THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: MEMO

jJ
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
25X1
pREpAREb FC3R TH NATIOR L SECURI, YCOLINCa
FURTFift DTSSEM'INATION OF INFO(MN
N`TAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHC','RIZED
:State Dept. review
'completed
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
Antigovernment activity gained :new militancy today as
various "struggle groups" in Hue and Da Nang pre-empted the
municipal radios to broadcast a pledge "to strive to the
end to fulfill the people's aspirations."
1. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Heavy
fighting apparently continues between battalion-strength
USMC and Viet Cong forces in northeast Quang Ngai Province
(Para. 1). USMC Operation OREGON continues according to
plan northwest of Hue, In Thua Thien Province (Para. 2)'_
Vietnamese CIDG paramilitary forces have inflicted heavy
losses on the Viet Cong in two separate enga;4ements in Dar-
lac Province (Para. 4). USAF B-52s yesterday attacked a
suspected major Viet Cong infiltration and supply base
just inside Laos along South Vietnam's Kontuum Province
border (Para. 6). An estimated two Viet Cong platoons
early today made a mortar attack against Cam Ly airfield
near.the. mountain resort of Da Lat (Para. 7). Interroga-
tion of a PAVN soldier recently apprehended in Darlac
Province has revealed Communist intentions to attack Plei
Me Special Forces camp in Pleiku Province and certain
areas in adjacent Kontum Province during the forthcoming
rainy season (Para. 9).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: Anti-Ky
student groups pre-empt municipal radios in Hue and Da
Nang; broadcasts call for an end to military regime in Sai-
gon and specifically denounce Premier Ky and Chief of
State Thieu (Paras. 1-3). No attempt as yet by military
authorities in northern cities to repress government's
critics.(Para. 4). Continuing efforts by "struggle forces"
in Saigon to organize student demonstrations (Para. 6).
Ky faces dilemma in handling Buddhist unrest; denies
criticising Buddhists in recent speech (Paras. 7-8). Gen-
eral Thi still in I Corps; possibility of anti-US slant
developing in protest movement (Paras. 9-10). ''Meeting of
Vietnamese provincial representatives in Saigon 23-25 March
unlikely to have much attendance from northern provinces
(Para. 11).
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
Vi. Other Major Aspects: Recent photography
has identified a new road linking the Laotian in-
filtration net with a newly constructed road segment
in Cambodia. The combined road segment is some 100
miles long (Paras. 1-2). Other evidence indicates
that there has been a substantial increase in illi-
cit traffic in rice from Cambodia to the Communists
in South Vietnam (Para. 3).
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
wool *w
PHUOC
I-gav a
B-52 STRIKES. / ; Pmw
_~
)YEN
VN
HOA
I',14aTrapg
[karat -_ ?
a~
,
~
-PN FiJJ a+d+T'c rt?nicn
;Air e)d,; uAN
L`F
SE~r TIIY
c ~M
Attopeu j
K6RITUM
f? AkTor.
{Kontum
Pleiku I -
Town
Pt1ei Me
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Battalion-strength USMC elements engaged
an estimated Viet Cong battalion during 20-21 March
in an area approximately 10 miles southeast of Chu
Lai. The marines were part of the joint US/ARVN
Operation TEXAS/LIEN KET 28 in northern coastal
Quang Ngai Province. A second USMC battalion from
Chu Lai was subsequently committed to the battle
and all units were reported heavily engaged last
night. Since its initiation on 19 March, the allied
ground sweep has resulted in Viet Cong losses of 162
killed (US -_,ody count), one captured, and 13 suspects
apprehended. Friendly casualties to date stand at
50 killed (45 US, including 11 US killed last night
in a helicopter crash caused by enemy ground fire),
141 wounded (115 US), and two ARVN missing.
2. A second USMC battalion has reinforced the
1st Battalion/4th US Marines conducting search-and-
destroy Operation OREGON northwest of Hue, in Thua
Thien Province. The ground sweep, currently in its
fourth day, has apparently encountered stiff enemy
resistance, resulting in US casualties of 10 killed
and 42 wounded and Communist losses of 48 killed.
3. Communist forces in Kien Tuong Province,
west of Saigon near the Cambodian border, have of-
fered heavy resistance thus far to Operation CUU
LONG 15--a six-battalion ARVN search-and-destroy
ground sweep initiated on 20 March. To date, gov-
ernment forces claim to have killed 229 Viet Cong,
captured 16, detained 34 suspects, and seized 80
weapons. Friendly casualties currently total three
killed (one US) and 38 wounded (four US).
