THE WARSAW PACT: ITS ROLE IN SOVIET BLOC AFFAIRS FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE PRESENT DAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010056-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: May 6, 1966
• Content Type: PAPER

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STAT
Its Role In Soviet Bloc Affairs
From Its Origin to the Present Day
6 May 1966
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D
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THE WARSAW PACT
Table of Contents
Page
Summary
1
History of the Organization
3
The Warsaw Pact Today and Its Value
To the USSR
14
Benefits Derived by Eastern Europe
from the Pact
21
Problems Within the Pact
24
Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance Signed By Warsaw Pact
Members
9
11
Estimated Personnel Strength of the
Eastern European Armed Forces
15
Appendices
Appendix
A Text of Warsaw Pact Agreement
B Comparison of Warsaw Pact Treaty and North Atlantic
Treaty
C Military Expenditures in the Eastern European Communist
Counties
D Warsaw Pact Meetings Since May 1955
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The Warsaw Pact was created in May 1955 by the USSR
as a political response to West Germany?s rearmament and
admission to NATOO
The establishment of the pact was in part an outgrowth
of the desire of Russia?s post-Stalin leadership to replace
the methods of Stalin, which were no longer practicable,
with a new mechanism for maintaining its position as the
supreme arbiter of Soviet bloc affairs. The Warsaw Pact
provided a new basis for the presence of Soviet troops on
the territory of some of the Eastern European countries.
The Russians probably thought--although they were
later proven to be wrong--that the pact was also a form of
insurance against effective political initiatives by the
leaders of the East European Communist parties. The Polit-
ical Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact was designed
as a convenient sounding board for Soviet foreign policy
views, particularly about West Germany and its admission on
9 May 1955 to NATO.
At the outset, the Eastern European members gained some
limited military benefits from their membership in the Warsaw
Pact, but they had no opportunity to function as other than
the military and political vassals of Moscow. This is no
longer the case, however, because of political evolution
within the Soviet bloc and of changes in the relations of
the Soviet bloc states to each other. The effect has been
to give the Warsaw Pact a political role in Soviet bloc
affairs at least as important as its function of bringing
about military integration.
Today, it is no exaggeration to say that the Warsaw
Pact is one of the few remaining effective devices available
to Moscow for holding the Soviet bloc together at a time
when the forces of national self-interest are increasingly
coming into play in Eastern Europe. The Eastern European
states, for their part9 probably regard the pact as surety
that the USSR will continue to underwrite their regimes and
to safeguard their boundaries.
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The USSR, in response to this view and to protect its
own interests, has had to tolerate the gradual achievement
of some measure of equality among pact members. Meaningful
military coordination among the armies of the signatories
has advanced, so that the Eastern European armed forces
are a more useful adjunct to Soviet military power.
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Why It Was Established
The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), established
formally on 14 May 1955, is composed of eight European Com-
munist states--the USSR, Albania,* Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. In the past,
Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia,
all of which remain outside the formal structure of the
treaty, have attended pact meetings as observers. Thus the
WTO, which has both a military and a political character,
is primarily a European organization (see Appendix A for
text of Warsaw Pact). Its specific purpose was to serve as
a counter to NATO, and internally as the formal device for
the perpetuation of close ties between the Soviet Union and
the Eastern European regimes.
Developments in East-West Relations
The act of forming the Warsaw Pact climaxed a series
of unsuccessful attempts by the USSR to prevent the inclu-
sion of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Western
alliance, NATO. At the Berlin Conference of Foreign Minis-
ters in February 1954, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov
renewed earlier Soviet suggestions for the neutralization
of Germany and proposed an all-European treaty of collective
security. By the terms of the Soviet proposal, cooperation
among treaty signatories would be confined to the military
field, and agreements on mutual aid among participants would
be determined by special procedures to be worked out later.
Like the North Atlantic Treaty, the proposal specified that
armed aggression against one treaty partner was to be con-
sidered an attack on all. Initially the United States and
the Chinese People's Republic were to be accorded only
observer status in the treaty organs, but the following
*Although sti 1 nominally a member of the Warsaw Pacts Albania
apparently no longer takes part in pact activities. It re-
jected a pact invitation to send Albanian representatives
to the last Political Consultative Committee meeting known
to have been held, that of January 1965. Moreover, because
of its diplomatic break with Moscow in 1961, it is unlikely
that Albania has had any formal type of military relation-
ship with the Soviet bloc for at least the last five years.
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month the USSR indicated its willingness to accept the U.S.
in the all-European security pact and at the same time sug-
gested its own entrance into NATO.
Although the Soviet proposals were unacceptable to the
Western powers, the USSR renewed its efforts to undermine
the European Defense Community and in July 1954 suggested
the holding of an all-European collective security conference.
The invitation was rejected by the Western powers. Some
months later, in December 1954, the USSR convened a meeting
in Moscow of its Eastern European allies. The Chinese People's
Republic was invited to send an observer, and did so. After
the Moscow gathering it was announced that the bloc would
"take common measures for the organization of armed forces
and their commands" in the event that the Western powers
ratified the agreement signed in Paris on 23 October 1954,
permitting the rearming of West Germany and its subsequent
admission to NATO and the Western European Union.
When the Paris Agreements went into effect on 5 May 1955,
the USSR carried out its threat and annulled its treaties
of alliance with Great Britain (1942) and France (1944). The
entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO occurred
on 9 May 1955. Two days later the "Conference of European
Countries for the Protection of Peace and the Security of
Europe" began in Warsaw. On 14 May the Treaty for Friendship,
Mutual Assistance and Cooperation was signed, and the eight
countries party to the treaty issued a "Resolution on the
Formation of a Unified Command of Armed Forces."
The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization thus
coincided in time with the accession of the Federal Republic
of Germany to membership in the Western alliance.* Pact
signatories explained its creation primarily as an answer
to the expansion of NATO and the creation of the Western
European Union. Conversely, observers in the West initially
tended to view the provisions of the Warsaw Pact primarily
as an effort to hasten the military integration of the Soviet
Union and its Eastern European neighbors and to justify the
maintenance of Soviet troops in those countries.
The Situation in the Soviet Bloc
The death of Stalin and the resultant political uncer-
tainty that beset the Communist leaderships in Eastern Europe
*See Appendix Bfor a comparison of the terms of the Warsaw
Pact and NATO.
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were also among the key factors which made a formal arrange-
ment governing military and political matters within the
Soviet bloc desirable in the eyes of the new Soviet leader-
ship. Already there had been manifestations of popular
discontent in Berlin and in Pilsen9 Czechoslovakia9 in
addition to economic problems and the appearance of factional
dissent within some local Communist parties.
The two years from Stalin's death in 1953 to the creation
of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 were marked by the attempts of
Georgi A. Malenkov9 Molotov9 and Nikita S. Khrushchev to
consolidate their individual power bases. Soviet political
and economic problems demanded immediate answers9 and these
problems became the issues over which the internecine struggle
was waged within the "collective leadership."
Malenkov9 whose "new course" proposed to cure Soviet
economic ills without disrupting the Stalinist political
structure9 tended to ignore the effect of such a program on
the stability of the Eastern European regimes9 then flounder-
ing under the legacy of Stalin's economic structures. More-
over9 the Eastern Europeans at this point erroneously inter-
preted Malenkov9s denigration of Stalinist economics as
meaning that there would be a concomitant loosening of
Stalinist political controls. Malenkov also overlooked the
fact that a softer foreign policy line might undermine stable
intra-bloc relations.
Molotov9 the die-hard Stalinist9 doggedly persisted in
his espousal of the hard-line in both the economic sector9
where he was unwilling to abandon Stalin's emphasis on heavy
industry, and the international arena9 where he opposed rap-
prochment with Yugoslavia and a soft-pedaling of East-West
antagonisms.
Khrushchev alone attempted a fusion of past with present 9
on both the domestic and intra-party front9 pursuing a course
that sought improvement of the agricultural situation9 revi-
talization of the economy and betterment of the standard of
living without abandoning past Soviet commitments to the
prior development of heavy industry,
Under Stalin's rule9 the Eastern European party hier-
arc3.ies had become accustomed to receiving instructions
from their Soviet advisors9 and they followed uncritically
the line developed by Moscow. They reacted with considerable
disorientation to the absence of clearly defined economic
and political formulas. The Eastern European regimes were
also uneasy because of popular pressures to take initiatives
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for economic and political reform on the home front. Popular
resentment of terrorism, economic stagnation and party incom-
petence were becoming increasingly widespread in Eastern
Europe.
In East Germany, the Party had already been shaken by
the workers' riots and general strike of June 1953, which
had been quelled only by Soviet troops. Although the Social-
ist Unity Party (SED) rejected general criticism of the Party
line at its 15th Central Committee Plenum that July, it did
admit that an accelerated effort "to construct the socialist
foundation had erred in ignoring practical internal and
external considerations." Economic concessions were made,
including a reduction in wage taxes and prices, and a partial
amnesty was granted for those convicted of minor offenses.
A similar state of affairs existed in Czechoslovakia,
where citizens rioted in Pilsen in the summer of 1953 to
protest a regime-inspired currency reform. Subsequent party
appeasement gestures included a reduction in delivery quotas
and a slowdown in the rate of industrial production, as well
as a limited and short-lived "de-collectivization" program.
In Poland, widespread poverty, economic instability
and a restive populace added to the problems facing the
Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). The PZPR was hampered
in attempting a relatively calm transition to reform programs
by the presence of the imprisoned but not forgotten former
Party boss, Wladyslaw Gomulka, whose rehabilitation many
party members thought should logically follow regime espousal
of economic change and limited liberalization. In fact, his
release in April 1955, after incarceration since 1949 for
"revisionist tendencies" and "Titoism," and a reorganization
within the Ministry of Public Security preceded the Polish
Communist icadership's endorsement of a less rigid domestic
policy.
In Hungary, the cumulative effect of the violent purge
trials, the executions of non-Communist leaders and an
extremely intensive industrialization drive necessitated the
elevation of the "liberal" Imre Nagy to the Premiership.
A subsequent government call for a "consolidation of legality"
attempted to head off popular reaction to economic and per-
sonal repression.
In Rumania, rejection of the SOVROM--joint stock com-
panies that facilitated Soviet exploitation of the country's
resources--as well as the 1952 ouster of pro-Moscow Rumanian
party leaders like hardline Vice Premier Anna Pauker, were
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further indications that a lack of firm leadership on the
part of the USSR was leading to a corresponding lack of
political cohesion in the bloc.
In an effort to buttress the individual regimes and to
reverse the trend toward bloc disunity, Khrushchev began to
emphasize the position of the Eastern European countries
as equal partners with the Soviet Union. He hoped thereby
to set the stage to bind them in a political and military
alliance that would create a commonwealth of socialist states
and ensure continued Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe,
Instrument of Soviet Control over Eastern Europe
As an instrument of Soviet control, the Warsaw Pact
had value as a device for monitoring political and military
developments in the member states. In the political field,
it reminded the signatories of their common ideologies and
purpose, underscored the importance of formal inter-state
ties and created a mechanism providing a common political
forum, over which the Soviet Union at first exercised com-
plete control. In its military aspect, it would eventually
lead to the solution of such problems as the status of Soviet
troops in the bloc countries, and the consolidation of the
Eastern European armies as an effective front line of defense
for the Soviet Union.
