georgi Dimitrov
Brigades
Khadzhi Dimitur
Petur Momchi_lov
Death to Fascism
Vasil Levski
The People's Fist
Brigades
VIII YOZ - Gorna Oryakhovitsa
Brigades
Data not available
IX VOZ - Kolarovgrad
Brigades
Data not available
X VOZ - Varna
Brigades
Data not available
-44-.
Georgi Georgiev
Vladimir Zaimov
Khadzhi Dimitur
Asen Zlatarov
Vasil Levski
Gorna Oryakhovitsa
Gabrovo.-Sevlci:evo
Battalions
Popova
Mikhail Moravka
Avgust ]Popov
Omurtag
Battalions
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Brigades
XII VOZ - Vratsa
Brigades
Data not available
Danube
Vasil Levski
Khristo Kurpachev
Dyado Vulko
Chavdar
Popovski
Gavril Genov
Georgi BenkoVski
Khristo Mikhaylov
Stefan Karadzha
1~QQ FO WEGN DISSEM
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Georgiev, Petur, ed. Bulgariens Volk im Widerstand 1941-
1944/Bulgarian People in Revolt
1941-1944/'; Berlin, Rutten and Loening,
I9 6 27713-pp .
Gornenski, Nikifor Vuoruzhenata Borba na Bulgarskiya Narod
Za Osvobozhdeniye of Khitleristkata
Okupatsiya i Monarkho-fashistkata Dikta-
tura - The Armed Struggle of
the Bulgarian People For Liberation
from Hitler's Occupation 9nd from the
Monarch-Fascist Dictatorship (1941-1944)
Sofia, The Bulgarian Communist Party
Publishing House, 1958. 336 pp.
Valev, L. B.
Iz Istorii Otechestbennogo Fronta Bul-
garia Iyu 1942g. - "Sent yabrIID_4Tg_.
/From the History of the Fatherland
Front of Bulgaria (July 1942 to Septem-
ber 1944/Moscow-Leningrad, USSR Academy
of Sciences Publishing House, 1950.
].03 pp.
Georgiev, Petur, Vuruzhenata Borba no Bulgarskuya Narod
Princip. ed. Protiv Fashlzma 1941-1944 Dokumenti
The Armed Struggle of the Bulgarian
People Against Fascism 1941-19-447-Sofia,
The Bulgarian Communist Party lish-
ing House, 1962. 798-pp.
NO FOREIG D
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