THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTB.A.L
INTELLIGENC'E A---G
THE 'SITUATION IN VIETNAM
ARMY, DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION. OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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The government's move with force against dis-
sidents in Hue has thus far resulted in relatively
little violence. Another North Vietnamese Army
regiment has been confirmed in South Vietnam.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Heavy fighting was reported early today between a
Viet Cong battalion and a USMC reconnaissance team
near Chu Lai (Para. 1). MACV confirms another
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment in South Viet-
nam (Paras. 2-3). A recently reported NVA unit
was apparently destined for southern South Vietnam
(Paras. 4-5). Weekly review of South Vietnam trans-
portation routes and battle statistics (Paras. 6-7).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The go vernment s_orcefuTmove against dissidents
in Hue has been accompanied by relatively little
violence thus far (Paras, 1-4). Police continued
to disperse Buddhist demonstrators in Saigon to-
day (Para. 5), as Buddhist Institute representa-
tives told US Embassy officers that militants now
determining Institute policy are determined to
maintain their hard line until Premier Ky and
Chief of State Thieu are deposed (Paras. 6-7).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is notFing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: A French
Foreign Office official has characterized as much
too optimistic the recent press report that Hanoi is
moving toward accepting the idea of a peaceful set-
tlement of the war (Paras. 1-4).
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 May 1966
General Statistical Data
Composite Annual Totals
Viet Cong Incidents
South Vietnam Battle Statistics
Personnel Losses--May 1966
Viet Cong Incidents--May 1966
Weapons Losses--May 1966
Chieu Hoi--May 1966
Desertions--April 1966
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kSayannakhet
NORTH ~Ddng Hai
'I VIETNAM
'y Sepone'
VIET CONG
*Da Nang MILITARY REGION V
VIET CONG
MILITARY REGION VI
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
(~ I 25 50 15 l00 Miles
0 25 50 75 1 0 Kir lometer.
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Communist forces, striking in estimated bat-
talion-strength, launched a predawn attack today
against an 18-man US Marine reconnaissance team de-
fending an isolated hilltop observation post approxi-
mately 12 miles northwest of Chu Lai. Tactical air
strikes and artillery bombardment supported,the badly
outnumbered Marine unit, but heavy ground fire, in the
vicinity of available landing-zones impeded reinforce-
ment and extraction operations for almost six hours.
Preliminary results of the action indicate US losses
of nine killed, 15 wounded, and two helicopters damaged
and one destroyed. Enemy casualties have been placed
at 43 killed.
Another PAVN Regiment in South Vietnam
2. MACV has accepted another North Vietnamese
Army regiment--the 88th--in South Vietnam. The 88th
has a strength of 2,000 men and is located in the tri-
border area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam ad-
jacent to Kontum Province. It is the fifteenth con-
firmed NVA regiment to date in South Vietnam. The
parent unit of the 88th Regiment is the 308th Division.
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If past patterns of infiltration were followed,
from this regiment were probably left in the DRV
cadre
to
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form and train a new 88th Regiment.
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3. Total confirmed NVA strength in South Vietnam
now stands at 32,810. Another 4,200 men in various
units are carried in the probable or possible cate-
ories. In addition. there are
w are no inducted in
e above-mentioned categories. There is presently
insufficient evidence on these reported units to in-
clude them in the order of battle but, if the reports
are accurate, the total number of North Vietnamese
troops now in South Vietnam would be well over 50,000
men.
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
ydsNG T
Rt. 9
I I Section of operable railroad
Section of inoperable road
Mo Due
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4TXAG ( vINH
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ob Phan Thiet
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PFi UOC
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N
flan Rang
Information as of 12 June 1966
Rt; 1
N,Tam Ky
QUANG '
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4. One such recently reported unit is of par-
ticular interest. Two North Vietnamese soldiers
captured in late May in western Pleiku Province in
the vicinity of Chu Pong Mountain stated that they
were members of the 95th Artillery Battalion of
the 68th Artillery Regiment. They stated that
their regiment was formed in October 1965 in the
DRV using cadre from the 304th Division and the
351st Artillery Division. The units making up the
regiment were the 95th Battalion (120-mm. mortar)
and the 10th and 11th battalions (105-mm. howitzer).