Instrument of Political Propaganda
Soviet Marshal G. P. Zhukov, in an article entitled "The
Warsaw Pact and Questions of International Security," pub-
lished in Moscow in 1961, observed,
The Warsaw Pact appeared and exists as a defense
pact of governments that are threatened by a
common dangers This is confirmed, if only by
the fact that the Warsaw treaty was born six
years after the North Atlantic bloc in answer
to their forming of a military threats
This theme has been used frequently by the USSR to underscore
the allegedly defensive character of the bloc alliance, and
to establish the alleged intransigence of the Western powers,
Related propaganda has also directed considerable attention
to the provision for dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the
minute that NATO ceases to exist.
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According to Zhukov,
the Paris Agreements formed a wide possi-
bility for the...rebirth of.. militarism in
West Germany. The coming into force of
the Paris Agreements compelled them (the
Warsaw Pact states) to take appropriate
measures,
By harping on the presence of West Germany in the Western
military alliance, the USSR was able to capitalize on the
all too recent memories of World War II harbored by the
Eastern European populations and was able, with apparent
logic, to suggest that the military organization of the
European Communist states was the only rational means of
coping with the alleged revival of West German revanchism.
The inclusion of Bonn in NATO was similarly helpful to local
regimes in these states by providing them with a justifica-
tion for their formal military and political subservience
to the Soviet Union; i.e., they were making a conscientious
effort to protect their citizenry from ravages by a newly
militant Germany, a subject around which some support for
the party could be rallied.
Thus, as a propaganda tool the pact served to illustrate
"the defensive and peaceful character" of Soviet military
relationships, to cast the USSR in the role of protector of
Eastern Europe and to gain some popular backing for the
local Communist parties.
Cooperative Military Alliance
Despite Soviet efforts to make the Warsaw Pact assume
the character of a viable military alliance, the USSR until
recently avoided meaningful military integration of the
member states. Prior to 1961, military cooperation was
limited largely to establishing and operating an integrated
Soviet-controlled bloc air defense, to providing the Eastern
Europeans with technical information necessary for the pro-
duction of Soviet-type weapons, and to a general standard-.
ization of weapons used by the armed forces of the member
states. Military leaders and delegations exchanged visits,
and broad strategic tasks were given a general definition,
but there was neither real military integration, nor frequent
and regular combined maneuvers of the various Communist
forces.
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BI-LATERAL TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
SIGNED BY WARSAW PACT MEMBERS
FMA
4-45
Czech
FMA
12-43
Hung
FMA
2-48
Rum
FMA
2-48
But
FMA
3-48
E.G.
FMA
6-64
r. 4-65
r. 12-63
Poland
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
F
4-45
3-47
6-48
1-49
5-48
7-50
r. 4-65
Czecho-
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
F
slovakia
12-43
3-47
4-49
7-48
4-48
6-50
r. 12-63
Hungary
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
F
2-48
6-48
4-49
1-48
7-48
6-50
Rumania
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
F
2-48
1-49
7-48
1-48
1-48
8-50
Bulgaria
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
FMA
F
3-48
5-48
4-48
7-48
1-48
8-50
East
Germany
FMA
6-64
F
7-50
F
6-50
F
6-50
F
8-50
F
8-50
The treaties are valid for a period of twenty years and commit the
co-signatories to mutual defense against aggression, particularly aggres-
sion by a rearmed German state. In this regard the treaties concluded
with East Germany were called only Friendship treaties. It was not until
June 1964 that the GDR-Soviet Union agreement was upgraded to the level
of a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. To date
none of the other Pact countries have followed the Soviet lead with a
similar upgrading. In two cases treaties have been renewed, between the
USSR and Czechoslovakia and the USSR and Poland. Albania has not been in-
cluded since it has signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance only with Bulgaria, an agreement the two states concluded in
December 1947.
FMA - Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty
F - Friendship Treaty
r - Renewed
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Relationship to Series of Existing Bilateral Agreements of
mutual Assifance
On 15 May 1955, one day after the signing of the Warsaw
Treaty, the Austrian State Treaty was signed in the Belvedere
Palace in Vienna. As a result, the original justification
for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania--
protection of the USSR supply lines to Austria--no longer
existed. The Soviet Union, moreover, was obligated to with-
draw its forces from the two countries within 40 days after
the new treaty took effect.
Thus, some new basis to permit the continued presence
of Soviet troops in these two countries was necessary; the
Warsaw Pact provided this. It also established terms under
which the Soviet Union could claim legitimacy for its armed
presence in other Eastern European countries, if necessary.
By 1950 the USSR had concluded bilateral mutual aid
treaties with all of the members of the Soviet bloc which
were to become signatories of the Warsaw Pact;_(except East
Germany, with which it did not conclude such a treaty until
1964, and Albania, which has a mutual aid treaty only with
Bulgaria). None of these treaties of friendship and mutual
assistance, however, provided a firm juridical basis for the
stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of a treaty
partner. Although the terms of the Warsaw Pact agreement
regarding this were general and referred vaguely to "agreed
measures," they did provide for the formation of a Unified
Armed Force and took the first step toward regularization
of the status of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.
After the widespread political turmoil that weakened
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe in 1956, the stationing
of Soviet troops in that area was further regularized by a
series of "status of forces" agreements, which in effect
used the Warsaw Treaty as their point of departure without
any formal reference to it. Since the USSR certainly wielded
the power necessary to conclude these agreements independently
of the Warsaw Pact framework, its use as a point of departure
for the agreements signified Soviet awareness of the-pact's
value as a means of coping with the threat of political
diversity in Eastern Europe.
How It is Organized and Operates
At the Warsaw conference of May 1955 establishing the
Warsaw Treaty Organization, two major bodies were created
to carry out the functions of the pact: the Political
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Political Consultative Committee
1, 1st Secretaries of Communist
parties
2. Heads of Government and
their assistants
3. Ministers of Foreign Affairs
4. Ministers of Defense or
Armed Forces
Permanent Commission
Composition unknown;
deals with recommenda-
tions concerning for-
Joint Secretariat
(Representatives
of member states)
sign policy questions)
Joint Armed Forces Command
1. Commander-in-chief
2. Ministers of Defense or
other military leaders--
Deputies--Commanders-in-
3. General Staff
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Consultative Committee, and the Unified Command of Pact
Armed Forces, both headquartered in Moscow.
According to the terms of the treaty the Political
Consultative Committee--on which each state,is represented
by a specially appointed official--is charged with coordinat-
ing all activities of the pact organization, with the excep-
tion of purely military matters. However, "general questions
pertaining to the strengthening of the defense capacity and
to the organization of the joint armed forces of the states
that are parties to the treaty will be examined by the PCC,
which will take appropriate decisions." Additional committee
responsibilities involve consideration of important foreign
policy decisions, and the use of the PCC by member states
to consult "on their common interests" and to develop the
"economic and cultural cooperation of'-the partners." Only
the first of these functions seemed to be of importance
until the early 1960's.
The PCC in May 1955 was further empowered to form auxil-
iary organs for which "a need may arise" in executing its
responsibilities. Accordingly a Permanent Commission, located
in Moscow, and a Joint Secretariat, also situated in the
Soviet capital, were created at the second meeting of the
Committee in Prague in January 1956. At this same meeting
it was also decided that the Political Consultative Com-
mittee would convene at least twice a year but could meet
more frequently if its members desired.
The Permanent Commission, the most significant of the
two auxiliary organs, has competence for the development of
recommendations on foreign policy questions of importance
to pact members, while the Joint Secretariat is responsible
for administering "those technical fields serving the real-
ization of treaty goals." Both bodies are dominated by the
Soviets, and the Soviet head of the Joint Secretariat is
also the Chief of Staff of the Unified Command of Pact
Armed Forces.
The Unified Command of Pact Armed Forces has paramount
authority over the troops assigned to it by the member states
of the pact. According to the terms of the treaty, the
Unified Command is enjoined to "strengthen the defensive
capability of the Warsaw Pact, to prepare military plans in
case of war and to decide on the deployment of troops"
assigned to the pact forces, which consist of contingents
of national units.designated for assignment to the Unified
Command.
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At the initial convocation of the Warsaw Treaty Organ-
ization, it was agreed that the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces would be a representative of the Soviet Union.
He is supported by a General Staff, which includes permanent
representatives of the general staffs of the member states,
and is assisted by eight deputies, traditionally the ministers
of defense of the countries party to the treaty, although
the deputies theoretically may be drawn from a lower military
echelon. Even though these deputies are appointed and
recalled by the governments of their respective states inde-
pendently of the Unified Command, the integrated staffs of
the Command function supra-nationally.
On paper, the organization of the Warsaw Pact bespeaks
impressive coordination among its members on political and
military matters, but the actual operation is a different
matter, The Political Consultative Committee meetings have
served principally as a forum for the articulation of a
common stand on important international issues as proposed
by the USSR. The Joint Command of Pact Armed Forces has
also been under complete Soviet domination, with both the
posts of Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff
held by Russian officers.
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Military Value
Since 1961, the Soviet Union has been carrying out
a program to upgrade the military significance of the
Warsaw Pact, particularly in terms of its use as an in-
strument of common defense of the Communist camp. This
policy has resulted in the holding of combined pact train-
ing exercises and in considerable modernization of the
equipment of the pact forces commensurate with their
apparently enlarged responsibilities.
Coordination of Military Planning, Equipment and Strategy
The late 1950's were marked by the first steps to
elevate the importance of the military contribution of
the Eastern European countries in over-all Soviet military
planning, with a concurrent increase in emphasis on a
more active joint role for pact forces in defensive and
offensive theater operations. Soviet attention to the
cooperative aspects of the alliance was heightened during
the Berlin crisis of 1961.
In September of that year, the defense ministers of
the countries involved gathered in Warsaw for the first
publicly announced meeting devoted wholly to military
matters. In October Soviet, East German, Polish and Czecho-
slovak forces participated in a major field exercise, the
first of a series of such annual combined training exer-
cises. According to Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-Chief
of the Warsaw Pact forces, these exercises are of great
importance because of their "contributions to further growth
of the combat might of our joint armed forces, to higher
standards of training, to better coordination of forces and
staffs, and to the elaboration of common views on methods
of nuclear and conventional warfare."
In addition to undertaking combined exercises, the
Soviets introduced a program of re-equipment and moderni-
zation of the Eastern European armed forces. On the whole,
the modernization program and the training given the Eastern
European armies prepared them principally for conducting
theater warfare under nuclear conditions. Except for Al-
bania all of the Soviet bloc countries, however, have been
furnished with potential nuclear delivery systems in the
form of tactical missiles or aircraft. Even though the
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ESTIMATED PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES
EAST
OLA
ND
LOVA IA
E
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA* TOTAL
Ground Forces
2l
000
0,000
80,000
?
