THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 14, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
0-7 .a. ? - - .
::?;:-\\
25X1
TI Cl 771 1-7 711 rl /Tr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
14 September 1965
HIGHLIGHTS
A joint US/South Vietnamese force yesterday
launched a major attack against a Viet Cong force
of about 10,000 men, 30 miles north of Saigon.
North Vietnamese propaganda aimed at domestic
audiences seems to reflect growing anxiety in
Hanoi over the effect on popular morale of the un-
relenting US air strikes.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
A major US/ARVN search-and-destroy operation was
initiated yesterday near the district capital of
Ben Cat, in Binh Duong Province, 30 miles north
of Saigon, against Viet Cong forces with an esti-
mated aggregatestrength of about 10,000 troops
(Paras. 1-2). Thirty Guam-based USAF B-52 strate-
gic bombers last night attacked a suspected Viet
Cong logistical center in the vicinity of the Ho
Be woods, Binh Duong Province, 15 miles north of
?Saigon (Para. 3). A Viet Cong force estimated at
two battalions early today, launched a three-hour
attack against a government outpost at Cau Dinh,
in Binh Duong Province, 25 miles nOrth of Saigon;
preliminary results indiaate 33 Vietnamese defenders
killed, wounded, and missing, as against enemy
losses of 50 killed (Para. 4).
II, Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The secretary general of the military Directorate
states that plans are proceeding to set up a
civilian advisory council to the cabinet by a
target date of 1 November (Pakas. 1-2)./
/The Saigon gov-
ernment may be planning shortly to execute a Viet
Cong terrorist for whose death the Viet Cong have
threatened to retaliate against a US captive (Para.
4). Despite recent government military moves
against dissident mountain tribesmen, the US Embassy
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5 -K1
believes there is still some flexibility in the
government position (Paras. 5-6).
IV. Other Communist Military Developmentsi
Nothing significant to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The DRV
delegation now visiting France wants to go to
Italy next, but so far has been refused permission
by the Italian Government; it is possible that
Hanoi would like to use,this group to probe for in-
dications of US willingness to. accept any of North
Vietnam's conditions for endifig the war (Paras. 1-2).
Hanoi responded to the landing of the US 1st Air-
Mobile Division in South Vietnam with a blustering
article seemingly intended to bolster the morale
of rank-and-file Vietnamese Communists (Paras 3-4)
North Vietnamese propaganda for domestic consump-
tion seems to reflect growing anxiety in Hanoi over
the effect on popular morale of the unrelenting
US air strikes (Paras. 5-8).
14 September 1965
ii
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
,
.?,- ? _
\ ... ...,. - ' ...--:....1.: Dong Ho I.2
? \I NORTH
Muang .N. 1
Muang
Sakon Nakhow?
Nakhon Phanornao_. Th
. ?
khek
1
\
e
ylETNA
N.?it
e , LINE
,i'-' DEMARCATION
, 1 .. Bo Ho .Su .0Quang Tri '
.rT,,shepone ,U
O NG T
.
'
1 ----\S
.',.S: avannakhet M-slg.Phine
\-
?i7
,
1 _____,45-
0) ..."41,5 1 St 0 ?
i ? H
? A 1-
?TH-trA T I -?????
(...
. i ".".?' 4.
" ? ',..
CORPS .
_,. ,
A NANG
v Oa Nang (Tourane)
15
(
THAILAND
Muang ? . .
?i;?
, ': !,.....(,:--- wari,"7?\?-??( pe?se
____
pUANG
, 2 .:ir ? 00.
' -Ci ? 1
h ?
1
CIU
. ,..
-
N Tic;e4,.,
-1;
NG Chu LaI
v:. '-.. Quang Nget., , ?
Chamrap
Swirl ? S. 1 .?,
:./C.,
?????
o'''''u - -------?
? s
I. ."...! : ?
N.1 j i
.. ??????? ., . .. ,
, --
KO TU.M
.
\ OLI ANG
., N.G A /'
. (r------1
Ko um
. \ ...,..,....? .
