THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 20, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
OCI No. 0371/66
Copy No. 3 4
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
20 April 1966
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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1paici44,9 front automatic
owngro ing and declassification
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0371/66
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
(14 April - 20 April 1966)
CONTENTS
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, facing page
Page
iv
1
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1
A. POLITICAL SITUATION 1
Tension eases following Buddhist ac-
ceptance of government's election
pledge (p. 1); Election decree an-
nounced on final day of National Po-
litical Congress (p. 1); Buddhist
Institute moves to restrain demonstra-
tions (p. 1); Proposed assembly falls
short of original Buddhist demands
(p. 2); Tri Quang returns to I Corps
(p. 2); Local frictions continue in I
and II corps areas (p. 2); General
Dinh moves cautiously to restore order
and authority (p. 2); Ky government
begins establishment of election pro-
cedures (p. 3); Election promise pro-
vokes negative reaction in some quarters
(p. 3); Saigon press opinions are sampled
(p. 3); Coup by Directorate's hard-line
members remains possible (p. 4); Economic:
Import activity returning to normal (p. 4);
Embassy feels economy minister is unco-
operative (p. 5); Food deliveries adequate
but retail prices rise (p. 5); Exchange
rates are given (p. 5).
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B. MILITARY S[TUATION 6
Communist activity level falls to new
low for the year (p. 6); Weekly sta-
tistics are given (p. 6); Friendly
large-unit operations increase (p. 6);
Four operations terminate in I Corps
(p. 6); Allied activities in II, III,
and IV corps are recapitulated (p. 7);
B-52s fly 18 missions (p. 7); Results
of tactical sorties are given (p. 8);
I Corps reports most Communist inci-
dents (p. 8); Enemy activity drops
sharply in II Corps (p. 9); Tan Son
Nhut airbase attacked (p. 9); Several
VC initiatives noted in IV Corps (p. 9);
Status of transportation routes shows
little change (p. 9).
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 9
C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT 10
Rural programs remain most promising
area of tangible Vietnamese action
(p. 10); Controller group begins two-
week training (p. 10); Each province
to have model hamlet for demonstration
of projects (p. 10); I Corps prospects
complicated by political turmoil (p. 10);
Chieu Hoi tallies 2,336 returnees for
March (p. 11).
Map, North Vietnam, facing page 12
II, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 12
Uong Bi power plant and Haiphong high-
way bridge attacked (p. 12); Two Hanoi-
area SAM sites struck (p. 12); SAM. site
near Vinh also hit (p. 12); Poststrike
photography of Mu Gia Pass shows damage
was minimal (p. 12).
THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 13
Cambodia's Sihanouk invites Liberation
Front representatives to join Indochinese
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people's secretariat (p. 13); Chief
of State Thieu postpones Seoul visit
(p. 13); GVN moves to widen repre-
sentation in Africa (p. 13); West
Germany and Switzerland furnishing
medical aid (p. 14); New Korean unit
brings "Tiger" division to full
strength (p. 14).
ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Personnel Losses (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Incidents and Attacks (Weekly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South
Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA,
DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by
CIA without final coordination.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Political tension subsided, at least temporarily, as
a result of the Buddhist hierarchy's declaration of satis-
faction with the government's promise of early assembly
elections. Although Buddhist elements in I Corps are
now responding to monk Tri Quang's appeals for an end
to protest activity, the situation there is still explosive,
with continuing friction between antigovernment partisans,
on the one hand, and armed Nationalist (VNQDD) Party
followers and Catholics, on the other. There are also
indications in Saigon of growing opposition to the elections
by strongly anti-Buddhist and anti-Communist circles.
The over-all level of Viet Cong activity declined last
week, but there was some increase in the number and in-
tensity of Communist attacks. South Vietnamese and
allied operations during the week generally kept up the
pressure on the enemy, but failed to score significant
results.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. An easing of tension in the country, at least
temporarily, has followed Buddhist acceptance of the
government's pledge to hold constituent assembly elec-
tions within three to five months. Antigovernment
elements in I Corps are reluctantly beginning to ac...;
knowledge monk Tri Quang's appeal for an end to pro-
test activity, but there is continuing danger that
the fragile government-Buddhist accommodation may be
rapidly upset by either side.
