AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 19, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
DIA review(s) completed.
GROUP 1
Excluded from outomatic
downgrading and
declassificai ion
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 0795/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 March 1966
An Appraisal of the Bombing
of North Vietnam*
Since the resumption of air strikes on 31 Jan-
uary, US efforts have been restricted primarily to
armed reconnaissance missions against the transporta-
tion and logistic networks in the southern half of
North Vietnam. It is estimated that the strikes thus
far have had little appreciable effect in reducing
either the capacity of roads leading to Laos or South
Vietnam or the high volume of goods moving into and
through southern North Vietnam. Hanoi has been forced,
however, to expend large quantities of manpower and
materiel to keep lines of communication open. It has
also been forced to revert to nighttime operations in
areas under attack.
There are still no political indications that
Hanoi has given up its determination fully to sup-
port the insurgents in South Vietnam with men and
materiel. There are signs, however, that the cumula-
tive effects of the bombings probably have contributed
to difficulties in implementing and interpreting party
and government directives. Popular morale has not
deteriorated to an extent which would cause the regime
to change its policies.
On the economic side, the renewal of air strikes
has had little adverse effect on the economy as a
whole, primarily because attacks against economically
important targets have been limited and other Commu-
nist countries have greatly increased their assistance
to North Vietnam.
*This memorandum is CIA's issuance of a joint CIA-DIA
study prepared monthly.
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have reverted to night operations and employment
of small convoys in contrast to the full-time op-
erations and large convoys during the pause. Work
groups are being hindered by bombing and strafing,
and are reluctant to work in areas where delayed-
action bombs have been dropped.
4. Rail lines from Hanoi to Thai Nguyen, Dong
Dang and Haiphong continue to be operational. The
Hanoi-Lao Cai line was attacked beginning 3 March
and reports indicate that several bridges were
damaged or destroyed. The Hanoi-Vinh line is prob-
ably operational as far south as Thanh Hoa with
segments south of Thanh Hoa being used by shuttling
and transshipping operations around interdictions.
The 45-mile section between Duc Tho and Tan Ap near
Mu Gia Pass remains in use by shuttling and trans-
shipping around interdictions. Construction is con-
tinuing on a new rail line between the Thai Nguyen
iron and steel complex and Kep, which will serve as
an alternate route to Thai Nguyen and the Hanoi area
in the event that the Hanoi-Dong Dang line were in-
terdicted south of Kep.
5. Strikes against waterways have been con-
centrated generally on routes near the coast and
south of Vinh. Although no JCS inland waterway tar-
gets have been struck since the resumption of the
strikes, attacks on waterway craft are estimated to
have caused minor reductions in the efficiency of
inland waterway transport operations. Although the
port of Ben Thuy was struck twice during this period,
no new significant damage has been noted. A con-
siderable volume of coastal traffic between Haiphong
(and possibly China) and Ben Thuy and other southern
ports has been observed since the beginning of the
year, with the port of Ben Thuy apparently working
at a high level of activity. New orders for barges,
a high level of domestic construction of barges, and
numerous sightings of coastal traffic along the
southern coast of the NVN all tend to indicate that
an effective water supply route links Haiphong with
Military Region IV.
6. Although the strikes have achieved some re-
duction in the capacities of the LOC system and are
making operations more difficult and costly, the
ability of NVN to support activities in Laos and SVN
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with men and materiel at current levels has not been
significantly affected. They have, however, reduced
the capability of North Vietnam to support a sus-
tained overt attack against South Vietnam. To date
the air strikes do not appear to have significantly
affected the morale of the armed forces or to have
reduced their capabilities for operations in North
Vietnam, including air operations.
Political and Public Reactions
7. Political indications from North Vietnam
since the renewal of the bombings on 31 January
point to a continuing determination to support fully
the insurgents in South Vietnam with men and materiel.
On 15 February, for example, Hanoi Radio broadcast a
congratulatory message to the Viet Cong armed forces
on their fifth anniversary which pledged that the
North Vietnamese will continue to "give wholehearted
and all-out support to the revolution in South Viet-
nam in all fields and will stand shoulder to shoulder
with the Viet Cong in fighting against allied forces."
