CUBAN CAPABILITY FOR LANDING MEN AND ARMS IN HAITI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000800420001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1966
• Content Type: FORM

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No. 1576/86
CELL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
14 June 1986
C MEMDRANDUM*
C u b a n . , in Men and Arms in Haiti
1. Cuban rair and naval forces have the capability to
put considerable numbers of men and amounts of materiel into
Haiti quickly--by sea, air or airdrop. More than 1,0?0 men
could be landed .-n a few hours' time, if the Cubans were not
constrained by the need for secrecy and by the recognition
that US counteraction would, at the least, prevent resupply
and support of their force. In any case, we have no indica-
tion that the Cubans are considering such offensive military
action.
2. Cuba's military transport fleet has a capability of
ai.rliiting about 600 troops or 60 tons of cargo in a single
lift, but little training has been conducted on logistical
support operations. The Cuban civilian airline has a capa-
bility of airlifting in a single airlift as many as 1,100
troops or 150 tons of materiel if its resources were pressed
to the limit.
Altogether, Cuba has approximately 20 IL-14 (CRATE)
transports, which could be used to support insurgency opera-
tions in Haiti. Each of these planes is capable of carrying
up to 36 personnel or about 4,750 pounds of military cargo.
The Cubans also have 30 to 45 AN-2 (COLT) short-takeoff-and-
land planes capable of carrying up to 12 men or 3,000 pounds.
Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence And coor-
dinated with ONE and DD/P. Concurred in by DIA and I,NR.
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addition, the Cuban Air Force has a few C-46 and C_q7
-naportss which could be used. Cuba also has about 70 MI-4
a maximum 16 -
passengers or 3,500 pounds of cargo.
41. The Cubans have a capability to provide
I a Paratrooper
seen ess' a s e at Libertad Air Base near Havana
rn. October 1962, classes of several hundred men were
being trained there each year.
5. The Cubans could hope to avoid detection of a small-
scale infiltration of men and/or arms using a few of their
large number of Gulf Fleet fishing vessels. In addition, the
Cuban navy has about 50 coastal defense and patrol boats which
could reach Haiti. The Cubans also have 3 C8 TACOMA class
patrol escort vessels. We have no evidence that the Cubans
have submarines.
$. Consideration must be given to the availability of
Communist-oriented Haitian. exile manpower in Cuba and their
potential for directing the activities of an invasion force.
A leading Haitian Communist exile in Cuba, Rene Depestre, re-
portedly said in January 1966 that 5,000 Haitian citizens
resident in Cuba have had military service in the Cuban army
or militia and that 500 of them have indicated a willingness
to participate in armed action against the Duvalier regime.
However,, the bulk of the 5,000 are from Haitian families who
were brought in. originally as cane-cutters and have lived in
Cuba for many years; they most probably regard themselves as
Cubans rather than. Haitians and probably have little desire
to return to Haiti.
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7. Although we have had occasional reports that Haitians
have been among the groups from various Latin American coun-
tries receiving guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, we have
not been able to confirm them. It is probable that some
Haitians have been given'this kind of training in Cuba; it
is also probable that the number has been small.
8. Haitite two Communist parties--the party of Popular
Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberation
(3 i )-...are small,, lacking in discipline and poorly indoc-
trinated. With a maximum of 500 members and up to 2,000
fellow travelers, the Communists constitute the onty internal
opposition with any degree of training and organization--how-
ever primitive. Havana radio broadcasts vitriolic anti-Duvalier
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propaganda to Haiti an well as ideological guidance to the
Castro-oriented STU. The P is Moscow. oriented. Whether
sceives financial assistance from Moscow is unknown, but
In addition: to these two parties, active Communist exile
groups are based In Mexico and Europe; the leaders probably
would attempt to return to Haiti should Duvalier be overthrown.
9. Communists appear to lack the membershipA leadership,
and organization to become serious contende r in a post-
Duvalier power struggle. To seize a pre-emiDent position,
the Communists would require the effective support either of
the military, or the "TonTon Macoutess" and the militia. At
the present time, there in no indication that they could at-
tract such support. This situation could change, however,
in, the chaos which probably would follow Duvalier's sudden
removal from power.
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