ROLE OF TOLUBKO IN THE SHELEPIN DELEGATION.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010034-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 7, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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Please rckrn to
Presentation Staff
7 January 1966
OCI No. 0755/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
ROLE OF TOLUBKO IN THE SHELEPIN DELEGATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA review(s) completed.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This Document contains information affeclhig the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the niean-
in of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person i~, prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form L' prohibited.
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OCI No. 0755/66
SUBJECT: Role of Tolubko in the Shelepin Delegation
1. Col. Gen. Tolubko, a member of Shelepin's
delegation to Hanoi, has since May 1960 held the post
of First Deputy Commander of the Strategic Rocket
Forces. His presence on the delegation could be in-
tended to suggest to the US that offensive missiles
are slated to be introduced into North Vietnam.
2. It may be that Tolubko will brief the North
Vietnamese on Soviet and American missile strength,
and explain to the North Vietnamese why offensive
missiles--which Hanoi may have requested--would not
prove useful in the Vietnamese war. He could then
return home hoping to have alarmed the US and thereby
apply a check to further escalation. This may be the
chief reason he was included, but his presence raises
the possibility that the Soviet Union proposes, in
the face of obvious risks and military limitations,
to deploy to the DRV surface-to-surface missiles.
3. Damage to the DRV has thus far been limited
more by US policy restraints than by Soviet-supplied
air defense assistance. The DRV may feel that only
a credible threat of retaliation against targets in
South Vietnam would avert a further escalation of US
attacks, that the way to save Phuc Yen and Hanoi is
to threaten Da Nang and Saigon.
4. The Soviets have strong reasons for wanting
to give extra help to the DRV at this time. Vietnam
has become a critical issue in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. The Soviets have been working hard to estab-
lish their influence in Hanoi. They might calculate
that this new and dramatic form of aid would suffi-
ciently strengthen their position so that Hanoi could
be induced to disregard contrary Chinese advice and
move toward negotiations on ending the war.
5. Transit rights across China would be required
unless the USSR were willing to risk a repetition of
the Cuban quarantine by attempting sea movement. The
SECRET
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transport requirement would be extensive, involving
not only missiles and their associated equipment, but
Soviet missile troops and additional SAM equipment to
defend the sites. The Soviets probably would see a
good chance that China would refuse passage, confirm-
ing Soviet claims that they were willing to go to great
lengths in support of North Vietnam but were blocked
by Chinese obstructionism.
6. If, on the other hand, the Chinese agreed, the
Soviets must consider that the US would eventually be-
come aware that the USSR had deployed offensive missile
units in North Vietnam. The US could not be sure that
nuclear warheads had not been provided. But even with
conventional warheads, the US would be conscious of a
much deeper Soviet involvement.
7. There are potent negative arguments against
the conjecture that the Soviets might adopt such a
course of action. Moscow would have to recognize a
considerable chance that the US would attack Soviet
units in the DRV. And it lacks any ready response
which would be both appropriate and limited. Without
nuclear warheads, even a large number of missiles
could not inflict serious damage on South Vietnam.
But the sites would be vulnerable to detection and
attack, and the USSR could not expect them to survive
for long if they became involved in an exchange.
8. The Soviet leaders have left the clear im-
pression that they have a realistic appreciation of
the seriousness of US commitments in Vietnam and of
the risks posed by a more direct and obvious Soviet
involvement. The Soviet role to date has been marked
by a concern with limiting the boundaries of Soviet
assistance to the DRV and a determination to avoid
any direct confrontation with the US. The Soviets
have indicated that they are apprehensive over pol-
icies of the current US administration and the long-
range implications for the USSR.
9. A more routine explanation can be offered
for the inclusion of Tolubko in Shelepin's delega-
tion. Tolubko's presence may merely be window-
dressing. There is clearly a place for a top Soviet
military official on any high level delegation to
the DRV. Last February Air Marshal Vershinin,
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CVG
commander of the Soviet Air Force, accompanied Kosygin
to Hanoi. The Kosygin mission did not lead to any
significant commitment of Russian air force units in
Vietnam. Tolubko may have been selected primarily to
draw special attention to the Soviet strategic rocket
forces and to underscore Moscow's contention that the
defense of the Communist bloc essentially depends on
the USSR's power. This line is aimed as much at Peking
as at Washington and the Soviet leaders have demon-
strated that they consider it an effective tool in the
context of intensive Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence
and credit both in Hanoi and throughout the Commu-
nist movement.
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7 January 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Earle Wheeler
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
,I'ss you know, a senior officer of the Soviet Strategic
Rocket Forces has been announced as a member of
,ihelepiin's mission to Hanoi. My people have prepared,
jointly with DIA, an assessment of what this might mean,
which I have attached for your use.
. F. R-4 BORN
WFR /mfb
Identical letters to:
McGeorge Bundy //
Secretary of State
Amb. L. Thompson V
DepSecDef Vance
Secretary of Defense J
icc - DCI official chrono - no attch.
icc - DCI Defense file w/cy attch.
icc - DCI State file - no attch
icc - DCI White Hs. file w/cy attch
icc - DCI JCS file - no attch
icc - ER w/cy basic
cc/- OCI via DDI - no attch.
Attachment is OCI 0755/66 dtd 7Jan66
"Role of Tolubko in the Shelepin
Delegation"
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