2. The decree, promulgating elections under the
signature of Chief of State General Thieu,was an-
nounced on the final day of last week's National Po-
litical Congress, which agreed in effect to endorse
the Buddhist position. Although the Buddhists offi-
cially boycotted the congress, they sent an "unoffi-
cial" lay observer to the concluding sessions in
anticipation of the favorable turn of events, and
after receiving private assurances from Premier Ky
that there would be no reprisals against participants
in the Buddhist "struggle" campaign. The final after-
noon session of the congress, at Ky's suggestion, dis-
cussed the question of whether the present government
should remain in a provisional capacity pending an
elected successor. On this issue, however, the con-
gress declared itself incompetent to make recommenda-
tions, even though most delegates supported the pres-
ent government's retention.
3. The Buddhist Institute moved swiftly to turn
a scheduled mammoth protest demonstration in Saigon,
scheduled for the same day, intO a smaller and or-
derly "victory parade." On the following day, 15
April, the Buddhist hierarchy--including Tri Quang--
met in Saigon and issued a statement that their
major demands had been satisfied and that they would
suspend further protest activity. The Buddhist
leaders also made it clear that they were willing to
see the present government stay in office to super-
vise the elections, but that their attitude in the
future would depend on the government's showing of
good faith.
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4. The government decree, spelling out only
that the function of an elected assembly is to
draft a constitution, falls considerably short of
original Buddhist proposals that an assembly be
given power to "legalize" an interim government and
to exercise quasi-legislative powers pending perma-
nent institutions. The Buddhists may reason that
having achieved a major concession, they lack strength
--at least in the Saigon area--to challenge the gov-
ernment further at this time. They probably calculate
that, in any event, future government actions will
offer them issues for resuming demonstrations if they
so choose.
5. Tri Quang has returned to his base in central
Vietnam, where he has appealed to recalcitrant ele-
ments in I Corps to line up behind the Buddhist hier-
archy's position. Both government officials and
Buddhist Institute leaders had voiced some concern
that despite Quang's persuasiveness with Buddhist
followers, he might not be able to control the sup-
porters of ousted corps commander Thi, or the Commu-
nist elements reported to have penetrated the "struggle
movement." However, both the Hue and Da Nang militants
now appear to be dropping their clamor for immediate
replacement of the Ky government and the military
Directorate.
6. At the same time, local frictions are Con-
tinuing in I Corps, and to some extent in 11 Corps,
between supporters and opponents of the "struggle"
groups. Sporadic acts of violence have occurred be-
tween antigovernment elements, particularly armed
student "suicide teams," and progovernment or strongly
anti-Communist militants, including armed followers
of the VNQDD (Nationalist) Party. Friction is also
increasing between "struggle forces" and the Catholics.
Some of this violence may be due to Viet Cong efforts
to keep the situation from quieting down.
7. The new I Corps commander, General Dinh, con-
tinues to move cautiously in trying to restore order
and government authority. To some extent, his coop-
eration with antigovernment military and civilian
officials in Da Nang and elsewhere has served to en-
trench these elements in power. However, by visiting
various provincial capitals and issuing orders to
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local army commanders, Dinh has so far succeeded in
heading off major confrontations between hostile
armed groups, and he has restored at least a sur-
face appearance of normality to the Da Nang area.
8. Meanwhile, in consultation with prominent
civilian politicians, the Ky government in Saigon is
moving to establish procedures for carrying out elec-
tions, now tentatively slated for mid-August. Pre-
liminary agreement has been reached to set up a com-
mittee of about 30 members, drawn from both the
municipal and provincial councils and from "various
organizations," to draft an electoral law and to
supervise the elections. The government, however,
plans to convene another consultative meeting with
a broad spectrum of civilian representatives who
will make recommendations on both thecomposition.
of the committee and the electoral regulations. This
procedure may be indicative of government efforts to
avoid any suggestion of plans to rig the elections;
however, this cautious approach may also provide
critics of the regime with ammunition for charges
of government delaying tactics.
