AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010026-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 22, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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in#>, of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
an;rnded. Its transmission or revelation of its conterts
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 Approver Rel
No. ? 1351/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 April 1966
An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam*
(Through pri
Summary
US air strikes in North Vietnam (NVN) during the pe-
riod 14 March - 14 April 1966--primarily armed reconnais-
sance against lines of communication (LOC), infiltra-
tion routes, dispersed logistic areas and land and water-
way traffic--were concentrated in the region below the
20th parallel. Strikes against fixed targets (other
than LOC targets) were few; consequently there was lit-
tle effect on national capacities. Probably the most
significant change in the air strike program was the
first B-52 heavy bomber strike on the NVN approaches to
Mu Gia Pass, the.principal truck supply route into south-
ern Laos and South Vietnam..(SVN).
Although the flow of men and materiel from NVN:.:
into Laos and SVN continues, the air interdiction ef-
fort is having some adverse effects on NVN operations
and is causing NVN to expend a considerable amount of
time, manpower, and materiel to continue the support
of Communist forces in Laos and SVN. The North Vietnam-
ese, in attempting to circumvent the effects of the air
strikes, have placed major emphasis on construction and
maintenance of LOC. As a result, LOC capabilities still
greatly exceed observed traffic densities. Moreover,
NVN's increased efforts have maintained the armed forces'
in-country-capabilities and their capability to support
VC/NVA and :PL/NV.A forces in SVN and Laos. We estimate,
however, that the reductions in LOC capacities attained,
coupled with internal manpower requirements, have
served to place a ceiling on the NVN's capability to
mount and sustain an overt attack into SVN and Laos.
Nevertheless, we see no change in Hanoi's position for
.settling the war, nor is there an apparent weakening
of popular morale.
TTH1s memorandum is CIA's issuance of a joint CIA-
DIA study prepared monthly.
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 The estimated damage, in dollar terms, con-
tinues to accumulate slowly, resulting in direct
and indirect economic and military costs totaling
about $69 million.* The economic impact of the
bombing has been limited by restriction of the
bombing to targets of relatively minor economic
significance, the predominance of a self-sufficient
subsistence sector, and. the receipt of aid from
Communist countries. Nevertheless, a decline in
living standards and local shortages have been
noted. Reallocations within the labor force and
the dispersion of facilities, undertaken in re-
sponse to the bombing, have been costly and these
costs have been increased because of inept manage-
ment. The domestic supply of skilled labor has been
exhausted and frequent localized shortages of un-
skilled labor have been noted.
Effects on Military Targets
1. US air strikes in NVN during the period
14 March - 14 April 1966 were primarily armed recon-
naissance against lines of communication, infiltra-
tion routes, dispersed logistic areas and land and
waterway traffic. Strikes against fixed targets
(other than LOC targets) were few; consequently there
was little effect on national capacities.
2. The interdiction effort was concentrated
in the region below the 20th parallel during this
period. Major efforts were directed against the four
principal routes: 1A, 7, 8, and 15. Heaviest em-
phasis was placed on road cratering and the bombing
of fixed and pontoon bridges and their approaches.
The destruction of vehicles was also given a high
priority. Cumulative totals of damaged and destroyed
targets are shown in Tab A.
3. On 11 April, 29 B-52s conducted the first
heavy bomber attack against North Vietnam on the
northern side of Mu Gia Pass about 60 nautical miles
south of Vinh. The objective of the attack was to
*US dollars are used throughout this memorandum.
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disrupt and impede vehicular movement on the NVN
approach route to the pass, which is the principal
truck supply route into southern Laos and South
Vietnam. Poor weather conditions and heavy foliage
in the target area have prevented an assessment of
the strike, but preliminary reports indicate that
a high percentage of the bombs were in the target
area and five new cuts were noted in the road.
4. While the flow of men and materiel from
NVN into Laos,and SVN continues, the effort below
the 20th parallel has had some adverse effects. In
the areas where armed reconnaissance has been concen-
trated movement is restricted almost entirely to the
hours of darkness and supply facilities have been
dispersed; they now operate from small isolated
areas, easily camouflaged or hidden. These strikes
maintained at high levels the amount of time, man-
power, and materiel that NVN must expend in order
to continue support of Communist forces in SVN and
Laos. In addition, problems of management, command,
and control have been compounded.
