THE LE MONDE ARTICLES BY ROBERT GUILLAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1966
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Releas 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A1Q05
ONF1DENTJAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence
THROUGH Acting Chief, Far East Area
FROM Chief, Indochina Division
SUBJECT The Le Monde Articles by Robert Guillain
A series of articles appearing in the Paris news-
paper Le Monde in late May written by French journalist
Robert Guillain presents the theme that the Americans,
lacking political Sophistication and awareness, risk
failure on the political side of the war in Vietnam.
American military actions, on the other hand, risk pre-
cipitating a war with China which could escalate into a
worldwide conflict.
Guillain musteri4 all the well-known problems, which
have and are confronting the US in its effort to defeat
the Communists in Vietnam. He adds little that is new
to the arguments and fears raised by critics of US
policy. The impact of the articles, however, may be
that of a well-reasoned case against the present US
course of action, since they are concentrated into a
package and sensationalized for journalistic effect for
a French audience.
1. The Le Monde series includes five articles. Two
of them deal w3th tEe moral degeneration of the South
Vietnamese in Saigon and with the virtual American "col-
onization" of the country as a result of the influx of
US troops and wealth. A third article deals essentially
with the Viet Cong politico_subversive effort, implying
that it is far more pervasive that) the Americans seem
to realize. A fourth article concerns the suffering of
the Vietnamese civilian population in the war, citing
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00090028 04aI .i~cat~cn
CQNFEflL , Al
 Approved For Release I .Tq RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
JEM
Viet Cong terrorism and abuse, but stressing the killing,
maiming, and uprooting of the rural civilian populace as
a result of US military and pacification tactics, A
final article assesses the nature of Viet Cong guerrilla
warfare and US military strategy, pointing out valid mili-
tary problems and contending that the US may respond by
rash escalation of the conflict,
Social and Economic Pitfalls Cited
2. The first article of the series, entitled Saigon,
describes the heart of the capital as having been to en
over by off-duty US troops. As a result, moral rot has
set in from the lowest shoeshine boy to the high officials.
US troops are described as relatively well-behaved, but
with too much money to burn and too many imported PX
goods and gadgets--a "Niagara of dollars and a Himalaya
of goods." Guillain notes rightly, that PX goods flood
the local markets either as a result of resale by US
troops or of hijacking from the port warehouses, through
the complicity of local customs and police officials.
He further adds, with some basis in fact, that prominent
entrepreneurs, civil servants, and even high officials o
or their wives are taking their cut by being Iremtved ift
such activities as black-marketing, property rentals,
and other financial manipulation. The problem of inflation
is also cited--including its two causes, Viet Cong economic
warfare and US spending; the true victims--honest civil
servants and military on fixed salaries--are noted. The
article concludes that the US, come to defend order, has
contributed mainly to disorder.
3. All of these unfortunate side affects of the US
build-up, both in men and installations, have been noted
by US officials concerned4and by Vietnamese leaders.
The chaos presented!by Gu`llain, however, is overdrawn
and distorted. c~a +-~etf' l t e ? Similar problems arise
in all countries where US troops are stationed. The
Vietnamese do not yet seem to regard the Americans as
"entrenched in Saigon" even more than were the French or
the Japanese, and contrary to Guillain's contention,
Saigon is probably no more immoral than was Tokyo
during the Korean war except insofar as the war is far
more total in Vietnam than was the Korean war in Japan.
What Guillain does hot say is that US officials and
responsible ministers in the Ky government are well aware
CONF DENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Release 2001 :'1 RR" t9T00826A000900280001-6
of these problems, and if unable to eliminate all of them,
are constantly taking steps and devising measures to try
to reduce their effects.
4. A second article, actually the third in the
series, takes off in much the same vein, but with the
theme that Vietnam is for practical purposes being "re-
colonized." The basic arguments here bear an element
of truth--the overwhelming dependence of South Vietnam
on US economic aid, both financial and material, in-
cluding even the impportation of rice. But as devices
of this "colonization," he cites surplus agricultural
sales, counterpart aid funds, underwriting of Vietnam's
military budget, financing its "self-help projects," and
the dispatch of US experts. Additionally, although not
specifically named, the Morrison-Knudson combine which
is responsible for military construction, is described
as a fifth American "power" (in addition to the State
Department, CIA, AID, and MACV) creating a revolution
in employment and salaries. The South Vietnamese general
staff is also described as dependent on the US not only
for its "mercenary army," but for its equipment, its
strategy, and decisions to undertake operations, because
of the need for air support.