The 95th Battalion left North Vietnam in February
1966 and arrived in the Chu Pong area in May. They
did not bring their weapons with them but had them
issued upon arrival. According to their ID cards,
their final destination was the Central Office for
South Vietnam (COSVN) in the southern part of South
Vietnam (Nambe). According to MACV, this is the
first :instance since early 1965 indicating that
infiltration groups have been destined this far
south rather than Military Regions 5 or 6.
5. A recently received translation of a note-
book captured from a member of Infiltration Group
623.which left the DRV in August 1965 indicates
that this unit arrived in War Zone "D" in late 1965.
This was one of the first indications that entire
North Vietnamese units--probably battalions--were
being sent to Nambe.
Operational Status of Major Surface Lines of Communi-
cations
There was a limited decline in the operational
capability of South Vietnam's major highways during
the period 4-11 June. Specifically Route 13 in
Binh Duong Province, Interprovincial Route 4 in
Vinh Binh Province, and Route 17 "A" in Bac Lieu
Province were closed. No change was reported in
the operational capability of the nation's coastal
railway.
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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
7. The week of 4-11 June compared with the
previous week of 28 May - 4 June
I. Viet Cong Incidents
Time At- Regimental Battalion: Company
Period tacks size size size Terrorism
28 May -
4 June 9
Time Anti- Total
Period Sabotage Propaganda Aircraft Incidents
28 May -
4 June
II. Casualties
Killed
.Wounded
Missing/Captured
902 1,240
TOTALS 1,022 1,406
Killed
Wounded
Missing/Captured
28 May-4-June
4-1_r Tune
109
142
636
741
4
4
GVN
28 May-4 June 4-11 June
121
151
219
328
23
30
363
28 May-4 June 4-11 June
14 6
18 14
0 0
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VC/PAVN
28 May-4 June 4-11 June
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III. Weapons Captured
VC/PAVN GVN
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28 May-4 June 4-11 June 2May-4 June 4-11 June
Individual 291 413 38 91
Crew-served 22 22 0 0
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I7:. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH.VIETNAM
1. The impasse between government forces and
dissident elements in Hue was broken today when po-
lice field forces from Saigon and a battalion of
progovernment airborne troops began clearing away
Buddhist altars which have been blocking the streets
for some ten days. Buddhists protesting the re-
moval of the altars were dispersed by tear gas,
and eligible draftees among them were detained for
possible induction into the armed forces. By even-
ing (Vietnam time), government troops were in con-
trol of the main roads leading into the city after
having cleared them of obstructions. Today's ac-
tion followed hours of effort last night by govern-
ment commanders to persuade Buddhists to remove
their altars and disperse peacefully.
2. Buddhist and "struggle" force elements in
the city are apparently maintaining their nonviolent
approach to the government's action thus far. In
a broadcast over the clandestine "Voice of Buddhist
Salvation" today, the lst Division Buddhist chaplain
appealed to troops to remain nonviolent in their
protests of the government's "repression of Buddhism."
During the day one group of some 400 1st Division
troops reportedly demonstrated against the govern-
ment's action but dispersed without violence. Other
dissident troops and Buddhists gathered at pagodas
and at 1st Division headquarters in the city. Re-
ports of a clash between local troops and the air-
borne battalion during the early evening hours (Viet-
nam tame) remain unconfirmed as yet. At last re-
port, the city was quiet at midnight (Vietnam time).
:3. Tri Quang, continuing his hunger strike
in a city hospital, reportedly is to be placed un-
der "informal" detention by the government and
will lbe allowed no contact with visitors.
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4. Further government action will probably
include completing a sweep of the city and a blockade
of pagodas in which some"struggle"force leaders have
reportedly taken refuge. Government force may also
be applied soon in the northernmost provincial capi-
tal of Quang Tri, where "struggle" influence has
also been strong.
Buddhists in Saigon
5. Buddhist monks today continued their efforts
to organize demonstrations in the capital area for
the fourth consecutive day. Police, meanwhile, con-
tinued to make arrests and set a 9 p.m. (Vietnam
time) curfew in Saigon this evening. One tactic
recently introduced by the Buddhists has been to
block major roads leading into the city with burn-
ing piles of trash, which, according to the US Em-
bassy, has thus far worked to the disadvantage of,
the Buddhists by irritating drivers stuck in rush-
hour traffic.
