THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY AND APRIAMO , PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
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• Publication Date: June 22, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT Control No. 1725/66
SUBJECT: The Peruvian Aprista Party Date: 22 June 1966
andA-Ifo: Fait, ree.n
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22 June 1966
No. 1725/66
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INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY AND APRISMO:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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No. 1725/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY AND APRISMO: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
(22 June 1966)
C O N T E N T S
Page
I.
II.
INTRODUCTION
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE APRA,
4
III.
APRISMO, AND THE PAP
THE EVOLUTION OF APRISTA DOCTRINES
9
IV.
AND PROGRAMS,
THE OUTLOOK: CONCRETE FACTORS
18
AND CONTINGENCIES
Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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We must be wary of Aprista Party changes of opinion .... the party
was anti-Yankee in 1930, pro-Yankee in 1945, defended
the oligarchy in 1956, and now in 1966 it becomes anti-
imperialist to recruit followers.
--- Statement of an anti-Aprista
Peruvian Congressman, May 1966
The policy of the national reformist leaders toward
imperialism detracts from the influence and popularity
of their parties. What has a particularly. disastrous
effect on /the "national reformist" parties7 is their
anti-communism. The frankly pro-imperialist APRA party
in Peru, officially allied to the extreme right Odria
group, probably furnishes the most striking indication
of the drift of the national reformist parties.
Latin American Institute, the
Academy of Sciences, USSR, from
"Political Parties in Latin.
America," World Marxist Review,
August 1965
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THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY AND APRISMO: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
I. Introduction
The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) was
founded in 1924 by the Peruvian Victor Raul Haya de la Torre
to launch a political-economic program applicable to all of
Latin America. Aprismo, as the international doctrine is
styled, in its early years gained widespread popularity among
leftist groups and intellectuals. Among other things, it
called for political unification of Latin America as a means
of combatting the overweaning economic and political influence
of the United States. Although the APRA also envisaged the
establishment of affiliated parties in each of the twenty
countries of the area to promote its goals, the Peruvian Aprista
Party (PAP) is the only surviving national organization of the
movement.
Aprismo and the programs of the PAP are tending to be
anachronisms in the political life of the hemisphere. Both
the national and international facets of Aprismo have evolved
to such a degree that they are scarcely recognizable when com-
pared with the original "purist" forms. The number one dogma,
calling for "action against Yankee imperialism" has been diluted
beyond recognition and long since preempted by Communist and
pro-Communist groups. Other aspects of Aprismo have been taken
up or perhaps even plagiarized by more recent political movements,
but without enhancing the stature of APRA.
The PAP still performs part-time as the authentic spokesman
of the "indo-American"*features of Aprismo, rather than in the
role of a true national party, concentrating on Peruvian domestic
issues. Yet it no longer has an unchallenged monopoly in Peru
as the only party with a mass base and with "programs and
principles." The PAP now faces serious competition from the
left in addition to its traditional enemy, the Peruvian Communist
Party (PCP), and its inflexible opponents among the armed forces
and the powerful rightist elite.
*A term specially devised by APRA to replace the allegedly
erroneous designation "Latin America." It emphasizes the
native or Indian element of the population of the area.
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Perennially frustrated in its attempts to win power
via the electoral path, the PAP has managed to retain its
legal status during the past decade, a major achievement
for an organization which had enjoyed such a position for
only four of the first twenty-six years of its existence.
It is now struggling to keep its place as the strongest
single party in the nation. The combined weight of tradi-
tion, tight discipline, a rooted organization, and program
appeal seems to ensure the PAP a major role in Peruvian
political life into the foreseeable future. But the odds
may be less favorable for the party's prospects of winning
power via the ballot than they were in 1962, when the military
intervened to nullify Victor, Raul Haya de la Torre's slight
plurality in the presidential election. Many contingencies
could sharply improve this outlook, but others equally
plausible are just as likely to worsen it.
The party's future, like its past, is intimately
linked with Haya who has provided the thread of internal
unity, international prestige, and an enduring quality, of
personalismo. If the Jefe runs for the presidency in 1969,
it quest ionable whether he will be any more acceptable
to the armed forces at that time than he has been in the
past. A similar cloud will surround any other Aprista can-
didate and it is doubtful that a definitive answer on the
military response can be obtained even just before the
election.
Apart from this critical factor, the PAP, which has
maintained a continuous battle with the PCP, has an unusual
quality as a catalyst for the heterogeneous opposition of the
left and right, which is united solely in a common hatred of
Haya, the party, and Aprismo. In addition, the price of
legality and overt participation in politics has been high,
and the charge to internal party unity may not yet have been
paid: many Apristas and sympathizers seem to feel that the
PAP has seriously compromised its principles and idealism
through the political tactics and deals into which it has
entered since 1956. However, serious dissension has not
yet erupted--and probably will not as long as Haya is in
command.
The irony of APRA's destiny as well as that of the PAP
is to have been born about twenty years too soon. Most of
its doctrines and programs would not seem extremist by
present standards. In other words, Aprismo was born before
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the acceptance of the "popular parties of the democratic left."
and especially before the fundamental social, economic, and
political reform principles were set forth'.in the Alliance for
Progress and adopted--at least in theory--as common policy for
the hemisphere,
With its strong leadership, anti-Communist orientation,
and the present relatively moderate Peruvian domestic programs,
the PAP could well have become a kind of prototype of all
that was desirable in a progressive political organization.
But the PAP was not born in the 1950's and thus far has been
unable to divest itself of the frustrating political impedi-
ments connected with its past.
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II, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE APRA, APRISMO, AND THE PAP.
The APRA was founded in 1924 by Victor Radl Haya de 1
Torre as the regional political organization,to promote a five-
point "Maximum Programs" for all of Indo-America. Haya, whose
career as an internationalist, philosopher, writer, and politician,
is virtually synonymous with the APRA, and other Peruvian founders
of the movement envisioned the formation of Aprista affiliates
in each Latin American nation with distinctive "Minimum Programs"
adapted to the special local conditions. The minimum program
of each country was nevertheless expected to mesh with, and
foster, the long-range common goals of Aprismo, the name used
to identify the collective doctrine and programs of the APRA.
The Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP), which has also been known
as the Party of the People, is the only viable political organ-
ization in the hemisphere spawned by the APRA and today is the
sole spokesman of Aprismo, which has consequently remained
essentially Peruvian in character. Although the APRA wielded
considerable influence over leftist intellectual and political
leaders'-in various countries in the two decades after its
founding, its appeal and inspirational strength have faded
considerably in subsequent years. Other hemispheric movements
of more recent vintage, which have possibly borrowed from
Aprismo, have tended to replace it in hemispheric political
ideology; for example, the justicialista program of former
dictator Perrin of Argentina; "third-force" and neutralist
doctrines, and the Latin American versions of Christian
Democracy,
The APRA's origins and inspiration were derived in part
from the Argentine university reform movement centered in
Cordoba in 1918; in part from precursor intellectuals and
inconoclasts, like the Peruvian Manuel Gonzalez Prada; and
especially from feudalistic Peruvian political and social
conditions. Haya and other "radical" student leaders in Peru
initiated a nationalistic protest movement against those
conditions, particularly the depressed state of the Indian
segment of the population and the absolute monopoly of politi-
cal, social and economic power by the numerically small upper
class. At the outset, the leadership was almost exclusively
composed of student intellectuals but it was soon reinforced
by the incipient Peruvian organized labor movement. Violent
methods were employed to challenge the authority of the dicta-
torship of Augusto Leguid. (1919-1930) which in turn reacted
with repressive countermeasures,
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The "heroic" generation of intellectual and labor leaders
of the early 1920's in Peru have retained control of the PAP
and its policies to the present time. In addition to Haya,
the party "jefe," these included Ramiro Pria16, Andres
Townsend, Arturo Sabroso, Manuel Cox, Fernando Leon de Vivero,
Luis Heysen, Luis Alberto Sdnchez, and, until his recent death,
Manuel Seoane. The dominant "old Aprista guard" is old in
years as well as tenure: Maya has passed his 71st birthday
and most of the others are well into their 60's.
The APRA and Aprismo
The APRA was formally established in 1924 in Mexico City,
where Haya resided as an exile. In the years which followed,
various short-lived Aprista affiliates or "cells" were founded
in Mexico, Cuba,, Argentina, Costa Rica, and other parts of
Latin America. But not until 1930 was the PAP organized in
Lima.
During the years 1924-1931, Haya traveled widely--in the
United States, Western Europe, Russia, and China. He came in
contact with many leading political, scientific, and intellec-
tual figures of the times and studied first-hand the doctrines
and workings of contemporary political movements and programs.
The leaders with whom he associated included such notables
as Albert Einstein, Jose Vasconcellos, Arnold Toynbee, Trotsky,
Bukharin, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Romain Rolland, Harold
Lasky, and Clement Atlee. Eventually he attracted intellec-
tual admirers and supporters in the United States and through-
out Latin America. Haya was particularly influenced by the
theory of relativity, the programs and progress,-,of the Mexican
Revolution, Marxist theory and the Russian form of Communism,
the political beliefs of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Italian fascism,
New Deal Programs, and British socialism. The doctrine, ideas,
And symbolism of these leaders and movements were adapted and
incorporated in varying degrees into Haya's philosophy of
Aprismo, as presented in his own voluminous writings, those
of other Peruvian Aprista leaders, and many intellectuals who
interpreted the meaning and significance: of APRA. The result
was a strange melange moulded into Haya's special "Indo-'
American" historical concepts, which he projected for all the
countries south of the Rio Grande.
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The PAP in Peruvian Political Life (1931 to present)
The PAP, which was not founded until 1930, is intimately
enmeshed--and seemingly encumbered--by its own history.
Haya returned to Peru in 1931 after many years of foreign travel
and study to become the new party's first presidential candidate
in the elections in September of that year. The PAP held its
first national congress just prior to the balloting and adopted
a detailed "minimum program" for Peru which called for compre-
hensive and detailed social, political, administrative, and
economic reforms. The program in fact was a kind of precursor
of the principles embodied in the Alliance for Progress, but
too advanced for its day and particularly for theiJultra-con
servative political milieu in Peru.
It is generally recognized that Haya won a clear electoral
victory in 1931 over General Luis Sanchez Cerro, the official
candidate, and that the final count was manipulated to deprive
him of office. Shortly thereafter, the famous Aprista up-
rising in Trujillo--Haya's birthplace and "cradle" of Aprismo
-took place in protest of the electoral fraud. Aprista
rebels decimated the military gerrison in the city and the
armed forces retaliated harshly. Large numbers of Apristas
were massacred or executed en masse in reprisal or in the
process of quelling the revIt, ese incidents are the root
cause of the enduring hostility between the PAP and the Peruvian
armed forces--a religion of hatred which is kept burning by
indoctrination of the officer corps and through annual commemora-
tion of the military martyrs in the Trujillo uprising.
Outlawed between 1931 and 1945, the PAP was the principal
element in the electoral victory of the National Democratic
Federation which backed the presidential candidacy of Jose Luis
Bustamante in the elections of the latter year. The PAP
exercised its major role in national government during this
administration, holding as many as three key cabinet posts for
a period, commanding a near majority in the Congress, and
dominating the municipal councils throughout the country.
The Aprista record in sharing government responsibility
was characterized in large degree by a major effort to expand
the party's influence at all levels of government, rather than
to press for some of the reforms which it had advocated. The
Aprista element in the coalition constantly challenged President
Bustamante (1945-48) and his minority following for domination
of the executive branch. Apristas in government blindly followed
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the instructions of Haya rather than those of the President,
placing first priority on-the parochial objectives of the PAP.