002600
17
125,000
30,000
395#000
Naval Forces
17,000
17,000
8,000
7,400
3,000
49,000
Air Forces
45$000
35,000
15,000
91000
15, 000
20,000
5,000
139"000
TOTAL ARMED FORCES
277,000
235,000
112,000
109,000
198,000
152,000
38,000
1,083,000
Militarized Security
45,000
35,000
70,000
35,000
60,000
15,000
12,500
260,000
Forces
Although Albania no longer participates in Warsaw Pact affairs, it remains a
nominal member and is included in this chart for comparative purposes.
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nuclear warheads for these weapons presumably are kept in
Soviet hands, possession of missiles and attack aircraft
by Eastern European armed forces increases the possi-
bility of nuclear sharing within the pact at some future
time.
Stationing of Soviet Troops in Eastern Europe
As noted earlier, the Warsaw Pact's initial military
significance lay in the fact that it provided justifica-
tion for the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.
This Soviet presence facilitated the adoption of Soviet
organizational forms and field doctrine by the local armies,
as well as the standardization of weapons and local arms
production along Soviet lines. Finally the deploying of
Soviet troops in Eastern Europe (in East Germany, Poland
and Hungary) serves as a guarantee of sorts for the existence
of a political atmosphere which best serves Soviet interests.
Since the late 19501s, however, when the Soviet Union
first showed a greater appreciation of the benefits to be
derived from closer military integration within the pact,
the role of the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe has under-
gone a significant change. The USSR was prompted to con-
clude status-of-force agreements after the events of 1956,
and great pains were taken to stress the legal restrictions
and juridicial safeguards governing the actions of the Soviet
military in the other pact countries. Emphasis now is placed
on the equality between the armed forces of the host country
and the Soviet troops, with considerable propaganda effort
devoted to demonstrating "the development of comradely
bonds" resulting from the combined exercises of pact troops.
Although military collaboration between the Soviet
Union and the other pact members may not have proceeded as
far as some official accounts seek to convey, the fact re-
mains that the Soviet Union has found it useful to stress
the close military bonds among the Warsaw Pact members.
One important Soviet motive can be traced to the fact that
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, in addition to their de-
ployment opposite NATO, have long had a kind of garrison
function to insure that regimes sympathetic to Soviet policy
remain in power. As the countries of Eastern Europe have
gradually acquired a measure of autonomy in their economic,
cultural, and political affairs, the garrison aspect of
Russia's military presence became increasingly awkward for
Moscow. The Warsaw Pact, however, confers collective sanc-
tion on the Soviet presence in the name of defense against
the NATO threat.
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Forward Defense Area
Closer military integration of the Eastern European
armies into Soviet operational plans has been noteworthy
for the particular attention given to East Germany, Poland
and Czechoslovakia,the so-called "northern tier" countries,
referred to in public statements by bloc officials as
"the first strategic echelon" of the Warsaw Pact. The
regional differentiation between the states of the northern
group and those constituting the southern sector of the
alliance stems from their relative importance as a forward
defense area. Since the territory of these northern
countries would be the main axis for a central European
campaign in time of war, the Soviets have shown greater
interest in them. Another contributing factor is the
role this area has traditionally played as a defensive
buffer zone against a possible land invasion from th
West, a concept that has remained alive in Soviet military
thought despite the fact that such a traditional military
invasion of the Soviet Union in the nuclear age is a remote
contingency.
The difficulty of deploying substantial reinforcements
from the USSR in the event of nuclear war makes an effective
Warsaw Pact force, already in place close to the arena of
European conflict, a highly attractive project.
Use to Plan Actions Elsewhere than Europe
There has been no evidence to suggest that the Soviet
Union has contemplated use of the armed forces of the pact,
committed by the terms of the treaty only to a European
defense system, to initiate or support military actions
elsewhere. For example, during the Suez crisis of 1956
there was no mobilization of pact forces. During the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962, the Soviets attempted to maintain
a non-provocative stance in terms of the treaty organiza-
tion, and again there was no build-up or mobilization of
pact forces.
The most significant concentration of Soviet forces
and the most effective troop contingents assigned to the
pact are in the previously mentioned "northern tier" coun-
tries, which have geographic and strategic political im-
portance only in terms of a European conflict. Inasmuch
as the pact armed forces have never been assigned a role
outside of the context of the European theater, it is
unlikely that they would be used in any other way--such
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as sending units to Vietnam--in the future, particularly
since some of the Eastern European countries have been
taking an increasingly independent stand toward pact
command arrangements. The USSR, in fact, probably is
finding that it can no longer singlehandedly decide in
all cases the disposition of pact troops.
On the surface, it seems inconsistent that the USSR
has adopted a policy of strengthening its Eastern European
allies at the very time they are becoming politically less
tractable. The political benefits derived by the Soviet
Union from the Warsaw Pact, however, are probably at
least as great as the military benefits.
Thus Political Consultative Committee communiques and
resolutions have been so phrased as to indicate unanimity
and to underline strongly the status of the USSR as the
spokesman for the Communist movement. Even in 1961, when
intra-bloc relations were exacerbated by the growing ten-
sions of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Russians were able
to use the Warsaw Pact to maintain a show of unity by issuing
strongly worded complaints against the West, particularly
in regard to the German question and disarmament
The USSR also used the periodic and irregular gatherings
of the Political Consultative Committee (see Appendix D)
to pressure a reluctant member to accept the "majority
view" or, if this was impossible, to persuade the other
governments in the alliance to join with them in isolating
the dissident.* This method was employed to bring about
and to justify the ouster of Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy.
At the end of the 1956 revolution, Nagy was charged with
violating the unity of the bloc by his unilateral decision
to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Similar pressure
was brought to bear against the Albanians in June 1962,
when they were excluded from participation in a meeting
in Moscow of the pact's Political Consultative Committee.
*This type of pressure tactic is one of the main reasons ac-
counting for Rumania's oft-voiced view in recent years that
bloc decisions are binding only with unanimous--rather than
mere majority support. Communist China has constantly
reiterated this point also during the years of its dispute
with Moscow and the Soviet bloc. The USSR has never been
willing formally to accept this view because it would giv
any one of the Eastern European countries veto power. As
a practical matter, however, it has on a number of occasions
found it necessary to accede implicitly to the unanimity rule.
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The Soviets also found the Warsaw Pact a useful
device for rebutting Chinese charges that Moscow was
a disintegrating influence in the Communist camp. The
communique' issued after the March 1961 meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee pointedly stated that
the PCC was "guided by the theoretical and political
conclusions of the November 1960 Conference of representa-
tives of Communist and Workers Parties" and by the
"historic documents" of that conference. Such an announce-
ment was devised to put the Soviet Union firmly on the
side of the angels, and to emphasize that it was the
Chinese and Albanians (neither the Albanian party or
government chiefs attended the meeting) who were dis-
rupting the unity of the bloc and rejecting the good
offices of the USSR and its supporters.
With the growth of economic pragmatism and the ap-
pearance of more nationalistically oriented policy stands
by the Eastern European regimes, a new situation in
Soviet bloc relations gradually came into being in the
early 19601s. Moscow's apparent hopes to use the Politi-
cal Consultative Committee genuinely "for the purpose of
consultations" among the parties to the treaty foundered
on the rocks of national differences. Today the USSR
has little capability to override dissenting elements
within the pact by political pressure; even those countries
willing to follow the Soviet line are reluctant to join
in isolating more independent members in case they too
should one day wish to pursue a path of their own choosing.
The failure of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative
Committee to most since January 1965 is probably a ref lec-
tion of the growing weakness of this body as an instrument
for achieving a political consensus, much less inte"-
party unity.
Economic Cost to USSR of
Europe
Military Withdrawal from Eastern
Although the military base system of the Soviet armed
forces in Hungary, Poland and especially East Germany is
rather extensive, a relinquishment of those facilities to
the present Eastern European governments should pose no
economically significant obstacle to a withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Europe.
The question of the exact value of the Soviet military
investment in fixed facilities in Eastern Europe is compli-
cated, as is perhaps best illustrated by examining the case
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of East Germany. The bulk of the Soviet military forces
outside the USSR are stationed in East Germany; and the
extent of Soviet control and exploitation of the Eastern
European countries has, in the long run, probably been
greatest in East Germany.
The Soviet forces in East Germany (GSF'G) are mobile
field forces and hence can be withdrawn to the Soviet
Union on short notice. Although available information
does not permit any highly accurate computations of the
economic value of the GSFG'ss fixed facilities, it is
believed that a significant portion, if not all, were
built at the expense of the Germans both before and
after 1945. In any event, the East German economy suffers
from a shortage of storage and housing facilities and
could well use any facilities vacated by Soviet troops.
There is little reason to suspect that the East Germans
would not make it economically worthwhile for the Soviets
to leave.
The purpose of the Soviet presence in East Germany
is no longer the exploitation of the East German economy,
but the maintenance of Soviet strategic interests. The
only remaining aspects which may still have economic importance
for the USSR are the relatively minor economic advantages
of garrisoning troops in East Germany instead of the USSR,
and the more significant operation of the uranium mines.
The Soviet Union has already given up most of the
economic advantages derived from the 1945 occupation of
the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin.
At the end of 1953, the USSR cancelled the balance owed
by East Germany on the reparations account, and arranged
to turn back to East Germany the last of the enterprises
seized after the war--except for the uranium mines, which
the USSR will probably retain until the ore is exhausted.
By 1955, the East Germans finished paying for the enter-
prises which had reverted to their control. Occupation
cost payments were progressively reduced in 1954, 1956,
and 1958, and finally discontinued in 1959.
Soviet withdrawal, then, apparently would neither
jeopardize significant economic interests, nor pose economic
costs of a size that would be difficult to negotiate.
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Assurance of Protection Against Germany
Whether the belief is justified or not, the Federal
German Republic remains a real threat in the minds of
many Eastern Europeans and thus has served., the govern-
ments of the Warsaw Pact states as a valuable propaganda
justification for their close relations with the Soviet
Union. Typical of the attitude of Eastern European
Communist regimes toward West Germany is the statement
made on 26 March 1966 by Jan Karol Wende, Vice Marshal
of the Parliament of the Polish People?s Republic;
...the Federal German Republic is the only
state in Europe whose government wants to
thwart the results of World War II, offi-
cially puts forward territorial claims to
Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union,
and is striving, under the slogan of "re-
unification" for annexation of the GDR....
any attempts at undermining the political
and territorial status quo in Europe threaten
an armed conflict, which in this part of the
world would inevitably turn into a world
conflagration....
As a consequence of this fear of a possible revival
of German militarism, the Eastern Europeans view a mili-
tary alliance with the USSR as the most practical means,
and perhaps the only feasibility, to protect themselves
from the traditional German threat to the area. Certainly
the collective security arrangements of the pact give them
a greater measure of defense than they could ever obtain
with their own resources.
Both the regimes and the people of these countries
are also highly sensitive to situations which, in their
eyes, constitute potential nuclear war hazards. They re-
gard the presence of NATO nuclear weapons in West Germany
as a principal deterrent to conclusion of the German peace
treaty and stress that their reliance on the nuclear capa-
bility of the Soviet Union is necessary in order to avert
the possible agressive aims of a reactionary West German
Government.
For some of the countries;--specifically Poland and
Czechoslovakia--membership in the Warsaw Pact under the
aegis of the USSR gives them some measure of assurance that
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they will be able to retain the territories they acquired
from Germany at the end of the war--acquisitions which
more than 20 years later still lack the legality of a
peace treaty.