5. The North Vietnamese, in attempting to
circumvent the effects of the air strikes, have
placed major emphasis on construction and maintenance
of LOC. No apparent effort is being made to repair
military installations such as barracks, supply
depots, and ammunition depots. As a result of their
efforts, the capacities of the LOC still greatly ex-
ceed observed traffic densities. Moreover, their
increased efforts have helped to maintain the NVN
armed forces' capabilitk to perform the missions
of national defense, internal security, and to
train and support with men and materiel VC/NVA and
PL/NVA forces in South Vietnam and Laos. On the
other hand, we estimate that the reduction in LOC
capacities which has been achieved by US air strikes
coupled with Hanoi's internal manpower requirements
have served to place a ceiling on NVN capabilities
to mount and sustain an overt attack into South
Vietnam and Laos.
6. Inclement weather during the last week of
March and in early April has limited air strike
effectiveness and a definitive assessment of repair
activity on transportation facilities. However,
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photographic analysis has confirmed rather extensive
road construction efforts in southern North Vietnam.
Construction was noted between Routes 15 and 101,
and in two separate areas south of Ha Tinh. A fourth
road construction site was reported in the vicinity,
of Hoa Binh near. Routes 15 and 6 southwest of Hanoi.
The capacity for moving supplies south by road prob-
ably has not decreased appreciably since the resump-
tion of bombing. The existence of numerous bypass
faciltites including new bridges, fords, ferries,
and alternate roads, many of which were constructed
or reconstructed during the bombing lull, has lim-
ited the impact of air strikes although the number
of unusable bridges has increased since February.
In addition, fords and ferries are now being re-
placed by pontoon bridge sections which are camou-
flaged and dispersed along the river banks during
the day.
7. In areas where concentrated armed recon-
naissance flights have been conducted, the figures
on motor vehicles sighted by pilots (approximately
397 vehicles
sighted appeare )on the LOC ne wor during tfte
third week of March. Pilots have reported that
at least 109 vehicles were damaged and 96 de.
stroyed,or approximately 50 percent of the total
number sighted. This reflects a significant in-
crease in the ratio of damage/destruction to ve-
hicles sighted over the level of previous months.
8, The Hanoi - Lao Cai railroad line, bombed
in March and April, probably has been or will be
reopened shortly for through service. The two
bridges on this line which were reported destroyed
have been rebuilt, and additional bridges and
track which were reported destroyed or damaged
also probably have been repaired. The results
of strikes against the Hanoi - Dong Dang railroad
line in early April have not been determined but
damage to this line would be repaired promptly.
The Hanoi-Vinh railroad line probably is opera-
tional'for'through service at least as far south
as Thanh Hoa. Information is inadequate to assess
the effects of recent air strikes between Thanh
Hoa and Vinh, but extensive provisions have been
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made to bypass existing and prospective interdic-
tions.
9. The number of waterway craft struck dur-
ing March 1966 was more than double that struck
during the previous month; about one third of the
craft struck were reported destroyed. No JCS tar-
geted waterway facilities were struck; however,
shipbuilding and ship repair facilities at Nihh
Binh and the naval base at Phuc Loi were attacked.
Heavy damage and numerous secondary explosions
were reported at Phuc Loi. Aerial operations
against the waterways were generally confined to
routes near the coast and in the coastal areas
south of Vinh. Coastal traffic continues to move,
and some unloading is being done over unimproved
riverbanks.
10. The continuation of the air strikes
against North Vietnam does not appear to have
weakened popular morale to an extent which would
influence the regime's determination to cont.
supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam.
in genera
11. The regime's propaganda efforts to dis-
count the effects of the air strikes appear to
have intensified in recent weeks. This may suggest
that there is a growing concern on the part of the
leadership that the bombings are having'an increas-
ingly adverse effect on the ability of those areas
under attack to carry out their normal functions.
At a congress of "emulation fighters" in the com-
munication and transport field, for example, both
President Ho Chi Minh and Defense Minister Giap
pointed out that the air raids had not been able
to achieve their objectives because construction
units had gone into action quickly in the most
critical. sectors using the watchword "the enemy
bombs the communications lines, we repair them
quickly and send traffic through." Similar state-
ments of achievement have been reflected throughout
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NVN propaganda to generate popular confidence
and pride in the ability to defeat the "US ag-
gressor."
12. One of the latest examples of the re-
gimen's determination to prosecute the war in the
face of the bombings came in an editorial in the
current issue of the party theoretical journal,
Hpc Tap, The editorial took the occasion of the
first anniversary of the promulgation of the NVN
four-point proposal on negotiations to make evi-
dent that in the intervening year the NVN's ada-
mant position on settling the war had not budged.
