THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
OCI No 0648/65
Copy No.
WEEKLY REPORT
110
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
DIA AND DOS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND
RELEASE.
SECRET
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 Approved F_or Rele
OCI No. 0648/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(25 November - 1 December 1965)
C O N T E N T S
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, facing; page
1. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Political scene remains unusually
quiet though rumors of cabinet changes
persist (p. 1); Premier Ky may be
pressing for more direct authority
(p. 1); Ky foresees two-year interval
before popular elections (p. 1); Some
official elements continue sniping at
Ky government (p. 1); Decree on trans-
lation upgrades Vietnamese generals
(p. 2); VC Liberation Front releases
two American military prisoners (p. 3);
Front broadcasts new appeal for popu-
lar demonstration (p. 3); Retail prices
resume upward trend (p. 4).
B. MILITARY SITUATION
Combat activity continues at high
level (p. 5); Highest weekly incident
total attributable mainly to terror-
ism (p0 5); Weekly statistics are
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generally favorable (p. 5); US-GVN
forces terminate Plea Me area opera-
tion (p. 6); B-52 strikes bring total
to 96 (p. 6); Communist actions in I
and II CTZ (p. 6); VC surprise GVN
regiment in rubber plantation attack,
decimating two out of three battalions
(p. 7); Transportation situation is
reviewed (p. 7).
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 7
VC assassination of local government
officials continues (p. 9); Refugee
increase continues to outpace resettle-
ment, but one million year-end total
may not be reached (p. 9); Chieu Hoi
returnees fall off by nearly half
(p, 10); Security situation has deteri-
orated badly in Quang Tin Province
(p. 10)0
Map, North Vietnam SAM Sites, facing page 11
Six more SAM sites discovered,
bringing total to 52 (p. 11); SAM
support facility bombed again (p.1.1);
DRV economic delegation arrives in
Peking prior to Moscow and Pyongyang
visits (p. 11); Hanoi may be seeking
long-range commitments as well as
immediate aid, but satisfactory agree-
ments may be difficult to obtain (p. 12);
Peking's propaganda continues to focus
on domestic US protests (p. 12).
Termination of Khmer Serei support
discussed in Bangkok and Saigon (p. 14);
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reassignments reveal paucity of
Cambodian policy shift possibly
indicated by proposed prisoner ex-
change with GVN (p. 14); Diplomatic
ualified GVN personnel (p. 15);
South Vietnam (p. 15).
ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)
US Combat Casualty Figures in Vietnam
(Weekly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam
is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it
is edited and published by CIA without final coordina-
on. )
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Combat activity continued at a high level during
the past week, with the Viet Cong attacking bivouac
areas and isolated outposts of government troops
while successfully avoiding contact with allied-ini-
tiated operations. The most significant actions were
multibattalion attacks launched by the Viet Cong on
22 and 27 November against a South Vietnamese regi-
ment operating in Binh Duong Province just north of
Saigon. Total Viet Cong - initiated incidents during
the week ending 27 November numbered the highest
of any week of the war to date.
The political situation in South Vietnam continued
undisturbed last week, although signs of internal weak-
nesses in the Ky cabinet and rumors of possible min-
isterial changes persist,
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T H A I L A N D
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SOUTH VIETNAM
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTNORITATIY#
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1. The political scene remained unusually quiet
during the past week. However, continued rumors of
possible cabinet changes may reflect concern over po-
litical stagnation and lack of clear-cut progress.
2. There have been indications that Premier Ky,
aware of the need for a more dynamic government image,
may be pressing for more direct authority and for
policies of greater austerity. He is reported to have
been greatly impressed with the efficiency of the Seoul
regime during his recent visit to South Korea. Since
his return, he has indicated that he intends to be less
lenient with the Saigon press and less amenable toward
frequent discussions with newsmen.. Apparently to end
speculation over a possible loosening of controls as a
result of the Directorate's plans to set. up a committee
to draft a constitution, Ky recently told the press
that no early return to greater civilian control was
envisaged,
3, in a discussion of his plans with US Special
Assistant Lansdale on 30 November, Ky outlined some of
his thinking on the evolution of the government. He
said he was setting a target date of two years for the
task of holding some type of popular election to vote
on a new constitution and g.ove.rnment:; this date, he
indicated, was determined by an estimate that with cone
tinued military successes and a strong pacification
program, it might be possible within two years to exert
adequate control over about 51 percent--a "simple ma-
jority"--of the population. Ky added that Chief of
State General. Thieu was insisting that in the meantime.
