THE LEADERSHIP UPHEAVAL IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1966
• Content Type: FORM

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17 JUN 1966
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(Attacbsent to No. 1578/66, 17 June 66,
"The Leadership Upheaval to Ceunist
China," (SECRET) an revised 17 June)
The Honorable Bill Moye J
The Honorable Robert S. ss r=~
The noi pprove FFor a eas 2005/
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The Honorable Dean .
The Honorable Geo'ge W. Ball
The Honorable Wi ll ias Bundy.
General Earle G. Wheeler
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CLASS ATION
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
MEMO NO.:
SUBJECT:
REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY:
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
CLASSIFICATION
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'As SIFICA'1'1oN
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MEMO NO.
SUBJECT:
REQUESTED OR C)RIG-n:ATJ-..
ILLEGIB
~_~ =.11~,SIr IC'ATION
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 No.1578/66
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title il. Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The _ reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No, 1578/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 June 1966
The Leadership Upheaval in Communist China
Communist China has, in a sense, entered a transi-
tion period even before Mao's final departure. Mao's
absences from the public scene are growing longer and
longer, suggesting recurring illnesses, perhaps of
growing seriousness. Circumstances surrounding his
last absence for five and on.e-half months this past
winter and spring are unknown, but it is inconceivable
that events would have unfolded as they have if his
grip on the party had not slipped.
Mao Tse-tung probably remains the dominant leader,
and can probably impose his will, but at least since
November has not had the sure sustained control of
events that a party leader aims at; he is more de-
pendent on his key lieutenants than he used to be;
and not all of them are thoroughly reliable in his
terms. It is possible, moreover, that he is being
pushed. by ambitious colleagues to turn over to them
more and more of the party machinery and the authority
to make domestic and foreign policy decisions. It
could be that we are seeing the beginning of the end
of the long Mao era.
At the present moment, the situation is highly
fluid. Disclosures already made point to a power
play by Teng Hsiao-ping, the powerful general secre-
tary of the party, who seems to be making a bid to
replace Liu Shao-chi as Mao's deputy in the party
and therefore the heir apparent, and in this he may
be succeeding. Teng is probably working with or
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the office of National Estimates.
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:..No, 1578/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 June 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
The Leadership Upheaval in Communist China
SUMMARY
Communist China has, in a sense, entered a transi-
tion period even before Mao's final departure. Mao's
absences from the public scene are growing longer and
lon.ger., suggesting recurring illnesses, perhaps of
growing seriousness. Circumstances surrounding his
last absence for five and on.e-half months this past
winter and spring are unknown., but it is inconceivable
that events would have unfolded as they have if his
grip on the party had not slipped.
Mao Tse-tung probably remains the dominant leader,
and can probably impose his will, but at least since
November has not had the sure sustained control of
events that a party leader aims at; he is more de-
pendent on. his key lieutenants than he used to be;
and not all of them are thoroughly reliable in his
terms. It is possible, moreover, that he is being
pushed by ambitious colleagues to turn over to them
more and more of the party machinery and the authority
to make domestic and foreign policy decisions. It
could be that we are seeing the beginning of the end
of the long Mao era.
At the present moment, the situation is highly
fluid, Disclosures already made point to a power
play by Teng Hsiao-ping, the powerful general secre-
tary of the party, who seems to be making a bid to
replace Liu Shao-chi as Mao's deputy in the party
and therefore the heir apparent, and in this he may
be succeeding. Teng is probably working with or
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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using Lin Piao, whose place in. the army would make
him a useful ally. Teng probably built the case
that :Led to the recent ouster of Peng Chen, a rival
in Mao's inner circle of advisers, and is probably
attempting to place loyal followers in key spots
throughout the party, security, and military ap-
paratus. Peng Chen has already been replaced in the
Peking city apparatus with one of Teng's proteges.
Teng is in a key slot. As general secretary
of the party and ranking member of the secretariat,
he controls the day-to-day business of the party
machine. There are important parallels between Teng's
position, today and that of Stalin and Khrushchev when
they made their bids for supreme power.
The duration of this fight and its outcome are
conjectural. Forces have already been loosed which
may be hard to cage again. If the process is a
lengthy one--a definite possibility--it could turn
disorderly. Men who have submerged differences and
ambit:ion.s under Mao will not necessarily continue to
do so under his successor. The situation could even
degenerate into regionalism, which traditionally ap-
pears when central authority is weakened.
We do not expect to see abrupt shifts in do-
mestic or foreign policy while the struggle goes on.
All the contenders--Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping,
Chou ]gin-lai and Lin. Piao--are hardline Chinese Com-
munists, and quick changes are unlikely. There
might be some modifications in approach, however,
if only in reaction to the immobilism of Mao's de-
clining years. Any new leadership might, for ex-
ample, elect to turn the country's attention to the
problems it faces at home in an effort to get the
Chinese Communist revolution moving again.
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Table of Contents
THE LEADERSHIP UPHEAVAL IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Page
Summary i
The Fall of Peng Chen 1
The Power Struggle Continues 5
The Role of Mao Tse-tung and Others 8
The Period Just Ahead 11
ANNEXES: (A) Chronology of the Leadership
Struggle 1 September 1965
to Mid-June 1966
(B) Peng Chen.'s Activities Since
1 October 1965
(C) Treatment of Liu Shao-chi in
the Chinese Press Since
November 1965
(D) Status of Chinese Communist
Leaders
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The Fall of Peng Chen
1.. The Chinese Communist Party, long one of
the most stable and tightly knit in the Communist
world, is being racked by an. unprecedented chain. of
events which have already extended over six or more
months (a detailed chronology is provided as Annex
A). The external manifestations of the internal
realities of these events are fragmentary and usually
tardy. Firm conclusions as to what really is going
on are a risky business, since the known facts lend
themselves to several explanations.
21. Conceivably, Mao Tse-tung may be fully in.
charge of the purge of an errant comrade or two. If
so, he is proceeding in a most uncharacteristic way.
In the past, Mao has conducted his infrequent purges
by acting first and explaining to the Chinese public
later. He has shown a distaste for airing dirty
leadership linen in public. In the present case,
leading party journals have been openly and persis-
tently attacking one another over a period of months.
This we take to be a sure sign of disarray in the
higher councils of the party, from which normally
flow the rigid guidelines governing the makeup of
the publications.
The hypothesis which best fits this and
other unusual features of the Chinese political
landscape this past winter and spring is that a
genuine power struggle has been and is under way
in Peking. Central to this interpretation are both
the case of Peng Chen, until March one of the five
or six top Chinese Communists, and the indications
since his fall in April that some party leaders re-
main unsatisfied. Peng was a key figure in the con-
trol of the party apparatus, and it was whispered
in Peking that he was a leading contender for party
leadership after Mao was gone. As such he was a
natural rival of Teng Hsiao-ping, similarly placed
and with similar ambitions.
4. The case Teng built against Peng Chen, the
only important figure publicly removed so far, re-
veals tactics which may be used to bring down other
officials.
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5. Peng's authority stemmed primarily from his
senior positions in the politburo and the secre-
tariat;, the body responsible for running the party's
day to day affairs. He also performed largely cere-
monial functions as first secretary of the Peking
municipal party committee and mayor of Peking, and
it was through these positions that he was publicly
attacked.
