THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A002200010002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 2, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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2 September 1965
HIGHLIGHTS
A large-scale South Vietnamese search-and-destroy
operation in coastal Quang Ngai Province has in
flicted significant losses on the Viet Cong, Am-
bassador Lodge, who talked with moderate Buddhist
leader Thich Tam Chau on 1 September, feels that
Chau is losing ground to the volatile Thich Tri
Quang. If true, Buddhist activity could take a
more violent turn. Meanwhile, student agitation
In.: Hud appears to be losing its force.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Thirty Guam-based USAF B-52 Stratofortresses yester-
day made a saturation bombing attack on a suspected'
Viet Cong base in the Ho Be woods, 17 miles north-
west of Saigon. Ground exploitation of the ,, target. zone
by regimental-strength ARVN forces began immediately
after the air strike, the 17th of the war to date
against Communist strongholds in South Vietnam
(Paras. 1-2). Viet Cong forces have sustained
significant losses in-the opening phase of a large-
scale ARVN search-and-destroy operation in coastal
Quang Ngai Province (Para. 3.
II. Political Situation In South Vietnam: Am-
bassador Lodge and Thich Tam Chau discuss political
and international developments (Paras. 1-3), Am-
bassador Lodge feels that the more, moderate Chau
has lost some ground to Thich Tri.. Quang (Para,'4).
Student agitation appears to be'subsiding.(Paras. 5-6).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO02200010002-5
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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
Nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Soviet
Premier Kosygin reportedly was inflexible and pes-
-s.imistic about Vietnam in his recent talks with
UAR President Nasir.(PAra, 1). The 1 September
Soviet UAR communique made the routine declaration
that bombing of the DRV.should cease immediately
and that the 1954 Geneva Agreements should be carried
out (Para. 2). The North Vietnamese Communist
Party delegation currently in France, ostensibly
to confer with the French Communist Party, may also
be in..-touch with French officials,(Paras, 3-4).
2 September 1965
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Thirty Guam-based USAF B-52 Stratofortresses
yesterday made a saturation bombing attack on .a sus-
pect Viet Cong ; base in the Ho Be woods, 17 miles
northwest of Saigon, on the fringes of the guerrilla
War Zone "D" stronghold. All aircraft released their
bombs on the target area and were recovered safely
at Guam.
2. Ground exploitation of the target zone by
ARVN forces began immediately after the air strike.
Participating elements included the 49th Regiment
(minus one battalion)/25th ARVN Division, and the let
Reconnaissance Company/5th ARVN Division, complemented
by USAF/VNAF tactical air and helicopter support. Ac-
cording to late reports, no contact had been estab-
lished with the Viet Cong; however, the operational
forces had uncovered a large ammunition dump, sev-.
eral individual weapons, one Russian flag, and a
quantity of clothing, plastic tubing, and assorted
tools.
3. Twenty-two Viet Cong were killed, five cap-
tured, and 46 suspects detained yesterday in the
opening phase of a large-scale ARVN search-and-destroy
operation 15 miles south of Quang Ngai city, the cap-
ital of Quang Ngai Province. Friendly losses thus
far were described as "light." In Binh Dinh Province,
US Army elements of "Task Force Alpha" ambushed a
Viet Cong patrol near the coastal supply port of Qui
Nhon late yesterday, killing seven insurgents. Amer-
ican casualties were again termed "light."
2 September 1965
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?, MACV's military report for 31 August shows
66 Communist-initiated incidents, 15 of which oc-
curred during the 24-hour reporting period. In ad-
dition to the large-scale attack against An Hoa out-
post in Quang Ngai Province discussed in Paragraph
4, the Viet Cong placed 60- and 81-mm, mortar fire
on the district town'of Thoi Binh, in southernmost
An Xuyen Province, and on Regional and Popular Forces
outposts in Binh Duong and Chuong Thien-provinces.
