LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010066-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: March 15, 1966
• Content Type: IM

15 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
OCI No. 1159/66
Copy No. ,
LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENTS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
Approved For Release 2004/07446r-;r 9tA RC3R7-9T00826A0004000100
A-31-1d U-EVET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
pwngrading and
6'Jdeclossification
 Approved Foriease 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826rW00400010066-9
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010066-9
 Approyad-E
-10 Gasp 9004 fU _RnWrW7910089cAQ00400 10066-9
OCI No. 1159/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
15 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Latin American Communist Developments
25X1
1. A number of Latin American Communist parties
and allied leftist-extremist groups are entering a
period of ideological ferment and change. The search
is on for new answers to the perennial question of the
means to power. The debate is uneven and far from
ended. However, developments to date appear to portend
additional problems for US national security interests
in the hemisphere.
2. Various factors have contributed to disorgan-
ize several key Latin American parties and groups.
The endemic problem of "personalismo"--squabbles based
on personal rivalries--has been joined by deepening
ideological and tactical dispute over the best way of
promoting revolution. The Russians have tried to
strengthen Moscow's influence within the far left and
effect a "unified" position among the Communist parties.
Finally, the Cubans have proved more choosy in assist-
ing Latin American revolutionary groups, generally aid-
ing only those few endorsed by the pro-Moscow Commu-
nist parties.
3. Several key Communist parties and groups are
facing divisions along pro-Moscow and pro-Peking lines.
The pro-Peking splinter groups are still numerically
small in most countries, but there is growing dissatis-
faction among younger party elements with the tactics
of the old-guard party leadership. The leaders of the
orthodox parties generally are old-line labor types,
55 to 65 years of age 'and strongly opposed to armed
struggle methods. They believe--with justification--
that sporadic terrorism will only lead to government
App
25X1
 25X1
25X1
25X'
Appro
reprisals against the party, regardless of whether
its members are involved. These leaders, with So-
viet approval, have long advocated political action
tactics through the labor unions and the multiparty
"front." The young "firebrands," on the other hand,
are eager for revolutionary action.
4. In the early 1960s, Castro's revolution and
the contagion of the "Cuban example" seriously chal-
lenged the old-guard Communists' tactics and inspired
young militants throughout the hemisphere. Moreover,
the Cubans frequently sidestepped the local parties
to establish and fund local groups more willing to
follow along their bath. This effort renrhed n npnk
25X1
Approved For Release 20 fTLpC&lf I1P79TOO826A000400010066-9
25X1
 Approy
25X1
7. The Cubans, moreover, by comparison with
1961-1963, have considerably narrowed the scope of
their subversive activities. Their total effort in
this regard has lessened, presumably as a result of
Castro's own awareness that "new Cubas" are not
imminent, and his realization that solving Cuba's
internal economic and political problems must be the
regime's first order of business. In addition, Mos-
cow has apparently urged the Cubans to be more cau-
tious and to cooperate more fully with the local
Communist parties.
8. At present, many Communist parties and al-
lied groups are searching for programs which would
serve to heal schisms, restore an element of revolu-
tionary fervor, and improve their chances for polit-
ical power without undue risk. For the short run,
this quest will cause increased strains in certain
countries. Significant pro-Peking party factions al-
ready have emerged in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia,
Bolivia, and Argentina. The failure of the other
parties to take to the streets may well cause similar
divisions elsewhere.
25X1
25X1
Approve or Release 010066-9
 25X1
Approy
25X1
11. A series of articles which appeared in
Soviet publications in 1965 probably were designed to
give ideological guidance to the Communist parties in
Latin America. The 17 May Soviet weekly, New Times,
for example, advocated the establishment of broader
united fronts, including the "liberal bourgeoisie,"
in Latin America. Writing with the events of the
Dominican Republic in mind, the author stated: "If
the Cuban revolution ushered in an age of peoples'
democratic, socialist revolutions in the Western
Hemisphere, the present developments in Dominica are
the beginning of a new period, in which the conditions
are being created for broad national anti-imperialist
fronts to resist North American imperialism and pro-
tect the sovereignty of nations and their right to
follow their own chosen paths." Clearly he was
advising the Latin American Communists to exploit the
rising anti-US nationalism prevailing in many of the
parties of the non-Communist left.
25X1
25X1
Apptl
 25X1
25X1
Approv A C-4,0 T Wipasp 20 C-R&TP7qTnnR?c&mnn 00010066-9
13. A series of articles by Latin American Com-
munist spokesmen in the August issue of Problems of
Peace and Socialism reiterated the same theme. The
common denominator of these articles was that a "broad
united opposition front," including possibly members
of the oligarchy but aimed at incorporating as much of
the population as possible, was needed for either a
peaceful or nonpeaceful struggle. A Costa Rican Com-
munist leader, Eduardo Mora Valverde, wrote that full-
scale Communist revolutions were not the immediate
task in Latin America. Rather, the area's Communists
were advised to pin their hopes on the "anti-imperial-
ist and democratic revolution," a coalition of all
political groups seeking revolutionary change. A
Brazilian Communist, Pedro Motta Lima, wrote that the
Latin American Communists must be capable of "uniting
and mobilizing a broad front of social and political
forces." Other authors argued in a similar vein.
14. All this does not mean Havana and Moscow are
consigning armed struggle to the -proverbial "trash
heap of history."
I It
oes indicate, owever, a e communists nave
recognized the potential of "new Dominican Republics."
Sharp, spontaneous non-Communist revolts against the
old order which could provoke a sudden collapse of the
traditional societal and governmental bulwarks are a
very distinct possibility in a number of countries.
Haiti, Guatemala, and Colombia are but three examples
of countries with exceedingly shaky political struc-
tures. Should revolt come, the Communists presumably
would repeat the strategy they followed in the Do-
minican Republic, i.e., latch on to a genuine popular
uprising in hopes of eventually dominating it.
15. In summary, the Communists are developing
contingencies for future popular non-Communist revolu-
tions in Latin America. They are prepared to employ
rather flexible tactics to gain a share of the power
in the confused aftermath of such revolts. In the
interim, Moscow and Havana probably will assist those
pro-Soviet parties which favor armed struggle, par-
ticularly if more militant organizations are seriously
challenging these parties for membership and popular
25X1
Appr - 010066-9
25X1
 Approve.; zelea '""~' 8'F?'17Q_T99826 nnG4GGg10066-9
following. In most cases, however, Moscow will en-
courage the peaceful action "united front" methods
which promise a greater chance of furthering Soviet
interests. Elsewhere, for instance in Venezuela,
the Communists are advocating both armed struggle and
"mass political action" tactics.
25X1
Approv 0010066-9
 Approved For, wease 2004/&BC-IMWDP79T0082SM00400010066-9
Approved For Release 200461 1 jDP79T00826A000400010066-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010066-9
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010066-9