6. The chief charge leveled against him, but
never specifically articulated, is that he tried to
pave the way for a coup d'etat. He reportedly did
this by directing party journals published by his
Peking committee to print numerous essays and ar-
ticles from 1959 through 1962 satirizing and slander-
ing Mao Tse-tung and the party. Writers employed by
him are now described as revisionist renegades of
the worst sort. They include men like Teng To, a
Peking party secretary, and Wu Han., a vice mayor of
Peking.
7. The major work which figured in the attack
on Peng; Chen was "Dismissal of Hai Jui," a play
written by Wu Han in January 1961. This play de-
picts the trials of a virtuous Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644) official who tried to help oppressed peasan.ts
and was dismissed by an unjust emperor for his pains.
Since April, all major party newspapers have seen
this as a symbolic play, in, which the leading figure
represented former defense minister Pen.g Te-huai,
purged as a "right opportunist" in August 1959. The
unjust emperor, of course, was taken to represent
Mao Tse-tung. The charges go on to claim that Wu
Han., working on behalf of right opportunists who
survived the 1959 purge, wrote the play both to pro-
test Peng's removal and to encourage other survivors
to wait for an opportunity to seize party leadership.
8. The charges make no effort to explain how
the true meaning of "Hai Jui" and other allegedly
slanderous material escaped the attention of the
party for so many years, and it is difficult on
other grounds to accept the charges at face value.
Peng Chen was long a member in good standing of the
dominant doctrinaire group of top leaders and had
risen in recent years. In 1964 Peng was brought into
the elite group of men identified as Mao's "close
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comrades-in.-arms." Liu Shao-chi, Chou En.-lai, Ten.g,
and Lin. Piao are the others given. this accolade.
As a hardliner, Peng has been, in. the forefront of
the anti-intellectual campaign. begun several years
ago by the regime.
9. The opening gun for the attack was fired
in the 10 November Shanghai Wen Hui Pao in an. ar-
ticle by Yao Wen-yuan, a name a er inked directly
with the attacking forces. Yao called "Hai Jul" a
big poisonous weed. The article was republished in.
the 29 November Liberation. Army Journal, which ap-
pended an. editorial note endorsing ao's view. The
journal later called this an "important, militant
and correct" view. The Peking Daily, published by
Peng's party committee, also reprinted Yao's article
on 29 November, but added a neutral editorial note
stating that "Hai Jui's" status was undetermined.
This stand was promptly endorsed explicitly by
People's Daily and implicitly by Red Flag, the
prestigious organs of the central committee itself.
10. The stand taken by these two organs means
that Peng, in effect, was being protected from at-
tacks by the party leader then in, charge, who would
have been Liu Shao-chi in Mao's absence. Peng's
heavy schedule of appearances from November through
March also indicates that his position remained se-
cure. In. that period he made numerous speeches,
some on important issues, and greeted many foreign
delegations. (See Annex B). On. 1 January, Red Flag
published a major statement which took an extremely
harsh line against "cultural" enemies and attrib-
uted this lin.e to Peng Chen, as well as to Mao and
Lin Piao. Peng's last major act was to host Le Duan.,
first secretary of the Vietnamese party, on his 22-
25 March visit to Peking. Le Duan. may still be
puzzling over that one.
11. During April, the case aimed at Peng Chen
began. building up in the party press in, a way indi-
cating that he had come under heavy attack in high
party circles about the end of March. Red Flag on.
5 April finally conceded that "Hai Jui" was indeed
an. antiparty, poisonous weed. People's Daily broke
down on. 8 April, admitting that "all" articles pub-
lished since November labeling "Hai Jui" a poisonous
weed had been correct.
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12. The ambivalent record of the two organs
later in. April, however, could suggest that Peng
was still being defended among top leaders who were
trying to mitigate the charges against him. Perhaps
a better explanation is that they had already thrown
Peng to the wolves and were busy trying to defend
themselves.
13. The next major development in the case
against Peng Chen. was an abject confession by Peking
Daily (Peng's journal) on. 16 April. This bore aIT-
t e earmarks of a last-minute, desperate attempt to
defend against behind-the-scenes attacks. The Peking
paper admitted that it had published much "antiparty"
material in 1961-62 and that the principal authors--
Ten.g To, Liao Mo-sha, and Wu Han, all Peng's subor-
din.ates--were members of an "antiparty gang." Neither
People's Daily nor Red Flag took note of the confession..
People's Daily on 19 April attacked a writer not con-
necEedwith the Peking apparatus, possibly to divert
attention from it. Red Flag on 29 April again at-
tacked Wu Han, but no eng To or Liao Mo-sha.
14. By early May, the fate of Peng Chen appeared
to be settled. The Liberation. Army Journal, which
has stayed in the forefront of the attack, declared
on 4 May that the party was engaged in. a "life and
death" combat with unnamed "right opportunists" within
the party. This was the first public revelation that
such enemies were currently active. On. 8 May, the
Liberation Army Journal unleashed a savage attack on
the Pe ing Daily and Teng To.
15. The army journals' onslaught signaled the
beginning of a nationwide campaign of extraordinary
intensity. For more than three weeks, all party
papers, including People's Daily and Red Flag, were
filled with attacks on Teng WS "black store."
Meetings and symposia were held throughout the na-
tion to denounce Teng To and his "backers." Expo-
sure of the "behind-the-scenes boss" was demanded
with increasing frequency. The Chinese people were
therefore well prepared for the disclosure on 3 June
that Peng Chen had been. dismissed. Peng has publicly
been. stripped only of his post as first secretary of
Peking, but the press has been treating his downfall
in all political roles as an accomplished fact.
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16. Behind these public revelations lie the
facts of the matter: that persons opposed to Peng
Chen used the intensifying anti-intellectual drive
set in motion by Mao in 1964 and 1965 to get Peng,
and that they carefully built a case against him.
The record indicates that Peng was brought down
shortly after his last public appearance on 29 March
and was formally stripped of his powers in early May,
possibly after a behind-the-scenes trial during
April.
The Power Struggle Continues
17. It is possible that Mao, morbidly suspicious,
was persuaded that Peng Chen was no longer reliable
and condoned the purge for this and no other reason.
This is not likely, however. The slow development
of the attacks against Peng and the growing signs
that other key figures fell with him and that still
others are under attack strongly suggest that this
is not a situation where a unified leadership under
Mao is conducting a purge, but that it is a genuine
power struggle.
18. The two ostensible charges against Peng--
that he is a bourgeois revisionist opposed to Mao's
thinking and that he aspired to the top post--are
implausible. Peng's record stamps him unmistakably
as a doctrinaire hardliner. He was sixth in the
power structure, and did not have enough power assets
to pull off a coup by himself.
19. As already noted, in the past when Mao
found it necessary to remove an errant comrade, he
moved quietly, not even hinting that a purge was
under way until it was an accomplished fact.
20. If this were a purge of men who could not
be trusted to carry out Mao's revolutionary line,
then. the wrong leaders have been brought down.
Peng Chen, and others on a growing list of suspects,
are hardbitten old revolutionaries, without an ounce
of softness, stamped in the same mold as Mao. They
are mainly key officials in the control apparatus of
the party and army, the kind of men one would expect
to see picked off early in a genuine power struggle.
(See Annex D)
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21. Signs of confusion at the top last winter
and spring--while Mao was out of sight--also argue
that the leadership had been disputing.