9. The government's promise of elections is al-
ready provoking a reaction among elements suspicious
of Buddhist motives and fearful of Communist exploita-
tion of the ballot box. On 17 April, militant Catho-
lics from a northern refugee community near Saigon
staged a demonstration endorsing the principle of
elections, but implying that they will combat any
procedures permitting the Viet Cong to infiltrate
an assembly. A group of Saigon University profes-
sors has also proposed delaying the elections until
the danger of Communist political inroads has dimin-
ished. An influential southern Buddhist lay leader,
who has long been critical of the political role of
the Buddhist clergy, privately expressed the view
that pressure for elections is only a device by Tri
Quang to gain control of the government.
10. Some of the Saigon vernacular press, particu-
larly papers sympathetic to the Catholics, has also
questioned the wisdom of attempting to elect a na-
tional assembly at this time. Since the government's
decree was issued, however, the militant nationalist
press, including Buddhist organs, has begun to tone
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down earlier overtones of anti-Americanism. Dat To,
a paper usually voicing Tri Quang's views, has now
even carried an editorial implying that the US has
some justification for intervening in Vietnam's in-
ternal affairs, but warned that US involvements will
be judged by their effects on Vietnam's vital in-
terests.
11. The Saigon press generally has reacted with
alarm to the shooting of an editor-publisher, whose
newspaper offices had a week earlier been sacked by
hoodlums during a Buddhist demonstration. The editor
had been sharply critical of the disruptive tactics
of the Buddhist clergy, and there is some feeling
among press circles that he may have been gunned down
by Buddhist elements. He is, however, the second
anti-Communist journalist to have been shot in Sai-
gon in recent months. The incident may have been
perpetrated by the Viet Cong, both to increase dis-
sension during the present unrest and to continue a
campaign of intimidation against anti-Communist in-
tellectuals.
12. According to press reports, one of Tri Quang's
top lieutenants has already accused the government
of planning a "false coup" in order to renege OD its
promises. The rumors of dissension among the mili-
tary, coupled with the rise of vocal opposition to
elections, may already be adding to a growing Bud-
dhist suspicion about the government's real inten-
tions. An account of a Directorate meeting, held on
18 April to discuss the election procedures and the
continued unrest in I Corps, indicates that there is
still serious division among the top generals over
the desirability of taking a moderate or firm ap-
proach toward the dissidents in I Coprs. The possi-
bility of internal changes to eliminate disunity in
the military, or even of rash action by the advocates
of a hard line, cannot be ruled out.
Economic Situation.
13. Import activity in Saigon is returning to
normal after seven weeks of decline, partly because
businessmen appear to believe that the GVN is pre-
pared to tolerate some black market activity and
partly because some merchants apparently feel that
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the present political crisis has distracted the GVN
from its anticorruption campaign. Businessmen and
bankers continue to hold that a serious interruption
of business activity and a significant increase in
capital flight is not likely unless the political
situation becomes much worse.
14. The US Embassy in Saigon reports that even
allowing for the present political difficulties,
Minister of Economy Au Truong Thanh has shown little
willingness to cooperate closely with the embassy on
important economic matters. The minister has proven
to be difficult, unpredictable, and sometimes secre-
tive. He tells his subordinates little of his inten-
tions, and it has been difficult to find out what is
taking place in the ministry.
15. Deliveries to Saigon of pigs and rice, two
key food items, have been adequate during early April.
According to the US Embassy, recent trends in pig
arrivals show that rural producers and suppliers
still have considerable.capability to maintain ship-
ments in the face of Viet Cong obstruction. Because
of the satisfactory deliveries of pigs, the GVN ap-
pears to have given up for the present thoughts of
relaxing price ceilings that heretofore had the ef-
fect of reducing deliveries of hogs to the Saigon
market.
16. Retail prices rose for the week ending 15
April, led by perennially scarce sweetened con-
densed milk. Rice prices continued upward as a re-
sult of higher GVN-purchase and open-market prices
set by Minister Thanh. The price of wheat flour
was stabilized by the arrival of substantial imports.
Apparently in response to the slackening of govern-
ment controls, the prices of iron and steel prod-
ucts and of fertilizer continued to rise.
