THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900050004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2014
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 20, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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OW\ I
20 April 1965
HIGHLIGHTS
Major new fighting has broken out south of Da
Nang and US aircraft providing air support to govern-
ment forces reportedly have inflicted heavy personnel
losses on the Viet Cong. On the international front,
Soviet President Mikoyan told the Indian President on
18 April that the DRV was already receiving Soviet
weapons "intended to shoot down American aircraft."
Peiping, which has intensified its propaganda attacks
on the US, continues to take a somewhat less flexible
public line on negotiations than Hanoi.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Major new fighting was reported in progress today south
of Da Nang near the government outpost of Viet An in
Quang Tin Province (Paras. 1 and 2). A terrorist bomb
blast in Ban Me Thuot has resulted in sizable casualties,
including several Americans wounded (Para. 3). An
American civilian and two Vietnamese were killed last
night in a roadblock ambush on the outskirts of Saigon
(Para. 4). The government follow-up air-ground opera-
tion against a Viet Cong headquarters in western Tay
Ninh Province has been terminated with generally meager
results (Para. 6).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: A
close adviser to Premier Quat has commented that the
Premier made the major decisions in the suspension of
two senior military officers and is making progress in
extending his control over the armed forces (Paras. 1-2).
The possibility of a recent sabotage attempt against
Premier Quat's private plane is under investigation
(Para. 3). A young Buddhist monk reportedly committed
self-immolation in Saigon today to protest the present
popular suffering ?in Vietnam (Para. 4).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: US
and South Vietnamese air strikes and road reconnaissance
missions on 20 April achieved limited results, including
damage to one bridge and destruction of several trucks.
Two US Navy aircraft were lost. The pilots are presumed
dead (Paras. 1-6).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments: Soviet
President Mikoyan told Indian President Radhakrishnan
in Moscow on 18 April that weapons "intended to shoot
down American aircraft" were being received by the
DRV (Para. 1).
V. Communist Political Developments: Peiping is
intensifying its propaganda effort to mobilize support,
both, foreign and domestic, for the regime's policy on
Vietnam. Peiping continues to take a somewhat less.
flexible public line on negotiations than Hanoi ,(Paras.
1 and 2). In South Vietnam, the Liberation Front
"presidium" has issued a communique which appears
designed to retain some freedom of maneuver on the
role Of the Front and on the exact conditions of any
future "settlement" of the war (Paras. 3-5). Dependents
of Soviet and other Communist personnel in Hanoi are
being evacuated from North Vietnam (Para. 7).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Indian Prime Minister
Shastri has again criticized American bombing in North
Vietnam (Para. 1).
20 April 1965
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. According to press reports, more than 40
US jet bombers and fighters today bombed and strafed
fortified Communist guerrilla positions 28 miles
south of Da Nang air base as major new fighting be-
tween government and Viet Cong troops continued into
its second day. Pilots of the US planes--F-4B
Phantoms, B-57 bombers, and F-100 Supersabres--re-
portedly destroyed one? antiaircraft gun emplacement
and six buildings, caused several secondary explo-
sions, and started large fires. Preliminary esti-
mates by US military spokesmen, presumably based on
pilot reports, placed Viet Cong losses as high as
150 killed, although there was no confirming body
couht.
2. The jets were providing air support to
government forces attempting to dislodge an esti-
mated three Viet Cong battalions entrenched just
south of the road linking the important government
outpost of Viet An with Thanh Bin Town, in Quang
Tin Province. The engagement began yesterday when
ARVN units encountered heavy resistance from the
well-fortified enemy position, losing nine killed
and 29 wounded, in addition to five US military
advisers wounded.
3. Eleven Vietnamese were killed and 41 per-
sons, including four US enlisted men, were wounded
last night when a terrorist bomb exploded in a bar
in Ban Me Thuot, Darlac Province.
4. An American civilian and two Vietnamese
were killed last night less than five miles from
the Saigon city limits when they were caught in
a roadblock ambush set up by a band of 50 Viet
Cong on the multilane Bien Hoa highway. Several
other Vietnamese were reported wounded or kidnaped.