22. The clearest evidence that factions have
been disputing is the differing, and at times op-
posing, lines taken by major party journals since
last November. Liberation Army Journal was in. the
forefront of the attack that led ultimately to Peng
Chen.'s downfall. From November through March,
People's Daily and Red Flag were trying to soften.
and deflect the attack: The two fell in line after
1 May, but there are still signs of differences,
and the army paper continues in. the forefront. Its
attacks have been. consistently sharper than those
of the two central committee publications, and other
differences remain..
23. So far the Liberation Army Journal has not
attacked the People's Daily and Red Flag by name,
as it did Pen.g en s e ing Daily.`3t has criti-
cized stands taken by the pair an implied that they
had lagged in'the struggle. On. 17 May the army
journal blasted the "absurd" view set forth by the
People's Daily on 14 April that the purpose of put-
ts gnti poicsin command was to get work done. Ac-
cording to Liberation. Army Journal, the purpose
should be to revolutionize people' s outlook.
24. On 6 June the Liberation Army Journal pub-
lished a list of key statements on the struggle that
have appeared in various party journals. The paper
represented itself and the Shanghai Wen. Hui Pao as
being in. the forefront of attacks launched in-
No-vember 1965, with Red Flag entering the fray in Feb-
ruary and People's Daily in June. This version of
history, however, was promptly disputed in an 11 June
NCNA (.New China News Agency) broadcast. The broad-
cast agreed that Shanghai Wen. Hui Pao had launched
the attack, but did not credit the Liberation Army
Journal with playing a role until May. e first
follow=ups to the Shanghai attack cited by NCNA were
articles that had appeared in Red Flag and People's
Daily in early April.
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25. It is reasonably clear by now that a group
controlling the Liberation Army Journal and the Shang-
hai Wen. Hui Pao has been attacking t e group in con-
trol of the major central committee organs, People's
Daily, Red Flag, and NCNA. The attackers appeared
to have won the first round by early May, but the
struggle is far from ended.
26. The Liberation Army Journal has been, de-
scribed recently as an organ of e military affairs
committee of the central committee. Because of its
responsibility for indoctrination in the armed forces,
the general political department (which is subordinate
to Terig Hsiao-ping's secretariat) may actually publish
the paper. In any event, the editor in chief is an
old associate of Teng's.
27'. The Shanghai Wen. Hui Pao is published by the
East China bureau of the party. This bureau has been
without an announced head since April 1965, and is
quite likely being run directly by the secretariat.
28. The People's Daily and Red Flag, the party's
most authorita ive journals, have a ways been con-
trolled by the top leadership. Their secondary, and
at times defensive, role in developing the attacks
on party "enemies" is significant; it indicates that
the entrenched top leadership team of Mao and Liu
was not behind the attacks.
29. Mao himself may not necessarily be under
attack. He could, however, be under strong pressure
to replace Liu with a more impressive deputy to
serve during his absences.
30. Much of the vacillation apparent in People's
Daily and Red Flag recently could be explainey
Mao's reluctance to turn against his old comrade
Liu. Or, since Mao presumably condoned the ouster
of Peng Chen, a Liu protege, he may have already
agreed to retire Liu, but is still undecided on his
replacement,
31.. Whatever the explanation, fresh disclosures
of leadership turnover are expected. Since Pen.g's
announced ouster on 3 June, the Peking press has
hinted several times that there are "party overlords"
and enemies in "very high positions" who will not be
able to conceal themselves much longer.
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The Role of Mao Tse-tung and Others
Mao Tse-Tung
His absences from
public view are getting longer and longer. He did
not make a single public appearance between 26 No-
vember last year and early May. On 10 May Peking
announced that he recently met with a visiting Al-
banian delegation. He has not reappeared.
34. The meeting came at a time when diplomatic
rumors and press stories that Mao was incapacitated
had reached a high point. Foreign press speculation
to this effect had drawn angry denials from Chinese
Communist Foreign Ministry spokesmen on 26 March and
3 May.
35. Mao's grip on party affairs appeared to be
weak during his absence. This is suggested by a num-
ber of things. Almost immediately after Mao went
out of sight on. 26 November, party newspapers began
taking opposing positions on, issues which led to
the ouster of Peng Chen.
36. There was a remarkable upsurge in adulatory
attention to Mao as an institution in the Chinese
press from December through March, and again in June
as all. parties tried to wrap themselves in Mao's
mantle.
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37. Most signs of leadership confusion since
November occurred during his long absence. He prob-
ably was incapacitated, especially in the early
months of his absence, but he has been able to
exercise a greater unifying influence since his
return.. In, general, however, his position, seems
to have been weakened and his current role must be
put down as uncertain.
38. The role of Liu Shao-chi, who has been.
Mao's deputy in the party and chosen successor since
the mid-50s, is equally in question. It is diffi-
cult to see how Liu could avoid being weakened by
his irresolute leadership from November through
March as well as by Peng's downfall. Peng had been
Liu's deputy in the party from 1949 to 1954 when
Teng Hsiao-ping came in and squeezed Peng out of
the inner circle. Liu was presumably at least
partially responsible for Peng's comeback in recent
years.
39. Liu's appearances since Peng was brought
down in March and the slight but perhaps significant
change in treatment of him in the Peking press sug-
gest that his party stature has declined. From 22
March to 20 April, during a period of intense po-
litical infighting in Peking Liu was out of town.
I IThere was no reception for him on his return
to e :Lng or even an acknowledgement that he was
back. No precedent is known for this omission. Even
minor officials are greeted publicly on their return
from abroad. Liu did not appear with Mao at his re-
surfacing ceremony in May. Liu's place at Mao's
right hand was taken by Teng Hsiao-ping.
40. Liu continues to appear routinely in his
ceremonial role as chief of state (Chairman of the
Chinese People's Republic), but press attention to
him as a leader and ideological authority has dropped
off since March. All top leaders are normally greatly
overshadowed by the attention given to Mao, but for
several years Liu, more than his colleagues, has
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been allowed to share a small part of the limelight.
His work "How To Be a Good Communist" has been recom-
mended,alon.g with Mao's works, as ideological study
material. Liu had been described as an, effective
leader, a reliable interpreter of Mao, and--along
with Mao--an authority for domestic policies. Last
winter Liu's name was cited in this manner two or
three times a month, but few such references have
been rioted since March. (See Annex C)
Tong Hsiao-ping
41. On the surface, the three remaining men in
the top power structure--Teng Hsiao-ping, Chou En.-
lai, and Lin Piao--appear to have remained in good
shape or gained as a result of recent developments.
All appeared with Mao Tse-tung in early May. Photo-
graphs of that meeting show Teng, Chou, and Lin, in
that order, sitting to the right of Mao.
42. At the moment, Teng seems to be gaining.
The removal of a potent rival, Peng Chen, strengthens
his position.. Peng's replacement as first secretary
of the Peking city apparatus, North China party boss
Li Hsueh-feng, probably is a protege of Teng's. Few
of the key officials who dropped out of sight with
Peng had important past connections with Teng, who
may well be replacing them with his own loyal. fol-
lowers. The most important official whose status
is in. question is Lo Jui-ching, army chief of staff
and top security chief. Lo has not appeared since
27 November and, according to diplomatic rumors in
Peking, was removed in March. A likely replacement
for him, at least in the security job, would be Min-
ister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih, a long-time
Teng man .
43. Premier Chou En-lai, China's Mikoyan in
terms of flexibility, appears thus far to have
managed to stay aloof from the struggle. He is a
useful technician and as such has a good chance to
survive.