Many considered Haya to be the true president of the country
during most of this administration.
The Apristas were also guilty of various blunders in
dealing with the obstructionist political opposition, includ-
ing the failure on one occasion to support a no-confidence
motion against the minister of government and police (Manuel
Odrfa). They consequently missed the opportunity to remove
their future nemesis from office. Periodic use of violence,
strikes, and strong-arm tactics also tended to reinforce a
widespread belief that the PAP was subversive in its methods.
The short-lived period of legal status and the experiment in
PAP-supported coalition came to an end in October 1948 when
Aprista elements became involved in--if they were not the
instigators of--a brief naval revolt at Callao. Bustamante
outlawed the party shortly before a military coup headed by
Odria ousted him from office. In the period which followed
the PAP was forced to operate underground again; the leaders
were persecuted; and Haya served his famous five-year asylum
in the Colombian Embassy in Lima (January 1949 April 1954).
This incident became an international cause celebre, which
was twice submitted to the International Court o ustice at
the Hague for adjudication, and centered considerable publicity
on both the Jefe and the PAP.
The PAP regained legality once more in 1956 as partial
payment for its support of the presidential candidacy of Manuel
Prado in the elections of that year. Prado's Democratic
Pradista Movement (MDP), which represented a segment of the
oligarchy and upper middle class, obtained the PAP's electoral
favor only after a close competition for Aprista aid with the
political organization backing the official candidate of the
Odria regime. Many Aprista supporters viewed this arrangement,
known as the convivencia ("living together") as a serious
compromise of party principles. The PAP agreed not only to
lend its voting strength to Prado but also to provide qualified
cooperation with his administration (if elected), in exchange
for legal status, a general amnesty, permission for Haya to
return to Peru, and the promise of municipal elections.
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Since 1956, the PAP has tended to move toward further
moderation in its program and tactics; has generally refrained
from violence; and has sought to win greater respectability
among the public and'particularly among its implacable enemies
of the center and right. However, these efforts were not
successful in gaining military acceptance of Haya's slight
plurality in the three-way presidential election in 1962, in
which both Fernando Belaunde and Manuel Odria were close
competitors. The elections were nullified by military inter-
vention; and in June, 1963, exactly one year later, Belaunde
succeeded in winning a small plurality in a re-run of the
same electoral contest. Although Belaunde's Popular Action
(AP) in coalition with the Christian Democrats was supported
by the Communists and advocated a program more leftist than
that of the PAP, Belaunde and his party nevertheless were
acceptable to the armed forces. This fact illustrates the
depth of animosity and suspicion between Haya and the PAP on
the one hand and the military leaders on the other. In 1962,
the military would not even countenance Odria's assumption
of office through Aprista support in-`.he Congress, which must
confirm a plurality candidate with less than one-third of the
total vote.
Since Belaunde's term began, the PAP and the National
Odrista Union (UNO), the patty of former president Odria, have
maintained a congressional and general political alliance or
working agreement which gives these two parties control of
Congress.- This control has exerted considerable influence
over the Belaunde administration and stands as a potential
challenge to the supremacy of the executive under the present
constitutional system.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF APRISTA DOCTRINES AND PROGRAMS
The doctrine of Aprismo has been altered substan-
tially since it was initially conceived. The evolution
consistently has been toward moderation. The PAP's
enemies and disaffected Peruvian Apristas have
repeatedly charged that the movement has abandoned its
basic ideology and even "sold out to Yankee imperialism."
Haya and other leaders have defended Aprismo by
asserting that it is not a static doctrine; that US
policies have changed; that Communist imperialism and
other new forces affecting Latin America have modified
conditions during the past decades; and that PAP goals
and ideals remain essentially unchanged. Whatever the
rationale, the striking metamorphosis of Aprismo and
the PAP is an undeniable political fact which bears on
the present and future of both.
Aprismo as International Doctrine
The "Maximum Program" of APRA, proclaimed by Haya
in Mexico City in 1924 and designed for the entire
hemisphere, contained five major points: 1) action
against Yankee imperialism; 2) the political unifica-
tion of Latin America; 3) nationalization of land and
industry; 4) internationalization of the Panama
Canal; and 5) solidarity with all oppressed peoples
in the world. The "Minimum Programs" of Aprista
national :t affiliates were to promote these ultimate
inter-Americana goals. Considered radical for their
day, the objectives are also partly utopian.
The five points provide only a superficial syn-
thesis of the elaborate philosophical and historical
premises presented in the voluminous literature df
Aprista intellectuals in the years after 1924 to explain
and advertise the program. These collective writings
converted Aprismo into a species of mystical political
religion for Latin American leftists. Haya was recog-
nized as the prophet and was the principal contributor.
The cornerstone of the dogma is Haya's philosophi-
cal "historical-space-time" concept, which at times is
abstruse and esoteric. It bears the pronounced
influence, inter alia, of the theory of relativity and
Marxism, incu ng 1st dialectical method and inter-
pretation of history.
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The theory has features which are closely related
to practical aspects of Aprismo and its relationship to
Communism. Haya rejected the terminology "New World"
as an erroneous European legacy and similarly the
European division of history into Ancient, Medieval,
and Modern periods. He stressed--and seemingly
romanticized--the pre-Columbian civilizations of the
hemisphere, the native races, and the Inca center in
his native Peru as the essential cultural ingredient
in Latin America. The Spanish-European civilization is
considered an undigested and artificial superimposition
on the basic Indian character of America, whose normal
development was interrupted by the Conquest. The
glories of the Inca Empire, the Inca system of land
tenure, and social welfare practices are thus emphasized
and have found a place in the PAP program for Peru.
The terms "Pan-American," "Latin American," and
"Spanish American," are considered inappropriate; the
first because it signifies Yankee imperialism and
domination; the second and third because they distort
the true historical perspective of America by emphasiz-
ing the European, In substitution, Haya adopted the
term "Indo-American" to describe the same geographic
area.