5. Again, the total effect of the article is to
distort the picture. It repeats, for instance--without
attempting to discredit--recent "rumors" that the US
has leased the base under construction at Cam Ranh Bay
for 99 years. As evidence, the author notes that, aided
by Viet Cong propaganda, anti-American sentiment has
been evident in the recent antigovernment struggle
demonstrations.
Viet Cong Pervasiveness
6. An article entitled "The Viet Cong in the City"
is one of the most snide indictments of alleged American
naivete, and gives vent to an underlying French assumption
that only the French truly understand the Vietnamese and
the nature of the guerrilla war in Vietnam. Guillain
cites three cases, not documentable in Washington but
certainly plausible, of Viet Cong penetration of official
Vietnamese circles. He claims that Viet Cong infiltration
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Release 20p / /p? E llAt79T00826A000900280001-6
is everywhere and "invisible." To the "amazement" of old
French hands, Americans in South Vietnam, he says, appear
unaware of this widespread Viet Cong presence and influence,
trusting their Vietnamese associates, their house servants,
and their girl friends, all of whom are key Viet Cong
targets,
7, There is little question that Viet Cong penetra.
tion is widespread., certainly reaching into the govern.
ment and the Vietnamese army although no evidence can
be found to implicate Saigon's highest levels.. Americans
are undoubtedly lax in some respects. Some are careless
to the point of unneeded risk, but most of them are aware
of the prevalence of Viet Cong agents and sympathizers.
Security checks are carried out on many Vietnamese, but
beyond normal caution, most Americans probably conclude
that they must assume the loyalty of their counterparts,
or they cannot operate with effectiveness. Guillain prob..
ably overstates the degree of popular complicity and the
Viet Cong capability, Very few Americans, for example,
are attacked in Saigon's cities or towns, One obvious
distortion is Guillain's contention that the Viet Cong
have a full army division within Saigon in the form of
some 20,000 agents, There is no official estimate of
Viet Cong sympathizers in Saigon, although a figure of
at least 10,000 is reasonable, Even if a fair number of
such agents and sympathizers are armed with such weapons
as pistols and grenades, they scarcely-ove equate to a
military division which could suddenly rise up and seize
the city.
Civilian Casualties
8. The most vicious of the articles deals with the
civilian casualties of the war in South Vietnam, not so
much because itw repeats charges frequently heard and
bearing some truth, but because of its implication that
the magnitude of civilian losses is being deliberately
concealed by US sources. Guillain estimates that civilian
deaths are probably well in excess of published figures
on Viet Cong killed, probably approaching 100,000 in
1965. His figures seem to us grossly exaggerated, but
we have no firm alternate to offer.
Approved For Release 2001/0319' A-R0P79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Release( ! I E MLDP79TOO826A000900280001-6
9. After several paragraphs purporting to illustrate
the casualness and the frequent errors and excesses of US
bombing attacks, the article comments on the number of
civilian refugees in government-held zones, their poor
lot, and alleged Vietnamese profiteering from the refugee
"racket". Guillain concludes that US policy is actually
designed to force the peasant, who is attached to his
land, to uproot himself and make a firm choice between
living among the Viet Gong--.-thus subjecting himself to
military retaliation--or in government areas.
Military Strategy
10. The last in the series of Le Monde articles
purports to deal with the prospects facing the US. As
Guillain seesit, the US faces continued frustration in
it military effort to beat the Viet Cong, or must choose
further to escalate the war in an effort to win it.
After paying tribute to the ten4iousness of the Viet.
namese Communists above all other Asians-.."the Americans
dontt know what country they are taking chances in?
Guillain cites the basic problem of Vietnamese guerrilla
warfare, that of engaging Viet Cong forces other than on
their own terms. He fails to observe that improved in-
telligence techniques are enabling the allied forces
to "fix" and engage Communist units far more often than
in the past. He rightly notes, however, that neither US
nor South Vietnamese troop strength is sufficient to
permit the holding of territory seized from the Viet
Cong, and that, inmost cases, the latter eventually
return. He does not describe present pacification poli-
cies, which are aimed toward a long-range effort to
establish and hold ground under government influence.
11. Guillain concludes that South Vietnamese en-
durance and US patience will crack.long before that of
Hanoi. He predicts that the US may resort to some rash
form of escalation which he projects as: 1) a pincer
operation across central Vietnam from both the China
Sea and from Thailand to cut off the South at the southern
terminal of the Ho Chi Minh trail, 2) a US landing in
North Vietnam, probably at Vinh, to cut off that country
at the northern terminus of the trail, 3) intensified
TIA~
~,' t~~-J DgN
Approved For Release 200 21' : A-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Releas e f)p~kIT ?RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
bombardment of North Vietnam including its industries and
possibly its dikes, or 4) a strike against Communist China.