17. In the Saigon free market, prices of $10
bills rose by five piasters per dollar to 172,
which is close to the peak level of 175 reached in
1965. The price of $10 MPC (scrip) rose by three
piasters per dollar to 119, and gold was up two
piasters per dollar to 246. The piaster-dollar
cross rate in Hong Kong increased from 155 to 156.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated
activity decreased for the week ending 17 April 1966,
falling to a new low for the year.
2. During the period there were 607 Communist-
initiated incidents compared to last week's 815.
There were 17 attacks (three of battalion size or
larger) and 463 acts of terrorism compared to last
week's five and 537, respectively. The kill ratio
favored free world forces 2.75 to 1 compared to last
week's 5.6 to 1 (recomputed). Viet Cong losses for
the period were 608 killed and 135 captured. Viet-
namese casualties for the period were 141 killed,
362 wounded and 52 missing or captured--a total of
555 compared to last week's 278. US losses for the
week were 89 killed, 635 wounded, and 2 missing or
captured--a total of 726 compared to last week's
598. Free world forces' losses decreased from 40
to 22. The South Vietnamese lost 237 weapons (six
crew served).
MIA/
TOTAL
KIA
WIA
CAPTURED
CASUALTIES
US
89
635
2
726
ARVN
141
362
52
555
THIRD COUNTRY
3
19
22
VIET OONG
608
135
743
GVN/Allied Activities
3. Friendly large-unit operations and resulting
enemy contacts both increased. Small-unit operations
and enemy contacts decreased.
4. In I Corps, US Marines terminated Operation
ORANGE in Quang Nam Province. Latest reported casual-
ties were 18 friendly killed and 92 wounded, while
Viet Cong losses were 57 killed and 61 captured. In
Quang Tin. Province, elements of the 1st ARVN Division
terminated search-and-destroy Operation LAM/SON-255
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with friendly losses of three wounded. The Viet
Cong suffered 33 killed and four captured, with 16
individual weapons lost. Operation QUYET THANG 184,
conducted by elements of the 2d ARVN Division,
terminated in Quang Ngai Province. Friendly forces
lost 11 killed, 45 wounded, and nine individual weap-
ons while inflicting on the enemy casualties of 70
killed and three captured together with the loss of
19 individual weapons. USMC/ARVN Operation NEVADA/
LIEN KET 34 terminated with cumulative friendly
casualties of three killed and 45 wounded (14 US)
and enemy losses of 68 killed, 23 captured, and 16
individual weapons.
5. Elements of the US 101st Airborne Division
and ROK Marine Brigade continue Operation FILLMORE
in Phu Yen Province of II Corps. Friendly cumula-
tive losses have been 13 killed and 88 wounded. The
Viet Cong have lost 165 killed. Operation BUN KAE
66-5 conducted by a regiment of the ROK Capital
Division in Binh Dinh Province terminated. Friendly
losses were 23 killed and 62 wounded. Reportedly,
the Viet Cong lost 292 killed, 74 captured, and 30
individual weapons.
6. In III Corps, the US 1st Infantry Division
concluded Operation ABILENE in Phuoc Tuy Province.
Cumulative losses were 48 friendly killed and 138
(3 US) wounded. Enemy losses were 92 killed and 20
captured.
7. The one day search-and-destroy Operation CUU
LONG 7 conducted by 7th ARVN Division elements in
Kien Tuong Province, IV Corps, resulted in Viet Cong
losses of 140 killed. Friendly casualties were 11
killed, 8 wounded, and two missing.
8. Free world forces conducted 98 battalion-
size or larger operations during the week, 47 of
them achieving contact: 30 GVN, ten US, two ROK,
and five combined. There were 24,535 small-unit
operations, including 3,250 conducted by US forces.
Of the 131 that achieved contact with the enemy,
64 were conducted by US units.
Allied Air Activity
9. Eighteen B-52 Stratofortress missions utilizing
86 aircraft were flown during the week ending 17 April.
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The target areas were in Thua Thien and Quang Tri
provinces in South Vietnam, the Mu Gia Pass area
in North Vietnam, and along the South Vietnamese -
Laotian border.
