THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS ISSUE IN VIETNAM FROM 1954 TO 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 25, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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25 February 1966
The National Elections Issue
In Vietnam From 1954 to 1960
Summary
Although the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva
Agreements called for the conduct of "general elec-
tions" throughout Vietnam in July 1956 in order to
determine the "national will" on reunification of
the country, such elections were never held. The
failure to carry them out can be attributed both to
the fact that the Hanoi regime almost certainly
would not have permitted genuinely free elections
to be held in the North, and to the fear of the Diem
government in Saigon that it would be outvoted in
the South by the Communists.
There is plentiful evidence that, whenever Com-
munist interests in the North were at stake, Hanoi
acted to impede and restrict the work of the Inter-
national Control Commission set up to supervise the
implementation of the Geneva agreements. It seems
certain, therefore, that the commission would not
have been able to intervene effectively to guarantee
that the North Vietnamese populace could vote freely
in a national election. Hanoi's position on the
elections issue was also bolstered by the fact that
Ho Chi Minh was a national hero who would probably
have gained more votes in the South than any rival
candidate.
Even while they were confidently pressing for
national elections, the North Vietnamese were working
covertly to subvert the government in South Vietnam.
When their low-level subversion policy failed, the
North Vietnamese ordered a full-scale guerrilla war
in South Vietnam, and proceeded with the establish-
ment of a new Communist front organization for the
South. Hanoi subsequently dropped its proposals for
national elections, and concentrated instead on de-
mands for elections in the South. It insisted, how-
ever, that these elections should be held under the
auspices of the Communist front for South Vietnam.
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1. From the outset, the government under Premier
Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam refused to comply with
North Vietnamese demands that the "preparatory consulta-
tions" on the general elections in Vietnam be held. Ac-
cording to the Geneva agreements, these consultations
were to begin on 20 July 1955, Diem based his refusal
in part on the implicit evidence that Hanoi would never
allow the International Control Commission (ICC)-) set up
for Vietnam under the Geneva Accords, to have a completely
unrestricted hand in supervising and guaranteeing the
freedom of voting in the North. Although North Vietnam-
ese propaganda maintained that Hanoi was willing to go
ahead with the elections under ICC supervision, there
was plentiful evidence by mid-1955 that the North Viet-
namese were impeding and restricting ICC activity whenever
it threatened Communist interests.
2. In June of 1955, for example, Hanoi blocked the
ICC attempts to inspect cargo brought-ashore from ocean-
oin ships into Haiphong harbor.
n a e , th-e-Com-'
mission had requested permission to make an inspection
survey of entry.-points along the border. Although Hanoi
granted permission, it required the inspection team to
travel to the area by motor vehicle and not by aircraft.
In this manner it assured lengthy advance warning of the
'
team
s arrival at border transshipment points
3. Apart from the restrictions on the ICC, there
was other evidence available to the Diem government in-
dicating that the Comminists in the North were intimidat-
ing and using force on the populace in a manner which
would prevent them from voting as free men in any national
election., The Hanoi regime, for example, had repeatedly
violated Article 14 of the Geneva cease-fire agreement
which,guarant.eed civilians the right to move freely from
one zone to another until the repatriation of military
forces in Vietnam was completed. There were numerous eye-
witness accounts of roadblocks in the North set up against
the movement to the South of both refugees and soldiers.
Refugees were also barred frequently from transportation
to the South and economic penalties were levied on many
of those whose departure was approved.
SE,
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4. From Hanoi's standpoint, there was every-
thing to be gained in going ahead with the proposed
national elections. Its own organs of control were
strong enough to ensure that the overwhelming major-
ity of the people in the North would vote as dictated
by the Communists. While Hanoi would almost certainly
have blocked the ICC from any true and effective
supervision, it probably could, for propaganda pur-
poses, have safely allowed the commission some token
participation in overseeing the vote, just as it al-
lowed the ICC to go through the motions in supervis-
ing the importation of bloc goods to the DRV. The
fact that the population in North Vietnam totaled
some three million more than in the South also con-
tributed to Hanoi's confidence in pressing for elec-
tions, since it was assumed that any decision on uni-
fication would be based on a majority of the total
vote.
5. The North Vietnamese position was also
bolstered by the fact that in Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi
had a national hero who would probably have gained
more votes in South Vietnam than any rival candidate.
Vietnamese in both the North and South considered
Ho as the leader of the anti-French resistance move-
ment. The Communists, moreover, represented the only
well-organized national political force in Vietnam.