Guillain considers the fourth course unlikely, but de-
clares that he fears that the US, by resorting to one of
the other three options, may precipitate the fourth
course by forcing China to intervene,
Guillaints Background
12, The author of the articles is Le Monde's'? Far
East expert. He has written extensively on many Asian
countries for a number of US publications i cluding-"'''The
Saturday Evenin Post'o-and the Washin ton ost.c Hem
did a ser"es or aic1es on Communist ina n 1964 for
the latter after a-visit there. He has also written
books on Japan and China and is married to a Japanese.
13. Le Monde" itself despite its limited circula-
tion of about 200,000, is probably France's most in-
fluential and respected daily newspaper, It is widely
read in intellectual, professional, and government circles.
The paper is often labelled as an "independent", although
its political line varies somewhat with the by-line author.
It has often been critical of the US, but it has also
been critical of the French government and it opposed
De Gaullets reelection last December.
Prepared by:
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 001/03/09 :CIA-RDP79A ~ t,~, E~0900id00a,-v
Approved For Release 2001/03/09: CIA-RDP79A
THE SECOND "DIRTY WAR"
I. Saigon
Heads shaved, shoulders squared, immense legs -- these are the
GIs in the streets of Saigon by the hundred. Almost all in civilian
clothes, shirttails flapping above their trousers, they have the ex-
pre#sion of vaguely uneasy boredom of soldiers on leave before a spree.
To these big black or white giants, an entire little yellow people--
three sizes smaller -- seems to be there only to serve them. They have
themselves pulled in rickshaws by half-naked coolies. They have their
bootsAshSadd by tiny ten-year-old shoeshine boys. They let themselves
be led around by girls who hold them by the hand.
For them the girls have renounced the graceful Vietnamese tunic,
with its silk pantaloons and floating veils, and rigged themselves up
in the slacks of teenagers that cling to the legs. At the corners of
the streets the GIs negotiate with the young urchins and the procurers
in blue-jeans, who offer them girls, black market money, the addresses
of gaming or opium rooms. For them the sidewalks of the Boulevard Charner
display merchandise of atrocious taste, sold outdoors; it is chiefly
C - r r. P' ~,evcS
erotic nudes painted on silk and Jlwlgu~s camouflaged with silver
dollars.
The center of the city belongs to them. Catinat Street, ironically
renvmed in Vietnamese Liberty Street, never saw so many blond, fair-skinned
people. The cafes are overflowing with men, all of the same mold. The
bare (there is one every 50 feet) have American names like the ones in
Chicago or Texas, and they are full any time of the day or night. LI
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 2
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
The Core is Rotten
Abroad it is readily believed that Saigon lives in an atmosphere
of war. War? Who here thinks of that except to detest it and flee it
and profit from the influx of dollars and mock it by the pursuit of
pleasures? Outsiders still think that Saigon lives in fear
.,,under the
threat of Vietcong grenades or machine guns at any minute. Well it's
all
not at'`like that. Saigon thinks only of profit and amusement, at least
when it is not caught up in the fever of political demonstrations. From
time to time, it's true, the napalm plays havoc. But, except for a
stroke of misfortune, each person feels safe, and Saigon.ls nothing like
Algiers during the terror. Why should the Vietcong spread terror there
when there is an evil which decays it much more surely from the inside:
corruption? A Vietnamese told me: "In this war the core is rotten: it
is Saigon".
They conduct themselves decently, however, these American "boys":
not too often fighting, not too often drunk, always generous with their
money. But when thousands of them each day'--spend looking
for girls, conducting their little deals (because each GI is a business
in himself), when the flood of men, the Niagara of dollars, the Himalaya
of goods descend on a poor and underdeveloped South Vietnam, on a people
who, never very hardy, have undergone the wear and tear of twenty years
of war -- how could it be hoped that this country would not become
corrupt?
In the first days, before 1 got used to it, the spectacle of Saigon
made me nauseous. From having lived the Asiatic drama for a quarter of
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
a century, have I become agoOM too "Asiatic"?.-I'm sure, in any case,
that the Japanese, the Indians, or the Chinese who pass through Saigon
must feel the same disgust. And why not? After twenty-five years of
struggles and costly revolutions so that Asia might belong to the Asiatics,
all of a sudden we see ag*in installed in an Asian capital (itself a k
e-
center of world news), all the old signs, all the loath 'some trappings
A
of a foreign white supremacy that seemed gone forever.