Aprismo logically stresses the improvement of the
Indian's status, his incorporation into modern life,
and indeed his mental transformation in the process.
Some of these precepts were influenced, though perhaps
not inspired, by Haya's observation of the Mexican
Revolutionary reform programs, which glorified the
native race and concentrated considerable attention on
promoting the material welfare of the Indian.
The political unification of Latin America, still
a long-term goal of the PAP and Aprismo, is closely
related to "action against Yankee imperialism" and also
to Haya's historical. concepts. Aprismo views the geo-
graphic division of the area into 20 nation-states as
an unfortunate outgrowth of the Spanish colonial period.
It looks toward the removal of these "artificial"
boundaries to form, as Haya has written, "the Great
Indo-Americana Fatherland" or "The United States of
Indo-America," Only through such political unity and
economic integration will the area be in a position to
develop its true destiny and work out equitable
relationships with the United States, which wields an
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allegedly disproportionate and dominating power over
Latin America. Indo-American citizenship, regional
groupings of Latin American nations for political and
economic cooperation and integration, customs unions,
a central development bank, a Latin American, parliament,
and regional economic planning councils are some of
the Aprista institutional proposals which will lead to
a super constitution for the Great Indo-American
Fatherland. Internationalization of the Panama Canal
was also intended to further unity sentiment in the
area, promote commercial integration, and force the
United States to recognize an inherent "sovereign
right" of Indo-America.
Proposed nationalization of land and industry
reflected the strong Marxist, socialist, and statist
influence on Aprismo economic doctrine in its formative
years as well as the chauvinistic resentment against
"Yankee economic imperialism." In addition, this point
of the program illustrated in part the emphasis on the
communal, cooperative, and social welfare practices of
the Inca Empire.
International political and military developments
and the practical experience and observations of Haya
and other Apristas have wrought substantial modifica-
tions in Aprismo, especially since the late 1930's.
Despite its heavy borrowing from Marxism-Leninism--for
methods, phraseology, and economic doctrine--the APRA
conflicted ideologically with the world Communist
movement. Exclusively and peculiarly Latin American,
Aprismo ipso facto challenged the basis of Marxism-
Leninism, which assumed that its principles were
universally applicable and provided solutions to all
problems at all times, regional and national. While
accepting the validity of the Marxist interpretation
of Western European history in the 19th century and
the application of Russian-style Communism, Haya
expressly denied its suitability to the Latin American
scene. For example, he asserted that imperialism was
the first rather than the last stage of capitalism in
the area; and he applied Marxist dialectic to Marxism-
Leninism, indicating that Communism also bore the seeds
of its own obsolescence and disappearance, at least in
its 20th century mold.
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. In the practical sphere, the PAP engaged in bitter
conflict with the PCP for control of the Peruvian
student and labor movements--a conflict which continues
to the present day. The two groups even battled over
which one could rightly claim as a founder the brilliant
Marxist intellectual, Jose Carlos Maridtigui, who had
served in this capacity for both parties. Finally, the
Peruvian Apristas were well aware that the orthodox
Communist parties in the hemisphere were blindly
obedient to the dictates of Moscow, a subservience
which ran afoul of the Indo-American regional thesis.
Over the course of time, Aprismo became less and
less anti-American in orientation and increasingly
rational and pragmatic in its policy toward the United
States. Apristas first asserted that, although all
imperialism was evil, the US version, unlike the
Communist form, at least carried no totalitarian politi-
cal straightjacket. The Good Neighbor Policy, the
liquidation of direct US military intervention in the
Caribbean, the struggle of the US and the Western
Allies against the totalitarian powers in World War II,
the subsequent cold war conflict between the West and
the Communist bloc, APRA's reluctant recognition that
foreign private capital had a necessary and positive
role to play in Latin America--all these factors con-
tributed toward APRA's elimination of the "Yankee"
adjective from its program calling for "action against
Yankee imperialism."
Haya, who has been described in his youth as a
more rabid anti-Yankee than the most confirmed Communist,
has himself radically changed his opinions of the
United States. Both he and the PAP have been regarded
as increasingly favorably disposed toward the US since
the end of World War II. At least Aprismo's rigid anti-
Americanism has long since faded into oblivion and has
been transformed into a more or less conventional
moderate-leftist position similar to that of other non-
Communist parties of the left in Latin America.
This striking evolution is clearly demonstrated in
a statement made by Haya in Mexico City for Life magazine
in May 1954, a few weeks after the termination of his
protracted asylum in the Colombian embassy in Lima. "I
believe," he declared, "that democracy and capitalism
offer the surest road toward a solution of world prob-
lems, even though capitalism still has its faults."
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Other aspects of the international program have
similarly been muted or modified. About 1946, Aprismo
substituted "inter-Americanization" for "international-
ization" of the Panama Canal, but this proposal has
been given little stress in recent years. The same is
true of the plank calling for solidarity with all
oppressed peoples. On the other hand, the PAP has
attempted to rectify the widespread belief that Aprismo
is fundamentally a class-ethnic doctrine; that is,
designed largely for the pure Indian elements of the
population. APRA denies this charge and Haya now
highlights mestizaje (mixed or mestizo elements) as
one of the great common bonds of Indo-America. The PAP
further explains that the Indian is not emphasized in
programs purely on ethnic grounds but only as one of
the oppressed classes in Latin America, all of which
Aprismo seeks to assist and uplift.
The.:"Minimum Program" of the PAP- Theory and Practice
The "minimum program" of the PAP was formulated in
detail at the first party congress in 1931 and during
the early years of the party's history. At least in
theory, the initial general reform objectives remain
intact. However, there have been modifications,
different points of emphasis, a toning down of the
phraseology, and even some abandonment of various
aspects of the platform. In part the program appears
far more moderate today because basic social, economic,
and political reforms--so-called "structural changes"
in society--are widely recognized in Peru and elsewhere
in'Latin America as desirable and even inevitable; in
part, because state intervention in the economies and
actual management of varied economic activities have
advanced rapidly throughout much of the area since the
1930's. Thus, the Aprista state capitalist theory no
longer carries the radical connotation of former times.
