POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010042-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 29, 1966
• Content Type: PAPER

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POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Summary
There are a multitude of religious, political and regional
factions in South Vietnam ranging from loose, countryside
organizations to a handful of men backing an influential
leader. Only the various religions have anything like a
wide popular base, and they are split internally, while their
followers are concentrated for the most part in a few geographic
areas. Of the religions, the Buddhist faction headed by
Thich Tri Quang has by far the largest popular following.
Only two of the political parties have national significance
and these are also splintered internally. Only a tenuous
guess at best can be made of the potential voting strength and
voting strongholds of most of the politically influential
groups. It appears, however, that the Buddhists stand the
best chance of garnering the largest popular support, and that
it will take a rather strong alliance between other factions and
groups to +bhieve a showing anywhere near as strong as tip Buddhists.
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1, Taken as a whole, firm adherents of Buddhism prob-
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ably comprise only about 15 to/percent of the roughly
15.5 million South Vietnamese, but up to 60 to 70 percent
of the population has been estimated to identify itself
loosely with the religion. The Unified Buddhist Association
(UBA), a national organization headquartered in Saigon, is
presently the principal vehicle for Buddhist political in-
fluence. The UBA has at least a partially effective provincial
and grass roofs structure extending down to individual pagodas,
However, the UBA is divided along regional lines into two
major factions, which have tended to act as the militant and
moderate wings of the ssociation: X
a. The,Central Vietnamese Buddhist faction is headed
by Thich Tri Quang, whose power is centered in the northern
city of Hue and extends roughly from the northernmost provinces
along the coast to the southern part of the central lowlands.
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t:uang?s influence is greatest in urban areas and mirrors the
somewhat xenophobic, militant attitudes of the central Viet-
namese populace with its traditional antagonism toward the
southerners. Quang?s chief lieutenant is Thich Thien Minh,
the UBA?s youth commissioner; his key lay followers include
the Hue University Rector Bui Tuong Huan, Professor Le Tuyen,
and former cabinet minister Tran Quang Thuan. It has been
esimated that the influence of the central Vietnamese faction
extends over as many as 3 million South Vietnamese. However,
probably less than one million of these are registered voters.
The faction has been trying for some time to form a lay
Buddhist political party, the Vietnamese Buddhist Forces
(UVF), but the party is not yet formally in being.
b. The more moderate southern wing of the UBA is
led by Thich Tam Chau, chairman of the Buddhist Institute.
Chau is actually a spokesmen for the refugee Buddhist clergy
from North Vietnam, but he appears to control the bulk of
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southern-born Buddhists, estimated to number from one to
three million. The southern Buddhists, however, appear to
be far less tightly knit that those under the influence of
Tri Quang?s faction. Chau is less politically effective
than Tri Quang, and has at times allied himself with politicians
whose actions have later cast discredit on him. His principal
associates in the clergy are Thich Tam Giac, head of the
Buddhist chaplain corps, and Thich Ho Giac, deputy chaplain
and a fiery orator.
c. A splinter group, the Southern Buddhist Studies
Association, is headed by lay leader Mai Tho Truyen, who
been
has prominent in international Buddhist circles, but has
split with the UBA. Although seldom involved in domestic
Buddhist "campaigns," Truyen has participated in various
government-sponsored civilian councils. He may have several
thousand followers, largely scattered among the southern provinces.
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d. The Theravada Buddhists, numbering more than 500,000,
are largely of Khmer (ethnic Cambodian) stock, and live along
the Mekong River provinces, primarily near the Cambodian
border, but also in Vinh Binh Province near the coast. They
have been politically inert at the national level, but their
leaders--including Son Thai Nguyen, brother of Khmer Serei
leader Son Ngoc Thanh--often exert considerable influence in
the provinces where they are concentrated. Nguyents faction
is known as militant; the other major faction of Theravada,
the Nguyen Thuy Association, is a'older established group.