an advisory council of about 70 persons be established by
early 1966. Ky commented that to prevent such a council
from degenerating into political opportunism and
criticism of the government, he felt: it must be set up
apart from the governmental.. framework as a kind of "de-
bating society" concerned with such issues as the de-
velopment of a two- or three-party system,
4, Ky, meanwhile, continues to be the 'target: of
some sniping, both directly and behind his back, on
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tl,e part of certain official elements. 1
serious, perhaps, are attacks from both wItTi.n. and
without the government on several cabinet members
and officials responsible for the government's eco-
nomic policies. The US Embassy believes that. Ky's
economic team is no longer fulfilling its initial prom-
ise of efficiency and harmony, and that Ky himself is
vacillating in his support, for the team and in his
amenability to its advice. With the prospect: of' in-,
creasi.ngly complex economic problems. this situation
could have a serious effect on the strengtn of the
government.
5, By the device of a decree involving the
English and French equivalents of the Vietnamese
Army's general. officer ranks, South "~,iet:nam`s top
generals have in effect. promoted themselves in rel.a?-
tion to their US counterparts without having had to
resort to formal promotions_. Hencefortn; t.hF; one-
star rank. of sub--brigadier or aspirant general is to
be translated as brigadier general-. several thr^ee-
star corps commanders who were :formerly called "major
general" will now be called "1 i.eutenant.. gtineral l`'
The highest rank. with f:iv.e stars, will be equivalent
to a French "marshal,"
6. Two officers sought for complicity in an
abortive coup attempt in September 1964 reportedly
surrendered to the government last: week. and are ex-
pected to be tried for -their part in -the coup attempt.
One of the two is former 7th Division commander
Colonel Huynh 'Van Ton, whose troops provided t.ne bulk
of the coup force, Another officer involved in the
same plot, Colonel Don.g Hieu Nghia, recently surren-
dered despite the fact that he was under a deatri
sentence handed down earlier "in absentia;" he was
retried last month and acquitted. It is possible
that Colonel Ton and the other returnee, a Captain
Tran Uong, may receive similarly lenient treatment,
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and that their surrenders result from the present
government's policy of disposing of pending trial
cases in a fashion that will reduce the number of
potential dissidents on the political scene,
7. The Viet Cong Liberation Front on 27 No-
vember in announcing a decision to release two
American military prisoners held since November 1963,
pegged their decision to "repentance" by the pris-
oners and to appreciation for domestic American
opposition to the war in Vietnam, The two prisoners,
Specialist Claude McClure and Sergeant George Smith,
subsequently turned up at a Cambodian border post and
were authorized 'transit of Cambodia pending return
to the US. The two have not as yet been returned to
US control, but in the company of a Front representa-
tive, they held a press conference in Phnom Penh in
which they declared that they had been well treated
and that they expected to oppose US policy in Vietnam
when they returned home, The Front has broadcast: a
statement recorded by at least one of the prisoners
in which he declares his sympathy with the "justness"
of the Viet Cong cause, and it seems evident: -that
their release was granted by the Communists in the
expectation of favorably exploiting such statements.
8. The Front has broadcast a new appeal for 15
minutes of silence by 'the people of Saigon and Gia
Dinh on 19 December, the anniversary of the beginning
of armed resistance against French rule, supposedly
to honor 'Vietnamese patriots and American martyrs
who have died in the cause of opposition to "US im-
perialism" in Vietnam, In view of the obvious lack
of any popular response in major cities to an earlier
Viet Cong appeal for a one-hour general strike on 15
October as part of a "hate America" campaign. the
Front's willingness to risk another failure is sur-
prising. The appeal., however, appears to reflect Viet
Cong determination to step up political agitation
among urban elements, and to associate themselves
with 'the current US protest movement.
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9. Retail prices resumed their upward trend but
are still below the levels of a month ago. Prices of
construction materials also continued to rise, but gold
and dollar prices have remained virtually unchanged
over the last two weeks. Dollars ranged from VN $162
to VN $165; MPCs (script) were down a little to VN $121-
123; and a dollar's worth of gold leaf rose slightly
to VN $215.
10. Public protests have occurred in central Viet-
nam over the high price of imported PL 480 or Thai
rice, a result of freight charges and generally higher
rice prices in the US and Thailand. If the price rise
continues, rice prices in Hue would reach VN $1,240
per 100 kilograms, and several senior GVN civil servants
have indicated it may be necessary to subsidize rice
prices in Hue.