The American was identified as John B. Cone, an
engineer employed by USOM to work on a construc-
tion project for improving the Saigon water supply.
20 April 1965
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5. The Viet Cong yesterday placed automatic
weapons fire on two US Marine trucks en route to
Phu Bai, in Thua Thien Province. The vehicles
received slight damage, but there were no casual-
ties.
6. The ARVN search-and-destroy oppration,
which followed the 15 April bombing of the Viet
Cong headquarters area in western Tay Ninh Prov-
ince, was terminated on 18 April. No contact was
made with the Viet Cong during the three-day sweep.
Only a small amount of weapons, documents, and ma-
teriel was found. Two tons of rice and 72 houses
were destroyed in the ground probe.
7. MACV's military report for 18 April shows
56 Communist-initiated incidents, seven of which
occurred during the reporting period. Communist
saboteurs mined the coastal railroad in Thua Thien,
Binh Dinh, and Binh Thuan provinces. Guerrilla-
directed 81-mm, mortar fire was placed on a rail-
road station in Binh Thuan Province. Government
outposts in Chuong Thien and An Xuyen provinces,
and an armored personnel carrier section at Vinh
Binh Airfield in Vinh Binh Province received small
arms harassing fire.
8. Three government operations of battalion
strength or larger were initiated and three ter-
minated, leaving 19 in progress on 18 April. A
large-scale RVNAF guard-and-escort operation was
initiated on 17 April ?in Binh Dinh Province to pro-
vide security lor truck convoys traveling along
Route 19 from the coastal city of Qui Nhon to II
Corps headquarters at Pleiku. Government elements
participating in the operation include one air-
borne brigade, two airborne battalions, two Ranger
battalions, an armored cavalry unit, and five Regional
Forces - Popular Forces companies.
9. Company-size or smaller, operations con-
ducted on 18 April increased to 2,576. Only six
contacts were made with the Viet Cong, none of
which produced significant results.
20 April 1965
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10. VNAF and USAF aircraft flew 97 combat
sorties against enemy targets throughout the coun-
try, including 48 by USAF 8-57/F-100 jets. Pilots
reported 260 structures destroyed and 69 damaged.
20 April 1965
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OUAI
II, POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1, Bui Diem, a cabinet member and close adviser
remier Quat,
Quat had mace the principal decisions in the
nt suspensions of Admiral Cang and General Dong,
and was satisfied with his progress in gaining con-
trol over the armed forces. He said various generals
had expressed their support for Quat during the pre-
mier's recent provincial tours. Diem said that Quat
would probably try to replace III Corps commander
General Vien with 9th Division commander General Vinh
Loc in order to be certain of the loyalty of all key
unit commanders.
2. Quat recently told Deputy Ambassador Johnson
that he had taken no steps to carry out his plans to
reorganize the military command, but he did refer to
a possible shift in the III Corps command. If this
were done, all but two or three of the top troop com-
manders would be men alleged at one time or another
to be sympathetic to the Buddhists.
3, Premier Quat also told Johnson that the pos-
sibility of sabotage against his personal aircraft was
being investigated after both engines had suddenly cut
out after takeoff from Bien Hoa Airfield on 17 April.
The pilot, Quat's cousin, had successfully restarted
one engine, and was able to return to Bien Hoa,
4. Press reports state that a 16-year-old Bud-
?dhist monk burned himself to death today near the
Buddhist Institute in Saigon. The monk left a note
indicating that his sacrifice was for the "present
sufferings sustained by the central area population
and the present war situation...." Not enough details
are available to determine whether the protest was
against the Communists, whom the Buddhists have re-
cently attacked for oppressions in Central Vietnam,
or was intended to dramatize the need for peace.
20 April 1965
I Il
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20 APRIL 1965
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. US and South Vietnamese air strikes of 20
April achieved limited results according to pre-
liminary evaluations. A Vietnamese strike against
the My Due bridge on Route 101 failed to damage the
structure. A follow-up by US Air Force F-100s
cratered both approaches and slightly damaged the
bridge. All aircraft returned safely.