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Lin Piao
44. Contrary to western. press speculation, De-
fense Minister Lin Piao probably is not a contender
for the top slot. His name is sometimes used to re-
inforce Mao's authority, but this practice goes back
several years. Exhortations to study the instruc-
tions of Lin Piao as well as Mao have appeared with
increasing frequency since the publication of a ma-
jor article by Lin in September 1965.
45. Lin Piao may be cooperating with Teng Hsiao-
ping, presumably the driving force behind the attacks.
Lin's place in the army would make him a useful ally.
It is unlikely that Lin himself, with his long record
of illness and absence from public life, seriously
aspires to the top job. This and the fact that Lin
has little strength in the party may be reasons why
Teng might be willing to work with him. It is pos-
sible that Mao now considers Lin Piao a suitable
interim successor. If so, Teng might acquiesce, be-
lieving he could use Lin as a front man.
46. Lin. has a brilliant record as a revolutionary
field commander and is the only military man in the
inner circle. This in itself makes him an unlikely
candidate for the top post in a state that places
such great stress on party primacy over the army.
47'. Thus, on the basis of all information
available to us, we believe that a struggle for
Mao's mantle has already broken out and will go on
until Mao finally does shuffle off and his successor
is able to consolidate power. Although the struggle
has developed with a rapidity which must have been
startling to some in. Peking, its duration and out-
come are uncertain at this point of time.
48. The process could turn out to be even more
disorderly than it has been so far. We cannot ex-
pect men who have submerged their personalities and
ambitions for years under Mao's restraining hand to
be equally willing to do so for another figure. Mao
was absent for five and one-half months this past
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winter and spring and was probably ill for some part
of this period. His absence seems to have reminded
party officials that he will not be around forever.
Signs of disarray were not long in appearing.
49. There is indeed a chance that Mao's final
removal will permit differences to be brought more
clearly into the open. This could lead to overt
factionalism, affecting the cohesion and direction
of the regime. If the struggle is protracted we
may even see a recrudescence of regionalism, which
traditionally appears in China when the central au-
thority is weakened.
50. The possibility of such a series of devel-
opments would be less if the hard-driving Teng Hsiao-
ping were able to bring down his major party rivals
before Mao goes. He has already been instrumental
in Pen;g Chen.'s downfall. In the process he has prob-
ably weakened Liu and possibly even Mao. He has not
yet won all the cards. He could still be stopped if
his potential victims were to write and work ener-
getically against him. Now, however, the tide seems
to be running in his favor.
51. As we see it now, the struggle among the
leaders is primarily over power, not issues. Its
public manifestations have been couched in terms of
hard-core revolutionary purity and an absolute fi-
delity to the thought of Mao Tse-tung. The attackers
present themselves as unswerving champions of both,
willing and able to spot the first hint of deviation.
Those attacked are presented in this material as
having tried over a period of years to besmirch the
true revolutionaries, undercut Mao's thought, and
restore the hated bourgeoisie. These an.tiparty ele-
ments are shielded by "knuckleheaded" party leaders
who cannot tell a fragrant flower from a poisonous
weed.
52. Such charges and testaments of orthodoxy
are, however, poor guides to what the attackers
actually represent and will do if they win. out.
In. the Soviet Union the attackers sometimes stole
the very policies espoused by those they attacked
and vanquished. It is too early to speculate as
to what will come out of the struggle in the way
of specific policy.
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53. Some special remarks can, perhaps, be made.
It seems fair to say that for the duration of the
struggle, the attention of the top men in Peking
will be fastened on the issue of personal survival.
Abrupt shifts in policy--or even in the execution
of established policy--do not seem likely either at
home or abroad. There is already evidence that the
disarray at the top is breeding confusion at the
lower levels.
54. All the contenders for the leadership are
confirmed and practicing dogmatic Communists, and
this is not likely to change no matter who comes
out on top. There might be changes in approach,
however, if only in reaction to the immobilism of
Mao's declining years, which has gained the Chinese
precious little at home and led to a series of set-
backs abroad. Future Chinese leaders would surely
wish to better this record, and could conceivably
turn 'their attention to an effort to get the nation
rolling again. The task at home will be formidable,
especially since the party apparatus is likely to
be damaged and made less effective by fallout from
the power struggle.
55. We see no reason to expect any changes
from the present implacable hostility toward the US.
Nor do we see Chinese leaders moving quickly to kiss
and make up with the Soviets. Basic changes, of
course, are possible over the long term but the
shift would take time.
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ANNEX A
CHRONOLOGY OF THE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
SEPTEMBER 1965 to MID-JUNE 19-6T--
Sep 65
AT A PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM,
MAO SAYS IT IS NECESSARY TO CRITICIZE
"BOURGEOIS REACTIONARY THINKING."
LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL ON 6 JUNE
3966IMPLIED IS INSPIRED CURRENT
STRUGGLE.
1 Oct Routine National Day speech. by Pen.g
Chen.
SHANGHAI WEN HUI PAO (A PARTY PAPER
PUBLISHED 1 I) LABELED WU HAN'S
1961 PLAY "DISMISSAL OF HAI JUI" A
"POISONOUS WEED." LATER SAID TO BE
OPENING GUN IN ATTACKS AIMED AT PENG
CHEN. THIS INITIAL CRITICISM, BY AN
UNKNOWN WRITER YAO WEN-YUAN, CHARGED
WU HAN WITH PRETTIFYING THE FEUDAL
CLASS IN HIS PORTRAYAL OF .HAI JUI AS
A VIRTUOUS MING DYNASTY OFFICIAL WHO
HAD THE PEASANTS' INTERESTS AT HEART.
WU HAN WAS ACCUSED OF OPPOSING THE
COMMUNES IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF HAI
JUI'S EFFORTS TO GET LAND RETURNED TO
THE PEASANTS.
12 Nov Liberation Daily (Shanghai municipal
party committee organ, not the Liber.a-
tiOn Army Journal) reprints Yao's
artic e.
Liu Shao-chi drops out of sight, does
not reappear for two months.
24-26 Nov East China provincial committee organs
reprint Yao's article.
Mao, Chen Po-ta drop from sight (Chen
is a politburo member, ghost writer
for Mao, and editor of Red Flag.)
Lo Jui-ching, army chief of staff,
made his last noted appearance, it
was in Shanghai.
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28 Nov 65 Shanghai Wen Hui Pao initiates a column
for discussion, calls for "hundred
flowers," i.e., open, debate.
29 Nov Yang Shang-kun, Mao's aide-de-camp,
drops from sight.
29 Nov LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL REPRINTS YAO'S
10 NOVEMBER ARTICLE, LABELS HAI JUI A
"POISONOUS WEED,"
29 Nov PEKING DAILY (ORGAN PEKING MUNICIPAL
PARTY COMMITTEE) ALSO REPRINTS YAO,
BUT EDITOR'S NOTE CALLS FOR "HUNDRED
FLOWERS" DEBATE.
30 Nov PEOPLE'S DAILY (THE ORGAN OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE KES HAI JUI A NATIONAL IS-
SUE BY REPRINTING YAO BUT IT ENDORSES
PEKING DAILY'S VIEWS; EDITOR'S NOTE
CALLS H NDRED FLOWERS'! DEBATE.
6 Dec Shanghai Wen Hui Pao prints a box-score
on which papers had printed what on
"Hai Jul."
RED FLAGARTICLE IMPLICITLY ENDORSES
REFUSAL-OF PEOPLE'S DAILY AND PEKING
DAILY TO CALL HAI JUI 'POISONO US
WEED."