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
4. In two separate engagements in the central
highlands province of Darlac on 19 and 20 March,
respectively, company-size or larger Vietnamese
CIDG paramilitary units on patrol reconnaissance mis-
sions skirmished with Communist forces possibly ap-
proximating battalion strength. The two actions re-
sulted in enemy losses of 157 killed (ARVN body count)
and seven captured. Government casualties were 11
killed and 11. wounded
5. Multibattalion US/ARVN road-clearing task
force elements have terminated Operation BUCHANAN, a
route-security mission along strategic lateral Highway
19 between Qui Nhon and Pleiku, after eight days with-
out significant enemy contact.
6. Fifteen USAF B-52 Stratofortresses yester-
day attacked a suspected major Viet Cong infiltration
and supply base approximately 26 miles northwest of
the capital of Kontum Province and two miles inside
Laos. Ground follow-up operations were not. scheduled..
Viet Cong Activity
7. An estimated two-platoon Viet Cong force
early today shelled Cam Ly Airfield, near the moun-
tain resort of Da-Latin Tuyen Duc Province, with 15
rounds of 60-mm. mortar fire. One light observa-
tion aircraft was destroyed and one H-37 Mojave
helicopter damaged; in addition, one ARVN soldier
was killed and five wounded. Enemy losses totaled
two killed and two weapons captured.
8. On the basis of more complete information,
MACV now reports that the 20 March attack by two
Viet Cong companies on an ARVN battalion in Binh
Tuy Province, 70 miles northeast of Saigon, re-
sulted in enemy losses of 166 killed (ARVN body
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
count) and seven captured, in contrast to ARVN cas-
ualties of 12 killed, 28 wounded, and two missing.
9. Subsequent interrogation of a Viet Cong
ca tive
has revealed ommunis in -
tions to conduct large-scale attacks against Plei
Me Special Forces camp in Pleiku Province and against
certain unspecified areas in Kontum Province during
the forthcoming rainy season. Plans for an attack
on Plei Me have also been obtained from other sources.
However, this is the first report that Communist
forces also plan attacks in Kontum Province. The
most likely targets are probably Dak Pek, Dak To, and
Tou Morong.
10. A review by MACV of the Viet Cong - initiated
incidents during February 1966 has revealed the fol-
lowing patterns:
(A) ATTACKS: Viet Cong attacks were gen-
erally concentrated along major lines of communica-
tions, and in heavily populated areas with the heav-
iest concentrations along Route 1 between Da Nang
and Quang Ngai city; along Route 14 in Darlac Prov-
ince, north of Ban Me Thuot; along Route 13 in Binh
Duong Province; along Route 1 in Hau Nghia Province;
and along Route 4 in Long An, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long,
and Phong Dinh provinces. The pattern of attacks in-
dicates that the maximum enemy effort was aimed not
at gaining territory, but rather at gaining control
of the population and isolating the major urban cen-
ters from the rest of the country.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
(B) SABOTAGE: Viet Cong sabotage was con-
centrated in four major areas. In southern Quang
Ngai and northern Binh Dinh provinces, the Viet
Cong continued their interdiction effort against
Route 1, thus prolonging the six-month-long isola-
tion of this area from the respective province capi-
tals. Route 4 was heavily sabotaged in the delta
provinces of Dinh Tuong and Bac Lieu, but govern-
ment efforts to keep both stretches of the road open
were almost 100 percent successful. The heaviest
railroad interdiction occurred in Thua Thien Prov-
ince, particularly the stretch between Da Nang and
Hue which was closed for more than half of Febru-
ary.
(C) TERRORISM: Viet Cong terrorism was
heavy in many widespread sections of the country,
but by far the greatest concentration was in the
Capital Military Region around Saigon and in the
central area of the delta, both highly valuable
areas and both hotly contested by the Viet Cong
and GVN.
(D) PROPAGANDA: Viet Cong propaganda/
subversion activities were heaviest in Darlac Prov-
ince and in the Lam Dong/Binh Tuy Province border
area. Of particular interest is the location of
propaganda incidents in areas where attacks and
sabotage are generally low or nonexistent, sug-
gesting that the Viet Cong may be using this "weapon"
in an effort to influence areas where they do not
have large enough forces to physically control
the area.