2. A US Air Force armed reconnaissance mis-
sion along Route 8 succeeded in creating several
landslides in the Kim Cuong chokepoint area. In
addition two buildings and four boxcars were at-
tacked. Weather precluded a reconnaissance of Route
12, an attack on the Mu Gia Pass Camp, and the ac-
complishment of any photographic damage assessment.
All aircraft returned safely.
3. One truck was destroyed during the recon-
naissance of Route 1 north of the Demilitarized
Zone,
4. Also on 20 April US Navy aircraft conducted
three armed reconnaissance missions, two during day-
light and one at night, along Routes 101, 102, and
107, south of the 18th parallel. During the first
reconnaissance three groups of trucks were attacked
with ?unknown results. Aircraft attacked 8 to 12
barges near Route 101 during the second reconnaissance
and destroyed a camouflaged truck. No targets were
observed during the night mission and no ordnance
was expended. Pilots report encountering heavy anti-
aircraft fire during the trubk attacks and possible
37-mm. AAA fire and a heavy automatic weapons bar-
rage during the night mission. One AlH was lost;
it apparently flew into the ground during a rocket
run. The pilot is presumed dead. Aircraft flying
a barrier combat air patrol in the area, which is
about 200 miles south of Phuc Yen Airfield, reported
three distinct radar contacts but were unable to
make Visual identification.
20 April 1965
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5. Two other night missions were flown by US Navy
aircraft against Routes 1 and 15 from the 20th par-
allel southward. Three trucks were attacked with
unknown results. Heavy AAA fire was encountered
south of Vinh. One A4C exploded im mid-air after
being hit. The pilot' status is unknown, although
he probably was not able to eject.
20 April 1965
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...A-I,' I
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Soviet President Mikoyan told Indian Presi-
dent Radhakrishnan in Moscow on 18 April that Soviet
military aid was going to the DRV and that the weap-
ons furnished were "intended to shoot down American
aircraft."
2. If Soviet military equipment is en route to
Vietnam, it probably is moving by rail through China
rather than by sea. Cargo information on the eight
Soviet vessels known to be en rOute to or in Haiphong
indicates they are making normal commercial deliveries
of oil, fertilizer, vehicles, and industrial equip-
ment.
3. In his talk with the Indian President, Mikoyan
claimed that the Soviet people were eager to help the
DRV, but that the North Vietnamese seemed to be defend-
ing themselves very well. The 17 April joint Soviet-
DRV communique took the same line in conditioning the
dispatch of Soviet volunteers to North Vietnam on an
intensification of US aggression and on an appeal from
Hanoi.
20 April 1965
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Peiping is intensifying its propaganda ef-
fort to mobilize support, both foreign and domestic,
for the regime's policy on Vietnam. On 20 April Pei-
ping announced that the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress--China's rubber-stamp
parliament--had adopted a resolution calling for the
Chinese people to join "with the world's people"
in launching a "powerful mass movement" to force the
United States out of Vietnam. The Chinese people
were instructed to make "full preparations" ?to send
men to fight alongside the Vietnamese "people" in
the event that the United States "continues to ex-
pand the war" and the "Vietnamese people need them."
While repeating and putting the National People's
Congress stamp of approval on previous Peiping dec-
larations, the resolution continues to place con-
ditions on the introduction of Chinese personnel.
It does not represent any extension of Peiping's
commitments.
? 2. The 20 April resolution continues Peiping's
hard line on negotiations. Hanoi's four-point
formula for a settlement is termed the "sole and
correct" path for resolving the Vietnamese question
--a line less flexible than that employed by the
North Vietnamese premier, 4ho on 8 April said merely
that the formula represented the "soundest basis"
for a political settlement.
3. The Viet Cong's Liberation Front has broad-
cast a communiqu?aid to have been adopted at a
15 April session of the Front "presidium." The.cOm-
munique, broadcast in Vietnamese, appears basically
to be a response to the appeal to world parliaments
issued by the DRV National Assembly on 10 April.
It stresses the unity of the Front with the North
Vietnamese in the "struggle" against "US aggression."
The communiqu?ssailed President Johnson's call
for "unconditional discussions."