13 Dec Peking municipal party committee spon-
sors forum of literature students to
discuss Hai Jui; Teng To, a committee
official, speaks, defends Wu Han,
criticizes Yao's article on Hai Jui.
15 Dec People's Daily presents summary of
views on Hai ui; editor's note finds
weaknesses but still does not condemn
27 Dec Peking Daily publishes a self-serving
criticism ~y Wu Han, Wu admits to un-
intended error but says he wished to
portray true character of Hai Jui and
thus prevent "right opportunists" from
using him.
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30 Dec 65 People's Daily republishes Wu Han's
see -criticism,
1 Jan 66 RED FLAG PUBLISHES SPEECH BY CHOU YANG,
A-MA(TVSPOKESMAN AND REGIME'S CHIEF
HATCHETMAN IN CULTURAL MATTERS. AL-
LEGEDLY GIVEN ON 29 NOVEMBER, IT WAS
ONE OF BITTEREST ATTACKS EVER MADE
AGAINST INTELLECTUALS. CHOU QUOTES
PENG CHEN AS AN AUTHORITY, CITES LIN
PIAO'S INSTRUCTIONS AS RIGHT FOR ALL
CULTURAL WORKERS, FAILS TO CALL "HAI
JUI" A POISONOUS WEED.
Shanghai symposium discusses Wu Han.'s
self-criticism; some defend, most are
critical. Wen. Hui Pao in publishing
minutes labels Fie sf-criticism a
counterattack and charges that he
actually had been trying to support
"right opportunists" in Hai Jui.
People's Daily reprints the minutes
of the symp?sum and the Wen Hui Pao
comment.
21 Jan. Liu Shao-chi reappears.
Signed article in People's Daily charges
that Wu Han, Tien. 1Han an:dTh 't:6 i d writer
wrote "ant;iparty" plays in 1.961. First
antiparty charge levelled at Wu Han.
Brunt of attack aimed at Tien Han, who
has no connection with Peking city,
was not mentioned in later Liberation
Army Journal charges. Red Flag addresses itself to Hai Jui,
deSCrlU-6s Wu Han as anti--Marxist but
not as antiparty; claims he aimed ai
class reconciliation, not class struggle.
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27 Feb 66 Red Flag again attacks those who will
not appl I y "class struggle" to history
and will not put history in service
of politics; this again is "anti-
Marxist."
3 Mar Teng Hsiao-ping drops out of sight and
remains out through March.
Possibly Mar Ouyan.g Chin, believed to be a protege
of Peng Chen, replaced as first secre-
tary of Heilungkiang Province.
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High Soviet officials indicate Chinese
still expected to attend Soviet congress.
Peking sends letter refusing invitation
to Soviet congress.
Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen
Yi leave Peking for Urumchi, in far
western China, as first step in a for-
eign tour.
22 Mar Ai Ssu-chi's funeral committee: Peng
Chen is chairman., Teng To a member.
Historian Chien Po-tsan first comes
under attack. Red Flag and People's
Daily accuse him of taking a "bourgeois"
view of history and call him the "chief
anti-Marxist" historian, along with
Wu Han, to have emerged in recent years.
Apparently, this is an, attempt to divert
attention from Wu Han as the dominant
culprit.
26 Mar PEKING SAYS THAT MAO IS NOT ILL.
26 Mar Liu and Chen Yi leave Urumchi for West
Pakistan..
Peng Chen, makes a speech at-Peking
rally for visiting Japanese Communists;
speech is tough, anti-Soviet.
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5 Apr
PENG CHEN MAKES HIS LAST APPEARANCE.
RED FLAG DESCRIBES HAI JUI AS "POISONOUS
WEED," CHARGES THAT WU HAN WAS PROMOTING
AN "IMPORTANT GENERAL" OF RIGHT OPPOR-
TUNISM WHO HAD BEEN DISMISSED IN 1959
(FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER PENG TE--HUAI).
ALSO, FOR FIRST TIME, RED FLAG DESCRIBES
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5 Apr Liberation Army Journal editorial, on
p'o1itics a--#Tie ore says "old com-
rades" and those in "high positions"
must engage in self-criticism.
7 Apr People's Daily links Hai Jui. directly
to the 195 Lushan plenum of the cen-
tral committee. Paper all but explicitly
charges that Hai. Jui in reality repre-
sents Peng Te-hua:iand that Wu Han was
inciting surviving members of Peng's
group to try a comeback.
A-5
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ANNEX C
TREATMENT OF LIU SHAO-CHI IN THE CHINESE PRESS
SINCE NOVEMBER 196b
For several years the Chinese press
and radio have been building up Liu Shao-chi
as an ideological authority, an effective
leader, a reliable interpreter of Mao, and
Mao's deputy. This buildup has been in a
low key, with usually only one or two refer-
ences a month to Liu's name in this manner.
No other leader besides Mao has been given
this attention, however, and it has been
clearly designed to groom Liu as Mao's suc-
cessor.
This list of references to Liu's name
is limited to those that deal with his party
role and his writings, and does not include
his numerous public activities as ceremonial
chief of state.
The attention to Liu in his party role
was heavier than usual last winter and spring,
but dropped off after March.
In this listing, SCMP is an abbreviation
for "Survey of China Mainland Press" published
by the American Consulate General in Hong
Kong. All references to "FBIS" are to the
FBIS Far East Daily book.
--4 November 1965, Peking, Kuang-ming Daily: An article
on agricultural middle schooossta -e ave not
sufficiently studied and implemented the directives
of the party center, Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu,
and as our experience is still inadequate, there are
still many problems in our work." (SCMP 3582, 22
November 1965)
--5 December 1965, Peking, NCNA: Peking reported that
a National Conference on Part-Work Part-Study Education
in cities "was called under the direct leadership of
the party central committee and Chairman. Liu and pre-
sided over by the Ministry of Education. Chairman Liu,
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Premier Chou, and other leaders gave important in-
structions at the conference. The conference re-
called the instructions given by the party central
committee, Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu about the
party's educational guideline." (SCMP 3598,
15 December 1965)
--8 December 1965, Nanking, NCNA: At a National
Conference of Higher Education held in Nanking dele-
gates "studied Chairman Mao's idea of education and
Chairman Liu's instructions about enforcing two
laboring systems and two educational systems and
intensifying spare-time education and the CCP cen-
tral committee's related documents." (SCMP 3599,
16 December 1965)
--9 December 1965, Peking, NCNA: Minister of Higher
Education told a rally of young people on the 30th
anniversary of the "December 9 movement" that Liu
Shao-chi had organized and led the movement. The
front-page of the 9 December issue of Jen-min
Jih-pao headlined both Mao and Liu's role in the
movement, with calligraphy of both priminently dis-
played. (SCMP 3597, 14 December 1965)
--18 December 1965, Peking, Liberation Army Journal:
An editorial quoted Liu's How To Be Good Communist
in exhorting every member of-the ommunist Party, of
the Communist Youth League and the PLA to emulate
Wang Chieh in "absolute obedience to the Party's
orders." (SCMP 3606, 29 December 1965)
--31 December 1965, Peking, People's Daily: An article
by Soong Ching-ling reviewing 16 years of "liberation"
quoted Liu (The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China):
"...We have in practice oiscovere the road t~ia , under
the prevailing conditions in our country, will lead to
the gradual transition from socialist collective owner-
ship to socialist ownership by the whole people, and
to the future gradual transition from socialism to
communism in the countryside." (FBIS, 5 January 1966)
--24 January 1966, Peking, Radio: A report by Hsiao
Hua, director of the General Political Department of
the PLEA, at a PLA conference on political work quoted
Liu on cadre relationship with the "masses." (FBIS,
27 January 1966)
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--3 February 1966, Canton, Yang-ch'en.g Wan-pao: An
article by a regimental comman er in Canton tells how
he studied Chairman Liu's directive requiring leading
cadres to work at selected spots at the basic level
and this "made his regiment technically proficient."