The PAP appears to have abandoned many of its
early fundamental principles in its long pursuit of gov-
ernmental power. From the standpoint of the party's
current propaganda lines, the program at present is
streamlined and simplified. The party no longer stresses
the innumerable specific goals and means to achieve
them as incorporated in the early "minimum program."
Whether some of these features have been shelved in
anticipation of eventually winning governmental power
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or quietly eliminated altogether is not clear; but in
view of the PAP's experience in government during the
Bustamente administration and as.a legal party since
1956, the latter is probably the more accurate estimate.
Certainly.,pragmatism has been a sobering influence on
the "heroic generation" of Apristas and some of their
early utopian goals.
General Aspects--The program of the 1930's for
Peru reflected the Idealism of the zealous intellectuals
who composed it. The party set forth a kind of cru-
sading, moralistic code for members to follow in
personal and professional life and projected the cause
of Aprismo as a kind of quasi-religion. The PAP was
not designed to win control of government for the
exercise of power per se, but to establish an institu-
tionalized mechanism to achieve the party's objectives.
The Spanish-Indian cultural dichotomy which had existed
in Peru since the days of the Conquest was to be blended
into a single Indo-American unity. The inner conscious-
ness and presumably values of the Indian were to be
transformed through material assistance of various kinds
and education, and the Indian element of the population
was thus to be gradually incorporated into the new life
of the nation. Peru was to look inward and backward to
its own history to find the uniquely Peruvian solutions
to its problems. The slavish habit of copying European
and North American models--a habit considered responsi-
ble for many of the nation's ills--was to be exorcised.
Political and Administrative Reforms--Borrowing a
fascist concept, t e P proposed a unicameral congress
along functional lines with workers, peasants, artisans,
managers, professional, and other classes represented,
as distinct from the traditional geographic represen-
tation in the Peruvian assembly. The armed forces and
police were to be strictly limited to an apolitical role
and were to participate in building public works in
order to contribute positively to social and economic
development goals. The government was to be decentral-
ized and extensive powers lodged in local and regional
governmental bodies, especially municipalities. The
same process would also apply to the nation's police
and security forces.
Administrative reforms included a merit civil
service system; public declarations of wealth by
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elected officials on taking office and investigations of
their personal holdings at the time of retirement; anc
independent judiciary; and sharply graduated income,
estate, inheritance, and gift taxes--in substitution of
taxes on consumption--to effect a rapid, equitable
redistribution of income.
Economic--The PAP proposed an economic system
which defined as a form of "state capitalism,"
rejecting on rather vague arguments the labels of
Marxism, Communism, and socialism for this aspect of
its program. The state was to dominate or play the
major role in planning, development, financing, produc-
tion, and distribution; ultimately it was to manage all
the major economic sectors--that is, when the "Aprista
state" had been constructed. Mining and transportation
were to be nationalized immediately after the PAP had
consolidated its governmental power, while other
sectors were to come under state operation more
gradually. Foreign private capital, which the PAP in
its early years denounced in phrases which could
scarcely be distinguished from Communist propaganda
attacks, was to be subject to close supervision by the
state. Such capital was to operate in Peru only so
long as it proved beneficial to the national interests
and retained the blessing of the state. On the other
hand, the economic program did not advocate outright
confiscation or wholesale expropriation of private
enterprise, foreign or domestic. Nor was the elimina-
tion of the private sector expressly contemplated even
after the millennium of the "Aprista state" had arrived.
A National Economic Congress, composed of functional
representatives from economic classes, was to be con-
vened soon after the PAP came to power to survey
national economic and population resources and then to
develop a master plan for economic development. Regional
congresses with similar local composition were also to
be established to assist in the planning and ultimately
to implement the economic design. Agrarian reform with
a basic redistribution of land was to be a major part of
the economic transformation.
The Indian Program--In addition to the general
objectives listed aove, the PAP set forth detailed
reforms to assist and defend the Indians, including
legislation to protect the communal landholdings,
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prevent their alienation to third parties, and restore
others which had been transferred; education, health,
and other social aid; support of agrarian production
and distribution through cooperatives; bilingual
instruction for Indian` children; and special campaigns
to eliminate the use of coca leaves and alcohol by the
Indians.
Other--In addition, the program comprehended legis-
l.ation`to protect and promote the interest of the
working classes. This would include social welfare and
education programs, such as free compulsory education
for all of school age:, the absolute separation of
church and state, and the limitation of the church to
the performance of strictly religious functions.
Since the PAP regained legal status in 1956, its
attention has been directed toward elections, parlia-
mentary maneuvers, specific political issues confronting
the government, and other mundane political matters.
Specifically, the Apristas have conducted a concerted
campaign for a powerful-to-dominant legislative branch
and a concomitantly weakened executive--a tactic closely
tied to their strong representation in the Congress.
There has been little clarification of the party's
doctrine and theory during this period.
In at least three spheres, however, the PAP has in
practice altered its position in relation to the
"minimum program" of the 1930's. First, it generally
follows a friendly or fairly rational line toward the
United States and hemispheric developments in which the
United States is deeply involved. This does not mean,
however, that the PAP is noncritical, sanguine, or even
notably "pro-American" in its policy. The party, for
example, joined the Latin American throng in denouncing
US unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic in
1965 and frequently voices the standard Latin American
"demands" that the United States grant the area a
privileged trading position for its exports, including
price supports to "compensate" for alleged underpricing
of these commodities in relation to high costs of
imported capital goods. It periodically calls for
changes in the OAS to reduce alleged US domination of
this organization and for the United States to remove
the "imperialist" features of its policies in Latin
America.
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Secondly, the PAP no longer advocates extensive
nationalization of sectors of the Peruvian economy.