Modern Armaments
As a result of the extensive supply program begun
by the Soviets almost 15 years ago, and the local manu-
facture of military equipment in Eastern Europe, a high
degree of standardization of materiel has been achieved
among the armed forces of the pact member states (see
Appendix C for Eastern European military budgets). This
process has not only facilitated simpler wartime weapons
coordination but has also made peacetime production and
supply of modern weapons easier. No Eastern European
country has been permitted to establish either an autono-
mous manufacturing capability for a complete range of mili-
tary equipment and supplies, or a fully adequate war re-
Despite some time lag between the appearance of parti-
cular weapons and supplies as standard in the Soviet army
and the supply of the same items to the Eastern European
armies, Moscow has generally made up-to-date military
materiel available to them. The bulk of equipment used
by these forces today is concurrently standard in the
Soviet military forces.
Although nuclear weapons currently deployed in Eastern
Europe are under the control of the Soviet forces stationed
there, tactical missiles and new generation aircraft have
been directly assigned to the armed forces of Poland,
Rumania, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and apparently
Bulgaria. Possession of these weapons undoubtedly increases
the stature of the bloc armed forces, and there is no doubt
that their ability to conduct modern warfare has become
far greater as a result of Soviet tutelage.
Support for Regimes in Power
Although the Warsaw Pact plays a role as the guarantor
of power for local Communist regimes in Eastern Europe,
this should not be given undue emphasis. Dissolution of
the pact as a formal organization, and even the subsequent
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the
Eastern European countries, would not spell the end to
Communist domination in those countries. In fact,
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particularly in view of the growing strength of "national
Communism," and its acceptability to most Soviet bloc
leaders, such a turn of events would probably make the
several Communist governments more palatable to the
populations of those areas. The majority of the citizens
of Eastern Europe tend to regard some form of socialist
government as the only practical method for establishing
and maintaining sound economies in their respective
countries.
However, it would also be unwise to underestimate
the psychological advantage the Eastern European govern-
ments derive from emphasizing their membership in the
Warsaw Pact. Reiteration by the Eastern European leaders
of the closeness of cooperation between the local army
and Soviet troops, as well as pointed references to Soviet
military might, are subtle but effective reminders. They
deter any considerations of political independence among
the satellite populations as forcefully as the more flagrant
methods of coercion, terrorism and blatant Soviet domination
experienced under Stalin. The "psychological shadow," as
it has been termed by George Kennan, cast by the presence
of the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe certainly falls
across the consciousness of those who are citizens of the
states belonging to the Warsaw Pact, and can only serve
to remind them that in all probability their destinies
are bound with that of the Soviet Union for some time to
come.
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PROBLEMS WITHIN THE PACT
EE Countries Becoming Less Tractable
The CPSU is against any hegemony in the Com-
munist movement, for genuinely international-
ist relations of equality among all the parties
....The strengthening of unity requires ob-
servance of the standards of relations among
the parties worked out collectively by them;
complete equality and independence, non-inter-
ference in each other's internal affairs,
mutual support and international solidarity.
These remarks, made by Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary
General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at the
23rd Party Congress in March 1966, are not hollow words.
They reflect Soviet recognition and acceptance of the
growing diversity within the Communist world, and parti-
cularly of the centrifugal forces at work within the War-
saw Pact. The USSR, by deciding to accept what it cannot
prevent without an undue and counterproductive show of
force, has given its stamp of approval to an increased
independence on the part of its pact partners. In so
doing, Moscow obviously hopes to perserve the unity,
as well as the military and political effectiveness, of
the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
In admitting the necessity of working out problems
collectively, the USSR is apparently responding to pressures
from the Eastern European regimes for a greater voice in
the conduct of pact affairs. Indeed, by accepting that
"business-like contacts and political consultations between
leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries
have become a system," the Soviet Union again has given
necessity the mark of virtue. Even so, the USSR has not
been able to convene a meeting of pact states at the first
secretary or ministerial level since the last convocation
of the Political Consultative Committee in January, 1965.
Under the terms of the pact, it is supposed to meet twice
a year.
Even in those instances where an Eastern European re-
gime has deliberately rejected the lead of the Soviet Union,
t h.e others have been reluctant to condemn the dissenting
member. For instance Rumania's unilateral reduction of
the term of service in its armed forces from 24 to 16 months
has drawn no censure, at least in public, from the other
members of the alliance. They have also been willing to
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tolerate Bucharest's insistence on full independence in
economic policy and foreign policy--Rumanian determination
to straddle the fence in the Sino-Soviet dispute--as well
as the Rumanian overtures to the West. The reasons for
this are clear. By refusing to criticize Rumania's right
to pursue an independent course, the other members of
the alliance are establishing a precedent that will serve
them well should their own national interests diverge
from those of the pact as a whole.
There is also evidence that the Eastern European
members of the pact, including those who consider main-
tenance of the alliance at least a military if not a
political necessity, disagree over the current organiza-
tion and chain of command under which the pact now operates.
Marshal Grechko has referred to the need to reorganize
the structure, and Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Czechoslovakia, in his 15 March 1966 speech to the
National Assembly spoke of the need for "further strengthen-
ing the Warsaw Pact organization." Disagreements on the
future structure and organization of the Warsaw Pact re-
portedly became evident at the last PCC meeting in January
1965. They apparently remain unresolved.
Another factor which obviously has considerable
bearing on the smoothness with which the Warsaw alliance
operates is the differing relationships that its various
member governments have with the Soviet Union. The greatest
degree of friction exists, of course, between the USSR and
Albania, which for all practical purposes has read itself
out of the pact; the friction stems from Albania's rigidly
pro-Chinese stand. Rumania has maintained correct relations
with the USSR, but has pointedly refused to take sides
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Within the pact, Rumania has
refused to attend meetings whenever it appeared possible
that the gathering might prove to be a forum for anti-
Chinese propaganda. Poland and Czechoslovakia support the
USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute, although Poland has taken
a more moderate stand on the problem. Both of these countries
tend to regard close support of the Soviet lead as a guarantee
of protection against Germany. East Germany has had no
choice but to be a faithful and willing ally of Soviet
foreign policy. The relationship of the Hungarian regime
to the USSR tends to be passive, largely because of Hungary's
economic dependence on the Soviet Union. As party First
Secretary Kadar said at the 23rd CPSU Congress, "We support
enhancing the effectiveness of international organizations
of such great importance for socialism and peace as the
Warsaw Pact and CEMA."
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Reliability of EE Forces
The inclusion of the armed forces of the Eastern
European countries in the pact has greatly increased
the quantity of manpower available to the USSR, but the
question of their reliability, if called upon to fight
with the Soviet Union, remains a major factor for
consideration. If the bloc forces were called upon to
support the USSR in a defensive campaign in hostilities
initiated by West Germany, it is likely that the pact's
Eastern. European armies would fight with their Soviet
comrades. It is also possible that the countries in-
dividually might fight an effective offensive campaign,
provided that it was directed against one of their
traditional national enemies; for example Poles and
Czechs would wage an offensive campaign against th
Germans, or the Bulgarians against the Greeks and Turks.
History indicates, however, that the national armies
of the bloc countries are hardly entirely reliable allies.
Units of the 'Hungarian Army actively fought the Russians
in the 1956 revolution. A decisive portion of the Polish
Army was prepared to resist any use of military fore
by the Russians to prevent the appointment of Gomulka
in October 1956.
The current Soviet Party leaders have had difficulty
in persuading the various pact members to pull their
proper weight within the alliance, as has been noted in
Rumania's reluctance to accept the burdens entailed by
larger pact commitments. Nationalism has also created
problems elsewhere, even among stalwart Soviet supporters.
In April 1965, for instance, a nationalist faction of
the Bulgarian army attempted a coup apparently aimed at
directing Bulgarian policy along more independent lines.
The Soviets have sought to explain away such soft spots
in the pact by claiming publicly that "imperialist" attempts
to split the bloc would prove futile. This type of comment
reflects, of course, a certain helplessness in dealing
with the problem of obtaining cooperation at a time when
the national interests of the Eastern European countries
are permitted greater play in their policy making.
Eastern Europ
Another reason for the determination of Eastern Euro-
pean members to assume a greater voice in. Warsaw Pact
decisions is their reluctance to become involved in a
nuclear war. Leaders of the non-Soviet member governments
are apparently interested in achieving a policy-making
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role for themselves commensurate with the vulnerability
of their positions as sites for Soviet nuclear weapons.
The possibility of their involuntary involvement in a
nuclear war became clear to them during the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962. As members of the Warsaw Pact and there-
fore allies of the USSR, they were implicitly involved and
would have been subject to the same consequences as Mos-
cow if the Soviet missile build-up in Cuba had led to
ware
Effect on Decision Making Process
The divisive factors which have been at work within
the Warsaw alliance are having repercussions within the
policy-making mechanisms of the pact as the Eastern Euro-
pean members of the alliance have begun to press for a
more influential voice in matters affecting their own
interests, such as choice of strategy, sharing of military
and economic burdens, and resolution of foreign policy
issues bearing on the question of war or peace. It seems
fairly certain that efforts to alleviate these pressures
will take the form of some sort of reorganization of the
pact structure. In mid-September 1965 Brezhnev, in com-
menting on the need to strengthen bloc unity, remarked
that "the current situation places on the agenda the
further perfection of the Warsaw Pact organization. We
are all prepared to work diligently in order to find the
best solution." The Soviet party leader revealed shortly
thereafter that a series of talks with Eastern European
leaders had dealt,with the need for establishing within
the Warsaw Pact organization "a permanent and operating
mechanism for considering urgent problems."
However, the role and nature of the Warsaw Pact
appears to be conditioned in large part by two closely
related factors: the degree to which the Soviets place
reliance upon the other pact forces, and the extent of
actual Soviet dependence upon them. The USSR will doubt-
less be prepared to accept some diminution of its authority
within the Warsaw alliance to the extent that it feels
dependent on the other pact forces. Although the advent
of the missile age seems, on the surface at least, to have
somewhat reduced Soviet military dependence on the Warsaw
allies, other considerations, both military and politi-
cal, suggest that on balance Soviet dependence on the
Warsaw allies probably is becoming greater.
Trends along the above lines, with greater emphasis
on military integration and interdependence and assertion
of separate national interests, will probably result in
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a new balance of decision-making power among the pact's
members. From the Soviet viewpoint, the alliance'con-
tinues to perform an important political function It
has proven more effective than any other multilateral
institution in holding the bloc together and still pro-
vides the basic treaty obligation binding the Eastern
European states to the Soviet Union.
Although it would be unrealistic to suppose that
the USSR will cease to play a predominant role in pact
affairs, the trends at work within the treaty organiza-
tion suggest that the pact may be evolving toward an
alliance of a more customary kind, subject to a greater
degree than previously to the interplay of coalition
politics, and that the Eastern European partners may
derive greater political, cultural and economic autonomy
in the course of such an evolution.
