WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010033-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: April 25, 1966
• Content Type: IM

25 April 1966
OCI No. 1196/66
Copy No.
41
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
WEEKLY REPORT
PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY
FOR THE
SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
DIA and DOS review(s) completed. GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declossification
Approved For Release 2008 jC 4 T79T00826A0006000 0033-3
ADDro\Aed For a ease ZUU371T4/,Z4- - lbAUUU6U0010033-3
 Approved For Re a 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826AO 00010033-3
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010033-3
 Approved 1 Release 200,SjC.RElT79TOd~$ 6A000600010033-3
Page
1. Rhodesian Developments. . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Cyprus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. India-Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
25 April 1966
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010033-3
SECRET
 Approved WOO Release 200,8'12^:'I4'19T06A000600010033-3
Prime Minister Verwoerd last week refused to
mediate between London and Salisbury, although he
did say he would help set up a meeting between Smith
and Wilson. Faced with the need to choose between
two unpleasant alternatives--running the risk of of-
fending Britain and the US, or giving in to their
pressure and working for a change in Salisbury--
Verwoerd chose the former. He probably will not ob-
struct private shipments of oil to Rhodesia or pri-
vate South African participation in Rhodesian tobacco
sales. He is doubtless banking on the US and Britain
to head off, in their own self-interest, economic
sanctions against South Africa. Verwoerd apparently
believes that Britain's relative weakness and US com-
mitments elsewhere preclude military intervention.
The UN's Committee on Colonialism has adopted a
resolution calling on Britain to use military force
in Rhodesia. The more moderate Africans would pre-
fer to call a Security Council meeting later in May,
and Secretary General U Thant has asked that a coun-
cil meeting not be held: until he returns from Europe
on 6 May. There is still pressure for further UN
action from the Africans who doubt that anything
good can come from possible British-Rhodesian talks.
-1- 25 April 1966
Approv d For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010 33-3
25X1
25X1
 Approved W Release 20 J"f W79TO 6A000600010033-3
New Turkish initiatives may soon raise the Cy-
prus dispute again to crisis level. The basic
problem to be faced will be no different from that
of previous crises over Cyprus, but Turkey's gen-
erally hardening attitude toward the US suggests
that Ankara will be less receptive to US efforts
to prevent a serious confrontation.
In an aide memoire delivered to us and the
British last week, the Turks have indicated that
they intend to issue a virtual ultimatum to Athens
and Nicosia demanding the removal of economic re-
strictions on the Turkish Cypriot community and an
end to alleged harassment of the Turkish Cypriots.
The Turks further imply that they may intervene on
Cyprus if their demands are rejected. US'represent-
atives~in both Athens and Nicosia appear certain
that such an "ultimatum" would be rejected out of
hand.
The Demirel government in Ankara has been under
heavy domestic pressure to take a firmer stand on
Cyprus, and it has been reviewing its over-all Cy-
prus policy for several months. Continued Greek
Cypriot military construction and the expected de-
livery this summer to Cyprus of Soviet SAMs from
Egypt have probably added to Turkey's sense of ur-
gency now. Makarios has also continued to inject
new abrasive factors.
The Turkish military has updated contingency
plans regarding Cyprus, held extensive amphibious
exercises this spring, and markedly increased its
naval lift capability. The US attache in Ankara
believes that Turkish military forces are in a much
better state of readiness now than they were during
previous crises and that plans have been completed
for execution should intervention become necessary.
-2-
25 April 1966
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T0082?A000600010033-3
25X1
25X1
 %of Release 200W-jW679T0b6A000600010033-3
3. UNITED NATIONS
The Special UN Committee on Peacekeeping Opera-
tions will resume meetings on 28 April amid a gen-
eral lack of enthusiasm. Most members feel there has
been no significant change in the conflict over the
proper roles of the General Assembly and the Security
Council in peacekeeping, and there appears to be lit-
tle prospect of a break in the deadlock.