The Catholics
Catholics comprise about 10-11 percent of the South
Vietnamese population. They have long been prominent among
the country's educated and administrative circles, and are
in the majority among the military officer corps. The Catholics
are concentrated chiefly around Saigon, in Gia Dinh and Bien
Hoa Provinces where JI there are several refugee settlements.
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There are also pockets of Catholic influence in the delta,
east of Saigon, and in parts of the northern provinces.
a. Politically, the most important Catholic elements
are the refugees from Communist North Vietnam, numbering XX
something under 1,000,000, They form a numerical majority
of the country's Catholics. Their acknowledged leader is
Father Hoang Quynh, usually known as a militant and a political
activist, though he often operates politically through lay
leader Nguyen Gia Hien. Quynh's more moderate approach
of the past year in relations with the Buddhists and other
sects, has put his influence under challenge from other
refugee priests, including Fathers Nguyen Quang Lam, Nguyen
Van Luc, and Tran Van Kiem.
b. Southern Catholics are less well-organized and less
aggressive than their northern counterparts. Numbering several
hundred thousand, their principal leader is the archbishop of
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Saigon, Nguyen Van Binh, generally a voice for moderation
and a widely respectedYfigure. The most important political
spokesman for the southern Catholics is probably Father Ho Van Vui,
a more militant figure who broke openly with the Diem regime.
The Cao Dai
The Cao Dai are K KXXX an eclectic religious sect,
founded in Vietnam in 1926 and combining elements of Buddhism,
Christianity, Confucianism, and animism. Under the French,
the Cao Dai enjoyed a measure of political autonomy, including
their own army. They claim a following of one to two million,
although they probably number closer to one-half million.
There are scattered Cao Dai villages in the western provinces
of the delta, but the principal base of Cao Dai influence,
and the seat of the sect's "Holy See", is in Tay Ninh Ii Province,
northwest of Saigon. The Cao Dai population in Tay Ninh
appear to number a few hundred thousand. The sect suffers
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from serious internal splits, and it is problematical whether
it could become a unified electoral bloc, although it might
Zz.
certainly elect some members to an assembly. Former chief
of state Phan Khac Suu is a Cao Dai, but representative of
the somewhat independent political Cao Dai elements in Saigon.
One principal faction, and probably the most nationailly-
minded, is led by former Cao Dai "general" Le Van Tat and
his brother XKXXXXX Le Trung Ngtia, who are strongly anti-
Buddhist. Tat was chief of Tay Ninh Province from Diem's
overthrow until late in the Quat regime. Close to them is
Tran Quang Vinh, a "spiritual" leader who served as a member
of the advisory High National Council under the Quat government.
A rival of Tran Quang Vinh is Cao Hoai Sang, who ousted Vinh
in the Holy See,' but his political ties are not clear. Another
Cao Dai faction is led by former "general" Nguyen Thanh Phuong,
who heads a small Cao Daiist political party, the Vietnamese
Restoration Party. Phuong ran as a vice-presidential candidate
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against the Diem ticket in 1961. At least one Cao Dai faction,
under a Major Mung, is openly affiliated with the Viet Cong.
The Hoa Hao
The Hoa Hao is a spiritualist Buddhist sect, with possibly
close to a million followers although it claims two million.
The sect is largely concentrated in the westernmost area of
South Vietnam--An Giang and Chau Doc Provinces bordering
Cambodia. They are the dominant political and religious
influence there. The Hoa Hao still retain remnants of their
former private army, but they have suffered from internal
divisions and are still without significant national influenc8.
They are,-however, a source of recruitment for government
paramilitary troops in several delta provinces outside their
own domain, and thus may be in process of spreading their local
influence.
Among the powerful Hoa Hao leaders at present is Colonel
Tran Van Tuoi, until recently chief of An Giang Province, and
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Colonel Nguyen Van Hue, the chairman of the An Giang provincial
council. Hue is a follower of a once powerful, but unsavory
Hoa Hao "general," Tran Van Soai.
Other key Hoa Hao figures at present are Colonel Ly Ba Pham,
the new An Giang Province chief, and Pham Ba Cam, a Saigon
politician who probably has little influence/a,t the local
level. One of the many factions in the sect is led by Truong Kim
Cu, another former "general" and erstwhile troublemaker.