For example, party policy calls at present for "gradual
nationalization" of the principal US-owned oil company
in Peru (IPC), a position which is relatively moderate
considering the stand of various other political and
pressure groups on this highly nationalistic issue.
The IPC case further illustrates the sharp contrast to
the party's proposed "immediate nationalization" of
transportation and mining as appeared in the program of
the 1930's.
Finally, the PAP has scaled down to practical size
its efforts to promote the Aprismo goal envisioning the
political unity of Latin America. Nevertheless, the
party still endorses this objective as well as economic
integration, and it attempts to arrogate all possible
credit for movements in this direction, such as the
Central American Common Market and the Latin American.
Free Trade Association. For example, it recently
endorsed President Belaunde's proposal for a "Latin
American Federation" as essentially a belated recogni-
tion of a time-honored Aprista concept.
The PAP also continues to be a promoter of various
projects which potentially are designed to encourage
multilateral political party cooperation, such as the
meetings of the Latin American Parliament and of the
"popular parties of the democratic left" in the hemi:
sphere. The purpose is to serve the political unity
goal of Aprismo. As late as January 1966, the PAP pro-
posed the establishment of fraternal ties between the
democratic parties in Latin America "with a profound
sense of social justice," and the world organization of
social democratic parties. At that time, it charged
Haya with exploring the possibilities of holding a
"Conference of Social Democratic Parties of the World"
in Lima, under PAP auspices. Haya himself continues to
play out his role as an internationalist, recently
calling for a "joint hemisphere plan" and a "continental
effort" to further economic development based on Latin
America's unifying elements of language, rel gion, and
"mestizo?sm."
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IV. THE OUTLOOK:
CONCRETE FACTORS AND CONTINGENCIES
Recent Political Tactics Affecting Party Strength
Having been outlawed for about 22 years of its 36-
year history, the PAP has tended to concentrate its ef-
forts on retaining the legal status it recovered in 1956;
on erasing false or distorted public concepts about
Aprismo, such as its alleged propensity to violence and
radicalism; and on political tactics designed to win
elections. The pursuit of these short-term goals has
produced internal strains, apparently diluted the fervor
of more radical, militant elements in the party, and
partly contributed to the decline of Aprista labor and
student support. It has also led to unnatural alliances
between the party and some of its traditional enemies,
including segments of the wealthy "oligarchy."
The convivencia ("living together") or modus vivendi
between the PAP and President Manuel Prado (1956 and
his small party was generally honored by the Apristas,
who gave qualified support to his administration. How-
ever, the arrangement failed to win acceptance of the
party among the higher ranking officers of the armed
forces or to modify perceptibly the animosity of its
rightist enemies. On the other hand, the PAP's room for
opposition political maneuvering was severely limited
during these years. The party did not share in execu-
tive responsibility, the spoils of office, or the achieve-
ments of the Prado regime. But a portion of the blame
for many governmental problems and difficulties seemed
to rub off on it, since it was recognized that the Aprista
vote had won the victory for Prado in 1956. Moreover,
to some Apristas and sympathizers, the convivencia was
tantamount to prostitution of the party's sacrosanct
principles. In other words, it was an alliance with a
member of the oligarchy who represented a perpetuation
of the feudalistic monopoly in Peru. The PAP?s very
existence, protracted struggles, and concomitant persecu-
tion were intimately linked with destroying that monopoly.
Prado fulfilled his promise under the convivencia
to permit Haya's return from exile, but this concession
proved to be a mixed blessing for the party. Haya's
decision to run as the PAP presidential candidate in 1962
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was a serious blunder. It virtually made military inter-
vention inevitable and thus sealed off any small prospect
that the party might reap the harvest of victory at the
polls. Although any other choice for a party candidate
might well have provoked the same intervention, military
opposition to Haya was undoubtedly sharper than it was
toward other leaders.
Moreover, the strong support for the candidacy of
Fernando Belaffide not only reflected widespread disen-
chantment among Apristas and sympathizers over the con-
vivencia, but posed a unique threat to the PAP's previously
unchallenged position as the largest and only mass-based
party in Peruvian history. Finally, Prado's personalistic
MDP disintegrated after the elections--as might have been
anticipated--leaving the PAP without even this modicum
of organized support from the right as a consolation
prize.
The impact of the PAP's present political alliance
with the National Odriista Union (UNO) on the party's
future and especially the elections set for 1969 cannot
at present be estimated with accuracy. However, the
balance sheet could very well be adverse to the Apristaso
Initially entered into after the elections of 1963, this
arrangement has been expanded subsequently to comprehend
broad parliamentary, electoral, and other political co-
operation. On the other hand, the Apristas in alliance
with the Odriistas in Congress are in a position to
influence, frustrate, and obstruct the Belatf ide adminis-
tration and its reform proposals, many of which, ironically
have a strong Aprista flavor. Such actions could seriously
erode the President's prestige and, in turn, the voting
strength of his AP party. However, obstructionism with-
out positive alternative measures by the Aprista-Odriista
combination could also rebound against both of these
groups and carries some risk of military intervention.
Possibly anticipating the collapse of former Presi-
dent Odr(a's highly personalistic UNO by 1969, the PAP
possibly sees in the alliance an opportunity eventually
to attract much of the UNO's voting strength to its own
fold. If successful, such a tactic could provide the PAP
with a slight majority or near majority at the time of
the next elections. Whether Odrfa could--even if willing
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--bequeath his present political support to the PAP is
highly questionable. And he himself has shown no signs
of a waning appetite for the presidency.