11. On balance, the pattern of Viet Cong ac-
tivity during February closely paralleled that of
recent months. A major exception was the intro-
duction of new units into Darlac Province. The
pattern for future months will probably reflect no
drastic changes in emphasis, although, as the
southwest monsoons approach, enemy activity can
be expected to decrease along the coastal plain
of I and II Corps and increase in the central high-
lands and in III and IV Corps.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
II. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Antigovernment activity gained new militancy':today
as various "struggle groups" in Hue and Da Nana pre-empted
the municipal radios to 'roadcast a pledge "to strive to the
end to fulfill the people's aspirations."
2. University students in Hue seized the radio station
this morning, justifying their action by the argument that
"moderation is no longer effective." For several hours, un-
til reception deteriorated, there were repeated broadcasts
attacking the legality of the present regime in Saigon, de-
nouncing Chief of State Thieu, Premier Ky, and Deputy Premier
Co, and calling for implementation of the four-point pro-
gram of the Buddhist hierarchy.
3. In Da Nang, a regular radio announcer broadcast a
communique in the name of the "Popular Force Struggling for
Revolution"--identified as the new appellation of the previous
"civil and military struggle group"--indicating that it was
formally organizing itself to speak for the local populace
and military. The statement said that the "Popular Force"
was "taking the Vietnamese Information Service as its head-
quarters, and the radio station, until the struggle is suc-
cessful."
4. In neither Hue notDa Nang was there any evidence of
interference in these moves by local authorities. According
to information of the US Embassy in Saigon, the new I Corps
commander General Chuan has indicated that the Hue radio will
be available to local students to broadcast any statements
they may choose.
5. There are other indications that antigovernment
groups are gearing up for a major campaign against the Sai-
gon government. The chief of Quang Ngai Province reportedly
stated yesterday that the people in central Vietnam would
not accept the military's "high-handed manner of dismissing
present government is brought down.
gie committees are being organized in Quang Tin Province in
preparation for an all-out effort.
persons with suspected Viet Cong ties among
the organizers.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
6. In Saigon, there are continuing reports of
efforts by a "struggle force," including at least
some Buddhist monks, to organize student demonstra-
tions. Buddhist Institute chairman Tam Chau re-
portedly personally dispersed an attempted demon-
stration today by pupils of one Buddhist-run school.
7. Signs now point to an increase in the tempo
of antigovernment protests, particularly in I Corps
where various local leaders and students appear de-
termined to keep up pressure. This could put Premier
Ky in Saigon in an increasing dilemma as to whether
to permit some continuing agitation in the hope that
the "struggle groups" will lose steam or to order
stern measures to put an end to protest activity.
Should he adopt the latter course, he risks some
danger that authorities in I Corps may defy such
orders or that repressive measures may further in-
flame emotions and play into opposition hands.
8. Ky, meanwhile, in an effort to prevent a
hardening Buddhist attitude, has issued a public
denial that his statements at Da Lat this weekend
were aimed at the Buddhist leadership or that he
considers Buddhist wishes. "illogical and unpatriotic."
Ky also praised Buddhist Institute chairman Tam Chau
as a respected national leader and anti-Communist,
an indication of his apparent hope that Chau can be
kept on a course of moderation even if Tri Quang at-
tempts to organize an all-out opposition movement in
I Corps.
9. Meanwhile, there has been no indication
that General Thi has responded to orders reportedly
sent to him yesterday to return to Saigon at once
because of the return of Tri Quang to I Corps. Thi
had earlier told a group of reporters that the sit-
uation in central Vietnam would worsen if he left.
10. There was no reference in support of Thi
personally in today's antigovernment radio broad-
casts in either Hue or Da Nang, nor were there any
anti-American overtones. Buddhist leaders have
previously warned, however, that too strong American.
22 March 166
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
identification with the Ky government could lead to
attacks on the US, and Tam Chau's speech in Saigon
on 19 February contained an ambiguous reference to
the gradual loss of Vietnamese sovereignty. The
embassy has also noted a Saigon student newspaper
recently attacked Ky as an "American stooge" for
permitting himself to be used by the US at Honolulu
and for bowing to alleged US support for the dissi-
dent tribal movement FULRO in II Corps. The embassy
has found this attack disturbing because of the stu-
dent paper's links to II Corps commander General
Loc, so far quiet in the present confrontation.