- ?
."
/ _ . 4th ,
hong I .thig DI
p4cbit ?z?
4
,? 7? - - -1
)1
Siem ?Reap ,t,ue4
No
.., z
s
c*
.Iternpong
" Thom
.. p
sat /
-71P 1
, I
Kompong Chas% A,?,
,r
D
, PHU
. ......_?.
...?:'PLE Pleiku
.
Sten.4
---,
,
D 4
.?"
) .
3r?
........
C VINH ./i4
&s5t Di isian,,Q NPitti
B
?
CORPS
U n 'fix
Ivi ui Nhon ..
,.\.....,,,.On ?D II
BON
h; 'Z.'
PH

oToyHoa
R?A
8 n Me Thuot
. ? ': KH / .44.
Di iSio :I-10A
... .
Ilha Trang ,-,:d
TUYEN bk\ C..
-,
B-52 STRIKE
PHNOM P
-6Slhanou vale , Kampot
Reatir`t ,.... ?...--?../........../
.........z.s, Ha TieKniE
!V ,1 Phuoc BI';')
I BE WCifiDS-.., 1 r,.,7117ii -N.0 SonsAle
.-Na . cc LAM 0
NH _ NG
TAY I H Bao Lot
'4'0.,..,9 ? ipi H
5th_
81N ??ot Vinh
CAP I .L'.. A i / M. ILIT...A.... \ \R-I- ;I. kl ..4 c BIN H
,EibION in KANH TUY
f c ?./. ehiSen Cuon 4'0".71,.. ' ? ' ook.0-en-1.:o
9th Di i 10_ el ? ;0314'
K1EN \
...6 I K
Chaeg,) PHONG . -euONG
po & Coo Lanh ,Le.,/, CORPS
Ong "Aen.-6 ' upg?Sat BEN
Da Lat r
0 N I NH ..
Cnn Ranh
Bay
D Lmh han Rang
B
????
\i/ Phan Thiet \
\\
C, HON CU
, LAO
CAT
NI ,.?
. , ?.-- ?,---...., ? Special Zone
Duong Dong \ ? (...- v'Y? .11.1.?
. tirrlq . Truc ang
1 De0 PHU (VNN)
Rach Gi F.1-03r1i-
SOUTH :VIETNAM
..- Divisiori
...? , DIY
Phu V9mh ?CAU DINH
....' ?? , ??:;?? VINI-I
c1cLongA ) Khanh ? 'c
Ok. 170W-G / Hung G.,,. BINH
1EN ,Oi ' ,... 1:
LIVEN , ti
.(;!, J
I.......)
MILITARY BOUNDARIES
Corps
4 pANJANG
GU L F OF
Q on .4tt,Vinh.L.01
ua
?if IV CORPS
boundary
- Special boundary
S IA Ai '
OW BA!
BUNG
A
XU EN
zi. j.b?.? n Son (Paulo Con/lore)
CON SON! .
A.
zone
Division boundary
0 25 50 7.5 100 Miles
I . .
0 25 50 75 Ion KilOmeters
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
48789 NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITA TIVE
,r
5X1
5X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
I. MILITARY SITUATION. IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A major US/ARVN search-and-destroy opera-
tion was initiated on 13 September near the district
capital of Ben Cat, in Binh Duong Province, 30
miles north of Saigon. Viet Cong forces in the
area are believed to consist of two or three Main
Force regiments, five or ix Main Force battalions
one Local Force battalion, and six Local Force com-
panies with an aggregate maximum strength of 10,150
men.
2. Friendly forces participating in the opera-
tion, which is expected to last from eight to ten
days, number approximately 5,000 troops. These
include 2,700 Vietnamese soldiers, 1,500 Americans,
700 Australians, and 110 New Zealanders. The US
force consists of units of the 173rd Airborne Brii.7-
gade((reinforce0). Additionally, one Australian in-
fantry battalion, a New Zealand artillery battery,
and the US 145th Aviation Battalion will provide
initial support. ARVN forces include four airborne
battalions and elements of? the 5th ARVN Division.