In Hau Nghia Province, a mine detonated by enemy ter-
rorists at a local village office wounded 12 militia-
men. Elsewhere, small-arms harassing fire actions,
2 September 1965
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hamlet entry and harassment, and communications
sabotage remained widespread throughout the four
corps tactical zones of,South Vietnam.
8. Delayed military reports state that on
29 August a Communist force of undetermined strength
attacked two paramilitary outposts in the Mekong
Delta province of Kien Tuong, inflicting . combined
friendly losses of 30 killed, 21 wounded, and 19
missing; 66 weapons, including four 60-mm. mortars,
were captured, Enemy casualties are unknown.
2 September 1965
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NORTH
VIETNAM
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II. POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Ambassador Lodge.met with Buddhist leader
Thich Tam Chau, president of the Unified Buddhist
Association, on 1 September. There was a friendly
and wide-ranging exchange, with Chau seeking in-
formation about. US intentions.. as-- well as express
.ing..his own views on domesti.c._a_nd international
problems. Thich Tri Quang was scheduled to ac-
company Chau to this meeting, but had gone to Hud
instead.
2. Chau stated at one point that he,be-
lieved the real.. threat to peace in Vietnam lay
in Peking and that in the'end the United States
would have to be prepared to face that reality.
He also said that the Vietnamese people sought
the reunification of the country, and he was
curious as to whether the US felt that an end of
the current aggression would havethe effect of
reaffirming the present borders. Chau was clearly
thinking of future actions to retake North Vietnam.
3. Chau was interested in the ambassador's
views on the present government. In reference
to the ambassador's appreciation of the incumbent
government and the need to give it a chance to'
make good, Chau thought that two years was an
optimum trial period.
4. Ambassador Lodge noted, that Chau seems
generally to have lost ground to Tri Quang. If
Chau's moderate influence is weakening, Buddhist
activity could take a more violent turn.
5. The student agitation in Hue appears to
be losing its force. The attemptr%to "export" the
antigovernment movement to other areas has not made
any Impressive progress. The embassy in Saigon
2 September 1965
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believes one reason for the campaign's loss of
steam is that Buddhist leader Tri Quang evidently
is not ready to lend significant support.
6. The "struggle" in Hue thus seems to be a
probe to test the extent of antigovernment senti-
ment.and the government's responses. The embassy
believes that so far the government has reacted
with caution, firmness, and even some finesse.
2 September 1965
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Nothing of significance to report.
2 September 1965
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Nothing of significance to report.
2September 1965
IV-1
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. According to information received.by Ambas-
sador Kohler, Soviet Premier Kosygin in his recent
talks with UAR President Nasir used the same inflex-
ible and pessimistic terms about Vietnam as were
used during Governor Harriman's visit in mid-July.
Although details of the talks are not available,
the Soviets have consistently maintained,
that a cessation of US air.strikes'is
a necessary first step toward a Vietnam settlement,
and that any move toward talks must come from the
participants--the DRV and the US.
.2. The joint Soviet-LIAR communiqud issued on
1 September routinely declared that bombing of the
DRV must cease immediately and that the 1954 Geneva
agreements should be fully carried out. The Nasir-
Kosygin talks were apparently exploratory, and there
is no evidence--contrary to press speculation--that
the Egyptian leader brought any specific Vietnam
peace proposal to Moscow.
3. A French Foreign Ministry official told
the American Embassy that Mai Van Bo, the DRV com-
mercial representative in Paris, has indicated that
the North Vietnamese Communist Party delegation cur-
rently in France would like to discuss with the For-
eign Ministry the possibility of buying heavy equip-
ment from the French Government. This source stated
that his government would not officially receive the
delegation due to its sponsorship by the French Com-
munist Party although other'sources in the Foreign
Ministry have indicated that a meeting with medium-
level officials has not been ruled out.
4. The presence on the delegation of the North
Vietnamese minister of heavy industry and his deputy
suggests that, in addition to political objectives,
the delegation may be exploring the possibility of
diversifying sources of supply of machinery--now ob-
tained almost exclusively from bloc countries.
V-l 1 September 1965
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