11. The Saigon regime is holding a meeting of
provincial representatives in the capital from 2
to 25 March to discuss pacification programs.
few representa-
tives of the provinces in the corps are likely to
attend. If, as occurred during a similar meeting
last October, the session becomes a private forum
for criticism of the government's proposed advisory
council, it could also lend weight to the present
Buddhist line.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
Ko chtu
F Onng Van.
z.7 `r
CHINA r 1 Ch,ng Its,
Ban LacN46-?f'-% CHINA
sue.. ! ~'~ ~J?; ao t-a: Cao Bang
Y` t
Bac Can + 1 -.. _._.: ,..e.. ._
% La,I hau It Nmg-mmg
a T,.yen Qaang Lang Son* `?
t
~L
?
?
`
? Phong Saly ?' i Nghea to? Eien Bji- ?. ,s k~%??..~;.
t
eTha, Nguyen ~!..,
I
/ a Phu 7ho Wong Cat
Gen Been Phu
C. Son L:a' s II ; .?B-ac Grang
?huc Yen.
.Bac Ntnh
' _-
. `
?? Son Tay
,.
?'
A
Y
?
NOI....`
en?
uapg
` ?'~ r;aDong N
,./ Hon Gal
??
/
~?^..~ J Hna K nh ? I Goong yIHatphong
`.! Hong Yen- Kiev An
~.~ Phu Lya
?Tha.Bmh
~
""'?` Nam n,nhar
LAOS Samnaua?
?'~ Nmh Binh j
r
? Luang Prabang
? \ _
~"'
Ban CMeng t
Xiang Khouang ? a Cue Boa Phu Q
Yang Vreng
? \
h
im
a.
a Ha Tint,
?
VIENTIAN
~
Norg Kha+
THAILAND
Muang Nalthon Pharrom `s ong Hot
eKi~amr^ouane
Muang Salton Nalkhon !
Ymh Lrnh
y" DEMARCATION LINE
r- i ?Dong Na
Wrione B Ho Su ?Quang T,,
NORTH VIETNAM
?
1
SOUTH
-7
savannather ,
A Huei.
-
e \ VIETNAM
Muang Nong i
LAOS
0 25 SO )SMries
0 21, 50 5 K1lrxnerts --?Saravane
wi..
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
NEWLY CONSTRUCTED ROAD LAOS m CAMBODIA BORDER AREA
SOUTH
VIETNAM
ORDER CROSSING
to-35N 10633E
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Recent photography has identified a new
road linking the Laotian infiltration net with a
newly constructed road segment in Cambodia. The com-
bined road stretches some 100 miles from the south-
ern extension of Route 96 in Laos to Siem Pang and
Route 15 in Cambodia. The road parallels the Se Kong
River and presumably will be used to supplement or
replace the river as a channel for moving supplies.
2. Other recent photography showing motorized
craft and suspected storage areas along the Se Kong
in Laos and Cambodia, appears to substantiate informa-
tion provided by a defector. He
claimed that in September 1965 the Communists con-
structed two small storage areas along the Se Kong in
Laos, and a somewhat larger one on the Cambodian side
of the border. He said that these depots were used
to store rice, dry fish, and clothing which were
smu;filed north on the Se Kong from Siem Pang. The
supplies were then relayed in Laos by bicycle teams
along a newly constructed trail which joined the
Laotian road net southeast of Attopeu. The Commu-
nists apparently upgraded this trail into the motor-
able road which has been recently identified in pho-
tography.
3. Other evidence indicating that there has been
a substantial increase in illicit rice trade between
Cambodia and the Communists
is facing a shortage of rice for export is year.
Although some of the shortage can be attributed to
a below normal rice harvest, it appears quite likely
that Cambodian peasants are selling their rice to
Chinese smugglers for prices higher than that being
offered by the Cambodian Government. Sihanouk has
alluded to this problem in public statements and
Cambodian border forces have been instructed to stop
the movement of rice into South Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
reported seeing some 40-50 trucks moving east on
Route 19 to a point a few miles from the South Viet-
nam border. The trucks, which were owned by local
Chinese businessmen, carried bags of rice. Farther
west, saw a small number of Cambodian
military trucks moving north from Bo Kheo on Route
19 to a village on the Se San River, an area in
which little Cambodian military activity has been
noted heretofore.
ese
sightings may represent a Cambodian military buildup
including the establishment of rice stocks or pos-
sibly preparations for an April visit to the area
to the Viet Conga
did not exclude the possibil-
ity that the Chinese-owned trucks were smuggling rice
by Prince Sihanouk.
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8
T()P.SFF'RF,T
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010011-8