THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030004-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 7, 2012
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 19, 1965
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030004-5.pdf | 519.92 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030004-5
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
19 March 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam. as of 0600 EST
The US Air Strikes on Phu Van and Vinh Son
1. Approximately 160 US Navy and Air Force planes
struck the Phu Van ammunition depot and the Phu Van and
VinhSon supply depots 160 miles north of the demili-
tarized zone at 1445 local Vietnam time (01-45 EST) on
19 March.
2. According to preliminary reports, all buildings
in the Vinh Son depot were.hit. No aircraft losses have
been reported.
3. The Phu Van ammunition depot contains storage
space for an estimated five percent of stored ammunition
in North Vietnam.
6. Recent photography of the Quang Khe naval base
in. North Vietnam--attacked by the South Vietnamese Air
Force on 2 March--reveals that 18 buildings were destroyed
and 13 others were probably damaged.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030004-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
7. There have been no significant Soviet propa-
ganda statements in the past 24 hours, but Soviet
officials in private conversations have again indicated
their grave concern over the course of US policy in
Vietnam and its implications for Soviet-US relations.
The flavor of these talks also reflected Moscow's
appreciation of the limited leverage it has in the
present crisis.
8. A senior Soviet official on the US Secretariat
Staff told former New York Goverr}:or Dewey that the US
may lose as many as half its aircraft in.future air
strikes on North Vietnam. The official asserted that in
the next strike US losses would increase substantially;
.in a following raid losses might be as high as one-third;
and in a third raid they might reach one-half.
9. The official expressed deep concern that US
bombing might extend-:into Communist China. He maintained
that under-,these circumstances the USSR would have to
carry out its treaty obligations or lose all claim to
leadership of the Communist bloc. He urged that the
President summon Ambassador Dobrynin for talks. The
Soviet official even hinted that the Brezhnev team could
not remain in control of the Kremlin if it could not
bring about at least a stalemate in Vietnam.
10. In another approach,
the more difficult would be the possibility of reaching
an honorable agreement. He called the situation "most
serious" and said that the Soviet government was con-
cerned that the conflict would spread.
that the longer and more
eeply the US became involved in the Vietnam situation,
11. The clearest North Vietnamese statement to
date that. negotiations are impossible at present was
carried in the party daily newpaper on 18 March. This
statement denounced the Tito-Johnson exchange of notes
on a negotiated settlement as a "peace farce." It
added that "there can be no question of negotiating with
the US imperialists once they have openly declared a
step-up of their aggressive war in South Vietnam and an
extension of the war to North Vietnam, and are actually
doing so."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5 1
12. The Hanoi statement added: "To solve the South
Vietnam problem the aggressor--US imperialism--must end
his aggressive war and withdraw all US troops from South
Vietnam. Without these conditions, no question can be
solved." The statement bitterly denounced Tito as a
US "stool pigeon."
13. Peiping's latest comment on deployment of
South Korean troops to Vietnam takes a somewhat less
threatening line than the initial Chinese reaction in
January. An article in People's Daily on 18 March
charges that the move is evidence t at the US has "gone
farther down the path of fighting a Korean-type war"
but avoids any implication that~Peiping is considering
countermeasures.
14. The article asserts that the US is unable
to command support of most of its allies and that only
"flunkeys" such.as the South Korean leaders can be
counted on to provide "cannon fodder" in exchange for
"payment in dollars."
Communist Military Developments
15. No unusual North Vietnamese,' Chinese Communist
.or Soviet. military moves have been noted in the past 24
hours.
18. Hanoi radio announced on 18 March that special
committees have been set up to ensure adequate water and
rail transportation under conditions of air and sea
attacks on North Vietnam. The broadcast claimed that
small boats have already been armed to assure continued
coastal transportation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5 ,
??uth Vietnam political Developments
20: Premier Quat has told the US Embassy that the
three detained leaders of a pro-Communist peace movement
are to be taken today to the demilitarized zone with
reporters present and ordered to cross a bridge into
North Vietnal~ An official in l Corps, where the prisoners
are now held, stated that the government has authorized
revocation of its expulsion order if the three appear,
under interrogation, to be sincere nationalists.
21, The I Corps official, who has heard reports
that North Vietnam intends to exploit the three for a
major propaganda campaign, believes South Vietnam should
allow them to repent at the bridge and launch its own
publicity campaign on their unwillingness to go north.
22. The NS Ambassador; has approved an ARVN recom-
mendation for crop destruction in northern Binh Dinh
province, the largest such operation to date. An estimated
3,300 to 13,500 villagers live in the target area. Al-
though the Viet Cong may not allow the population to
evacuate, the embassy recognizes that their resettlement
could add to the already serious refugee problem in the
province. Despite this, however, US officials believe
the crop destruction, program, scheduled to begin on 22
March, is justified by the serious military situation in
the province.
Viet Cong Military Activity
23, There have been no significant Viet Cong attacks
reported in the past 24 hours. Press reports 25X1
claim the Viet Cong are massing to 25X1
attack Da Nang and Quang Tri, but MACV has no confirmation.
24, In Saigon today, a grenade thrown at a truck
carrying American military personnel wounded four US
servicemen and four Vietnamese civilian bystanders.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
NORTH 0 a
VIETNAM TOP SECRET
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STRIKE TARGETS
19 MARCH 1965
A US Air Force Strike Target
0 US Navy Strike Target
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PHU VAN SUPPLY DEPO and
VINH SO
IV SUPPLY-DEPOT
I
PHU VAN AMMO DEPOT
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CHINA
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030004-5
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TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030004-5