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APPENDIX A
TREATY
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
Between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic,
the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic,
the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic
The Contracting Parties,
reaffirming their desire for the
establishment of a system of Euro-
pean collective security based on
have decided to conclude the
present Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assist-
ance and have for that purpose
the participation of all European appointed as their plenipotentiaries:
states irrespective of their social the Presidium of the People's
and political systems, which would Assembly of the People's Republic
make it possible to unite their of Albania: Mehmet Shehu, Chair-
efforts in safeguarding the peace man of the Council of Ministers
of Europe; of the People's Republic of Al-
mindful, at the same time, of bania;
the situation created in Europe by the Presidium of the People's
the ratification of the Paris agree- Assembly of the People's Republic
ments, which envisage the formation of Bulgaria: Vylko Chervenkov,
of a new military alignment in the
shape of "Western European Union,"
with the participation of a re-
militarized Western Germany and
the integration of the latter in
the North-Atlantic bloc, which in-
creases the danger of another war
and constitutes a threat to the
national security of the peaceable
states;
being persuaded that in these
Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria;
the Presidium of the Hungarian
People's Republic: Andras Hegedus,
Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters of the Hungarian People's
Republic;
the President of the German
Democratic Republic: Otto Grote-
wohi, Prime Minister of the Ger-
circumstances the peaceable European man Democratic Republic;
states must take the necessary mews the State Council of the
ures to safeguard their security Polish People's Republic: Jozef
and in the interests of preserving
peace in Europe;
guided by the objects and
principles of the Charter of the
United Nations Organization;
being desirous of further pro-
moting and developing friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance
in accordance with the principles
of respect for the independence
and sovereignty of states and of
non-interference in their internal
affairs,
Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Polish
People's Republic;
the Presidium of the Grand
National Assembly of the Rumanian
People's Republic: Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Ru-
manian People's Republic;
the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics: Nikolai
Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman
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of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R.;
the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic: Viliam Siroky, Prime
Minister of the Czechoslovak Re-
public,
who, having presented their
full powers, found in good and due
form, have agreed as follows:
They shall immediately
consult with one another when-
ever, in the opinion of any
one of them, a threat of armed
attack on one or more of the
Parties to the Treaty has
arisen, in order to ensure
joint defence and the main-
tenance of peace and security.
The Contracting Parties under-
take, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations Organization,
to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of
force, and to settle their inter-
In the event of armed attack
in Europe on one or more of
the Parties to the Treaty by any
state or group of states, each
of the Parties to the Treaty,
in the exercise of its right
national disputes peacefully and to individual or collective
in such manner as will not jeopardize self-defence in accordance with
international peace and security. Article 51 of the Charter of
The Contracting Parties declare
their readiness to participate in
a spirit of sincere cooperation in
all international actions designed
to safeguard international peace
and security, and will fully devote
their energies to the attainment
of this end.
The Contracting Parties will
furthermore strive for the adop-
tion, in agreement with other states
which may desire to cooperate in
this, of effective measures for
universal reduction of armaments
and prohibition of atomic, hydro-
gen and other weapons of mass
destruction.
The Contracting Parties shall
consult with one another on all
important international issues
affecting their common interests,
guided by the desire to strengthen
international peace and security.
the United Nations Organization,
shall immediately, either indivk1-
u a lly or in agreement with
other Parties to the Treaty,
come to the assistance of th
state or states attacked with
all such means as it deems
necessary, including armed
force. The Parties to the
Treaty shall immediately consult
concerning the necessary measur
to be taken by them jointly in
order to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
Measures taken on the basis
of this Article shall be reported
to the Security Council in con-
formity with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations
Organization. These measures
shall be discontinued immediately
the Security Council adopts the
necessary measures to restore
and maintain international peace
and security.
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The Contracting Parties have
agreed to establish a Joint Com-
mand of the armed forces that by
agreement among the Parties shall
be assigned to the Command, which
shall function on the basis of
jointly established principles.
They shall likewise adopt other
agreed measures necessary to
strengthen their defensive power,
in order to protect the peaceful
labours of their peoples, guarantee
the inviolability of their frontiers
and territories, and provide defence
against possible aggression.
For the purpose of the consul-
tations among the Parties envisaged
in the present Treaty, and also for
the purpose of examining questions
which may arise in the operation
of the Treaty, a Political Consul-
tative Committee shall be set up,
in which each of the Parties to
the Treaty shall be represented by
a member of its Government or by
another specifically appointed re-
presentative.
The Committee may set up such
auxiliary bodies as may prove neces-
sary.
The Contracting Parties d
Clare that they will act in a
spirit of friendship and coopera-
tion with a view to further
developing and fostering econom-
ic and cultural intercourse
with one another, each adhering
to the principle of respect for
the independence and sovereignty
of the others and non-inter-
ference in their internal af-
fairs.
The present Treaty is open
to the accession of other states
irrespective of their social and
political systems, which express
their readiness by participa-
tion in the present Treaty to
assist in uniting the efforts of
the peaceable sates in safe-
guarding the peace and security
of the peoples. Such accession
shall enter into force with the
agreement of the Parties to the
Treaty after the declaration of
accession has been deposited with
the Government of the Polish
People's Republic.
The present Treaty is subject
to ratification, and the instru-
The Contracting Parties undertake ments of ratification shall b
not to participate in any coalitions deposited with the Government
or alliances and not to conclude any of the Polish People's Republic.
agreements whose objects conflict The Treaty shall enter into
with the objects of the present force on the day the last instru-
Treaty. ment of ratification has been de-
The Contracting Parties declare posited. The Government of the
that their commitments under existing Polish People's Republic shall
international treaties do not con- notify the other Parties to the
flict with the provisions of the Treaty as each instrument of
present Treaty. ratification is deposited.
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The present Treaty shall remain
in force for twenty years. For
such Contracting Parties as do
not at least one year before the
expiration of this period present
to the Government of the Polish
People's Republic a statement of
denunciation of the Treaty, it
shall remain in force for the
next ten years.
Should a system of collective
security be established in Europe,
and a General European Treaty of
Collective Security concluded for
this purpose, for which the Con-
tracting Parties will unswervingly
strive, the present Treaty shall
cease to be operative from the day
the General European Treaty enters
into force.
Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955,
in one copy each in the Russian,
Polish, Czech and German lan-
gt ,all texts being equally
authentic. Certified copies
of the present Treaty shall
be sent by the Government of
the Polish People's Republic to
allthe Parties to the Treaty.
In witness whereof the
plenipotentiaries have signed
the present Treaty and affixed
their seals.
For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's
Republic of Albania
For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria
Vylko Chervenkov
For the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic
Andras Hegedus
For the President of the German Democratic Republic
Otto Grotewohl
For the State Council of the Polish People's Republic
Jozef Cyrankiewicz
For the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the
Rumanian People's Republic
Gheorghe Ghsorghiu-D
For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin
For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic
Viliam Siroky
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of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
In pursuance of the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance between the People's
Republic of Albania, the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian
People's Republic, the German Demo-
cratic Republic, the Polish People's
Republic, the Rumanian People's Re-
public, the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics and the Czechoslovak
Republic, the signatory states have
decided to establish a Joint Command
of their armed forces.
The decision provides that gen-
eral questions relating to the stren-
gthening of the defensive power and
the organization of the Joint Armed
Forces of the signatory states shall
be subject to examination by the
Political Consultative Committee,
which shall adopt the necessary
decisions.
Marshal of the Soviet Union
I.S. Konev has been appointed Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed
Forces to be assigned by the signa-
tory states.
The Ministers of Defence or other
military leaders of the signatory
states are to serve as Deputy Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Joint Armed
Forces, and shall command the armed
forces assigned by their respective
states to the Joint Armed Forces.
The question of the participation
of the German Democratic Republic
in measures concerning the armed
forces of the Joint Command will be
examined at a later date.
A Staff of the Joint Armed
Forces of the signatory states will
be set up under the Commander-in-Chief
of the Joint Armed Forces, and will
include permanent representa-
tives of the General Staffs
of the signatory states.
The Staff will have its
headquarters in Moscow.
The disposition of the
Joint Armed Forces in the
territories of the signatory
states will be effected, by
agreement among the states,
in accordance with the require-
ments of their mutual defence.
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COMPARISON OF WARSAW PACT TREATY AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance, Warsaw, May
14, 1955
/Preamble?
The contracting parties again
confirm their desire for the estab-
lishment of a system of collective
security in Europe, based on the
participation in it of all European
states, irrespective of their social
and state order, which would permit
the unification of their efforts in
the interests of safeguarding peace
in Europe.
Taking into consideration at the
same time the situation which has
arisen in Europe as the result of the
ratification of the Paris Agreements
envisaging the formation of a new
military alignment in the form of the
West European Union with the parti-
cipation of West Germany, which is
being remilitarized, and her inclu-
sion in the North Atlantic bloc,
which increases the danger of a new
war and creates a threat to the
national security of peace-loving
states; being convinced of the fact
that in these circumstances peace-
loving states in Europe must take
measures necessary to safeguard
their security and in the interests
of preserving peace in Europe;
guided by the aims and principles
of the U.N. Charter; and in the
interests of the further strengthen-
ing and developing of friendship,
collaboration, and mutual assistance
in accordance with the principles
of respecting the independence and
sovereignty of the states and non-
interference in their internal
affairs, the contracting parties
have decided to conclude the present
treaty of friendship, cooperation,
and mutual assistance and have
appointed the following as their
representatives- /signatures omitted?
North Atlantic Treaty
April 14, 1949
/PreamblW
The Parties to this Treaty re-
affirm their faith in the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and their desire to
live in peace,with all peoples and
all governments.
They are determined to safeguard
the freedom, common heritage and
civilization of their peoples, founded
on the principles of democracy, indi-
vidual liberty and the rule of law.
They seek to promote stability
and well-being in the North Atlantic
area.
They are resolved to unite their
efforts for collective defense and
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The Contracting parties pledge
themselves, in accordanpe withthe
U.N. Charter, to refrain in their
international relations from threat-
ening force or from using it, and to
settle their international disputes
by peaceful means, in such a way as
not to threaten international peace
and security
for the preservation of peace and
security.
They therefore agree to this
North Atlantic Treaty:
The Parties undertake, as set
forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international
disputes in which they may be involved
by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered, and
to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of
force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United
Nations,
The contracting parties declare
their readiness to participate, in a
spirit of sincere collaboration, in
all international missions aimed at
safeguarding international peace and
security, and will devote their
strength fully to the realization of
these aims. Hereby the contracting
parties will strive for the adoption,
in agreements with other states which
wish to collaborate in this matter,
of effective measures for the
general reduction of armaments and
the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen,
and other types of mass destruction
weapons,
/No equivalent in NATO7
The contracting parties will consult
with each other in regard to all :impor-
tant questions touching upon their
common interests, being guided by the
interests of the strengthening of inter-
national peace'and security. They will The Parties will consult together
consult with each other without delay whenever, in the opinion of any of
at any time when, in the opinion of any them, the territorial integrity,
of them, there may occur the threat of political independence or security
an armed attack on one or several of any of the Parties is threatened.
states participating in the treaty,
in the interests of a resolute joint
defense and the maintenance of peace
and security.