6. Conversations between US Embassy officers
and two Buddhist Institute leaders today tend to
confirm that the militants are now determining Bud-
dhist policy in Saigon. Although Tam Chau remains
chairman of the Buddhist Institute, he has lost con-
trol over policy and has been absent from Institute
proceedings for the past several days. More mili-
tant monks on an 11-man Institute policy council
are determined to maintain a hard line until Ky and
Thieu are deposed. In addition, the General Associ-
ation of Young Monks and Nuns in Saigon has also
come under the control of extremist monks, who have
declared that if the Buddhist Institute council does
not enforce the policy of Tri Quang, they will.
7. One of the Buddhist leaders also told a
US Embassy officer today that "all top Institute
leaders" (excluding Tam Chau) will go to Saigon city
hall tomorrow and ask to be put in jail, in accord-
ance with an earlier, militant Institute communique.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1,. There is nothing of significance to report.
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1. The Asian Director of the French Foreign
Office, Manac'h, has characterized as "much too op-
timistic" the 13 June report out of Hanoi by the
French Press Agency (AFP) to the effect that the
idea of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war is
making headway among the North Vietnamese leaders.
Manac'h stated that the AFP report did, however,
tend to confirm French views that a growing senti-
ment of nationalism among the North Vietnamese lead-
ers, plus the internal crisis in China, might even-
tually result in a less rigid attitude by Hanoi. The
British 'onsul in Hanoi has also stated his belief
that the AFP report is overly optimistic. He
pointed out that the AFP man has only been in Hanoi
a few months and is "very ambitious." He said he
thought that the AFP representative does not have
special access to high Hanoi officials and his re-
ports are probably based on diplomatic corps rumors.
2:. Manac'.h expressed the:.opinion that the: North
Vietnamese Government must have been aware of the
content of the AFP report because it was filed in
the Hanoi post office. Since Hanoi did not refuse
to allow the story to be sent, the French official
reasoned, the North Vietnamese at least were not op-
posed to having AFP's interpretation of Hanoi's at-
titude on peace negotiations spread through the
Western press.
:3. The AFP report had cited certain factors
which it alleged had led to the feeling in Hanoi
that a "new atmosphere" had developed "within the
past few days." The factors cited were: (1) All
of Hanoi's allies with the exception of Peking
ardently desire an early end to the Vietnam war;
(2) "'Reliable" sources indicate that Hanoi is now
prepared to help the US "lose gracefully';'; (3)
Hanoi now believes it is in a position of strength
and can therefore seek an end to the war without
losing face; and (4) The forthcoming visit to Hanoi
of former French cabinet minister Jean Sainteny
could provide an opening for peace moves.
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4. The first two factors cited are, of course,
not new. Hanoi has long stated its position that
it would help the US withdraw gracefully from South
Vietnam. The Eastern European bloc nations have
long made it clear that they wish the war would end.
As for the third factor, there is nothing to indi-
cate that Hanoi believes its military position is
any stronger now than it was in the past. Manac'h
downplayed the significance of Jean Sainteny's trip,
claiming that the AFP story "exaggerated" its impor-
tance? North Vietnamese statements in recent days
have indicated no change in Hanoi's insistence on US
acceptance of the "four points."