II ': Developments of the Vietnam Conflict
Saigon overrun as it never was under the French, more occupied than
Japan after the defeat, more immoral than Tokyo during the Korean War --
the Whites masters of the city, the comer dores back in power (the
indigenous businessmen who collaborate with the occupiers) -- the puppet
administrators -- the Vietnamese beggars who hold out their hands -- the
girls who sell themselves -- Don't the Americans see how shocking this
spectacle is? In the fifteenth or twentieth year of decolonization,
don't they fear the judgment of the rest of the world? Don't they
realize what a weapon they are furnishing to their enemies when the
Vietcong can say, "Look at Saigon. It's nothing but a brothel and a
pigsty."?
Prostitutes and Traffickers
The biggest industry in Saigon today is prostitution. In Korea,
during the other war, the Americans were boycotted by the proud Korean
women. The GIs in Saigon have a happier lot: the Saigon girls hardly
resist their youth and their dollars at all. Still less the refugees
Appiov,ed F ,E3 aseB29 1I WQ il(;lAaBD$7tST 26Adg9WQ2 Aly
 4
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
reopening on condition or payment of a clandestine bribe which can amount
to as much as a million piasters.
It is in these places, with the shadows, the jazz, and the whiskey,
that 't e GI ind$ what he is looking for. The rest takes place elsewhere,
in the hotels, including the most expensive and the best known. Or in the
thousands of rooms recited by the day or by the hour; countless Vietnamese
families have set apart a room of their living quarters for this purpose.
Or in the vast camps of huts or cabins which have sprung up on the edge
of the American camps or along the routes leading out of Saigon towards
Tu-Duc, Bien-Hoa, and Mytho.
To. work with the Americans, or even to live near them, is the ideal
of thousands of Vietnamese. Pro-American? No, pro-dollar. Money simply
falls from the pockets of these GIs. By being near them one has access
to all kinds of products, all the "gadgets". The American army imports
everything; even its wastebaskets are "Made in USA". To approach it is
to approach the miraculous P.X., and to enter into the tremendous traffic
. First, hundreds
of GIs resell each day on the black market all kinds of purchases which
they have made at the P.X. for this purpose. Secondly, hundreds of tons
of merchandise desuined for the P.X. disappear regularly between the
0
quay of the p~-rt of Saigon and the warehouse in the city, a mile away.
Entire trucks,, have been known to disappear as if by magic. And every-
one knows that it couldn't happen without a vast network of conspirators
which, besides the customs officials, the convoy officials, the Vietnamese
police, etc. (who check each other from time to time), must involve e.ver-
important bureaus in the American army.
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
The diverted articles reappear in the immense open air market on
the sidewalks and in the boutiques of the entire city. Anything under
the sun can be found there, from canned food to rare products'marked "Not
to be sold in trade". It is not only P.X. products'which disappear.
A certain "t4i*ves' market" in the city specializes in the sale of brand
new American uniforms. If you want to buy American weapons they can give
you the address.
Civil and Military "Rackets"
Another large, lucrative traffic is in construction and rentals.
To obtain the materials it is necessary to pay all kinds of bribes, but
the rich Vietnamese coutruct villa after villa, paying off the house in
two years. They ask up to $800 per month for rent, knowing that their
American tenants will always pay, ending by going in four together and
sharing the rent. The Chinese of Cholon construct large buildings of
eight or ten stories, profiting from-the "cement racket", a traffic re-
what traffic don't they exploit:
served for them. But tk#xax#axxaick xtxaYfjsx shell cartridges, scrap
metal from the battlefields, old food cans which are flattened for use
as sheet metal on the refugees' cabins. The Vietnamese rival them:
traffic in the importing of automobiles and scooters, pharmaceutical
products, asstl, military exemptions, etc. Vietnamese, Chinese, or American--
everyone quickly finds himself in one major traffic: that of the dollar
and the piaster. There are at least three recognized rates of the dollar:
the official rate, the rate of the military dollar,(more than double),
and the.-,rate on the black market (more than triple). There are always,
as one would suspect, those who have access to several rates and who
thus build a fortune on clandestine exchan e.
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
11
 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
Many officials, even in the highest echelons, enjoy a large share
in all these traffics. In a regime which pays its officials at a ridicu-
lous rate (a maximum of about 50,000 old francs per month), the mis-
appropriation is an accepted practice: one pays oneself from State money.
CA 14
"The mandarin
AMM himself too, but in a lifetime," a Vietnamese told me;
"the minister of Tonton Dien in teu years; today it can be done in a year'."
