THE CHANGED POLITICAL SCENE IN INDONESIA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 3, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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3 JANUARY 1966
OCI No. 0481/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE CHANGED POLITICAL SCENE IN INDONESIA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
State Dept. review completed
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ins Document contains information affecti ? the Na-
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OCI No. 0481/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
3 January 1.966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Changed Political Scene in Indonesia
Summary
1. It is now apparent that the abortive coup
of 1 October has brought Indonesia to a major turn-
ing point in its history. The era of Sukarno's
dominance has ended. Sukarno's power had been based
first on his personality and his great prestige as
the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism, and second
on his ability to play off against one another Indo-
nesia's major power factors, in recent years prima-
rily the Indonesian Communist Party and the army.
In the last three months his prestige has been seri-
ously eroded; he is less the father and political
hub of the country and more the petulant old man,
More important, the political. balance has been sig-
nificantly changed: the army has virtually destroyed
the PKI. The political upheaval has not solved any
of Indonesia's basic problems, however, and the
army's ability to deal. with them cannot be rated
very high on the basis of past performance.
Introduction
2. President Sukarno has been. the focal point
of Indonesia for the 20 years that followed the coun-
try's declaration of independence from the Dutch in
1945. As he moved politically, he carried the entire
national structure with him, Moving consistently to
the left, he encouraged the growth of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI), By identifying itself with
Sukarno and by securing his tolerance, and later,
support, the PKI: grew from a discredited minority
party to the most powerful civilian organization in
the country, In 1965 it claimed three million mem-
bers and the support of some 15 million more persons
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in its front groups. The only body which had the
capability and inclination to check the Communists
was the army. Army leaders, although personally
anti-Communist, were also loyal to Sukarno and re-
luctantly followed him in his leftist course. Over
the years, their hope of changing political trends
in Indonesia lay in the possibility that the PKI
might challenge Sukarno or the state in such a way
that they could take retaliatory action.
3. By September 1.965, the way appeared clear
for phased Communist accession to power with Sukarno's
approval. The political atmosphere was one of leftist
totalitarianism. Moderate civilian elements were
largely paralyzed and discredited. Opportunistic non-
Communists, of whom the most notable was Foreign Min-
ister Subandrio, feverishly curried Communist favor.
Army leaders mouthed Sukarno's extreme nationalist
and pro-Communist line but put up some resistance to
the President's and the PKI's efforts to increase
Communist influence within the army itself. The
army, however, appeared to be losing the battle.
The Coup Attempt
4. This situation was almost completely reversed
however, by the army's prompt and forceful reaction
to the coup attempt which took place on 1 October.
The coup, promoted by a group that called itself the
"30 September movement," involved Communist elements
and may have been master-minded by the party. The
facts behind the coup--which took the lives of six
top army generals--are not fully known, but the army
has promoted the explanation that the coup was a Com-
munist attempt to overthrow the state, and on this
basis has ruthlessly persecuted party leaders and
members.
5. The army leaders are convinced that Sukarno
himself was deeply involved in the coup, and their
previous loyalty to him has given way to active dis-
trust. Although clearly in the political ascendency,
they have nevertheless refrained from publicly impli-
cating the President in the 30 September movement and
have made no effort to remove him from office. Sukarno,
for his part, has reluctantly agreed to the prosecution
of coup elements, but he continues to parry army de-
mands that he ban the PKI.
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The Army's
Widening Role
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6. The military, and the army in particular,
have clearly emerged as the most powerful force in
Indonesia. Whether or not the surviving army leaders
foresaw the consequences of the coup and of their
response to it, the logic of the situation has thrust
the military into an ever more predominant position.
Sukarno's refusal. to cooperate fully with the army
and his constant but ineffective criticism may well
have forced it to assume a broader role simply to
protect itself from a possible counter-attack. Some
sort of fuzzy Javanese-style compromise between the
military and the President is still possible, but
it daily becomes less likely. Indeed, the army, as
it grasps the reins of power more firmly, may no
longer feel the need for compromise. Nor does the
military seem disposed to abdicate its present power
in favor of the traditional political parties. It
has used anti-Communist political elements to further
its own ends but thus far has refrained from treat-
ing these groups as its equal. The army, like
Sukarno, has over the years shown considerable dis-
trust and contempt for the often quarrelsome and
ineffectual traditional politicians.