(SCMP 3637, 14 February 1966)
--7 February 1966, Peking, NCNA, English; 10 February
1966, Peking, NCNA, English; 11 February 1966, Canton,
Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao: These items dealt with the
February campaign-fo "emulate" Chiao Yu-lu. They all
mentioned the two books found under the pillow of
Chiao's sickbed: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung and
Liu Shao-chi's How T& Be A Good Communist. (SCMP
3639-3641, 16-18 February_196
--12 February 1966 Peking Radio (on the transfer of
the department of philosophy of China People's Univer-
sity to a commune in Peking's suburbs): "Old teaching
method consisted entirely of lectures, unsatisfactory.
Now students work... When Ch Mao and Ch Liu gave their
views in support of the work-study educational system,
the department discussed the possibilities and, in the
summer of 1964, started a work-study course on an
experimental basis..." (FBIS, FE, 23 Feb 66)
--18 and 25 February 1966, Peking Review (issues 8 and
9): Both issues had. items on Chiao Yu-lu and both
included the reference to the two books found under
Chiao's pillow: the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung
and Liu's How To Be A o0 ommu~ nist?
--19 February 1966, Peking Radio: Peking announced
that it was "equally necessary" for "leading cadres
at all levels" of the army to "repeatedly study" three
of Mao's works and Liu's How To Be A Good Communist.
--2 March 1966, Peking, Liberation Army Journal: This
article used Liu as a source Tor stressingie impor-
tance of Mao's work "as highest directive for all PLA
work." ..."More than 20 years ago Comrade Liu already
said: 'When the revolution was directed by Mao and
his thinking,it would win victories and achieve develop-
ment. Whenever it was separated from the direction
of Comrade Mao and his thinking, it would fail and fall
back.' This is the conclusion of history: nothing else
is so efficacious as the thought of Mao Tse-tung."
(SCMP 3652, 8 March 1966)
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--8 April 1966, Canton, Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao: Cadres
in the Central-South Bureau of the CCP referred to
Liu's writing in discussions on the need to study
Mao's works. (SCMP 3680, 19 April 1966)
--31 March 1966, Urumchi Radio: Foreign Minister
Chen Yi spoke at a banquet, given by the Hotien CCP
committee honoring the visit of Liu and Chen, at
which he stated: "It is hoped that cadres at all
levels and the masses will study Chairman Mao's
works seriously and Chairman Liu's works, work well,
produce more grain and industrial goods..." (FBIS,
4 April 1966)
--April/May 1966, Liu met Albanians in his role as
Party Vice Chairman.
--May 1966, China Pictorial., both English and Chinese
versions, date of pu icaton uncertain but probably
early May: The lead article was titled "Chiao Yu-lu,
Good Student of Chairman Mao" and contained the
reference to the two books found under Chiao's pil-
low: the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tun.g and Liu's
How To Be A Good Communist.
--9 May 1966, Canton, Nan-fang Jih-pao: A hsien
party committee decided that works of Mao and Liu
should be studied for the next two months and be
used "as weapons for thought reform." (SCMP 3702,
20 May 1966)
--18 May 1966, People's Daily carries a long article
attacking Teng To, wrften y four Chinese People's
University staffers, in which Comrade Liu Shao-chi's
speech at the 1961 celebration of the 40th anniver-
sary of the founding of the CCP is mentioned as
praising Mao's works at the same time that Teng To
is ridiculing one of them.
--21 May 1966, Kweiyang Radio: A work-study con-
ference in Kweichow Province reviewed the "relevant
instructions" by Mao and Liu on the educational
system. (FBIS, 26 May 1966)
--2 June 1966, Central-South China regional party
boss Tao Chu praises the accomplishments of the
masses of people from the home villages "the two
chairmen, Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi." People's
Daily carries Tao's speech on the first page of its
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3 June issue. This is a mention of Liu in his
ceremonial role.
--6 June 1966, People's Daily, on page 4, prints a
summary of an. ar i~ cfe inert e April issue of the
Australian. Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) journal
which is largely devoted to the value of Mao's "On
Contradictions" and "On Practice" in training Com-
munist Party members. In. the last paragraph, the
document is quoted as saying: "Marxism-Leninism
definitely strives to create a new man, to create
the kind of man spoken of by Liu Shao-chi in his
How To Be A Good Communist."
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ANNEX D
Status of Chinese Communist Leaders
Normally in a Communist state the power structure equates roughly to the
Central Committee. In China, however, the current central committee was
formed ten years ago, and many members have become inactive for one reason
or another, while some who are not central committee members have risen to
positions of authority. The following list includes the men who were at the
top of the apparent power structure in 1965, plus selected provincial leaders
whose career have been connected to either Peng Chen or Teng Ilsiao-ping.
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I. LEADERS WHOSE STATUS IS IN QUESTION
Number
of Appearances
Last Noted 31 Oct 65 to date
Appearance With With With
Name Positions as of 13 June Teng Both Peng if any, with Teng or Peng
Party and Security
Officials
P'eng Chen ......... Politburo and secretariat member, one of Mao's inner 29 Mar 66
circle of advisers; 1st secretary and mayor of Peking
Lo Jui-ch'ing ........ Army chief of staff; chief of secret police; party secre- 27 Nov 65
tariat; secretary general of Military Affairs Committee
of CCP-CC
Lu Ting-i ........... Director, party propaganda department; alternate polit-
buro member and secretariat member
Yang Shang-k'un ..... Mao's personal aide and party secretariat alternate
member
First important target and victim of current power struggle.
A Mao protege. As one of few Chinese leaders to hold a considerable power position with
a large degree of independence from General Secretary Teng, he would be, like Peng,
a natural rival with Teng for the succession. He is rumored in Peking diplomatic circles
to have been ousted about late March.
Close to Mao. Has not been seen in Peking since 28 February; noted at undated appear-
ances in provinces in March.
An Tzu-wen ......... Director, party organization department (dealing with 25 Mar 66
personnel)
Chou Yang .......... Deputy Director, party propaganda department 3 Jan 66
Military Men
connection with anti-Mao "28 Bolsheviks" in 1930s, but has worked as Mao's personal
link with the secretariat since 1956.
0 1 Possibly Peng .............
Hsiao Hua .......... Head of army's General Political Department;. deputy 27 Mar 66 0 2 1
secretary general of MAC
Nieh Jung-then ...... Runs advanced weapon program; MAC Vice Chairman 1 Oct 65 ... , . .
Yang Yung .......... Commander, Peking Military Region 8 Feb 66 ... . , . ...
Wang Shu-sheng ..... Vice Minister of National Defense 20 Jan 66
Hsiao Ching-kuang ... Navy commander 23 Feb 68
Yang Ch'eng-wu ..... Deputy chief of staff
Chang Ai-p'ing ...... Deputy Chief of Staff 27 Mar 66 ... ... ...
ri n r-ro she Vice MMinister Nat' v uw Defense ,.1 DefenSc ivl M dr W 66 n
.,.......~,.-,... ng .,w ..,,..w. u v 1
......