8. The renewal of the US air strikes against
the NVN does not appear to have appreciably disrupted
the NVN leadership's ability to control and command
the war effort either at home or in the South,or to
have raised new issues. There are signs, however,
that the cumulative effects of the bombings probably
have contributed to difficulties in implementing and
interpreting party and government directives related
to the war effort. An example of these difficulties
appeared in an unusually candid article by Politburo
member Le Duc Tho in the party daily of 3 and 4 Feb-
ruary. In reviewing the difficulties encountered by
the North Vietnamese party leadership during the past
year, Tho leveled some serious charges against a
"number of comrades" for failing to follow the Cen-
tral Committee's policies on the war and for failing
"to realize clearly the deceptive peace negotiations
plot of the enemy." Tho failed to threaten any dras-
tic retaliation against these elements--suggesting
that they do not currently pose a threat to the re-
gime. It is probable that the party members under
attack are in the middle-level bureaucracy. Such in-
dividuals have been one main target of similar re-
bukes in the past by Le Duc Tho and other NVN Polit-
buro members.
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9. It appears that the bombing raids have not
caused popular morale to deteriorate to an extent
which would effect a change in the policies of the
regime. Difficulties in the distribution of food
and supplies, as well as problems of dislocation a
Effects on the NVN Economy
10. The renewed air attacks against North Viet-
nam have had little adverse effect on the economy as
a whole. The cumulative economic effects of the air
strikes have not been crippling because (1) bombing
of economically important targets has been limited
and only a few have been put out of operation for
critical lengths of time, (2) the predominance of a
largely self-sufficient subsistence sector which
limits the impact of air attacks, and (3) increasing
assistance from other Communist countries has re-
lieved in part the strains on economic resources.
Strikes beginning on 3 March have halted through
traffic on the Hanoi-Lao Cai railroad line, but the
transportation system elsewhere is functioning at a
relatively high level of activity, aided by repairs
and construction carried out during the bombing lull.
Moreover, steps taken by the NVN leadership give
evidence of their resolve to maintain at least im-
portant lines of communication and a minimum supply
of food and other civilian essentials at the expense
of goods and services not necessary for the support
of the war. Nevertheless, some strains resulting
from the cumulative effects of the bombing still re-
main.
11. The adverse economic effects of the bombing
are evidenced in some, though uneven, decline in
living standards for almost every segment of the
civil population, a disruption of exports, some de-
crease in industrial performance, and problems of
management which have proliferated during the course
of the bombing. About 200,000 workers probably have
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been shifted on a full-time basis into transporta-
tion activities, repair, and reconstruction efforts
during 1965. Additional thousands are impressed for
labor services on a part-time basis and further di-
versions of manpower to these functions are expected.
These and other reallocations of the labor force cur-
rently under way within both industry and agriculture
have caused the regime to term the labor situation as
becoming "critical." Workers in both urban and rural
areas are being mobilized to participate in produc-
tion, repair work, and other tasks, and the labor time
expected of workers in both industry and agriculture
has been lengthened in order to compensate for the
reallocation of manpower. The plans for dispersal
of industry and the farming of marginally productive
land probably will impair the efficiency of both
agricultural and industrial production, and also
will require large expenditures for the physical
transfer of plant and personnel.
12. Direct losses caused by confirmed bomb
damage to economic facilities and equipment are
estimated at approximately $28 million as indi-
cated in the following tabulation:
Million US $
Railroad and Highway Bridges*
Reconstruction
10.3
Temporary Repairs
0.9
Transport Equipment
6.2
Railroad Yards and Ports
0.7
Electric Power Plants
7.8**
Petroleum Storage Facilities
0.7
Manufacturing Facilities
1.2
TOTAL
27.8
* The estimate of damage in this category is incom-
plete because of inadequate post strike photography.