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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 May 1966
Viet Killed Wounded
Cong in in Captured Total Weapons
Time Inci- Action Action or Missing Casualties Losses
Period dents GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
1962 1825 299 1294 475 212 116 390 890 1896 - -
-Jan 1963 927 453 1754 908 318 102 379 1463 2451 457 683
1964 1770 343 1223 913 - 555 240 1811 1463 917 532
1965 2206 904 2203 1938 - 471 565 3313 2768 1700 711
1966 3914 747 2648 1557 - 450 588 2754 3236 935 979
1962 1460 244 1205 300 316 124 353 668 1874 - -
Feb 1963 788 379 1082 656 303 82 292 1117 1677 253 399
1964 2078 374 1055 916 - 303 289 1593 1344 708 471
1965 1982 880 1564 1840 - 1394 309 4114 1873 2454 620
1966 3100 1015 4727 2095 - 477 508 3587 5235 1076 1219
1962 1961 523 1456 737 551 140 523 1400 2530 - -
Mar 1963 1282 410 1443 851 368 66 222 1327 2033 467 367
1964 2160 439 1456 1249 - 345 531 2033 1987 814 532
1965 2056 751 2022 1633 - 720 394 3104 2416 1442 698
1966 3670 938 5685 1961 - 466 604 3365 6289 1393 1632
1962 1933 387 1596 532 292 151 415 1070 2303 - -
Apr 1963 1331 506 1660 878 256 96 388 1440 2304 797 468
1964 2284 594 1671 1584 - 398 245 2576 1916 990 424
1965 1860 591 1909 1650 - 232 529 2473 2438 757 973
1966 3235 573 2818 1522 - 121 483 2216 3301 594 829
1962 1825 390 1756 509 352 94 524 993 2632 - -
May 1963 1208 435 1895 889 295 94 695 1418 2885 463 564
1964 2143 458 1135 987 - 202 242 1647 1377 723 281
1965 2263 1049 1975 2143 - 873 548 4065 2523 1701 831
1966 3566 661 4239 1454 - 196 652 2311 4891 493 1087
1962 1477 325 1666 613 413 77 441 1015 2520 - -
--Jun 1963 1311 389 1863 772 310 90 437 1251 2609 580 394
1964 2062 494 1005 1145 - 313 230 1952 1235 718 387
1965 2597 1211 2208 1920 - 1260 189 4391 2397 2387 793
1962 1564 384 1544 686 424 212 542 1282 2510 - -
Jul 1963 1368 529 1918 1071 372 306 387 1906 2677 663 374
1964 3045 900 1427 1812 - 510 219 3222 1646 1889 447
1965 2520 1160 2980 1591 - 540 580 3425 3560 1375 882
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 Time
Period
1962
Aug 1963
1964
1965
1962
Sep 1963
1964
1965
1962
Oct 1963
1964
1965
1962
Nov 1963
1964
1965
1962
Dec 1963
1964
1965
VC
Time Inci-
Period dents
1962 19076
1963 17852
1964 28526
1965 31529
**1966 17485
Approved F6 eleas
Wounded
in
Action
GVN VC
Viet Killed
Cong in
Inci- Action
dents GVN VC
1642 377
1349 411
2580 721
2498 808
1375 419
1763 672
3091 819
2473 655
1357 365
1422 428
2827 739
3330 961
1311 410
3182 664
1982 574
3638 1034
1346 294
1921 389
2504 1002
4106 1239
2271 626 367
1685 804 237
1449 1612 -
3624 1945
2218 646 365
1982 1155 234
1187 1759
3485 1724
1967 619 286
1520 989 244
1617 1583 -
3874 2416
1982 834 368
2333 1554 373
1747 1404 -
5516 2056
2203 618 289
1440 961 191
1813 2053
4076 2262
BAOOO9OOO8OOO1-8
Captured Total
or Missing Casualties
GVN VC GVN VC
63 669 1066 3307
352 482 1567 2404
478 282 2811 1731
287 606 3040 4230
59 446 1124 3029
566 347 2393 2563
737 230 3315 1417
266 838 2645 4323
64 373 1048 2626
398 236 1815 2000
693 576 3015 2193
225 660 3602 4534
92 561 1336 2911
665 252 2883 2958
410 570 2388 2317
520 592 3610 6108
78 463 990 2955
320 190 1670 1821
1092 503 4147 2316
926 516 4427 4592
KIA
GVN VC
4417 21158
5665 20575
7457 16785
11243 35436
3934 20117
WIA
GVN VC
7195 4235
11488 3501
17017
23118
8589
Captured Total
or Missing Casualties
GVN VC GVN VC
1270 5700 12882 31093
3137 4307 20290 28383
6036 4157 30510 20942
7848 6326 42209 41762
1710 2835 14233 22952
*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 31 May 1966
Weapons
Losses
GVN VC
637 428
1106 619
705 1074
878 389
1465 525
778 838
753 330
1510 482
762 1013
1595 455
1104 515
1126 2164
724 546
2111 666
1728 1158
Weapons
Losses
GVN VC
5195 4049*
8267 5397
14055 5881
16915 11755
4491 5746
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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 May 1966
Time
Period
Viet Cong
Incidents
1962 1825
Jan 1963 927
1964 1770
1965 2206
1966 3914
Small-
Scale
528
242
218
57
42
Co. Size BN. Size
21
8
2
5
23
1962 1460 480 20
Feb 1963 788 181 13
1964 2078 211 3
1965 1982 73 6
1966 3100 50 10
549
252
223
63
70
839
447
1244
1489
2490
Sabotage
180
49
129
272
312
0 500 613 137
1 195 433 69
3 217 1389 210
3 82 1411 267
9 69 1829 201
1962 1961 561 27 0 588 660 290
Mar 1963 1282 333 11 0 344 653 131
1964 2160 198 4 1 203 1632 158
1965 2056 80 3 3 86 1476 240
1966 3670 32 10 10 52 2332 212
1962 1933 470 27 0 497 1024 220
Apr 1963 1331 371 9 3 383 688 105
1964 2284 211 6 3 220 1738 169
1965 1860 38 1 4 43 1407 149
1966 3235 61 7 9 77 2238 252
Propa-
ganda
257
179
174
Anti-
Aircraft
170 212
299 743
210 -
91 -
271 -
91 131
172 829
423 -
154 -
167 -
90 164
154 920
192 -
155 -
157 -
96 165
110 513.