On the negative side, the PAP has more seriously
compromised its "honor and principles" in the UNO alli-
ance than in the convivencia, where legal status was at
least a valuable and tangible quid pro quo for the party's
vote. As a president, Odr1a was the symbol of the last
era of persecution of Apristas and the Aprista-controlled
labor organization. He personally was responsible for
holding Haya a prisoner in his own country during Haya's
asylum in the Colombian Embassy. Haya's authoritarian
control over the party, his personal prestige, and the
loyalty he commands within the Aprista leadership appear
essential to contain the dissension in the PAP over the
UNO partnership. For example, various Aprista elements
of unknown strength are known to have favored a more
logical, qualified cooperation with the Belauffide govern-
ment. In any event, the seeds of far more serious party
dissension are sown and could well sprout in the event
the UNO falls apart or otherwise fails to provide a sub-
stantial electoral benefit to the PAP.
Haya's Influence on Unity and Prospects
The PAP is one of the oldest organizations in Latin
America to qualify as a true political party of the non-
Communist left. It has displayed remarkable durability
and vitality in the face of protracted and harsh persecu-
tion, including imprisonment and exile of its leaders.
Under these conditions, the internal unity of the PAP is
similarly unique.
Various factors account for both viability and unity.
The PAP program and Aprismo doctrine go beyond the appeal
of a conventional political movement to offer a code of
living, a crusade, a humanistic "mission." The Apristas
copied the trappings of fascism and, to a lesser extent,
of Communism to inculcate dedication, discipline, and
loyalty in the adherents. For example, Haya's large photo-
graph is displayed prominently after the style of Musso-
lini in party headquarters throughout the country and on
placards at political and ceremonial functions of the
party. His title as "Jefe" is also reminiscent of Musso-
lini. In addition, the party has a flag, a song set to
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the music of the Marseillaise, a salute, a credo for youth,
and other quasi-national symbolism. At one time, the
party apparatus included effective paramilitary elements
known as "buffaloes" (goon squads) for intimidating politi-
cal opponents and carrying out assignments similar to
those of the counterpart "Brown Shirts."
The PAP's vertical, highly authoritarian organiza-
tional structure, with all real power centered in the
Jefe, has been able to enforce strict discipline within
party ranks at all levels down through the years. The
top hierarchy, particularly Haya, has largely dictated
party strategy, tactics, and program modifications, appar-
ently with a minimum of internal party debate. During
the Aprista-supported Bustamante administration, for ex-
ample, Haya reportedly held signed resignations of all
Apristas in government to facilitate his determination
of party policy.
The party has been free of major threats to unity.
The expulsion in 1959 of Luis de la Puente Uceda, late
guerrilla leader and former head of the dissident APRA
Rebelde (the Rebel APRA party)--a Castroite movement
which is now called the Leftist Revolutionary Movement
--was the first public break in the PAP in recent years.
But the defection of De la Puente and his followers was
not serious. Of course, individual leaders and intellec-
tuals of prominence have deserted the party from time
to time for varying reasons. Until his recent death,
Manuel Seoane, one of the most capable and dynamic Aprista
leaders, headed a strong faction within the party which
frequently challenged Haya's directives or opposed party
policies, such as the dilution of the anti-Yankee line.
However, no person has been able to assume Seoane's
"challenger" role since his death. Luis de las Casas
Grieve, who displayed ambitions in this direction in 1964,
has been subject to sharp and effective party discipline.
Thus, the PAP has combined the two key elements
which make for a viable Latin American political organi-
zation: a program, a mission, and a past glorified by
"martyrdom" in a struggle against authoritarian rule and
privilege; and secondly, a dynamic, magnetic, powerful
single leader with longevity.
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The key questions about the future of the PAP, in-
cluding the maintenance of its unity, now hinge in large
degree on Haya. The Jefe has not groomed an acceptable
heir apparent nor even indicated his choice of successor
or successors. The large national executive committee
is still monopolized by the old names. The party does
not seem to be preparing any dynamic, young leaders to
enter top positions or become potential presidential
candidates. Thus, the balance of power in the PAP in
the post-Hayti period defies an accurate prognostication.
Even those ambitious leaders who may seek to unseat the
ancien regime cannot be identified from information
avai lab eat present.
The old "heroic" generation, bound together by com-
mon experience and loyalty to Haya, may eventually split
among themselves in a contest for control of the party
and its program after Haya's departure. It is more prob-
able, however, that they will face mounting pressure from
discontented elements of the middle and lower echelons
who will demand a greater voice in the direction of the
party.
Respect for Haya and his dictates has prevented any
accurate measure of the level and seriousness of discon-
tent in Aprista ranks. The PAP has in fact been a one-
person party. Haya of course is only one element of
party unity, but his demise will raise fundamental prob-
lems of leadership, organization, and orientation. The
probable changes in the PAP could rock the foundations
of its traditional discipline and cohesion.
National Elections
The PAP's political outlook is not encouraging for
1969 in the event Haya is around, in good health, and
controlling its destiny. The party will almost certainly
feel saddled once more with his candidacy. Barring, the
possibility that he will see the light of Peruvian politi-
cal realities in his twilight years, decline the nomina-
tion, and also leave the country, the PAP will again
confront the dual obstacles of winning the necessary
votes and overcoming the orientation of the armed forces.
Of course, the latter development lies within the realm
of the possible; but more likely the armed forces will
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seek to insure by indirect means that there will be no
repetition of the 1962 election outcome and thus avoid
involvement in another public crisis.
Even without Maya, the PAP will probably be a strong
force on the Peruvian political scene in the foreseeable
future. Its viability is thoroughly tested, in contrast
to the late-comers of the "democratic left," such as the
AP and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), neither of
which has a strong organization or has demonstrated the
ability to survive for any protracted period without
sharing in the spoils of office. Belaunde's AP in par-
ticular seems to be typical of the strongly personalistic
party traditional to Latin America, and is likely to
lose popularity with the exercise of power. Without a
leader who can fill Belainde's shoes in'1969, it may be
less of a challenge to the PAP at the time. However, the
real question is whether leftists and rightists can get
together on their common denominator of anti-Aprismo to
thwart the Apristas at the polls.