4. In spelling out the Front's position on
settling the war, the communiqu?eclared ?that the
"basic stand" of the NFLSV consists of resolutely
20 April 1965
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Peiping is intensifying its propaganda ef-
fort to mobilize support, both foreign and domestic,
for the regime's policy on Vietnam. On 20 April Pei-
ping announced that the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress--China's rubber-stamp
parliament--had adopted a resolution calling for the
Chinese people to join "with the world's people"
in launching a "powerful mass movement" to force the
United States out of Vietnam. The Chinese people
were instructed to make "full preparations" to send
men to fight alongside the Vietnamese "people" in
the event that the United States "continues to ex-
pand the war" and the "Vietnamese people need them."
While repeating and putting the National People's
Congress stamp of approval on previous Peiping dec-
larations, the resolution continues to place con-
ditions on the introduction of Chinese personnel.
It does not represent any extension of Peiping's
commitments.
2. The 20 April resolution continues Peiping's
hard line on negotiations. Hanoi's four-point
formula for a settlement is termed the "sole and
correct" path for resolving the Vietnamese question
--a line less flexible than that employed by the
North Vietnamese premier, :who on 8 April said merely
that the formula represented the "soundest basis"
for a political settlement.
3. The Viet Cong's Liberation Front has broad-
cast a communiqu?aid to have been adopted at a
15 April session of the Front "presidium." The com-
munique, broadcast in Vietnamese, appears basically
to be a response to the appeal to world parliaments
issued by the DRV National Assembly on 10 April.
It stresses the unity of the Front with the North
Vietnamese in the "struggle" against "US aggression."
The communiqu?ssailed President Johnson's call
for "unconditional discussions."
4. In spelling out the Front's position on
settling the war, the communiqu?eclared that the
"basic stand" of the NFLSV consists of resolutely
20 April 1965
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fighting the "US imperialists...to the end." The
communiqu?dds that putting an end to US "aggres-
sion" is a "basic principle...to settle the Viet-
namese problem satisfactorily." Any "approach"
to the restoration of peace in South Vietnam which
As not "based" on US withdrawal, sayS the communiqu?
must be regarded as "unrealistic." The wording of
the communiqu?n a settlement of the war suggests
that the Front wishes to preserve some flexibility
in its position on the question.
5. The Front communiqu?efers to the NFLSV
as an "organ" leading the "resistance war" in South
Vietnam. According to the communiqu?any "solu-
tion" for South Vietnam will be "unrealistic and im-
practical" if it "disregards the participation and
decisive position of the NFLSV." This relatively
cautious formulation on the position of the Front
may have been intended to leave some room for ma-
neuver on the exact role and status of the Front in
any future move toward a settlement in Vietnam.
6. Soviet President Mikoyan, in his 18 April
talk with Indian President Radhakrishnan (See IV. 1),
said that the 17 April joint Soviet-DRV communiqu?
"had been most carefully drafted" and represented
a "full statement" of the Soviet position on Viet-
nam. Although Mikoyan maintained that President
Johnson was "undoubtedly shrewd" in making his 7
April speech? proposing unconditional Vietnam negotia-
tions, he claimed that the proposal was not serious.
He asserted that the US must realize that the DRV
would not agree to talks while US attacks against
North Vietnam continue.
20 April 1965
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8. The periodic Sino-US ambassadorial talks
are scheduled to resume tomorrow in Warsaw. At
the last meeting on 24 February, Chinese Ambas-
sador Wang was predictably unyielding on Vietnam
and merely reiterated Peiping's demand that the
US withdraw completely and permit the Vietnamese to
"settle their own problems."
20 April 1965
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? OW\ I
VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
Indian Prime Minister Shastri has again
criticized American bombing in North Vietnam.
Delhi radio says he told a reception of the Indo-
Soviet Cultural Society that if US raids continue,
"there is hardly any point in President Johnson's
acceptance of the nonaligned countries' proposals
for talks without preconditions. The bombing must
Stop, and that will make talks possible. India's
policy;'he continued, "is to bring an end to the
hostilities...."
20 April 1905
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? 1U1-' CARE 1 ' ?
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