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In the event of an armed attack in The Parties agree that an armed
Europe on one or several states parti- attack against one or more of them
cipating in the Treaty, by any state or in Europe or North America shall be
group of states, each of the states considered an attack against them all
participating in the treaty, will, by and consequently they agree that, if
virtue of the right'to individual or such an armed attack occurs, each
collective self-defense, in conformity of them, in exercise of the right
with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, of individual or collective self-
offer to the state or states subjected defense recognized by Article 51 of
to the attack immediate assistance, the Charter of the United Nations,
individually or in agreement with other will assist the Party or Parties so
states participating in the treaty, attacked by taking forthwith, indi--
with all the means which it considers vidually and in concert with the
necessary, including the use of armed other Parties, such action as it
force, deems necessary, including the use
The states participating in the of armed force, to restore and
treaty will immediately consult as to maintain the security of the
the joint measures which it may be North Atlantic area.
necessary to undertake for the purpose
of restoring and maintaining inter-
national peace and security. The
measures adopted on the basis of this Any such armed attack and all
article will be reported to the measures taken as a result thereof
Security Council, in conformity with shall immediately be reported to
the articles of the U.N. Charter. the Security Council, Such measures
These measures will be suspended as shall be terminated when the Security
soon as the Security Council launches Council has taken the measures neces-
measures necessary for the restoration sary to restore and maintain inter-
and maintenance of international national peace and security.
peace and security.
The contracting powers have
agreed to set up a joint command of
their Armed Forces, to be placed,
according to agreement among the
powers, at the disposal of this com-
mand acting on the basis of jointly
established principles. They will In order more effectively to
also launch other agreed measures achieve the objectives of this
necessary for the strengthening of Treaty, the Parties, separately and
their defense capacity in order to jointly, by means of continuous and
protect the peaceful toil of their effective self-help and. mutual
peoples, to guarantee the integrity aid, will maintain and develop their
of their frontiers and territories, individual and collective capacity
and to insure defense against possi- to resist armed attack.
ble aggression,
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With the object of carrying out
consultations, provided for by the
present treaty, among the states par-
ticipating in the treaty and for the
examination of questions arising in
connection with the realization of this
treaty, a Political Consultative
Committee is being set up in which each
state participating in the treaty will
be represented by a member of its
Government or another specially appoint-
ed representative. The committee may
set up any auxiliary organs it con-
siders necessary.
The Parties hereby establish a
council, on which each of them shall
be represented, to consider matters
concerning the implementation of this
Treaty. The council shall be so
organized as to be able to meet
promptly at any time. The council
shall set up such subsidiary bodies
as may be necessary; in particular
it shall establish immediately a
defense committee which shall recom-
mend measures for the implementation
of Articles 3 and 5.
The contracting powers pledge
themselves to refrain from taking part
in coalitions or alliances of any kind
and from concluding any agreements the
aims of which contradict the aims of
this treaty. The contracting powers
declare that their commitments by
effective international treaties are
in no contradiction to the theses of
this treaty.
The contracting powers declare
that they will act in the spirit of
friendship and cooperation with the
purpose of further developing and
strengthening the economic and
cultural relations between them,
following the principles of mutual
respect for their independence and
sovereignty and noninterference in
domestic affairs,
Each Party declares that none of
the international engagements now in
force between it and any other of the
Parties or any third state is in con-
flict with the provisions fo this
Treaty, and undertakes not to enter
into any international engagement in
conflict with this Treaty.
The Parties will contribute
toward the further development of
peaceful and friendly international
relations by strengthening their free
institutions, by bringing about a
better understanding of the princi-
ples upon which these institutions
are founded, and by promoting condi-
tions of stability and well-being.
They will seek to eliminate conflict
in their international economic
policies and will encourage economic
collaboration between any or all of
them.
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The treaty is open to other states,
irrespective of their social and state
regime, who may express their readiness,
by means of participating in this
treaty, to promote the unification and
efforts of peace-loving countries to
insure the peace and security of
peoples. Accession to the treaty
comes into force by agreement with the
states participating in the treaty
after the document of accession has
been deposited with the Government of
the Polish Republic.
The Parties may, by unanimous
agreement, invite any other European
state in a position to further the
principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to
this Treaty. Any state so invited
may become a party to the Treaty by
depositing its instrument of acces-
sion with the Government of th
United States of America. The
Government of the United States of
America will inform each of the
Parties of the deposit of each such
instrument of accession.
ARTICLE X
The present treaty is subject to
ratification, and the ratification in-
struments are to be deposited with the
Government of the Polish People's
Republic. The treaty comes into force
the day the last ratification instru-
ment has been handed over for deposi-
tion. The Government of the Polish
People's Republic will inform the
other states participating in the
treaty of the deposition of each rati-
fication instrument.
The present treaty will remain in
force for 20 years. For the contract-
ing powers who fail to hand to the
Government of the Polish People's
Republic a declaration renouncing the
treaty one year before the expiration
of this term it remains in force for
the following 10 years.
(continued)
This Treaty shall be ratified
and its provisions carried out by
the Parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
The instruments of ratification
shall be deposited as soon as pos-
sible with the Government of the
United States of America, which will
notify all the other signatories of
each deposit. The Treaty shall enter
into force between the states which
have ratified it as soon as the
ratifications of the majority of the
signatories, including the ratifica-
tions of Belgium, Canada, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and the United States,
have been deposited and shall come
into effect with respect to other
states on the date of the deposit
of their ratifications.
After the Treaty has been in
force for twenty years, any Party
may cease to be a party one year
after its notice of denunciation
has been given to the Government of
the United States of America, which
will inform the Governments of the
other Parties of the deposit of each
notice of denunciation,
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Should a system of collective security
be set upin Europe and an all-European
treaty on collective security con-
cluded for this purpose, toward which
the contracting powers will continue
to aspire, the present treaty is to
lose its force from the day on which
an all-European treaty comes into
force.
(continued)
Compiled in Warsaw on May 14, 1955
in one copy in the Russian, Polish,
Czech, and German languages--all texts
being of equal force. Affirmed copies
of the treaty will be dispatched to
the Governments of the Polish People's
Republic and all other particpants of
the treaty, in witness Of which those
authorized have signed the present
treaty and affixed their seals:
/s`ignatures omitted?
/No equivalent?
After the Treaty has been in
force for ten years, or at any time
thereafter, the Parties shall, if
any of them so requests, consult
together for the purpose of re-
viewing the Treaty, having regard
for the factors then affecting
peace and security in the North
Atlantic area, including the develop-
ment of universal as well as region-
al arrangements under the Charter of
the United Nations for the mainten-
ance of international peace and
security.
This Treaty, of which the
English and French texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in
the archive s of the Government of
the United States of America. Duly
certified copies thereof will be
transmitted by that Government to
the Governments of the other
signatories.
In witness whereof, the under-
signed plenipotentiaries have signed
this Treaty, /signatures omitted?
For the purpose of Article 5
an armed attack on one or more of
the Parties is deemed to include an
armed attack on the territory of
any of the Parties in Europe or
North America, on the Algerian
departments of France, on the oc-
cupation forces of any Party in
Europe, on the islands under the
jurisdiction of any Party in the
North Atlantic area north of the
Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels
or aircraft in this area of any
of the Parties.
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/No direct equivalent7
This Treaty does not affect,
and shall not be interpreted as
affecting, in any way the rights
and obligations under the Charter
of the Parties which are members
of the United Nations, or the
primary responsibility of the
Security Council for the mainten-
ance of international peace and
security.
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Military Expenditures in the Eastern European Ccnmunist countries
1958-59 and 1963-66
1
9
AP,rs+ IX C
58 1959 1963 a/ 1964 a/ 1965 a/ i9
Announced military expenditures in cirrent prices
_
Bulgaria (million leva) 173 163 297
260 231 240
Czechoslovakia (million 8.933 a/ 8 ~ 790 a/ 11,332 10,948 10,220 10,800
crowns) b/
East Germany (million
DME) 2,700 2,800 2,900 3,300 d,/
Hungary (million 2,080 2,410 6 610
f orints) : 6,150 5,567 e/ 5,219
Poland (million 11,220 14,259 20,694 f/ 21,881 23,500 25,300
zlotys)
Rumania (million 3,600 3,446
lei)
4, 143 f/ 4,346 f/ 4,700 f/ 4,800
a. Planned expenditures, unless otherwise indicated.
b. Including expenditures for public security
c. East Germany began publishing realistic defense figures in 1962 following
a reclassification of military expenditures among categories of the state
budget which made the military budget more inclusive.
d. The figure shown is the upper limit indicated in the plan.
e. Lctual expenditures in Hungary reportedly were 190 million forints less
than the plan of 5,757 million forints.
f. Lctual expenditures,
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Date Place Type
27-28 Jan 56 Prague PCC
24 May 58 Moscow PCC
Members Repre-
sented
27-28 April 59 Warsaw Foreign
Ministers
Level of Participation
All Chief or Deputy Chief
of Govt, Defense Ministers
All Chiefs of Party & Govt.
Defense Ministers
Foreign Ministers
All+CPR Foreign Ministers, CPR
Deputy Foreign Minister
All Chiefs of Party & Govt.
Defense Ministers
Foreign Ministers
Albania did Chiefs of Party & Govt.
not send Par-Defense Minister
ty or Govt Foreign Minister
Chief Chief or Deputy Chief for
Economic Planning
3-5 Aug 61 Moscow First Albanian Chiefs of Party
Secretaries First Secre-
tary did not
attend. Repre-
sentatives of
Asian socialist
countries attended
Sept 61 Moscow Defense Albania prob-Defense Ministers, Chiefs
Ministers ably absent of General Staff
30 Jan-l Feb 62 Prague Defense Albania prob- Defense Ministers
Ministers ably absent
7 June 62 Moscow PCC All except Chiefs of Party & Govt.
Albania
27-28 Feb 63 Warsaw Defense All except Defense Ministers, Chiefs
Ministers Albania of Staffs
(Continued on next page)
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Date
Place
Type Members Repre-
Level. of Participation
?--?-- - ~
rented
. ~.
Jul 63
Moscow
Heads
of Party
& G
t
All except
Albania
Chiefs of Party & Govt.
ov
26 Jul 63
Moscow
FCC
All except
Albania
Chiefs of Party &T Govt,
Defense Minister
Foreign Minister or
Deputy
19-20 Jan 65
Warsaw
PCC
All except
Albania
Chiefs of Party & Govt.
Defense Minister
Foreign Minister
According to the articles of the Warsaw Treaty the Political Con-
sultative Committee is obligated to meet at least twice a year and may
convene as frequently as its members deem necessary. However, as the
sporadic pattern of meetings indicates, the committee has never met
biannually The above table represents only those Pact meetings which
have been held openly. It is probable that treaty; members have met
at unpublicized gatherings.