**The difference between the $9.5 million previously
estimated and the current figure is due to a reassess-
ment of the costs of restoring the Uong Bi thermal
power plant.
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Measurable indirect losses amount to about $11 mil-
lion, made up principally of losses of foreign ex-
change earnings of $7.4 million and losses in the
1965 fall rice crop of $3.5 million. The measurable
direct costs of reconstruction, replacement, or re-
pair of damaged facilities represent more than a
quarter of total gross annual investment in industry.
13. Loss of electric generating capacity in
North Vietnam because of bombing amounts to 47,000
kilowatts, about 27 percent of total national gen-
erating capacity. There is a high probability that
the Uong Bi power plant, the most important economic
target struck to date, can be put into partial opera-
tion by mid-1966. At least one of the four boilers
apparently can be salvaged readily and probably two
or more of the four turbogenerators can be made
serviceable in a short time. Attempts will probably
be made to rebuild the Thanh Hoa plant, although it
is unlikely that this plant can be put into partial
operation before mid-1966. No significant progress
has been noted toward restoring four other power
plants south of Hanoi, put of operation by US air
strikes during 1965.
14. The over-all damage to transport equipment
since resumption of the bombing is lower than that
in most months in the latter half of 1965. Imports
and, to a much smaller extent, domestic production
generally have compensated for bomb damage to equip-
ment. There is evidence that imports of equipment--
including freight cars which have been received in
only small numbers in the past--will continue to be
an important source of supply. Moreover, China may
be permitting the NVN to counterbalance the loss of
North Vietnamese rolling stock by the use of Chinese
meter-gauge freight cars from Yunnan Province.
15, Seaborne exports from North Vietnam continue
to show the effects of air strikes. No shipments of
apatite have been detected since early last August.
Shipments of cement in February were the first de-
tected since December, with the decline attributed
primarily to increased North Vietnamese requirements
for repairing bomb damage and for military construc-
tion. The volume of seaborne imports continues at a
high level.
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16. There is no evidence that the resumption
of air strikes against North Vietnam has inflicted
any direct damage to the current winter/spring agri-
cultural crops. Preliminary indications are that the
acreage for the spring rice crop--normally about one
third of the annual harvest--may be down. A NVN of-
ficial has stated that only 700,000 hectares of a
total of about 900,000 had been transplanted and
that nearly half of the 700,000 had been too hastily
transplanted. This poor showing is at least partly
attributable to shortages of manpower and other
management problems caused by the air war.
I
ANEGRET
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RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS a/ THRU 13 MARCH 1966
TARGETS
% of
STRUCK
NAT'L CAPACITY
No. AT- S
c/
TRIKE
DE-
IN-
No.
% b/
TACKS S
ORTIES
STROYED
ACTIVE
BARRACKS 4
AMMO DEPOTS 1
POL STORAGE
SUPPLY DEPOTS 1
POWER PLANTS
MARITIME PORTS
RR YARDS
EXPLOSIVE PLANT
AIRFIELDS
NAVAL BASES
BRIDGES 4
COMMO INSTALL
RADAR SITES 13
SAM SITES 24
LOCKS & DAMS 1
FERRIES
4
3
4
8
6
4
1
1
4
2
2
2
23.0
75.7
19.0
19.0
27.5
12.0
7.0
100
184
51
9
45
22
15
4
3
12
13
d/
105-
2
54
29
2412
1143
128
585
231
193
33
28
359
176
1955
15
371
233
13.65
32.84
17.20
9.96
27.50
5.70
7.50
70.00
15.12
71.20
00.00
6.25
TO
A
Results e7-
T
L SORTIES
Destroyed Dama
ed
A
g
AG
INST FIXED TARGETS: 7,916 Ves
sel
535
ARMED RECCE SORTIES
19
747
s
981
:
,
TOTAL OF ALL SORTIES
Vehicles
520
610
EXCEPT SUPPORT : 27,663
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will
be refined as more accurate information becomes available.
b/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
Strike plus flak suppression sorties.
d/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
e; Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, at-
tacked and road and rail cuts made.
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