Whatever the outcome of the future struggle for exe-
cutive power, the PAP will probably continue to exercise
considerable direct and indirect influence over govern-
ment through its strong representation in Congress. As
at present, it will probably continue to hold the largest
bloc of deputies and senators of any single party, barring
a major break in unity. Such influence is not to be dis-
counted under the Peruvian constitution, which provides
for interpellation of cabinet ministers and mandatory
resignation after a vote of no-confidence. If frustrated
in its long pursuit of the presidency in 1969, PAP will
probably keep pressing for a form of parliamentary sup-
remacy in Peru, even though experience with this form of
government in Latin America has led to stagnation or
chronic instability. The PAP used the lever of its near
majority in Congress during the Aprista-backed Bustamante
regime in a concerted effort to expand its control over
government and dominate the executive. It is employing
somewhat similar strategy against Belaunde, and its cur-
rent propaganda line stresses the superior role of the
Congress.
Decline of Aprista Influence in Student and Labor Movements
The PAP's current problems and prospects are not
restricted to internal unity, leadership changes, the ani-
mosity of the armed forces, and the new challenge of the
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non-Communist left. Since 1956 it has faced related
Communist and non-Communist threats to its control of
traditional strongholds among organized labor and students.
The protracted battle with the Communists in these two
areas is not new, but the Communists have found new Aprista
enemies with which to cooperate.
Both the PDC and the AP are bitter enemies of the
PAP and apparently view Aprismo as a greater political
threat than Communism. Their willingness to work with
the Communists is an important factor contributing to
the weakening of Aprista influence in the student and
labor fields -- a decline which may be a kind of barometer
of the PAP's political future.
Apristas lost their domination of the university
student movement after 1956 and have not been able to re-
coup their losses. They were even defeated in student
elections at the University of Trujillo, an Aprista strong-
hold, for a brief period in the early 1960's. Although
there is some evidence of a reversal of Communist control
in the past two years and of a Moscow-Peking split within
Communist student ranks, future Aprista victories at the
university elections will probably be won only through
compromising deals with the student leaders representing
other political parties.
The PAP has controlled Peru's principal labor organ-
ization, the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP),since
the year after its founding in 1944. It still monopolizes
the leadership of the CTP, but the locus of power for polit-
icAl:action rests primarily in the affiliated federations
and individual unions, several of which are under Communist
or pro-Communist leaders. During the past decade, both the
PDC and the AP have also developed an organized labor follow-
ing which has tended to dilute the PAP's position. Thus,
organized labor is an even less reliable political action
arm of the party today than it has been in the past.
In part the decline of Aprista influence in organized
labor reflects the PAP's attempts to exploit this mass ele-
ment to back party political objectives, rather than to
support the CTP as a conventional labor organization.
General strike attempts, dictated by the PAP and carried
out by the CTP since the 1940's, have usually been failures,
detracting from the prestige of the party as well as that
of labor. Since mid-1965, the CTP has displayed a degree
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of independence from party control, refusing unqualified
support of the Aprista position on certain issues. PAP
leaders have also reportedly agreed to requests from the
Aprista directors of the confederation for greater freedom
from party directives. These adjustments, if respected
in practice, could prove mutually beneficial to the party
and the confederation,
The decline of Aprista influence over both students
and labor will probably not be reversed without a re-
orientation of the party's program and a change in its
leadership. The weakness in these Aprista strongholds
is difficult to measure in terms of impact on voting
strength, but may in part foreshadow a critical period in
the party's history.
The Dilemma of the PAP and Aprismo
The PAP today holds many strong political assets
and advantages vis-a-vis its competition, inter alia:
organization, discipline, tradition, and programs. As
noted, it also will probably retain unity as long as
Haya stays on the scene.
But many of these assets may also be considered
among.the party's heaviest liabilities The PAP cannot
seem to erase the facts, myths, and distortions connected
with its violent and checkered history. Many still view
Aprismo as a:-kind of subversive, unpatriotic, international
conspiracy. Haya and the old-line leaders are still anathemas
to the military and powerful rightist elements, and the
passage of time has done little to change this.
Until freed of the old guard, the PAP's prospects
for winning executive power show only limited potential
for improvement over past experience. Moreover, the
monopoly of the mature Aprista leaders has no doubt dis-
couraged not only development of younger replacements but
has seriously inhibited the construction of a fresh faSade
for the party's programs. In addition, Haya's concentration
on his international stature and the Aprismo concept of
unity for the hemisphere have probably been a detriment
to the PAP, dissipating its energies and leaving it open
to charges that it is not a true, patriotic, national
organization. In this sense, Aprismo has clashed with
the strongest force in Latin America during the years
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since the PAP was founded-.the force of nationalism,
raw, violent, and often irrational.
In still another way, the PAP has gone against the
political trend in Peru as well as in less conservative
countries of Latin America. Many centrist and leftist
parties have turned increasingly to more radical programs
and promises of "fundamental reforms," "destruction of
privilege," "social justice," and similar planks in order
to appeal to the expanding electorate. Nationalistic
issues, promises for expropriation of foreign assets,
US-baiting, advocacy of extensive relations with Communist
bloc countries, expansion of state enterprises, and various
welfare measures are some of the principal themes..stressed
in these political campaigns. In contrast, the PAP has
moved back from the far left toward the center in the past
two decades, muting, moderating, or even dropping such
extremist attractions from its programs. In the view
of youth, intellectuals, and other radical elements, the
PAP and Aprismo apparently are becoming somewhat faded and
shopworn, in addition to being perennial losers.
Certain identifiable contingencies would undoubtedly
enhance the PAP's relatively strong position. These
include: the.disintegration of the AP at the close of
Beladnde's term of office; the departure of Haya along
with the emergence of new Aprista leaders with national
stature; the rejuvenation of the party program; and, perhaps
most important, the adoption of a true apolitical attitude
on the part of the armed forces, comprehending an Aprista
electoral victory. The PAP will have to make positive and
concerted efforts to encourage all but the first of these
contingencies. At present, however, there is little in-
dication that the party is planning or adopting measures
to bring about such results.
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