Two ARVN Ranger battalions are being held in re-
serve at Phuoc Vinh. Close air support is being
provided by USAF F-100 Supersabres and A-1E Sky-
raider aircraft. According to the latest available
'information from MACV, the operation is proceeding
according to plan.
3. Thirty USAF B-52 Stratofortresses from
Andersen AFB, Guam, last night conducted a satura-
tion bombing mission against a suspected Viet Cong
logistical and transshipment center in the vicinity
of the Ho Be woods, Binh Duong Province, 15 nautical
miles north of Saigon. The attack was made in
two waves of 15 aircraft each, with all aircraft
successfully releasing their bombs over the target
area. No follow-up ground exploitation was planned.
4. An estimated two Viet Cong battalions, em-
ploying heavy mortar and small-arms fire, launched
an attack early today against a government outpost
at Cau Dinh, in Binh Duong Province, ?25 miles
14 September,1965
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5 xi
north of Saigon. The assault, which lasted for
three hours, resulted in initial friendly casual-
ties of four killed, 18 wounded, and 11 missing.
Enemy forces are believed to have sustained 50
killed. Two ARVN reaction force units were dis-
patched to assist in the defense of the besieged
outpost.
5. MACV's military report for 12 September
shows 48 Communist-initiated incidents, five of
which occurred during the 24-hour reporting period.
No significant new actions were reported.
14 September 1965
1-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1, General Pham Xuan Chieu, secretary gen-
eral of the Military Directorate, told the US
Embassy political counselor yesterday that plans
were going forward toward the establishment of an
advisory council with a target date of 1 Novem-
ber. Chieu said that the military were thinking
of a council membership of about 100, including
one member elected from each provincial and munici-
pal council, with the balance of the 'members to be
selected from among the religious sects, profes-
sional groups, labor unions, and acknowledged po=
litical parties.
2. Chieu said that the council would serve
as an advisory body to the cabinet rather than to
the Directorate, and that, if it proved success-
ful,it might eventually evolve into a constituent
assembly. Although he admitted that there might
be political troublemakers of the council, Chieu
appeared cauticiusly optimistic that the council
would be controllable, particularly through its
appointed members. Ambassador Lodge has re-
ported his own concern that there appears to-. be
no group of civilians upon whom Premier Ky can
rely to assure effective cooperation from an ad-
visory council and that the council might become
a vehicle for obstructionism of divisiveness such
as occurred in Iprevious regimes during the past
two years.
14 September' 1965
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
4. The US Embassy has been informed confiden-
tially that the Saigon government has reviewed and
rejected appeals from six convicted Viet Cong ter-
rorists, whose executions may now take place in the
near future. Among the six is embassy bomber Nguyen
Van Hai, for whose execution the Viet Cong have
threatened to retaliate against Gustav Hertz, a US
AID official now in Communist hands.
5. In reviewing recent developments affecting
ethnic tribesmen in the central highlands, the US
Embassy believes that the situation is still fluid.
Government suspicions that negotiators from FULRO--
the dissident tribal autonomy movement--have been
stalling while trying to subvert government CIDG
camps in the area have already caused some precipi-
tous government moves, beginning with the disarming
of one CIDG camp on 7 September, and the subsequent
surveillance of two others still deemed loyal to
Saigon. Shortly after a local Vietnamese commander
was informed of an approach-by FULRO to a US Special
Forces officer for weapons and- medical supplies, a
government operation was launched on 10 September
which led to the surrender of a 400-man FULRO unit;
on 12 September, another 30 CIDG troops were tempo-
rarily detainedand partially disarmed.
14 September 1965
I1-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5 (1
6. The desire for Strong action by some Viet-
namese Commanders may have adverse effect's on pres-
ently loyal tribesmen. However, the II Corps , coM-
mander General Vinh Loc, although an advocate of
strong 'measures, states that he intends for .the
present to treat leniently those who 'surrender. He
also plans to- begin a series (3f meetings between
Saigon authorities and tribal leaders in each high-
land province in an effort- to try to meet tribal?
objectives.