7. In the past month especially, the army has
thrust itself into a widening range of governmental
activities. Defense Minister Nasution and Army Chief
Suharto have been, speaking authoritatively on a great
variety of subjects, some having only the most tenuous
connection with military or security affairs. After
initial hesitation, the army forced a reorganization
of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI), which now has
responsibility in nearly all phases of Indonesian polit-
ical life and appears to be emerging as a kind of "super
cabinet." The army dominates this organization as it
is now constituted. The military is also maintaining
close control over the Indonesian information media.
8. The other branches of the armed services have
fallen in step with the army. The navy has given whole-
hearted support to the army's initiatives from the be-
ginning. Although air force elements--in particular the
former commander, Dani--were implicated in the insurrec-
tion, this service is now acting vigorously to weed out
PKI suspects from its rank The new air force com-
mander, Muljano Herlambang
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I mnow appears to be cooperating closely
witft Generals Nasution and Suharto in this connection
and has made suitable anti-PKI noises in recent weeks.
In these circumstances Sukarno has had little opportunity
to employ the tactic of divide and rule--a device he has
often used in the past to keep the military subservient
to his will.
9. The danger of a PKI. take over in Indonesia has
been dissipated, probably for many years. The party as
it has existed in the recent past is a spent political
force. Nearly every member of the PKI Politburo has
been arrested; many have already been executed, includ-
ing the three top party leaders, Aidit, Lukman, and
Njoto. The party's communications have been effectively
disrupted, and outlying PKI branches, lacking direction
from the center, have been forced to fend for themselves.
The party's mass organizations have been paralyzed and
virtually put out of business.
10. Although the PKI has not been banned throughout
Indonesia, this action, for immediate practical purposes,
would be largely a formality. Army commanders have on
their own initiative outlawed the party in more than
half the country's provinces. Although for the moment,
the PKI clandestine apparatus is largely leaderless, it
probably retains the capacity for at least limited sab-
otage. However, the army no longer fears full-scale
PKI insurgency. Repression of the PKI has led to large-
scale defections from the party, and these are likely
to continue. In addition, the slaughter of PKI members
and sympathizers in. North Sumatra, East and Central Java,
and Bali is continuing,
11. Nevertheless, Marxist and specifically Commu-
nist ideas still have some currency in Indonesia. A
rapid shift away from the jargon and many of the atti-
tudes of the past several years is not likely. Despite
President Sukarno's repeated assertion that "Indonesia
cannot exist without Communism," however, the army has
made it clear that it will not brook the establishment
of a new party replacing the PKI in all but name. In
the short run, at least, the military should be able
to make this decision stick.
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12. The PKI now appears to have no future except
as a lean, highly revolutionary clandestine party along
lines frequently advocated by Peking. But a clandestine
party whose hand is set against the existing regime is
one that any government, even one espousing principles
not dissimilar to those of Yugoslavia, must perforce
suppress as thoroughly as possible. In this respect,
Egypt and Syria offer interesting examples. A deep
antagonism between the remnants of the PKI and the Army-
led Indonesian Government for the foreseeable future
therefore seems inevitable,
Sukarno's Present Status
13. As the power of the army has grown, that of
Sukarno has declined. Once the unchallenged master of
Indonesian affairs, the President now finds himself
increasingly shunted aside. His advice is being ignored;
his statements appear to have no effect on the course
of events. His remarks are heavily edited and sometimes
distorted in the army-controlled press; the Indonesian
radio has on occasion seen fit not to broadcast even an
abbreviated version of his speeches. The speeches
themselves, the US Embassy reports, appear to have little
impact
on
his audiences. The President often sounds
shrill
and
petulant, and he seems increasingly out of
touch
with
political reality. He appears unable effec-
tively
to
protect his political friends.
1.4. Sukarno, of course, is still trying to keep
the KOM in NASAKOM, his acronym for nationalism, reli-
gion, and Communism, the "pillars" of the Indonesian
revolution. However, there seems little chance that he
will be able either to save the present PKI or to resur-
rect the party under another name in the near future.
The President is fearful that with the demise of the
PKI the leftward course of "his" revolution will be
slowed or reversed. But the destruction of the PKI has
also meant the dissolution of the most disciplined,
dynamic and tightly organized party in Indonesia, and
this in itself distresses Sukarno. The President--him-
self unaffiliated with any political organization--no
longer has at his disposal a mass party to support all
his ideas and theories, and there is no longer an impor-
tant political force available for him to balance off
against the army.
