THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900010012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 20, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/02 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010012-8
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OCI No. 0772/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
20 February 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam as of 0600 EST
Political Developments in South Vietnam
1. South Vietnamese military leaders have put down
the coup in Saigon, but they also appear to have taken this
occasion to oust General Khanh as armed forces commander.
- 2. At a joint meeting this morning of representa-
tives of the armed forces and the Quat.government, Khanh
is reported to have received a no confidence vote. Sub-
sequently, according to a Vietnamese broadcast, head of
state Suu signed a decree relieving Khanh from the post.
of commander-in-chief of the armed forces., and announcing
the temporary appointment of Major General Nguyen Van
Thieu, a deputy premier and the minister of the armed
forces, to Khanh's old post. Although Khanh still may
seek to contest these actions, General Dong, the military
governor of Saigon, expects him to choose exile abroad
instead.
3. Earlier in the morning, senior commanders with
units near Saigon dislodged rebel forces from their posi-
tions in and around the capital with little or no blood-
shed. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao appears to be under arrest,
but former General Phat and former Colonel Ton, the two
other principal coup leaders have reportedly disappeared.
4. The ease with which the rebels were dispersed
suggests the possibility of a deal between the coup
leaders and those commanders who opposed the coup,, but
shared the rebels' distaste for Khanh. It became quickly
apparent yesterday that the coup group would be unable
to attract enough additional military support to make
its takeover stick. The coup leaders may thus have de-
cided to strike a bargain, settling merely for Khanh's
removal and possibly promises of lenient treatment for
themselves.
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5. Even though Khanh appears to have been ousted
and even though the militant Catholic elements repre-
sented in the coup attempt have again been thwarted,
serious divisions will remain in the military establish-
ment. For example, two controversial officers, General-
Thi of I Corps and General Ky of the Air Force, appear
to have strengthened their positions for the-moment, but
may face increased hostility from some of their colleagues.
6. The Buddhist leadership, while not involved in
the events of the past two days, will probably be grati-
fied by the suppression of a neo-Diemist coup attempt
and the apparent ouster of Khanh, who was increasingly
becoming the target of criticism by Tri Quang.
7. On 19 February a Hong Kong daily quoted Quang
as saying that North Vietnam and the US should begin
peace talks. The article was based on an interview Quang
purportedly gave at some unspecified time after the US/
Vietnamese air strikes. He allegedly said that despite
recent Communist military gains in the south, "the north
cannot overcome the south any more than the south can
conquer the north." Asserting that the Vietnamese nation
now wanted a negotiated peace, Quang called for a diplo-
matic offensive leading to a settlement which would
guarantee the sovereignty of both North and South Vietnam
without encroachment either way.
8.. Although he has been long suspected of possible
neutralist tendencies, in the past Quang has never made
such an explicit call for peace talks. In view of Quang's
characteristically ambiguous mode of discourse, it is
possible that he was misquoted or that his stated views
were oversimplified.
Viet Cong Military Activity
9. No unusual Communist military actions have been
reported during the past 24 hours but the Viet Cong con-
tinue their recent pattern of widespread and gradually
increasing small-scale guerrilla activity.
ing the suspected Communist vessel sunk at Cape Verelle,
in Phu Yen Province on 17 February. Government ground
forces which reached the area on 19 February reportedly
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found large. quantities of ammunition and explosives,
one 12.7 mm Soviet machine gun, one 57 mm recoilless
rifle and between 2,000 and 3,000 individual weapons,
primarily of Chinese manufacture. in the hulk. A
search of caves in the area of the sunken vessel repor-
tedly uncovered a Viet Cong weapons cache containing
918 rifles, 48 Czech submachineguns and 50 automatic
rifles.
Communist Military Developments
11. No significant deployment of Communist Chinese
or Vietnamese military forces has been detected in the
last 24 hours.
12. The North Vietnamese appear to be moving ahead
with civilian evacuation from DRV urban centers. Plans
for such a move were laid during the Tonkin Gulf crisis
last August, but apparently were not extensively imple-
.Communist Political Developments
13. North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist press
services promptly reported the attempted coup, stressing
the instability and confusion in Saigon,
14. Peiping rejected the possibility of a negotiated
settlement in Vietnam editorially in People's Daily on
19 February as. "too much wishful thinking." The-editorial
confidently predicted ultimate victory in Vietnam as a
"foregone conclusion" and ridiculed American statements
that Chinese intentions'are not clear, asserting that
Peiping's plans to help "tighten the noose" are "clear as
day,"
15. Moscow's extreme caution in dealing with the
Vietnam crisis is reflected in its noncommittal attitude
toward the possibility of negotiations.
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16.. This lack of initiative apparently results in
part from the Soviet leaders' desire to avoid an open
divergence with the Hanoi and Peiping regimes. These
regimes probably believe that any overture toward nego-
tiations would be interpreted as a sign of wavering in
the face of US actions. The USSR probably also wishes
to'play for time to assess further developments in US
policy.
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