1962 1825 490 28 0 528 892 154 251 -
May 1963 1208 344 13 0 357 608 93 150 -
1964 2143 170 3 2 175 418 217 140 193
1965 2263 40 7 11 58 1558 365 115 170
*1966 3566 37 9 7 53 2552 295 106 560
1962 1477 339 23
Jun 1963 1311 398 11
1964 2062 128 10
1965 2597 62 1
362 736 157 222 -
410 652 107 142 -
140 1390 176 162 194
69 1784 469 103 172
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Time
Viet Cong
Small-
P
ropa-
Anti-
Period
Incidents
Scale
g
anda
Aircraft
1962
1564 437
10
448
7
35 158
223
Jul
1963
1368 398
8
407
6
98 80
183
1964
3045 166
12
185
21
32 286
224
218
1965
2520 42
n
48
17
06 400
154
212
1962
1642 368
10
0
378
8
85 146
233
-
Aug
1963
1349 356
11
1
368
6
47 113
221
-
1964
2580 107
3
3
113
17
75 315
173
204
1965
2498 38
9
5
52
15
97 349
200
300
1962
1375 382
9
0
391
6
24 178
182
-
Sep
1963
17763 483
17
3
503
8
89 164
207
-
1964
3091 110
4
4
118
19
38 482
178
375
1965
2473 19
7
5
31
15
30 278
185
449
1962
1357 406
12
1
419
5
83 189
166
-
Oct
1963
1422 359
6
0
365
8
02 105
150
-
1964
2827 75
2
6
83
17
90 480
197
277
1965
3330 24
8
12
44
19
69 415
198
704
1962
1311 411
7
3
421
6
14 144
132
-
Nov
1963
3182 631
11
3
645
19
90 269
278
-
1964
1982 57
2
1
60
13
91 247
109
175
1965
3638 26
16
10
52
22
34 486
255
611
1962
1346 375
8
1
384
6
70 107
185
-
Dec
1963
1921 258
3
0
261
12
98 111
251
-
1964
2504 81
9
6
96
17
19 318
128
243
1965
4106 32
18
7
57
25
72 442
317
718
1962
19076 5247
Compo
6
si
2
te Annual
12
Totals
5465
88
75 2060
2676
No Data
1963
17852 4354
15
1
21
4490
98
05 1396
2161
No Data
1964
28526 1732
41
60
1833 1
95
56 3178
2080
1879
1965
31529 531
73
81
685 2
07
30 4132
1974
4008
*1966
17485 222
59
40
321 1
14
86 1272
841
3565
*Through 31 May 1966
S-4
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 Awk.
Approved For R le se 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A900080001-8
Ann alT f-
ffary Totals
{4552'
1,242,
19 6k 4,631 8 766
Militoty only thr April
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A000900080001-8
 Approved For Rse 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A900080001-8
ttfy=
924;,
4 1
141
45 b11 H 1 I
GVN static"ics rl. -r:t diff entiate between deserters who eventually return or enlist in other goyernment units
remain AWOL, or defect to the Viet Cong. Statistics do show that 53% of the regular force desertions are among
draftees who comprise 13% of the regular force strength,
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A000900080001-8
 TOP SECRET
Approved For Relea2004/12/14 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00d9080001-8
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A000900080001-8
TOP SECRET