Liang Pi-yeh ........ Deputy Director, General Political Department, PLA 14 Feb 66 0 0 1
Provincial Leaders
Liu Jen ............. 2nd Secretary, Peking
Ou-yang Ch'in ....... 1st Secretary, Heilungkiang
Tian Ch'i-lung ....... 1st Secretary, Shantung
Chia Ch'i-ydn ....... 1st Secretary, Kweichow
Huang Ou-tung ...... Governor, Liaoning
Ch'en P'ei-hsien ...... 1st Secretary, Shanghai
Li Pao-hua .......... 1st Secretary, Anhwei
Lin T'ieh ........... 1st Secretary, Hopeh
Ma Ming-fang ....... 3rd Secretary, Northeast Bureau
26 Mar 66 0 0 3
10 Feb 66 ...
29 Mar 66 ... . , . ...
5 Apr 66 ...
6 Mar 66
14 Feb 66
Apr 66
24 Mar 66
Mar 66
Part of Mao's brain trust since 1937, has held his present job since 1955, has been a chief
spokesman for Mao's policies in the field of culture.
... Has served as political commissar under Lin Piao and Yang Yung.
.. Closely allied with Chou En-lai throughout his career. A former Marshal.
Listed as possibly a Teng Has served primarily (1939-52) under Liu Po-ch'eng and his political commissar, Teng;
has also served under P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, and Hsd Hsiang-ch'ien. As Peking
commander, he presumably worked closely with P'eng Chen.
Activities have been primarily military, avoiding involvement in political shakeups.
Served under Lin Piao in late 1940s; went to school with Liu Shao-ch'i and probably Mao;
studied in Moscow for several years.
Political commissar of air force 1957-65; Deputy PC 1954-57; before that a political com-
missar in Kwangsi Military District. The Air Force was attacked by Liberation Army
Journal on 20 May for its ideological problems.
Deputy to Nieh Jung-then, early 1950s; succeeded Nieh as Peking Military Region Com-
mander (1954-1959), and as such associated with P'eng Chen; Air Defense commander
in late 1950s.
P -ably a I eng leuuai parow62.
Peng (entire career) ...... Replaced by Wu Te, 3 Jun 66.
Possibly Peng ............. Replaced by P'an Fu-sheng, May 66.
... Branch of Teng To's "black store" exposed in Shantung Province in May 66.
... Branch of "black store" exposed in Kweichow Province 5 June 66; Chia, best-known as
incompetent head of State Statistical Bureau during Leap Forward, was made head of
Kweichow party in summer (Jul or Aug) 1965.
Possibly Peng .............
Named to succeed the late K'o Ch'ing-shih, who was possibly a Peng man, in Nov 65.
Possibly Peng ............. A "black store" has been identified in Anhwei.
A schoolmate of Kao Kang and Hsi Chung-hsiin, he also served under Teng and was probably
moved into NE Bureau to help weed out Kao supporters.
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 ApprftvqL AffE gle1 020 ?Na1 T&If ER 733
Party and Government Officials
Number
of Appearances
31 Oct 65 to date
With With With
Teng Both Peng
Last Noted
Appearance
as of 13 June
Party and Government
Officials
Mao Tse-tung ........ Chairman, CCP and Politburo
Liu Shao-ch'i ....... Chairman, PRC (ceremonial chief of state), and Mao's
7 Jun 66
chosen successor since 1959 as Vice Chairman, CCP
and Politburo
Teng Hsiao-p'ing ..... General Secretary, CCP; Politburo and ranking secre-
11 May 66
tariat member; Vice Premier (Acting Premier in
Chou's absence)
12 2 1
Lin Piao ............ Minister of National Defense; Vice Chairman, CCP and May 66 1 0 0
Politburo; First Vice Chairman, CC Military Affairs
Committee
Li Hsien-nien ........ Politburo; overseer of 4 finance and trade ministries; 13 Jun 66 9 4 5
Minister of Finance; party secretariat
Ch'en Yi ............ Minister of Foreign Affairs; Politburo
Po I-po ............. Director, Industry and Communications Staff Office
(overseeing 24 industrial ministries); also heads State
Economic Commission; Vice Premier; Alternate Polit-
buro member
T'ao Chu ........... Chief, Central-South Regional Bureau
Li Fu-eh'un ......... Chairman, State Planning Commission; Politburo and
As Mao's personal position of leadership can hardly be helped by the present divisive party
struggle, it is possible that Mao had already lost partial control of the party machinery
to Teng after a serious illness last winter.
As the long-established heir-designate to Mao, Liu has undoubtedly lost stature as the
result of current party in-fighting. There is further evidence that the low-key process
of grooming him for the succession virtually halted at about the time of P'eng's political
demise in March.
Occupies strategic position in placement of top personnel and transmission of party policy;
third in power structure since mid-1950's, he appears to have benefitted the most from
the political demise of his rival for leadership withip the radical wing of the party, P'eng
Chen. May now play the leading role in party.
Once the focus of loyalty for the party's "moderates," he appears so far to have gone along
with, perhaps even abetted, Teng's drive. He is a useful technician and probably
will survive.
Lin is the only leader besides Mao to have been cited as an ideological authority during the
past two months in the major party journals. It is likely, however, that he is being used
as little more than a front man for Teng. A former Marshal.
An unlikely ally of Teng, Li has managed so far to stay out of obvious trouble, like Chou.
In most respects closely associated with Chou, but may have profited from the purge of
Jao Shu-shin and, thus, from Teng's concomitant rise. A former Marshal.
man ....... One of Peking's three top economic administrators, aligned with radical group during
Great Leap. ,
2PRM 00001 i
Est. Associations,
if any, with Teng or Peng Comment
14 May 66 10 3 0 Possibly a Teng
secretariat member
T'an Chen-lin ....... Coordinator of four agriculture and forestry ministries;
11 May 66
Politburo and secretariat member
Li Ching-ch'uan ...... Heads Southwest Bureau of CCP; Politburo member
1 May 66
Li Hsueh-feng ....... Heads North China Bureau of CCP; now also 1st Secre-
11 May 66
tary, Peking; secretariat member
K'ang Sheng ........ Secretariat and alternate politburo member
11May66
Liu Lan-t'ao ......... Heads Northwest Bureau of CCP; alternate party secre-
22 May 66
tariat member
Hsieh Fu-chip ....... Minister of Public Security, also overseeing Ministry of
Internal Affairs; Vice Premier
Sung Jen-ch'iung ..... Heads Northeast Bureau of CCP
5May66
Liao Ch'eng-chih .....
Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Staff Office; heads Over-
seas Chinese Affairs Commission
9 Jun 66
Ch'en Po-ta .........
Alternate Politburo; Editor, Red Flag; Deputy Director,
10 May 66
Central Committee propaganda department
Wu Hsiu-ch'uan ...... Director, party Central Committee's International Liaison
Department
As the only regional leader who seems to have built his own personal power base, T'ao
would be a likely ultimate target for Teng. There has been some evidence that Central-
South propaganda outlets have not kept pace in the attacks aimed at P'eng Chen. As
of now, however, T'ao seems to have made his temporary peace with the victors.
Counted among the economists of the party's moderate wing.
5
3
3
Long an associate of Mao; spokesman for radical agricultural policies of Leap Forward
period.
1
0
0
Long associated with Teng in Southwest and Szechwan, has risen rapidly as a result, made
Central Committee in 1956, Politburo in 1958. Also serves as Political Commissar for
Ch'eng-tu Military Region.