The editorial recalled that in the; past year the
US had been repeatedly bombing North Vietnam to
no avail, and claimed that in return the North
Vietnamese people had caused the loss of "nearly
1,000 US jet aircraft," a continued exaggeration
of US losses.
Effects on the NVN Economy
13. The estimated damage, in dollar terms,
to economic and military facilities in North Viet-
nam continues to accumulate at a slow rate. There
has been only a limited number of strikes against
fixed targets--principally military targets--and
the major effort has been against LOC and traffic
targets that have relatively low value. The
measurable economic loss to North Vietnam result-
ing directly or indirectly from the bombing of
economic and military facilities totals about $69
million. The cost of replacing damage and destroyed
economic facilities and equipment now stands at
$30.6 million. The cost of replacing damaged and
destroyed military facilities and equipment is $27
million. In addition, measurable indirect losses
to the economy amount to $11.4 million, consisting
of losses in foreign exchange earnings of $7.9
million resulting from reduced exports of apatite
and cement, and losses in the 1965 fall rice crop
of $3.5 million.
14. Although the cost of replacing damaged
and destroyed economic and military facilities and
equipment is not an insignificant loss when com-
pared with total North Vietnamese investment in
1964, which amounted to about $200 million, it is
a very small share of the country's total fixed
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assets. This loss is also overshadowed by the value of eco-
nomic and military aid given to North Vietnam in 1965 by
other Communist countries. Direct losses caused by con-
firmed bomb damage to economic and military facilities and
equipment measured in terms of estimated reconstruction or
replacement costs are as follows:
Economic Facilities and Equipment Military Facilities and Equipment
Targets
Railroad/High Bridges*
Reconstruction
Temporary Rapairs
Transportation Equipment
Railroad Yards and Ports
Electric Power Plants
Petroleum Storage
Facilities
Manufacturing Facilities
Cost
(Million
Dollars) Targets
Barracks 16.0
10.6 Ammunition Storage 4.5
2.6** Supply Depots 3.0
7.0 Radar and Communications 1.1
.7 Naval Bases .8
7.8 SAM Sites .6
Airfields .4
.7 Miscellaneous Targets of
1.2 Armed Reconnaissance .6
Cost
(Million
Dollars)
15. The NVN leadership continues to give evidence of its
intention to maintain as a matter of priority the important
lines of communication and to provide for the supply and dis-
tribution of a minimum of food and other essentials. The de-
termination of the regime to continue its support of the war
in South Vietnam is reflected in recent statements indicating
a willingness to eliminate when necessary those goods and
services not needed for the support of the war. More than
200,000 workers have been shifted into transportation activ-
ities and repair and reconstruction programs. Expenditures
to date for temporary repairs to bridges are estimated at
$1.8 million, The transport system apparently is able to
maintain essential services and to adapt to the bombing even
though the bombed bridges have not been restored to pre-at-
tack condition, and no efforts have been made to undertake
even temporary repairs to a large number of bridges.
* The estimate of damage in this category is incomplete be-
cause of inadequate poststrike photography.
** Includes $1.8 million expended to date on temporary re-
pairs and $0.8 million required to provide temporary re-
pairs for structures damaged but not yet repaired.
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16.. The economic impact of the bombing has
been limited by the restriction of bombing to
'targets of relatively minor economic significance,
the predominance of a self-sufficient subsistence
sector, and the receipt of aid from Communist
countries. A recent North Vietnam periodical
even claimed that industry developed more than
ever in 1965 despite the destruction and disor-
ganization caused by air attacks. Nevertheless,
a decline in living standards has been noted.
During March a member of the presidium of the
central committee admitted that the livelihood
of the people in the cities has been affected.
Moreover, localized shortages of food and other
commodities continue to be observed in rural
areas in the southern part of the country and
contribute to poor morale and discipline at work
sites and among some military personnel. Real-
locations within the labor force and the disper-
sion of some plants and equipment have been under-
taken in response to the bombing. There is no
way of quantifying the economic cost of these
activities, but they must be considerable. More-
over, these costs have increased because of inept
management. The domestic supply of skilled labor
has been exhausted and the leadership is fre-
quently faced with localized shortages Of un-
skilled labor.
17. Apart from the attack on the port of
Ben Thuy in March, the only other recent attacks
on targets of potential importance were those on
the Ben Thuy thermal electric power plant and
several targets in the Vinh area. These restrikes
did not add significantly to the damage already
sustained by the facilities in these areas. The
regime had made little progress, if any, in re-
storing the damage done by previous strikes.
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