Most of the other political elements in the South
were squabbling bitterly among themselves and it
seemed unlikely that they would be able to unite in
opposition to the Communists. E_ I
eneva Conference had hardly
terminated before Hanoi had issued new strategy
directives to Communist components in the South
guiding them on how to take advantage of the situa-
tion and contribute to a Communist electoral vic-
tory in the South.
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instructed that Hanoi's strategy envisioned the
"exact execution" of the Geneva Accords, no doubt
because the Communists believed at the time that
they could take over through the elections.
7. According to the document, all activity
was to be directed at ensuring that the French and
other Western elements left South Vietnam "within
the next two years." The provincial committees
were warned against putsch-type actions and told
that "later on, when the Geneva Accord is on the
point of fulfillment, we will fight more openly for
more speedy fulfillment. We will gain nothing by
being impatient or overbold." Each member of the
party, said the document, "must be given a new re-
sponsibility applicable to the present situation."
He should become "secretly the basic element" in
some popular or governmental organization so as
to be "ready for the fight" when the time is ripe
for a Communist take-over. The document noted that,
while the previous aim had been to "destroy" the
governmental apparatus in South Vietnam, "until the
general elections" it would be necessary to coop-
erate with the government, being careful to use it
"for our own advantage." The document stressed the
importance of confidence "in the party and President
Ho Chi Minh."
8. The North Vietnamese also moved during the
period 1954-56 to reorganize and strengthen the Com-
munist party central apparatus in South Vietnam.
said, the party leaders in North Vietnam had se
up a branch office in the South called the "Office
of the Central Committee for South Vietnam" which
was directed by several present-day members of Hanoi's
politburo.
9. After the armistice in 1954, the authority
of the branch central office in the South was
strengthened to enable it to deal more effectively
with the situation created by the political separa-
tion of North and South Vietnam. The Communist
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apparatus in the South, however, still remained ef-
fectively, under the over-all direction of Hanoi.
10. It was clear that the party leaders in the
South were still the hand-picked associates of those
in the North. There is considerable
example,
that the present party first secretary
in Hanoi, Le Duan, was at the head of the party ap-
paratus in the South from at least 1954 to 1956.
He was first identified as a member of the party
hierarchy in North Vietnam in late 1957.
11. During this period, Hanoi tried repeatedly
by both diplomatic and propaganda means to pressure the
Diem government into holding the general elections.
In August, 1955,the North Vietnamese Foreign Minis-
try appealed to the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union as the Geneva co-chairmen to use their author-
ity to bring about the elections. Moscow supported
the North Vietnamese plea, but the United States
backed Diem's stand that there was no prospect of
free elections in North Vietnam. Secretary of State
Dulles at a press conference on 30 August 1955 stated
that "we certainly agree (with Diem) that conditions
are not ripe for elections. We see no reason to
oppose having elections if there can be produced
conditions of genuine freedom."
12. During this period Diem was having some
success in strengthening his government's position
in South Vietnam. In October of 1955, Diem spon-
sored a referendum in the South on the question of
whether the people preferred a republic under him-
self or a monarchy under Bao Dai. The results
showed Diem a clear winner, and he then became
president of the Republic of Vietnam.
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13. By 1956, Hanoi appears to have realized
that the national, elections could not be held as
scheduled. The North Vietnamese apparently be-
lieved, however, that Diem's regime would fall
eventually and that a government more amenable
to Communist demands would take over. Thus, the
North Vietnamese continued to carry the propaganda
offensive to the South by publicly proposing a
series of schemes during 1957 and 1958 which they
claimed would lead to general elections. One such
scheme called for an "early meeting" between north-
ern and southern representatives to discuss a bi-
lateral armed forces cut and a trade exchange be-
tween the two zones. Hanoi also offered to discuss
the "free" movement of people across the demili-
tarized zone, as well as the free exchange of mail.
The Change in Hanoi's Strategy
14. Saigon's success by late 1958 in over"
coming many of its difficulties and setting itself
on a relatively stable and firm footing appears to
have caused great distress in Hanoi. Le Duan is
reported to have recommended to the politburo that
a full-scale guerrilla war be instituted in the
South to overcome the Diem government. Although
it is not clear whether the politburo-fully ap-
proved such a move at the time, it apparently did
not decide on a step-up in terrorist action in the
South. By mid-1959, Communist terrorist activities
were.posing a serious security problem in the prov-
inces south of Saigon. In July alone there were
131 assassinations and 70 kidnapings of civilians.