The UN's financial crisis continues, the result
of the Soviet and French refusal last year to pay as-
sessments for peacekeeping operations authorized by
the General Assembly. France refused to contribute
to the Congo operation and the USSR refused to con-
tribute to the operations in the Congo and the Gaza
Strip area. Both contend the Security Council has
the exclusive power to authorize and finance a peace-
keeping operation, although they concede the assembly
can make recommendations. The Afro-Asians and most of
the Western powers have held that the assembly may
undertake a peacekeeping role when there is lack of
unanimity among the permanent members of the Security
Council.
Most members of the Peacekeeping Committee agree
that these constitutional questions will not be re-
solved when the committee reports to the General As-
sembly next fall. There seems to be a general wish to
avoid unnecessary controversy by concentration on the
question of how to finance past debts, for which
there is some hope of finding an acceptable answer.
The principal methods proposed include voluntary con-
tributions, collective responsibility and compulsory
assessment, apportionment among all the members, and
special arrangements among the parties involved.
U Thant is extremely concerned about the finan-
cial difficulties of the UN, especially in connection
with the peacekeeping operations on Cyprus and in the
Gaza area. The Scandinavian countries and Ireland are
threatening to withdraw their troops unless they are
reimbursed for their expenses. The Canadians also may
soon be pressing for reimbursement. U Thant has taken
the position, on which he has the support of many
countries, that the system of voluntary financing is
totally unreliable.
-3- 25 April 1966
Approved For Release 2003~~1 79T00826A000600010033-3
 ApprovedW,p%- Release 2003'1'~4Lq179T( 6A000600010033-3
4. INDIA-PAKISTAN
Recent events in India and Pakistan have further
dissipated the "spirit of Tashkent" and reduced the
prospect for any early normalization of relations
between the two countries.
The government-inspired enthusiasm with which
the Chinese Communist leaders were welcomed on their
recent official visit to Pakistan, combined with the
display of Chinese military equipment in Rawalpindi
in late March, has reinforced Indian fears of Sino-
Pakistani military collusion. New Delhi'has also de-
nounced the Pakistanis for reviving hostile propa-
ganda against India--in violation of the Tashkent
Declaration--and for refusing to negotiate solutions
to economic problems which resulted from the Indo-
Pakistani hostilities of last fall. A joint minis-
terial meeting held in early March was generally un-
productive although it did result indirectly in elim-
ination of the last problem involving withdrawal of
military forces to prehostilities positions.
Pakistani spokesmen are equally critical of In-
dia's refusal to proceed with negotiations on Kash-
mir. They maintain that until the Indians indicate
a willingness to begin meaningful discussions on
this dispute, little progress will be possible on
other issues between the two countries. The Ayub
government, pressed by growing separatist sentiment
in East Pakistan and continued hostility to the Tash-
kent "sell-out" in West Pakistan, is reacting an-
grily to repeated statements by leaders in New Delhi
that Kashmir is and must remain an integral part of
India.
-4- 25 April 1966
Approved For Release 2003/O 79 TOO826A000600010033-3
 Approver Release 20041q''M9T6Q,16A000600010033-3
The majority of Tour4's advisers apparently have
convinced him that Guinea was becoming dangerously
isolated in Africa because of his extreme support
of Nkrumah following the February coup in Ghana.
They also argue that hopes of extensive new Soviet
support are unrealistic and that US aid should not
be jeopardized. Tourd has scheduled a review of
economic aid and reportedly plans to reconsider the
IMF stabilization proposal. If he does in fact pro-
ceed with a serious attack on Guinea's economic
problems, this may ultimately contribute to reduc-
ing internal discontent. Meanwhile, the activities
of ant'iregime Guinean exiles, supported from the
neighboring Ivory Coast and from France, are still
in the organizational phase and pose little immediate
threat to Tour6.
Approv
25 April 1966
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rel a 2003/QS!E ]WlbP79T00826A0 00010033-3
Approved For Relea 6A000600010033-3
25X1-
25X1