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1. Combat activity continued at a high level during
the week as the Viet Cong attacked GVN bivouac areas and
isolated outposts while avoiding contact with allied-
initiated operations.
2. Significant actions occurred on 22 and 27 No-
vember in Binh Duong Province, III Corps Tactical Zone
(CTZ) when multibattalion Communist forces attacked the
7th Regiment (GVN). In other actions, the Viet Cong
attempted to take advantage of low cloud ceilings and
heavy rain by attacking a series of regional and popular
force posts and a GVN Ranger battalion along Route 1 in
Phu Yen, Binh Dinh, and Quang Ngai provinces.
3. During the week of 2027 November, the Viet
Cong instigated 1,038 incidents, the highest weekly
total of the war. Significantly, the increase is attri-
butable mainly to acts of terrorism. The previous high
followed the Diem coup, when 1,021 incidents were re-
ported during the week of 31 October - 6 November 1963.
Viet Cong attacks increased to 20, as against 14 the
previous week; there were 679 terrorist acts compared
to 505; sabotage continued at a high level, with 147
incidents this week matching last week's 146. The kill
ratio in the government's favor increased to 5.7 to 1
from 3.78 to 1.
4. Communist weapons losses fell to 393 from the
previous weekly peak of 1,161; their known casualties
were 1,539 killed and 70 captured, a drop from last
week's record 2,262 and 136. Allied totals also fell.
South Vietnamese casualty figures were 240 killed, 470
wounded, and 135 missing or captured, compared to 357,
807, and 106. US forces lost 33 killed, 108 wounded,
and five captured, a sharp decline from last week's
record 240, 470, and six. Casualty figures for the
27 November attack against the 7th Regiment (GVN) are
not included. Reported government losses during this
action were 226 killed (7 US); 400 wounded (9 US), and
50 missing (1 US). Viet Cong casualties are unknown.
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GVN/Allied Activities
5. The combined US-GVN operation in the Plei Me
area terminated, with no important contact after 19 No-
vember. A related GVN operation, THANH PHONG 7, ter-
minated on 27 November with the return of the airborne
brigade (GVN) to the Due Co Special Forces camp in
western Pleiku Province. Friendly casualties were 24
killed and 55 wounded. The Viet Cong lost 270 killed
(US body count), 11 captured, 57 weapons, and a large
quantity of medical supplies. A large-scale combined
operation, NEW LIFE, involving elements of the 173d Air-
borne Brigade (US), the 1st Infantry Division (US), and
the 10th Division (GVN), was initiated in Binh Tuy and
Long Khanh provinces to relieve Viet Cong pressure, pro-
tect the :rice harvest, and 'relocate inhabitants.
6. During the period 20-27 November, GVN/allied
operations of battalion or larger size again decreased
in number, from 93 to 82, with 36 contacts resulting. In
21,197 small-unit actions, there were 214 contacts; US
small-unit contacts again outnumbered those of the Viet-
namese, 158 to 56, although GVN forces conducted more
than eight times as many small-unit actions.
7. B-52 Stratofortress strikes were flown against
Viet Cong installations in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Binh
Tuy provinces, bringing the total of such raids to 96 at
the end of November. No significant naval activities
were reported; sea, river, and coastal forces searched
4,687 junks and 17,314 persons with negative r-esults.
Communist Activities
8. Military actions this week involved primarily
Viet Cong rather than PAVN forces. The scene of major
engagements shifted from Pleiku Province in II CTZ to
Binh Duong Province in III CTZ.
9. In the I CTZ, a regiment-size Communist force
attacked the GVN 37th Ranger Battalion near Ouang Ngai.
The ranger battalion lost 68 killed, 80 wounded, and three
missing as a result of the action. Viet Cong losses were
225 killed and 85 weapons seized. There is increasing
evidence that the 18th Regiment (PAVN) was involved in
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
~-i-I Sections of operable railroad
Sections of inoperable road
Note Routes are inoperable primarily
because of Viet Cong sabotage/
interdiction efforts
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the attack and had recently moved from northern Binh
Dinh Province to Quang Ngai Province. Other enemy activ-
ity in the I CTZ consisted of harassing fire directed
primarily against US Marines.