Some 351 other "clashes" with Communist guerrillas
were reported, an increase of 80 over the previous
month.
15. Hanoi also began the systematic training
of military personnel for infiltration to South
Vietnam in 1959. An infiltrator captured in Quang
Nam Province in 1960 stated that he had begun his
training in the North the preceding July, having
been assigned to the duty. from an infantry billet
in the North Vietnamese regular army. He began his
trek south in August of 1959.
16. During 1960, North Vietnamese leaders began
to call publicly for the inauguration of full-scale
insurgency in South Vietnam. Politburo member
Nguyen Chi Thanh, for example, writing in the August
IS-EGRET
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issue of Hoc Tap, the official party journal in the
North, put guerrilla warfare in the context of a
Communist holy war. Extoling violence as a tech-
nique for achieving power in Vietnam, Thanh called
specifically for the development of guerrilla forces
in the South. Several prisoners of war have reported
that Thanh is presently in the South directing the
Communist insurgency. He has not appeared publicly
in North Vietnam since late 1964.
17. The political aspects of the North Viet-
namese plan to topple the Diem government were de-
scribed in early September of 1960 at the North Viet-
namese third party congress. Party secretary Le
Duan called for a "broad united front"'to be'formed
in the South. This front, he said, would be under
the "leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party" in
South Vietnam and would "unite" all the people
against the government.
18. The Ho Chi Minh - led Communists in Indo-
china have persistently operated under the cover of
a large "front" movement. In 1946, they formed the
Lien Viet, or Vietnam United Front, to conceal
Communist direction of the war against France. When
the struggle shifted to South Vietnam following the
Geneva agreements., the North Vietnamese organized
the Vietnam Fatherland Front to garner support for
the "reunification" of Vietnam. However, this orga-
nization, headquartered in North Vietnam, had little
success in securing public backing in the South. It
was with this situation in mind, apparently, that
Le Duan called for a new front apparatus in 1960.
Establishment of a New Front
19. The abortive coup against the Diem regime
in November 1960 provided the final impetus for the
extablishment of the new front. Reports indicate
that the Communists believed a new mass organi-
zation was necessary in order to mobilize large
numbers of people and take advantage of any future
coup in Saigon. The insurgents in the South announced
the establishment of the new "National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam" (NFLSV) on 20 December
1960. To sustain the fiction that the NFLSV was
the product of an indigenous band of patriots in the
South, Hanoi itself gave no publicity to the new orga-
nization until January 1961.
I
INEGRET
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20. The hand of the North Vietnamese Communists,
however, was clearly evident in the organization of
the Front. The manifesto of the NFLSV was first aired
in a Hanoi radio broadcast. The next time it was
broadcast from Hanoi a few days later, the manifesto
contained several significant changes. These changes
appear to have eliminated material which the DRV, on
second thought, believed would tend to undercut po-
tential support for the Front in South Vietnam. Some
passages which suggested Communist origin or ambi-
tions were altered or deleted. The term "agrarian
reform,` for example, was dropped. Vicious and
bloody excesses had been carried out under this
slogan in North Vietnam, and had caused widespread
revulsion in the South.
21. In its final version, the manifesto bore
a remarkable similarity to Le Duan's speech before
the party congress in Hanoi, even using his words
to describe some of the Front's aims. In estab-
lishing a series of broad, general objectives which
could be accepted by the majority of people in South
Vietnam, the manifesto followed the strategy the
North Vietnamese Minister of Defense, Vo Nguyen Giap,
set forth in his treatise on revolution in Vietnam,
"People's War, People's Army," written in 1961.
Subsequent Policy on Elections
22. After the formation of the NFLSV, North
Vietnamese propaganda dropped its proposals for
nationwide elections and, instead, began to concen-
trate on demands for free, general elections in
South Vietnam alone. These demands were played
cautiously, however, apparently because the Commu-
nists were no longer confident of victory if gen-
uinely free elections were held.
23. The Liberation Front manifesto called for
the "formation" of a "broad, national, democratic
coalition government," to replace the Diem regime.
Elections were only called for in regard to a new
National Assembly in the South to be voted in through
"universal suffrage." Both the Front and Hanoi have
also made it clear since the NFLSV's formation that
any "free" elections to be held in South Vietnam must
be held under the auspices of the Front, and that the
Front will not allow "foreign interference."
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