THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 11, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
11 February 1965
The Situation. in. Vietnam as of 0600
The 11 February Air Strikes
1. Forty-six US carrier-based aircraft conducted a
retaliatory air strike against the Chanh Hoa army barracks
north of Dong, Hoi at approximately 0100 EST today. This
installation is adjacent to Dong Hoi airfield and has an
estimated capacity of 2000 troops. It is believed to house
elements of the PAVN 325th Infantry Division, one of
several North Vietnamese units with a long history of
military operations in Laos.
2. Results of post-strike photography are not yet
available, but judging from pilot reports, the target area
was severely damaged. At least three barracks areas were
observed to be burning heavily. Four of.the US strike
aircraft were lost, but'at least three of the pilots were
recovered..
3. Another air strike by the South Vietnamese Air
Force (VNAF) was launched at approximately 0245 EST against
targets located just north of the DMZ. The primary target
was the Vu.Con barracks and storage area, a newly con-
structed installation believed to be a staging area for
infiltration units. Preliminary information, however,
indicates that the VNAF may have concentrated on the
secondary target of the strike, the Chap Le army barracks.
This complex, believed to contain the headquarters of the
DRV 270th Independent Infantry Regiment, was also hit in
the 8 February VNAF attack. An estimated 60% of the tar-
get was destroyed on the 8th.
4, All of the VNAF aircraft have returned safely to
base, but no information is yet available on the success
of the strike.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
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Communist Military Reaction
7. No significant Chinese Communist or Soviet mili-
tary reaction has been noted during the past twenty-four
hours
Developments in South Vietnam
Aggressive ie ong military activity continues
in widespread areas of South Vietnam. The singling out
of Americans as targets of violence, probably in retalia-
tion for the airstrikes against the North, is indicated by
the mutilation of three American advisers whose bodies were
found yesterday when government troops recaptured a dis-
trict town north of Saigon which had been overrun by the Viet
Cong on 9 February. Confirmed US-casualty figures in yester-
day's terrorist bombing of the enlisted men's billet in Qui
Nhon now stand at 1 dead, 14 wounded Twenty five are
still sought in the debris.
9. The Viet.Congattempted~an amphibious assault
today. _ on Qui Nhon,. '_aot far fi-om ' the site of yesterday's
terrorist bombing. The Communists employed 50 armed junks,
but.were.driven off by armed ARVN vessels. This action
represents the first attempted Viet Cong amphibious attack
on a major population center.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
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10. MACV reports that in the first ten days
of >!bbb`Puary, there have been 213 US casualties, in-
cluding 14 KIA and one MIA. 141 of these casualties
resulted from last Sunday's attack on Pleiku. These
figures apparently do not include losses sustained
in the Qui Nhon terrorist bombing.
11. The military developments of the past few
days have overshadowed the political maneuvering in
Saigon, and have lent some urgency to the formation
of a new government. Agreement seems to have been
reached on the designation of Interior Minister
Nguyen Luu Vien as premier, and an announcement is
expected shortly. However, continuing conflicts
among the principal power elements are reflected in
the difficulty being experienced in selecting in-
dividual cabinet ministers.
12. The first post-strike report on conditions
in North Vietnam has been received from the Canadian
ICC representative in Hanoi. According to the re-
port, there was no evidence of public concern evident
in Hanoi as of 8 February, not any outward signs of
a renewed civil defense alert or special defense
precautions
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
Communist Political Developments
15, A joint Soviet-DRV statement was issued on 10
February following Kosygin's departure from Hanoi. It
proved to be relatively bland and non-committal. The
USSR reaffirmed its pledge to render "necessary assistance
and support" to the DRV, but strongly implied in the state-
ment that it intends to carry out the commitment step by
step, carefully weighing the extent of its involvement
against future US actions in Indochina. The statement as-
serted that "regular consultations" would be held on
"measures which should be taken to strengthen" North Viet-
namese defensive capabilities.
16. There was no indication in the statement that
Kosygin had extracted a pledge of support from Hanoi on
issues in contention in the Sino-Soviet dispute. No men-
tion was made, for example, of the proposed meeting of the
.Communist "editorial commission" in Moscow on 1 March,
.thus casting doubt on whether the Soviets were able to.
win Hanoi's agreement to participate. The statement also
failed to refer specifically to future Soviet economic as-
sistance to North Vietnam. In a farewell speech in Hanoi,
Kosygin mentioned only that an "exchange of views" on..the
subject had taken place.
17. The Soviet Premier is now in North Korea, after
a short stop in Peiping for further talks with Chinese.
leaders including Mao and Liu Shao-chi. No information is
.available on these discussions. There are some indications
that Kosgyin's decision to include Pyongyang on his itinerary
was hurriedly made. His trip adds to the"thesis.that
the Soviet Union has begun a concerteu eriort to increase
its overall influence with the Asian Communist parties.
Since the new Kremlin leaders came't o power, North Korea
has dampened down its pro-Chinese polemics.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
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REPRISAL TARGETS
North Vietnam
p U. S. Targets
x Vietnamese Targets
* Alternate Target
6-'IUZ10 6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010002-9
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TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
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