10, Major Viet Gong - initiated activities in the
II.Corps area consisted of battalion-size attacks against
a regional force company at Ngan Son and against an out-
post at Tuy An in Phu Yen Province, Initial reports
indicate that the Tuy An attack was conducted by elements
of the 3d VC Regiment and two PAVN companies, probably
from the 95th Regiment. Other Communist activity in the
II CTZ included small-scale attacks in Darlac, Binh Dinh,
and Phu Yen provinces.
11. On 27 November at the Michelin rubber plantation
in Binh Duong Province, III CTZ, the Viet Cong achieved
complete surprise in a dawn attack on the 7th Regiment
(GVN) as this three-battalion force was preparing to move
out to follow-up a B-52 strike. The Viet Cong delivered
mortar fire on friendly positions and overran the GVN
regiment's command post. The battalions were prevented
from going to the assistance of the regimental command
post by Viet Cong situated in well chosen blocking posi-
tions. The conflict lasted for approximately four hours,
after which the Viet Cong broke contact. The 1st and 3rd
battalions of the 7th Regiment were rendered ineffectiie,
and friendly casualties included the commanding officers
of 'the regiment and of the 1st and 3rd battalions.
12. Viet Cong activity in the IV CTZ continued at a
high level. Four attacks were made against lightly de-
fended outposts and bivouac areas. The airfield at Soc
Trang was subjected to a mortar attack, and throughout
the area the Viet Cong engaged in harassing fire and
sabotage incidents.
13, National. Route 1 is closed from Hoi An, Quang
Nam Province, to Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Province, and in
Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Hau Nghi.a provinces. In Quang
Tri Province, Route 9 is closed. Route 14 is closed in
Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long
provinces. Route 19 is closed west of Pleiku city. In
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Bien Hoa Province, Route 15 is closed. Interprovincial
Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces.
Provincial Route 10 is closed in Hau Nghia Province.
14. The national railroad is closed between Xuan Loc,
Long Khanh Province, and Song La Song, Binh Thuan Prov-
ince; between Suoi Dau and Nha Trang in Khanh Hoa Prov-
ince; between Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province, and Da Nang,
Quang Nam Province; and north of Hue, Thua Thien Province,
to the Demilitarized Zone.
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C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION
1. According to recent USOM reporting, 22 local
government officials were killed and 23 abducted dur-
ing the month of October, compared with 42 and 33,
respectively, in September. Between 1 January and
31 October, a total of 450 officials have been killed
and 709 kidnapped, These figures have fluctuated
considerably from month to month and no overall trend
is discernible.
2. In the Capital. Military Region during the
month of November, three hamlet officials were assas-
sinated by the Viet Cong; throughout the whole of
the Hop Tac area there were an additional three such
murders. This could be an indication that the Viet
Cong are attempting to further solidify their position
in areas immediately adjacent to Saigon.
3. As of 21 November, the total number of refugees
in South Vietnam stood at 727,901, with 266,502 of them
permanently resettled and the remainder in temporary
shelter areas. There are now a total of 250 temporary
refugee shelters operating throughout the country.
Since early October, only about 8,500 refugees have
been resettled while the total count of refugees has
risen by nearly 58,000.
3 October
21 November
Net Change
In temporary shelters:
42,OD0-
'461,399
; 39,399
Permanently resettled:
258,000
266,502
+ 8,502
Total:
670,000
727,901
+ 57,901
4. As shown by the preceding figures the rate of
refugee input has exceeded the rate of resettlement by
about six to one, with the burden of supporting the re-
fugees in temporary shelters falling directly on the
GVN as assisted by USOM. The only hopeful aspect in
the situation seems to be that if the rate of refugee
input butween 21 November and the end of the year does
not markedly exceed that of the period 3 October to
21 November (57,901), then the total number of refugees
will not reach the 1,000,000 mark that GVN-USOM officials
had been using as a planning figure.
5. Part of the trouble with the refugee problem
is the apparent inability of the GVN to fix a definitive
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refugee policy. USOM officials recently presented
to the Premier's office a draft refugee policy state-
ment that would, if adopted, centralize the refugee
relief functions within the GVN. At the present
time, the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Ministry
of Rural Construction have been instructed by Premier
Ky to work together on refugee relief pending a final
resolution of the procedural problem.
6. According to GVN statistics, the total number
of Chieu Hoi returnees for the past week was 556, a
drop of 471 from the previous week's total of 1,027.