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CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON
SAFEGUARDING EUROPEAN PEACE AND SECURITY
11-14 May 1955 (WARSAW)
ALBANIA: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Beqir Balluku, Minister of National Defense
Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs
BULGARIA: Vulko Chervenkov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Petur Panchevsky, Minister of Nation Defense
Mincho Neichev, Minister of Foreign Affairs
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Viliam Siroky, Premier
Alexej Cepicka, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
EAST GERMANY: Otto Grotewohl, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Otto Nuscheke, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of the Interior
Heinz Hoffmann, Deputy Minister of the Interior
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hans Reichelt, Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry
Stefan Heymann, East German Ambassador to Poland
HUNGARY: Andras Hegedus, Premier
Istvan Bata, Minister of National Defense
Janos Boldoczky, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Endre Sik, First Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Lagos Dragos, Hungarian Ambassador to Poland
POLAND: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Konstantin Rokossovsky, Minister of National
Defense
(Marshal of Poland, Marshal of the USSR and a
Russian citizen)
Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Marian Naszkowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
(Continued on next page)
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RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman, Council
of Ministers
Emil Bodnaras, Minister of Armed Forces
Ion Tutoveanu, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces
Simion Bughici, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Grigore Preoteasa, First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Marian Florea Ionescu, Rumanian Ambassador
to Poland
U.S.S.R: Nikolay Bulganin, Chairman, Council of
Ministers, U.S.S.R.
Vyacheslav Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgi Zhukov, Minister of Defense
Ivan Konev, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Aleksandr Puzanov, Chairman Council of Ministers,
RSFSR
Nikif or Kaichenko, Chairman, Council of
Ministers, Ukrainian, SSR
Vilis Latsis, Chairman, Council of Ministers,
Lithuanian, SSR
Aleksey Muurisepp, Chairman, Council of Ministers,
Estonian, SSR
Valery Zorin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
U.S.S.R.
Panteleymon Ponomarenko, U.S.S.R Ambassador to
Poland
OBSERVERS: CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: Peng Te-huai, Vice Premier of
State Council;
Minister of
National Defense,
COMMUNIQUE: "thoroughly examined the changes in the international
situation which have arisen as a result of the ratifica-
tion of the Paris agreements providing for the creation
of a new military alignment in the form of 'Western
European Union' with the participation of a remilitarized
Western Germany and her inclusion in the North Atlantic
bloc, heightens the danger of a new war and threatens
the national security of peaceable states .... to take
necessary steps to ensure their security and safeguard
peace in Europe ...a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance was concluded at the conference....
The Conference also adopted a decision to set up a Joint
Command of the armed forces of the treaty states."
The treaty also provided for the creation of the Pact's
Political Consultative Committee, on which each member
state was to have equal representation.
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WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
FIRST MEETING
27 January 1956 (PRAGUE)
ALBANIA: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Beqir Balluku, Minister of National Defense
BULGARIA: Raiko Damianov, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Petur Panchevsky, Minister of National Defense
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Alexej Cepicka, Deputy Premier; Minister of
National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Deputy Chairman, Council
of Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense
HUNGARY: Andras Hegedus, Premier
Istvan Bata, Minister of National Defense
POLAND: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Konstantin Rokossovsky, Minister of National
Defense
RUMANIA: Chivu Stoica, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
U.S.S.R: Vyacheslav Molotov, First Deputy Chairman,
Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R
Georgi Zhukov, Minister of Defense
OBSERVERS: CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: Nieh Jung-chen, Vice Chairman,
National Defense Council
COMMUNIQUE: Announced that the East German army, established 18 Janu-
ary 1956, would be included in Pact's Unified Command.
Also announced that a Permanent Commission, to deal with
foreign affairs, and a Joint Secretariat, both under the
Political Consultative Committee, were established with
headquarters in Moscow.
A declaration on foreign affairs issued at the same
time contained two new elements: 1) a demand that none
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of military forces in Germany be equipped with atomic
weapons and 2) a call for improvement of relations,
particularly between bloc countries and neighboring
states, with the suggestion that pending establish-
ment of a collective security system non-aggression
pacts might be concluded between them; specifically
mentioned in this connection were the U.S.S.R, Turkey,
Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Italy, Czechoslovakia,
and the Federal German Republic. Declaration also
repeated several standard bloc proposals including:
1) an all-European collective security pact and
establishment of a zone of limited armaments in Europe,
to include the whole of Germany, and 2) rexamination
of proposals submitted in this respect by the British
at the Geneva summit conference.
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WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
SECOND MEETING
24 MAY 1958 (MOSCOW)
ALBANIA: Enver Hoxha, First Secretary, Albanian
Workers' Party
Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Arifa Hasko, Chief of the General Staff of
the Peoples' Army
Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs
BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian
Communist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Petur Panchevsky, Minister of National Defense
Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Viliam Siroky, Premier
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist
Unity Party
Otto Grotewohl, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Bruno Leuschner, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense
Otto Winzer, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party; Minister of State
Geza Revesz, Minister of National Defense
Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs
POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish
United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu?Dej, First Secretary,
Rumanian Workers' Party
Chivu Stoica, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Emil Bodnaras, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
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xt page)
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U.S.S.R: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union;
Chairman, Council of Minis-
ters, U.S.S.R
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense
OBSERVERS: CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Chen Yun, Vice Premier, State
Council; Vice Chairman Chinese
Communist Party
Li Fu-chun, Vice Premier, State
Council
COMMUNIQUE: Announced that the Political Consultative Committee approved
the Soviet-Rumanian proposal on the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Rumania in the "near future" and that it had
also approved the "decision of the Soviet government in
agreement with Hungary to reduce in 1958 the number of
Soviet troops stationed in Hungary by one division." Com-
munique also announced that "decisions were also taken
on some organizational matters involved in the activity
of the joint armed forces" but failed to specify what
these decisions involved. Members of the Political
Consultative Committee also resolved to address a pro-
posal on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between
the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries and issued a draft
proposal on this subject.
The committee members also heard a report by Marshal Ivan
Konev, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Forces of the
Warsaw Pact on a reduction of armed forces of the treaty
countries.
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CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF WARSAW PACT
COUNTRIES AND CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC
27-28 APRIL 1959 (WARSAW)
REPRESENTATIVES:
ALBANIA: Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs
BULGARIA: Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
EAST GERMANY:
HUNGARY :
POLAND:
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Janos Peter, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
RUMANIA: Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
U.S.S.R:
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC : Chang Wen--tien,,
Vice Foreign Minister
COMMUNIQUE: Communique issued at the end of the conference was notable
for its moderation and stated that "prospects of allevia-
ting international tension have markedly improved."
It also announced the satisfaction of the meeting parti-
cipants that "an agreement has now been reached on con-
vening a conference of foreign ministers and a summit
conference."
In reference to the German problem the communique stated
that the signing of a peace treaty "would also put an
end to the occupation regime in West Berlin" and again
called for "free city status" for West Berlin, which
"would be guaranteed by the great powers, with the
participation of the U.N organization." It was also
noted that "the conclusion of a German peace treaty and
the settlement of the Berlin issue should not depend
on the solution of the European security problem."
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WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
THIRD MEETING
4 FEBRUARY 1960 (MOSCOW)
ALBANIA: Enver Hoxha, First Secretary, Albanian
Workers' Party
Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Beqir Balluku, Minister of National Defense
Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nesti Nase, Albanian Ambassador to U.S.S.R
BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian
Communist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Ivan Mikhailov, Minister of National Defense
Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lyuben Gerasimov, Bulgarian Ambassador to U.S.S.R
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak
Communist Party
Viliam Siroky, Premier
Otakar Simunek, Deputy Premier
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Richard Dvorak, Czechoslovak Ambassador to
U.S.S.R
HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party
Ferenc Munnich, Premier
Geza Revesz, Minister of National Defense
Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs
EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist
Unity Party
Otto Grotewohl, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish United
Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Boleslaw Jaszczuk, Polish Ambassador to U.S.S.R
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RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gehorghiu-Dej, First Secretary,
Rumanian Workers' Party
Chivu Stoica, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister c>f Armed Forces
Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mihai Dalea, Rumanian Ambassador to U.S.S.R
U.S.S.R: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union;
Chairman, Council of Ministers
U.S.S.R
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of National Defense
OBSERVERS: CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: K'ang Sheng, Alternate Member,
Politburo,, Chinese Communist
Party
Liu Hsiao, Member, Central Com-
mittee Chinese Communist Party;
Chinese Ambassador to U.S.S.R
Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, member,
Central Committee, Chinese
Communist Party
KOREAN PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Kim 11-song, Member, Presidium,
Korean Labor Party; First Vice
Chairman, Cabinet of Ministers
Pak Song-ch'ol, Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Hoe Pon Hal, Deputy Minister of
National Defense
Kim Kwang-hyop, Minister of
National Defense
MONGOLIAN PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Yumiaagiyin Tsedenbal, First
Secretary, Mongolian Peoples'
Revolutionary Party; Chairman,
Council of Ministers
Lubsantserengivn Tsend, Second
Secretary, Central Committee,
Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary
Party
Puntsagiyn Shagdarsuren, Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs
Jam'yangiyn Lhagbasuren, Minis-
ter of Peoples' Forces
VIETNAMESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Truong Chinh, Deputy Premier;
(ember, Politburo, Dang Lao Dong
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COMMUNIQUE: Communique stated that the best ways to ensure the se-
curity of Europe and a peaceful settlement of the Ger-
man problem were the conclusion of a German peace
treaty, "renunciation of all ideas of revanchism and
border revision and repudiation of the policy of Ger-
man remilitarization and atomic armament."
This meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
was short and was primarily a preparation for the
then pending Paris summit conference. The section
in the committee's declaration which described the
"fruitful effects" of mutual relations and develop-
ing links between the "states of the socialist camp"
and the neutral countries of Asia and Africa" enumerated
only the member states of the Warsaw Pact and made no
mention of Communist China.
The communique issued at the end of this meeting was
the first in the history of the Political Consultative
Committee to be signed by the First Secretaries of the
Communist parties of the countries concerned. Previously
declarations had been signed only by prime ministers
in accordance with normal international practice.
At this meeting Marshal Ivan Konev was relieved as
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the
Warsaw Pact for "reasons of health." He was replaced
by Marshal Andrey Grechko.
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WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
FOURTH MEETING
28-29 MARCH 1961 (MOSCOW)
ALBANIA: Beqir Balluku, First Deputy Chairman, Council
of Ministers; Minister of National
Defense
Koco Theodosi, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers; Chairman, State Plan-
ning Commission
Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Com-
munist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Ivan Mikhailov, Minister of National Defense
Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tseko Monov, Deputy Chairman, State Planning
Committee
Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak
Communist Party; President of
the Republic
Viliam Siroky, Premier
Otakar Simunek, Chairman, State Planning Committee
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist
Unity Party
Erich Honecker, Secretary, Central Committee,
Socialist Unity Party
Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party
Ferenc Munnich, Premier
Lagos Czinege, Minister of National Defense
Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ervin Javor, Deputy Chairman, State Planning
Commission
Lagos Toth, Acting Chief, General Staff, Hungar-
ian Peoples' Army
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POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish
United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Stefan Jedrychowski, Chairman, State Planning
Commission
RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary, Ruman-
ian Workers' Party
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, Chairman, State Planning
Commission
U.S.S.R: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union;
Chairman, Council of Ministers,
U.S.S.R
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense
Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
OBSERVERS: CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Liu Hsiao, Member, Central
Committee, Chinese Communist
Party; Chinese Ambassador to
the U.S.S.R
KOREAN PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Kim Hwan-hop, Member, Presi-
dium, Korean Labor Party;
Minister of National Defense
Ch'oe Hwan, Deputy Minister of
National Defense
Yui Tan Sik, Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs
MONGOLIAN PEOPLES" REPUBLIC: Yumjaagiyin Tsedenbal, First
Secretary Mongolian Peoples'
Revolutionary Party; Chairman,
Council of Ministers
Jam'yangiyn Lhagbarsuren,
Minister of Peoples' Forces
Puntsagiyn Shagdarsuren,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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COMMUNIQUE: Again the communique emphasized the necessity for a Ger-
man peace treaty and the making of West Berlin a demilitari-
zed free city. On the development of international events
it stated that the Political Consultative Committee "was
guided by the theoretical and political conclusions of
the November 1960 Conference of the Representatives of
Communist and Workers Parties and by its historic docu-
ments." The statement also announced that West Germany
was becoming the chief center of war danger in Europe.