14 September 1965,
II 3
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
14 September 1965
Iv?'
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-p,A1
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. According to the US Embassy in Rome, ?the
Italian Communists have so far been unsuccessful
in their efforts to obtain permitsibro, from the
Italian Government for a visit to Italy by the
DRV party delegation presently in France. Hanoi
expressed an interest several months ago in hav-
ing Le Duc Tho, who heads the delegation in France,
stop in Italy for talks with the Italian Commu-
nists. Communist leaders in Italy claim that the
DRV delegation "might be carrying some interesting
proposals" (presumably on ending the war).
2.1
/Le Duc Tho's delegation did
visit Rumania in early August prior to its trip to
France. It seems unlikely that this delegation
has been empowered by Hanoi to present proposals
on negotiations, but it is possible that Hanoi
would like to use the group to probe for any
signs that the US is willing to accede to any or
all of North Vietnam's demands for ?a settlement
of the war.
3. Hanoi's initial response to the landing
of the US. 1st Air-Mobile Division in South Viet-
nam came in a 14,SeptemberINhan Dan article which
denounced the move as a "brazen ISFUvoication--
against the whole of progressive mankind," The
article pointed out that 'US forces already in
Vietnam_havemet/repeated "disasters" and asserted
that additional troops Would not be sufficient?
to win the war. DI lailguage seemingly intended
to bolster the-morale-Of the rank-and-file Viet-
namese,ComMunists,thearticle declared that "the
more US forces that come to Vietnam,' the 'more'
they will be wiped out."
14 September 1965
V-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5,xi
4. The announcement of an increase in the US
commitment to the Vietnam war in the past has often
drawn threats from the Vietn mese Communists to call
in outside volunteers. Although there was no warn-
ing of DRV intervention in the Nhan Dan editorial,
new threats to c 11 for outside personnel may come
in the Liberation Front's propaganda response to the
1st Divisions deployment.
5. The deleterious effect on the North Viet-
namese populace ciused by the unrelenting attrition
of the US air strikes is apparently of growing con-
cern to the Hanoi regime. The most explicit state-
ment of anxiety on Hanoi's part over public morale
in some time was contained in a domestic broadcast
on 11 September discussing conditions in the Viet
Bac Autonomous Region--the northeastern DRV. The
broadcastJ,Warned that,,"dadresand"peoplEW in thiS'
area ,"are not yet fully aware of the shrewd plot
and tricky, dangerous schemes of the enemy," or of
the "nature of sabotage waged by the US" against
North Vietnam,
6. In particul r the uthorities expressed
dissatisfaction with evacuation procedures in the
area. The broadcast,implied that when US rcraft
strike local residents t ke to their heels, with
little regard to planned evacuation prodedures.
Cadres and state employees were urged to "explain
things" to the people in order "to reassure them."
7. The broadcast also revealed the regime's
continuing suspicion that the Viet Bac area is har-
boring spies and provocateurs. All provinces were
instructed to counter the "erroneous view." allegedly
spread through the area by the enemy and to "smash
in time" all "Counterpropaganda,arguments."
8. The air strikes also appear to be seriously
straining public health facilities in North Vietnam.
Ata recent conference, reported by Hanoi radio on
13 September, the minister of public health stressed
the steps needed to "reduce to the minimum" the
losses in human lives c used by air raids. The
14 September 1965
V-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5 xi
conference discussed the produCtion and distribution
of Medicines 'and medical equipment and, encouraged
local cultivation of mediCinal plants for the self-
supply of drugs and medicines "Most needed" for
"emergency treatment On battlegrounds," The need
for local production of drugs reflects not only the
increaed number .of casualties,. but the 'interruption
of nor al transportation." ? The iMPOrtance which the
regime places on this. problem is reflected by the
fact that-the conference was called by the-key.party.
central committee secretariat and was addressed by
Premier Pham Van Dong, himself.
14 September 1965
V-3
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5
Tf)P SFCRFT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010011-5