10. On 11 April, 29 aircraft (ROCK KICK III)
struck the North Vietnamese side of Mu Gia Pass.
Poststrike photography reveals 245 impacts inside
and 270 outside the target area. On 15 April, RAT
MAT I and II, with six aircraft each, struck in
Quang Tri Province in an effort to thwart a possible
attack on the special forces camp at Khe Sanh. While
no poststrike results have been received, ground
follow-up action is tentatively scheduled. Twelve
missions of three aircraft each struck Viet Cong
infiltration points on the South Vietnamese - Laotian
border. Three missions (LONG BEAK II) totaling nine
aircraft struck southwest of Hue at Viet Cong sup-
ply areas. Poststrike photography of these three
missions reveals 64 impacts inside and 51 outside
the target area.
11. During the period 8-14 April, a total of
2,540 tactical airstrikes and armed reconnaissance
sorties were flown by the combined efforts of the
US Navy, Air Force, Marine, and VNAF aircraft. The
cumulative results of these strikes as reported by
the pilots included destruction of 1,631 structures,
41 sampans, 20 bunkers and trenches, 6 automatic
weapons sites, 2 dams, and 1 ammunition dump. Dam-
age was reported to 1,285structures, 29 sampans, 10
bunkers, 9 foxholes, and 1 AW site.. There were 23
secondary explosions reported. On 13 April, a USAF
0-IA Birddog on a visual reconnaissance' flight was
brought down by ground fire approximately 70 miles
south of Saigon. The crew was rescued.
Communist Activity
12. I Corps continues to lead all other areas in
Communist incidents with 227 reported. On 14 April,
an estimated Viet Cong battalion-size force attacked
an outpost in Quang Ngai Province. Reaction forces
for relief of the outpost reported heavy contact with
Viet Cong company-size units on the same day. On 16
April, a well-organized Viet Cong force attacked the
positions of a US Marine company in Quang Nam Province.
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
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Other activity was limited to a variety of harassing
actions.
13. Enemy activity in II Corps dropped almost
50 percent from that reported last week. An attack
by an estimated Viet Cong company on an ARVN company
in Binh Dinh Province resulted in friendly losses of
seven killed, 13 wounded, and 24 missing. One Viet
Cong was captured and two suspects detained.
14. On 11 April during Operation ABILENE in
Phuoc Tuy Province, III Corps, a company from the
2d Battalion, 16th US Infantry, was surrounded by
a Viet Cong force estimated to be a battalion from
the 94th Viet Cong Regiment. During the two-hour
fight, 34 US soldiers were killed and 60 wounded.
Nine Viet Cong were killed. On 13 April, Tan Son
Nhut airbase was subjected to an intense 15-minute
attack by Viet Cong employing 82-mm mortars and
75-mm recoilless rifles. The losses resulting from
the 157 rounds fired at the base were seven US
killed and 149 wounded (including 14 ARVN), as well
as four aircraft destroyed and 56 damaged. In addi-
tion, 400,000 gallons of fuel were destroyed.
15. In IV Corps an estimated Viet Cong battalion
attacked a forward operating base in Kien Tuong Prov-
ince on 10 April. The attackers employed a flame-
thrower, the first reported use of such a weapon in
IV Corps. Captured documents indicate that the at-
tacking force was the 261st Main Force Battalion,
Dong Thap I, Viet Cong Regiment. An ARVN relief
force made heavy contact on 11 April. Casualties
from these two actions were 28 friendly killed (1 US)
and 228 Viet Cong killed (US estimate including a
body count of 140). The popular force training cen-
ter in Kien Hoa Province was overrun on 14 April by
a Viet Cong force. Friendly losses were 50 killed
and 36 wounded; 24 civilians were wounded as well.
Weapons losses included one 60-mm mortar and 116
individual weapons. Six Viet Cong were killed.
Status of Transportation Routes
16. The only changes in the status of major trans-
portation routes are that National Route 1 has been
reopened in Quang Tin and Binh Thuan provinces, and
the national railroad is again in operation between
Nha Trang and Ninh Hoa in Khanh Hoa Province.