The Dai Viet Party
The Dai Viets are one of oily two nationally significant
political parties in South Vietnam. However, they are also
splintered into several factions, two of which are of
importance:
a. The northern branch of the Dai Viet Party is composed
chiefly of refugees from North Vietnam, and has little in
the way of formal mass organization to support its nationally
prominent politicians. The northern faction is led by
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Dang Van Sung, a publisher, and includes former Phan Huy Quat,
Bui Diem, an adviser to Premier Ky and officially under-
secretary of foreign affairs, has also been associated with
this faction. As national figures, some of these men prob-
ably could draw a substantial vote, particularly in Saigon,
but they have no local strongholds.
b. The southern faction of the Dai Viet Party is now
somewhat splintered. Its nominal leader, Nguyen Ton Hoan,
is once again in exile after having been ousted as deputy
premier to General Khanh; he calls his party the Dai Viet
Nationalist Party, Hoan appears to have had ties among
several top military officers including the present Chief
of State Nguyen Van Thieu, whose brother, Nguyen Van Kieu,
is a prominent Dai Viet party member. Party leadership by
default is now claimed by Ha Thuc Ky, whose actual base of
power is in Quang Tri Province of central Vietnam. Ky calls
the party the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party, The popular
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has never been credited with more than about 50,000 active
followers, and it is impossible to tell whether this includes
all factions, or those in the southern provinces alone,
The VNQDD (Nationalist) Party
Life the Dai Viets, the VNQDD Party has been badly
splintered, not only between a northern and southern faction,
but within the various provinces of central Vietnam, where
its strength and organization is greatest,
a. The southern branch of the VNQDD is based largely
in Saigon, and does not appear to have extensive grass roots
support, Among its true southern leaders is Nguyen Hoa Hiep,
minister of interior under Quat and a somewhat ineffective
administrator who used his government post to build up the
party. Another old-time VNQDD leader, also in Saigon, is
Vo Hong Khanh, a businessman and one-time minister in the
Bao Dai era. It was recently reported that Khanh will be
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recognized by local VNQDD factions as the party's national
leader in an effort to unify the VNQDD as a counterforce to
the Buddhists,
b. The primary base of VNQDD strength is in central
Vietnam--the northern provinces of South Vietnam--where
the party appears to have some genuine organization and grass
roots following. The VNQDD has been particularly strong in
Quang Ngai and Quang Nam Provinces, where it has entrenched
itself to some extent in provincial administration. It has
nevertheless experienced internal provincial factionalism,
chiefly between younger and older elements. The party has
strength in Quang Tin, but little of the province is free of
Viet :bong control; it also has some following in Quang Tri
and Thua Thien provinces, but certainly less thaa the central
Vietnamese Buddhist faction. Some VNQDD leaders in central
Vietnam have in the past cooperated with Tri Quang, but are
now in the process of allying themselves against him; a
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regional leader has not yet emerged, and one prominent party
leader from Da Nang was recently assassinated. Altogether,
the VNQDD probably could command a following of a few hundred
thousand throughout central Vietnam.
Independent Politicians
A large number of independent politicians, most of them
living in Saigon and heading their own small political parties,
are nationally prominent and might well be elected if
they were to be candidates for a constituent or national
assembly. Some of these men now wield influence in the cur-
rent political scene, but probably have no real power or
popular support outside of the political and government circles
in which they lobby. Many are former government officials
and ministers, others are leaders of regional factions, some
are former army officers.