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15. These developments not only have greatly
reduced Sukarno's political leverage; they also appear
to have had an, effect on the President's frame of mind.
His frequent displays of pique seem to reflect a growing
loss of self-confidence. By objective standards Sukarno
has been reduced to a position that is scarcely more than
a figurehead chief of state. General Suharto--whom
Sukarno himself now calls "caretaker of the Indonesian
situation"--apparently has gained a degree of personal
ascendency over the President and can frequently secure
Sukarno's acquiescence to army measures on a wide range
of subjects. Sukarno's only initiative in recent weeks
has been the revaluation of the Indonesian currency--a
move taken over army objections but one that will prob-
ably have relatively little effect on the economy and
is not likely to help the President politically.
Sukarno's Future
16. Sukarno's demonstrated ability to accommodate
himself to changed political circumstances may again
assert itself, but, for the moment at least, the Presi-
dent has lost his political touch. Furthermore, as
evidence of Sukarno's political deterioration increases,
opportunistic Indonesian politicians will feel they have
correspondingly less to gain by associating themselves
closely with him.
17. Many of the President's political supporters
already seem to be fading from the political picture.
It is probably only a matter of time until Subandrio
is completely eased out of office. A rumored govern-
mental reoganizat:ion may remove other prominent figures
who have long been close to Sukarno. Minister for
People's Relations :Ruslan Abd.ulgan.i has been given a
major position in the reorganized KOTI, but--always an
opportunist--he now appears willing to work closely
with the army, Third Deputy Premier Chaerul Saleh is
also still active, but he too appears anxious to ingra-
tiate himself with the military and has recently been
making statements similar in content 'to those of Nasution
and Suharto.
18. The President probably has relatively little
time left in which he can work the political magic that
over the years kept him at the center of Indonesian
affairs. His health is failing. There are also per-
sistent rumors that Sukarno will be entirely "removed
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from the scene" shortly after the first of the year.
Many senior army officers believe Sukarno was deeply
implicated in the coup attempt. Some--said to include
Suharto--seem to have little respect left for the Presi-
dent and possibly would be happy to see him removed
from office. However, the gradual reduction of the
Presidency to a ceremonial office seems a more likely
possibility. This would probably develop from the
practical power situation rather than through a legal
reorganization. Most military leaders believe that the
President is still helpful to them as a symbol of Indo-
nesian unity and of the legitimacy of the new political
order, Furthermore, a direct move against Sukarno is
perhaps the one action that could split the present
unity in army ranks, since some senior officers are
still personally loyal to the President.
The Army's Problems
19. Some divisive strains are likely to develop
within the army as time passes. Although it is unlikely
that they will be serious enough to affect the position
of Nasution or Suharto, the strains may yet offer S-
karno an opportunity for renewed maneuvering. The army
is also likely to face increasingly hard going in dealing
with Indonesia's myriad economic and administrative prob-
lems. Although the military leaders have recently been
forced to pay considerable attention to economic affairs,
there is no sign that they have developed a coherent pro-
gram to deal with this and other major problems. The
military have enlisted the Sultan of Jogjakarta to handle
economic affairs within KOTI, but it is unlikely that the
generals, preoccupied as they have been with suppressing
the PKI and maneuvering vis-a-vis Sukarno, have given
much thought to recruiting a civilian cadre to help run
the government. Although the military probably expect
to achieve a decisive voice in governmental affairs,
they presumably would prefer to operate through a facade
of top civilian leadership. There is no sign that they
are interested in establishing a military dictatorship,
although Nasution has been mentioned by several army
figures as a possible replacement for Sukarno.
20. However, as the pressure increases to find
solutions to Indonesia's many problems--in particular
the economic ones--the army may find civilian government
to be a luxury it cannot afford. Since power is now
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largely in its hands it is likely to be blamed if
solutions to Indonesia's ills are not found, and the
military leaders may come to feel that they must take
direct action in tackling these problems. The army is
already deeply involved in the administration of the
country under the emergency regulations now in force.
21. On the basis of its past performance, however,
the army is not likely to do well in this area. In the
period 1957-1960, when the army had great administrative
responsibilities, it found some of these problems almost
beyond it. Food collection and distribution became
badly snarled and corruption was rife at all levels
within the army. The army leadership may have learned
something from this earlier adventure, but it is doubt-
ful that the mistakes of the past can be completely
avoided.
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