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C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
1. One of the most promising areas of tangible
Vietnamese action taken as a result of US recommenda-
tions continues to lie in the field of revolutionary
development. With the exception of I Corps, progress
is visible in many sections of South Vietnam as funds
are released in record amounts, cadre groups are trained,
and technical ministries begin to coordinate their
activities with the Ministry of Revolutionary Develop-
ment. However, the revised program is still in its
elementary stages and further progress will depend on
the work of cadre and other specialized groups in the
field and on the degree of security that can be pro-
vided for the population with whom they will work.
2. The 63-man controller group that will be re-
sponsible for inspecting all phases of revolutionary
development has been formed and will now undergo two
weeks of training. It will then be broken up into
nine teams, one for each of the four corps and five
others for specific tasks as directed by General Thang.
The chief of the group, who recently returned from
training in the United States, will be assisted by two
civilian controllers, 12 recent graduates from the
National Institute of Administration, and 41 officers
from the ARVN Officers Candidate School.
3. In addition to cadre groups, each province
will have at least one pilot or model hamlet to dem-
onstrate across-the-board civilian activities such as
agriculture, health, information, and self-help proj-
ects. It is expected that about 15 percent of the
total pacification effort in each province will be
committed to the pilot hamlets.
4. The prospects for successful, progressive
revolutionary development projects in I Corps have
been complicated by the political turmoil there dur-
ing the past month and a half. None of the goals
programmed for the first quarter of 1966 in the Na-
tional Priority Area in Quang Nam Province have been
completed in spite of attempts by US Marines to pro-
vide security. The embassy feels that as long as the
VNQDD (Nationalist) Party disassociates itself from
the pacification plan, the GVN chain of command will
remain fragmented and unable to recruit military and
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Approied Far-Release 200&ECRET79TOOMINA000600010019-9
civilian cadre locally, resulting in the priority
area not being able to fulfill its plans. Further
complications have been introduced by the resigna-
tions of the civilian chiefs in Quang Nam and
Quang Tin provinces. The resignation in Quang Tin
reportedly involved the inability of the chief to
cope with a confrontation between antigovernment
demonstrators and armed VNQDD forces from another
province.
Returnees (Chieu Hoi)
5. The official tally for March is 2,336 re-
turnees, most of whom defected in the II Corps
area where there were large military operations and
air strikes. In the week ending 9 April, 646 de-
fectors were registered, of whom 475 were military
cadre. Incidents of Viet Cong terrorism against
Chieu Hoi centers have increased; two centers were
attacked recently, and a claymore mine was exploded
on the edge of a third center.
Approv
-11-
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"Phone Say
L.t.tang Pfabang
Vane Vteng.
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CHINA
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
1. During the week US aircraft struck several
major targets in close proximity to the Hanoi-
Haiphong area. On 19 April the Uong Bi thermal
power plant and the Haiphong highway bridge were at-
tacked but the exact amount of damage cannot as yet
be determined. At the power plant, pilots reported
seeing detonations in the target area and the simul-
taneous extinguishing of not only the lights at the
plant but those in the area of Haiphong.
2. Pilot reporting on the bridge strike in-
dicated that all ordnance was on target and that one
span of the bridge had been dropped. Two USN F-8
CRUSADERS escorting the strike force to the Haiphong
area were downed by ground fire.
3. On 17 April two surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites south of Hanoi were attacked by US aircraft.
Both sites were left aflame and a secondary explosion
was observed at one site. Prior to the strike the
aircraft were fired upon by two SAMs but were able
to take evasive action.
4. On the same day, US Navy jets attacked a
SAM site some 25 miles south of Vinh. They dropped
two 1,000-pound bombs on the site, but dust and smoke
precluded an accurate damage assessment. At least
two SAM firing battalions are believed to be operat-
ing in the vicinity of Vinh and have probably ac-
counted for the loss of six US aircraft in the area
since 25 February.
Mu Gia Pass Damage Assessment
5. Poststrike photography of the 12 April B-52
Stratofortress bomber raid against Route 15 leading
into Mu Gia Pass indicates that over-all damage to
the route was minimal and that the damaged areas
were probably by-passed within three days. According
to the photography, Route 15 was cratered in five
places for a total length of 2,500 feet and a small
landslide was noted in one place.