Such men include Pham Quang Dan, a Gia Dinh council
member; Tran Van Van, a southern leader; Hoang Co Thuy and
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his brother Hoang Co Binh, a Saigon councillor; former premier
Tran Van Huong,. and such figures as retired Generals Tran
Van Don, "Big" Minh, etc, Except for a few possible cases,
it is impossible to estimate the extent and locale of support
such men might draw from the electorate, unless they were
endorsed by organized parties, religious groups, or the
military. Among them, however, are probably some of the
country2s best political and administrative talent, as well
as some of its most overrated politicians,
Labor
Although there are several competing trade union, the
only labor organization in South Vietnam with any substantial
following is the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor, or CVT,
headed by Tran Quoc Buu. The union claims a membership of
about 300,000 from its affiliates, but actual strength may
be less. Most of the CVT support is in the Saigon area,
but it has some relatively important affiliates in Da Nang
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and other cities of I Corps and in the delta. The CVT has
some rural following its plantation workerst affiliate,
but most of the plantation areas are now Viet Cong-infested,
and may not be permitted to vote.
Military
With approximately 600,000 men under arms, the military
could be a potentially powerful voting bloc, although there
has never been any evidence that the military could be
persuaded, under secret ballot, to vote as ordered. A past
practice of allowing army troops to vote in areas where they
are currently based or operating gives the army the potential
of swinging the outcome in a given electoral district. Most
of the rank and file of the military, however, would probably
vote their own political and religious persuasions, although
they might support popular military candidates. The influence
of the Buddhists among the officers and ranks of both the
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army and police in I Corps has recently been demonstrated;
certain troops in the delta are known to be strongly Catholic.
The Montagnards
The ethnic tribes number about 500,000, and are scattered
throughout the central highlands, primarily close to the main
towns. Allowed to vote, they would probably support tribal
candidates, but as there are more than 35 different tribes,
any real cohesion among the Montagnards is questionable. One
of the most prominent tribal leaders now active in the govern-
ment is Paul Nur, newly appointed to the commissariat for
montagnard affairs, but it is by no means clear that he is
genuine spokesmen for the Montagnards as a whole.
Popular Voting Strength
At the present time, any attempt to assess the potential
voting strength and voting strongholds of any or all of
the politically influential groups and factions in South Vietnam
is at best tenuous. Elections held under the Diem regime
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were controlled or influenced by the government in such a
manner as to provide no framework for a study of voting
attitudes or habits. Although provincial and municipal
council elections held under the Quat regime in May 1965 appear
to have been generally free of government domination, available
data on them is sufficient to provide only a rough guage of
political and religious influence among the electorate. More-
over, the issues and candidates were local, and the 1965
results may not necessarily have a valid bearing on a national
election. It is not yet known whether the upcoming elections
will be organized. to run provincial candidates locally or
run all the national candidates on the same ballot. In
1965, some 3.5 million voters partidpated in the local
elections, or perhaps half of the estimated potential
voters in the country, as measured by voter turnout claimed
by the Diem regime.
Attempts to plot the areas of probable strength or control
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by the various power groups--Buddhists, Catholics, the sects,
the Dai Viets or VNQDD--can be done only roughly. There is
data concerning the political and religious affiliations of
individual provincial council members, and the size of the
vote won by each member, but no information is at hand con-
cerning the total vote or affiliations of losing candidates.
Moreover, the 1965 results provide almost no clue to political
affiliations at the district level.
Finally, the suppression of genuine political activity
by the Diem regime, and to some extent by the power of the
military since, has prevented the development of political
parties, contributed to their internal splits, and forced or
encouraged them tocperate clandestinely. Most of them are
reluctant to reveal their membership, and their strength
claims, when made, tend to be inflated. Moreover, candidates
in the past elections ran as independents or with government
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endorsement but usually without political party or religious
labels. There is no accurate census of the population as a
whole, or of popular religious affiliations.
On the accompanying map, an effort has been made to
pinpoint known strongholds or pockets of political or religious
influence. It has been impossible to estimate on the map
group strengths by cities, except Hue where Buddhist domination
is evident. No attempt was made to estimate possible party
or religious voting strength. Attempts to pinpoint areas of
major strength by religious or political affiliation have
been necessarily limited to the populated coastal areas in the
northern part of the country, and the major towns and cities
in the delta. Most of the inland area of central Vietnam
is, of course, sparsely populated, and relatively little
information is available to estimate rural political allegiances
in the delta outside of the known strongholds of the sects and
sects and the Khners.
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