The absence of the usual joint declaration and of the
Albanian Party and government leaders showed that the
differences between Moscow and Peking had not been eli-
minated. As a compensation for this failure to achieve
accord the communique issued after the meeting levied
massive complaints against the Western powers.
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CONSULTATION OF FIRST SECRETARIES OF
THE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES
OF THE WARSAW PACT POWERS
3-5 AUGUST 1961 (MOSCOW)
Announcements that the meeting had been convened gave no indication of
the countries, parties or representatives attending beyond the state-
ment that "representatives of the Asian socialist countries attended
as observers." Presumably the first secretaries of all the member
countries of the Warsaw Pact were present, with the probable exception
of the Albanians, whose rift with the Soviet Union had become in-
creasingly visible.
COMMUNIQUE: According to this document the delegates to the
consultation "instructed the competent authorities
to prepare the necessary foreign policy and economic
measures for the conclusion of the German treaty
and maintenance of its provisions including the
provision affecting West Berlin as a free city."
This meeting was held from the third until the
fifth of August 1961. On 13 August 1961 the Ber-
lin wall was constructed.
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MEETING OF THE DEFENSE MINISTERS
OF THE WARSAW PACT POWERS
SEPTEMBER 1961 (MOSCOW)
Although there was no listing of the individuals who attended the
meeting it was announced that the chiefs of the general staffs of
the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as, their defense
ministers attended.
According to the announcement issued after the meeting the gathering
was chaired by Marshal Andrey Grechko, Commander-in-chief of the Pact
Armed Forces. It was further announced that the participants "dis-
cussed specific questions concerning enhancement of military preparedness
of the troops belonging to the joint armed forces" and that they "in-
structed the chiefs of the general staffs to work out practical measures
toward further strengthening of the defense of the Pact states stem-
ming from the agreement reached at the meeting."
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MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
30 JANUARY - 1 FEBRUARY 1962 (PRAGUE)
Again press anouncements of the meeting did not list the specific
countries or representatives attending and it is probable the
Albanian defense minister was not present at this gathering.
According to bloc press announcements the defense ministers discussed
the strengthening of their forces. It was stated that the member
governments of the Pact would be asked to confirm the discussions
of the Prague meeting at the next session of the Political Consultative
Committee
In general hard information on this meeting and what was discussed at
it has been scarce.
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WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
FIFTH MEETING
7 JUNE 1962 (MOSCOW)
REPRESENTATIVES:
ALBANIA :
BULGARIA:
Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Com-
munist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak
Communist Party; President of the
Republic
Viliam Siroky, Premier
EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist
Unity Party; Chairman, Council
of State
Willi Stoph, Acting Chairman, Council of Ministers
HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party; Premier
POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish United
Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary, Rumanian
Workers' Party
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of Minis-
ters
U.S.S.R: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union;
Chairman, Council of Ministers,
U.S.S.R
OBSERVERS: CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: According to some reports the
Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet
Union attended.
COMMUNIQUE: The communique stated that "the Warsaw Pact states declare
that, just as in the past, they support the solution of
problems dividing states by peaceful means, by negotiation,
and they hope that the Western powers, too, will display
such a sober approach to the solution of these problems."
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According to the communique the delegates also reaffirmed
that "a German peace settlement through conclusion of a
peace treaty, abolition of the occupation regime in West
Berlin on this basis and establishment of a free city
of West Berlin is in the interest of European security
and world peace."
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MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS OF WARSAW PACT STATES
27-28 FEBRUARY 1963 (WARSAW)
There is practically no information available concerning
this meeting. According to very sketchy bloc-released
press and radio accounts the pact defense ministers "dis-
cussed current questions related to the state of the
armies and plans to coordinate military training in 1963."
It is presumed that Albania did not attend the meeting
and that the defense ministers of the other members at-
tended as would normally be expected.
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MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND FIRST SECRETARIES
OF WARSAW PACT STATES
JULY 1963 (MOSCOW)
There is practically no information available concerning
this meeting which immediately proceeded the July 1963 meeting
of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee. Albania
was not in attendance but presumably all other government
chiefs and Party first secretaries of Pact member states
were in attendance.
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WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
SIXTH MEETING
26 JULY 1963 (MOSCOW)
REPRESENTATIVES:
ALBANIA: Did not attend.
BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian
Communist Party; Chairman,
Council of Ministers
Stanko Todorov, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of National Defense
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak
Communist Party
Viliam Siroky, Premier
Otakar Simunek, Deputy Premier
Bohumir Lomeky, Minister of National Defense
EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist
Unity Party; Chairman, Council
of State
Willi Stoph, First Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Erich Honecker, Secretary, Central Committee,
Socialist Unity Party
Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense
Otto Winzer, First Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party; Premier
Lajos Czinege, Minister of National Defense
Karoly Erdelyi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
POLAND: Wiadys law Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish
United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Zenon Kliszko, Member, Politburo Central Com-
mittee, Polish United Workers'
Party
Marian Spychaiski, Minister of National Defense
RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary, Rumanian
Workers' Party; Chairman,
Council of State
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RUMANIA: Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Emil Bodnaras, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ion Gaston-Marin, Chairman, State Planning
Commission
U.S.S.R: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union;
Chairman, Council of Ministers,
U.S.S.R
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense
COMMUNIQUE: According to the communique issued after the committee
meeting "questions connected with the state of the armed
forces of the Pact states were reviewed." Soviet Marshal
Andrey Grechko delivered a report on this subject and sub-
sequently "appropriate decisions were adopted as a result
of the review and exchange of views on these questions. The
session was held in an atmosphere of complete mutual under-
standing and agreement.,,
Available information on this meeting of the Political Con-
sultative Committee is limited. Press announcements issued
at the time of the gathering make no mention of attendance
of Albanian representatives or of observers from the Asian
socialist countries. The limited press play given to the
developments of the meeting are further indication that
among the fraternal countries of the Warsaw Pact all was
not well.
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WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
SEVENTH MEETING
19-20 JANUARY 1965 (WARSAW)
ALBANIA: Did not attend.
BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Com-
munist Party; Chairman, Council
of Ministers
Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of National Defense
Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czecho-
slovak Communist Party;
President of the Republic
Jozef Lenart, Premier
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Oskar Jelen, Czechoslovak Ambassador to
Poland
EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist
Unity Party; Chairman,
Council of State
WilliStoph, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Hermann Axen, Candidate member, Politburo,
Central Committee, Socialist
Unity Party
Peter Florin, Chief, Department of Interna-
tional Relations, Central
Committee, Socialist Unity
Party
Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Otto Winzer, First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Karl Mewis, East German Ambassador to Poland
HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party
Lajos Czinege, Minister of National Defense
Janos Peter, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Karoly Erdelyi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ferenc Martin, Hungarian Ambassador to Poland
POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish United
Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
(Continued on next page)
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 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010056-8
POLAND: Zenon Kliszko, Member, Politburo, Central Com-
mittee, Polish United Workers'
Party
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary,
Rumanian Workers' Party;
Chairman, Council of State
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gheorghe Diaconescu, Rumanian Ambassador to Poland
U.S.S.R: Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary, Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
Aleksey Kosygin, Chairman, Council of Ministers,
U.S.S.R
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
COMMUNIQUE: The communique issued after this session reiterated fact
that the Pact was one of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance, replayed the theme that territorial designs
harbored by the Federal German Republic on the territory
of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and other social-
ist states necessitated the existence of the Warsaw Pact
organization and stated that the Political Consultative
Committee regarded insuring the security of Europe as "an
urgent demand of our time.,,
It further stated that the NATO Multilateral Force had the
aim of perpetuating the special America-West German bloc
within the North Atlantic alliance and commented that "this
is the sort of deal by which the U.S. strives to insure its
military-political hegemony in West Europe while the German
Federal Republic gains access to nuclear arms for its con-
sent to support the American line."
Additional remarks directed against the possible formation
of a NATO Multilateral Force announced that "attempts to
achieve implementation of West German revanchist demands
by means of nuclear arms is fraught with the greatest
danger to the German people, resulting not in reunification
of Germany but in its conversion into an atomic desert."
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 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010656-8 .
10 15 20 25 30
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50
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I T A L Y
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TURKEY
-
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ti r:1 \ GREECE
Boundaries and name
R E A
t
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those recognized by the U.S. Government. y E A `Jty .-13r`
15 20 25
The European Soviet Satellites
0 100 200 300 400 Statute Miles
y
l
l 1 1 T
Railroad 0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
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 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010056-8
eated by Moscow in 1955
provided Russia's post-Stalin leadership with
'owever, the political role of
the,'act has steadily gained in importance. Today, the
Pact ne of the few remaining effective devices available
to T oscow for holding the Soviet bloc together at a time
when the forces of national self-interest are increasingly
coming into play in Eastern Europe.
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 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010056-8
in detail
This report examines/the changing role of the Warsaw Pact
@-9 from its origin in 1955 to the present
l t
>fe4t} (~,~P,J_.
day. Initially inter d d,,1to pr vide Russia's post-Stalin
leadership with acianism for maintaining Soviet
armed forces in Eastern Europe, the pact is today one of
~r?rs~l-~rC`eg.,4
the few remaininc'; effectiveAdevices available to Ioscow
for holding the bloc together in the face of rising national
self-intere.-.t in Eastern Europe. Included are charts of
organizational structure and personnel strength, together
with Acomparison of the pact and NATO treaties.
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 Approved For Release 20d2/09/04 CIA-R[ P79T008264p00600010056-8
y 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR. Deputy Director for Intel
Study for Jackson Subcommittee
1. The attached unclassified Study an the Warsaw
pact has been prepared by t1CI, in response 25X1
to a request made last winter Y e J a.ckson Subcommittee
on National Security and International Operations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations, OCI has pre-
pared a number of similar studies on Soviet and Chinese
govrent operations for the Jackson Subcommittee since
its establishment in the late "50a".
2. The study has been thoroughly coordinated with-
the I and is as complete and accurate a work as is
possible within the confines imposed by its being un--
classified.
3. The analysis in the study is consistent with
published chssified papers.
4. At the request of the Legislative Liaison Office,
the study will be given only limited dissemination within
CIA, pending final disposition of ths: paper by the sub-
committee.
5. Deadline for delivery of th:n study to the
Jackson Subcommittee is #i May.
E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
Director of Current Intelligence
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 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010056-8
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