Ap
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Appr
III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. CAMBODIA
0019-9
1. Radio Phnom Penh announced on 14 April that
Prince Sihanouk had invited NFLSVN chairman Nguyen
Huu Tho to send representatives to Phnom Penh as
soon as possible. These delegates, "together with
those of the Sangkum, Vietnam Fatherland Front, and
the Neo Lao Hak Xat, will be charged with the task
of setting up a permanent secretariat of the Indo-
chinese peoples." As yet, there are no indications
that similar invitations have been sent to the
other groups, or that any replies have been received.
2. The decision to set up such a secretariat
was made at the Indochinese Peoples Conference that
met at Phnom Penh over a year ago. At that time,
there were indications that both the Hanoi and NFLSVN
representatives to the conference had misgivings
about establishing the organization in Cambodia for
fear of losing control over its actions. It is pos-
sible that Hanoi has permitted Sihanouk to go ahead
with his project in return for the recent agreement
to raise the North Vietnamese mission in Cambodia
from commercial to "government" (but not diplomatic)
status.
B. SOUTH KOREA
On 19 April, Seoul radio carried a South
Korean Foreign Ministry announcement that GVN Chief
of State Thieu has postponed his official visit to
Seoul, which had been scheduled for early May.
C. GABON
A GVN Foreign Office official stated that the
Vietnamese ambassador in Tunis would visit Libreville
in order to make "initial contact" with the Gabon
Government. He also said that the GVN hoped to ac-
credit its ambassador in Tunis to several other
African nations, including Libya, Cameroon, and Gabon.
The GVN presently has embassies in Rabat, Dakar, Tunis,
and Abidjan.
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. FREE WORLD AID
1. West Germany. The West German Interior Min-
istry has informed the US Embassy in Bonn that eight
tons of pharmaceuticals will be shipped to Saigon by
charter aircraft between 21 and 25 April.
2. South Korea. A 3,560-man Korean regimental
brigade, destined toreinforce the ROK "Tiger" Divi-
sion, arrived in South Vietnam on 16 April aboard a
US Navy troopship. The division is now at its full
strength of three combat regiments.
3. Switzerland. A Swiss medical team comprising
two doctors, one x-ray technician, one administrator,
and five nurses arrived in Saigon on 14 April. The
team will be assigned to Kontum Province to replace
the Philippine surgical team that is being reassigned
to My Tho. There are now 11 free world medical teams
operating in Vietnam, altogether involving 99 medical
personnel.
Appr
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SOUTH V IMAM Ftlitettate t?014tinCSIA-RDP79T008013A000600010019-9
WEEKLY REPORT 10 APRIL -17APRIL 1966
Total Personnel Losses
(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in
3,500 III I I I II I I
GVN /US/other Free World
Viet Cong/PAVN
3,000 US only
Z500
SECRET
Action)
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
4,000
APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR
I I I I I I I I jI H
3,500
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam
(including North Vietnam)
Fatalities Non-fatal Wounds
3,000
2500
Cumulative, 1961-1964
Cumulative, 1965
Cumulative, 1966 to date
TOTAL
255
1365
1427
3047
1524
6110
8229
15863
Captured Missing
10 12
15 136
7 38
32 186
2,000
1,500
1,000
AP MAY JUNE
1958
JULY AUG
SEPT OCT
AN
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GIN/Other Free World)
M. Killed in actiOn Miuinci
cor. Captured in action Wounded in action
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WEEKLY REPORT 10 APRIL ?17 APRIL 1966
,250
1,000
750
500
I Attacks
Viet Cong incidents
Terrorism
I i I I
Sabotage
Propaganda
SECRET
0- Antiaircraft Fire
Viet Cong Attacks
Company and battalion sized attacks
? ? ? Battalion sized (and larger) attacks only
1,400
oo
Weapons Losses
3
APR
?
Government
? Viet Cong
T. I
f
1 ? r
AA00.' 4
I APR ri MAY JUNE JULY I AUG
61959
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