5
1
0
Closely associated with Teng
since 194US, has now
emerged as one of his chief
batchetmen
First key leader to receive new public prominence as result of current power struggle, he
has replaced r eng Chen, nrst major purge viciim, in one of his pose.
16
5
8
Until 1956, reputed to be secret police boss; has since specialized in ideological work.
...
...
...
Teng man ..............
Liu has a background as political commissar in the military, owes his NW appointment
to Teng.
Served as army political commissar in units under Teng Hsiao-p'ing in Southwest China;
replaced Lo Jui-ch'ing in public security in 1959 when Lo went over to the PLA general
staff; will likely replace Lo in latter capacity.
...
...
Probably a Teng man ...... Formerly a military political commissar, later minister for atomic energy and defense
2
1
9
...
production, Sung is now top party man in region which Kao Kang used to build a personal
power base.
Increasingly active in foreign trade matters, especially with Japan.
1
1
0
...
Red Flag was slow to join the attack on Peking committee; also, an unnamed deputy director
of the CCP-CC's propaganda department has been made a public target. Ch'en could
be in trouble on both counts.
Has specialized in Sino-Soviet and East European inter-party affairs. A strong voice in
anti-revisionist propaganda.
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 arty anu overnmenisofgigQ s~~t.onfinJ I~ 7it?aTr9Oa ~~o ~n~o~I90
Name Positions
Party and Government
Officials
Number
of Appearances
Last Noted 31 Oct 65 to date
Appearance With With With Est. Associations,
as of 13 June Teng Both Peng if any, with Teng or Peng
Liu Ning-i .......... Heads All-China Federation of Trade Unions; Deputy 20 May 66 12 4 15
Director, Foreign Affairs Staff Office
Chao I-min .......... Deputy Director, CCP International Liaison Department 2 Jun 66 7 2 5
Lin Feng ........... Head, Higher Party School; long-time propagandist 8 Jun 66 9 0 6
Wu Leng-hsi ........ Editor, People's Daily; Head of NCNA; deputy director, 6 May 66 0 0 2
propaganda department
Chang Chi-ch'un ..... Director of Culture and Education Staff Office, overseeing 25 Mar 66 0 0 3
four ministries; deputy director, party Propaganda
Department
Hu Yao-pang ........ 1st Secretary, Young Communist League 20 Apr 66 0 0 2
... Active in China's foreign relations, especially with non-Communist countries.
... Spokesman for Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda since 1962.
A Possible Peng man .......
Listed as possible Teng man Like Ch'en Po-ta, Wu's party role and the lag in his paper's taking up the attack make
him suspect to the Teng forces, but past linking to Teng may mitigate.
Probably a Teng man ......
Possibly a Teng man, but Perhaps associated with Liu Shao-ch'i, his status is in doubt, largely because of obvious
mixed failures of YCL.
Possibly a Teng man ....... Transferred to SEC from 1st secretaryship in Shansi Province in 1965; has also been a
secretary on North China Bureau, CCP.
... Chu at 79 is pretty much out of it as far as political maneuvering within the party is
concerned. A former Marshal.
. , . One of 12 founders of CCP with Mao, Tung still sits in inner party circles, but at 80 is
no longer an important active member.
... Top non-Han leader in CCP, but apparently has little authority in his own right.
Tung Pi-wu ......... Politburo; heads party's Control Commission; Vice Chair- 14 May 66 1 1 0
man of the PRC
Ulanfu ............. Alternate politburo member; 1st Secretary, Governor, 11 May 66 3 0 1
Military Commander and Political Commissar in Inner
Mongolia; 2nd Secretary, North China Bureau
Military Men
Ho Lung ............ Politburo member, vice chairman, Military Affairs Com- 25 May 66 6 0 3
mittee of CCP-CC
Yeh Chien-ying ...... Member, standing committee of Military Affairs Com- 3 May 66 6 2 2
mittee
Hsii Hsiang-ch'ien . . Top military figure for 40 nears; member Military Affairs 5 May 66 1 0 0
Committee's standing committee
Hsu Kuang-ta ....... Vice Minister, National Defense; Commander, PLA 2 Jun 66 ... ... ...
Armored Forces
P'eng Shao-hui ....... Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA
Wang Hsin-t'ing . . Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA
Chang Tsung-hsun ... Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA
A former Marshal, is probably not as important as his posts might indicate.
Associated in 30s with Chang Kuo-t'ao, who was purged in 1938, Hsu has nevertheless
remained publicly active. A former Marshal.
Served under P'eng Te-huai, but not implicated in 1959 purge.
20 May 66 0 0 1 ... Not on Central Committee.
28 Apr 66 1 0 1 Probably a Teng man Not a Central Committee member.
3 May 66 1 0 1 ... Over 30 years service with Chu Te, Ho Lung, and P'eng Te-huai, does not appear greatly
Liu Chih-Chien....... Deputy Director, PLA's General Political Department 3
Hsu Shih-yu ......... Vice Minister, National Defense; Commander, Nanking 20
Military Region
May 66
Apr 66
Provincial Leaders
Liu Chien-hsun ...... 1st Secretary, Honan; Secretary, Central-South Bureau, May 66
CCP
Li Ta-chang ......... Secretary, Southwest Bureau, CCP; Governor, Szechwan 1 May 66
Liao Chih-kao ....... 1st Secretary, Szechwan; Secretary, Southwest Bureau, 1 May 66
CCP
Yen Hung-yen ....... 1st Secretary, Yunnan; Political Commissar, K'un-ming MR 1 May 66
Wu Te ............. 2nd Secretary, Peking (since 3 Jun 66) 5 Jun 66
Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu ........ Mayor, Shanghai; Secretary, Shanghai party committee 10 Jun 66
P'an Fu-sheng ....... 1st Secretary, Heilungkiang (since May 66) 5 May 66
Li Fan-wu .......... 2nd Secretary, Heilungkiang 5 May 66
important.
Not a Central Committee member.
Appointed to Ministry in 1959 after P'eng Te-huai purge; however, earlier associated with
Chang Kuo-t'ao; once opposed Mao in Yenan.
Possible Teng man ......... Replaced Wu Chih-p'u in Hon an (1960 or 62) after Wu's radical Leap Forward and com-
mune policies there had led to agricultural disaster and peasant/militia riots.
Probably a Teng man ...... Served apparently as trouble-shooter for the party in Kweichow Province in spring of 1965,
replacing Chou Lin as 1st Secretary there until relieved himself by Chia Ch'i-yun.
Possible Teng man .........
Probable Teng man ....... A military commander since the 1930s, Yen has served under Teng, Li Ta-chang, Li Ching-
ch'uan, and Hsieh Fu-chih.
Mixed associations, including Was 1st Secretary, Kirin, at time of his assignment to help Li Hsueh-feng clean out Peking
Teng, P'eng, and police party machinery.
Probable Teng man ........ Succeeded K'o Ch'ing-shih as mayor in Dec 65 (K'o had died in Apr); appears frequently,
his last appearance being directly connected with the present "cultural revolution" (i.e.,
power struggle).
... Had been 1st Secretary in Honan until accused of "right opportunism" in May 1958 and
Possibly, P'eng ...... . .... .
replaced by Wu Chih-p'u; later headed All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing
Cooperatives. His new job, replacing Ou-yang Chin, a possible P'eng Chen man, suggests
some connection with Teng Hsiao-p'ing.
62671 d
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