The "tip" is indispensable for all sorts of occasions, asked chiefly of
Americans. The officials make a fortune. The customs men buy a Mercedes.
The colonels build villas.
Warm The extortion does not spare the South Vietnamese army. it
is,aam in fact, a problem at all levels. The government soldier will
raid the villages during an operation. The senior officer serves two
three
meals to the recruits instead of theAwhich are expect4d, and pockets the
gain. Nevertheless, when such or such general or colonel is perfectly
many
honest, and aftimxtkm are, it is too often his questionable wife who
engages in vigorous trafficking, like the one who had cement transported
by army airplanes to build her villa.
The first explanation of all these practices is simple: to escape
insecurity. The war has been going on for twenty years. Death is
perhaps around the corner, or ruin, or communism. To flee the war and
is
to hang on to something sure arm the desperate reaction and the obsession
of thousands of Vietnamese. Security for many of them is the piastre,
or better, the dollar, or an account in a Swiss bank. For others it is
the French civilization, a form of evasion, or a villa on the Cote d'Azur.
Ah, to leave for France, to live in Paris, and never return... to leave
a country that kam is no longer habitable. If one could change the color
AppnaaeckEoiR* ae.2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
- L
 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
Inflation
Even in waiting for them the profits of these shady deals are
subject to inflation. They coincided with the massive arrival of
American troops, and hence, dollars. Prices increased 55% in 1065
and the rise continues because of the flood of money and the dearth
of goods. The Vietcong know very well how to aggravate the situation
by an economic war. They cut the provisions to Saigon of rice, milk,
pork, e&xk charcoal, etc.
It should be noted, and this is important, that everyone does
not suffer (far from it) from the inflation and the economic upheavals.
American enterprises bring employment for many of the little people
and the rackets are profitable. In the hovels of the slum quarters
there is sometimes more money than there rover was before: the father
is a coolie for the Americans, the son a 'ishoeshine", and the girl,
sL~t
u hah". -
cfovernor everywhere; he wt s very much in the public eye, the
prestige of a repentant Co.munist. One day, after six years of work,
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
the men disappeared--mission sccomp'_i.ghed: he was a "Viet".
invisible Invaders
The Frenchmen of Vietnam who know this country ilt best, in pprticulnr
those who lived through the other wtr of Indochina, are analyzing the present
=0.tuetion. Their pessimism at firs, seemed beyond reason to me,but the hundred
P :a Vt
pieces of evidence nccuamulgted J~p gradually convinced me that this analysis
c r, e.
Is probably thej1nlosest to the truth. For them, very simply, the conquest of
South Vietnam is already more thA-lhalf done, but it is an invisible conquest
of the rentons held by t;he Ameriepn.-, themselves. The Vietcong hats already
7t rq%o6AeC-a--
infiltrPtedttiinto the aorerr rental system. They are in the police. They are
in the ermy. They are no diubt pre,-,ant in the government. And certainly
they are everywhere among the people.
What amazes the Oren^h it thr-t the Imericpns, with a few exceptions,
do not went to see to what 3xtent this political decay has pone. Without
experience in Vietnam, without i.nsirht into political analysis, they see the
it ld tin bincklA and whited. Or one side are very cleerly the good VietnPmese,
who are working for than and are thus their friends. On the other 'ide rare
the bad whom they do no-, s43 baceusc they are in the isbodmw of this jungle or
VP11n% on
iat clandestine activity. Lit very often the good and the b#d may be the same,
arri the Vietcong may be right under their eyes without their even suspecting.
This all passes Above the Americans.
Than, an essential a!isractir-st1c of the VietnPmese situation is pre-
cisely the interpenetration of the Vietcong system and of -the povernmentnl
system. The Vietcong hrve 1ea.rned t,hnt the mein interest is not to create
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900280001-6
s. parallel organization but .rather to establish themselves in every way possible
r?'in the offi.cd,&1 or?taniz.sticnlike a microbe in blood. Their ammunition supply?
That will most likely cow:by rner17!Pn ships. Their weapons? By the Viet-
namese Prmy. Their mon-iy? 7M will be the ssme as that of Sai.aor. Their
police? That is certsialy tha }cline of the regime. Its military information
is furnished lprrely by the mt13 tnr:T of the rrovernmentsl Prmy.
Appearances ore thus decri.vi ^, ^nd there is rePlly no contest.
St,F"K t a4 C~ottwt'S
Tf the Saigon River is not blocked---one boat , euld be
enough--it i.a not becau,ie the Vx