The biggest fall-off was in the number of civilian
returnees, only 28 for the current reporting period
versus 413 for the previous period. Military returnees
totalled 407, as opposed to the 493 recorded in the
previous week. Communist political cadres who rallied
to the government side numbered 114, only one less
than the previous week. Draft dodgers/deserters num-
bered seven this week versus the six counted in the
previous reporting period.
7e According to a recent report from the con-
sulate at Hue, the security situation in Quang Tin
Province has deteriorated so badly in the past year
that the GVN is now in full control of only about 10
square kilometers--namely, the province capital of
Tam Ky and eight nearby hamlets. There are a total
of 426 hamlets in Quang Tin. Even the US Marine Corps
area of responsibility around Chu Lai is inhabited by
a substantially hostile population, and is subject to
continuing infiltration and small-unit harassment.
8. The province government estimates that at
the present time only about 37,200 out of a total
population of some 355,000 are living in secure
areas. The Viet Cong are believed to control 179,500,
including about 15,000 Montagnards in the extensive
mountainous areas of the province where the G'VN does
not even attempt 'to exert its influence,
9. Lines of communications in Quang Tin are de-
described generally as "open," which means in essence
that 'they are not physically impassable. Civilian
traffic is largely unmolested except for occasional
taxation stops. However, any military or government
traffic outside the immediate area of Tam Ky must move
by convoy preceded by a road-clearing operation.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
A. MILITARY
1. Six additional surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites were discovered in North Vietnam this week,
bringing the total to 52. Sites 47 through 49 were
discovered in the Haiphong area
bringing to ten the number of 6A-Z sites
e en ing is vital port city. Sites 47 and 48
extend SAM coverage over adjacent coastal waters in
the vicinity of Cat Ba Island where a number of naval
anchorage areas are located.
2. Sites 50 and 51
are from 24 to 28 miles
west-northwest of Hanoi, an number 51, is apparently
still under construction. The final site, number 52,
was detected in the Thanh Hoa area
3. US Air Force aircraft attacked the Dong Em
SAM support facility for the second time on 27 Novem-
ber. Preliminary pilot reports indicated that 17
buildings were destroyed, three damaged, and two cave
entrances hit with 3,000-pound bombs. This support
facility is the only one of its kind found to date in
North Vietnam. This type of installation normally
houses all the equipment needed for the transporting,
assembling, storing, maintaining, checking, and fuel-
ing of missiles. It also stores complete major mis-
sile components such as fins, boosters, warheads, and
bodies, as well as component parts replacements.
B. POLITICAL
1. Hanoi on 29 November announced that politburo
member Le Thanh Nghi had arrived in Peking as head of
an economic delegation that is also scheduled to visit
Moscow and Pyongyang. As yet, no details have emerged
from the negotiations in the Chinese capital, it
seems likely, however, that the DRV would be seeking
substantial and immediate help to repair the bomb
damage to its transportation routes, which in addition
to disrupting the inflow of needed equipment may also
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be interfering with the distribution of daily
necessities produced in North Vietnam such as
clothing and food.
2. In addition to immediate needs, Hanoi
may also be seeking commitments from its allies on
longer range programs such as the rebuilding of its
economy after the fighting stops. If this is part
of the current delegation's mission, there may be
some hard bargaining, since Peking--or Moscow, for
that matter--is not likely to be eager to commit
itself in detail at this point to a future recon-
struction program.
3. The difficulty Hanoi is apparently having
in arranging satisfactory aid commitments from its
allies can be measured in part by the fact that Nghi
made a similar jaunt less than six months ago. This
suggests either that there has been some difficulty
in implementing the agreements reached then, or that
the situation in North Vietnam has deteriorated to
such an extent recently that supplementary aid is
now considered necessary. However, it is also possi-
ble that Nghi is making an effort to gain better co-
ordination between Moscow and Peking in the assistance
they are rendering his country. A 28 November Pravda
editorial pointed up the serious effect that the poor
relations between the two bloc giants is having on
Vietnam. The editorial accused the Chinese of hamper-
ing the efforts of the Vietnamese Communists, and of
aiding the US by subverting Communist unity and re-
fusing to cooperate with Moscow. Describing the
Chinese as "super-revolutionaries," Moscow reasserted
its claim that proposals for joint action against
"imperialism" have been consistently rejected by
Peking,
4. Peking this week continued to give heavy
propaganda attention to protests in the US against
American policy in Vietnam. The People's Daily on
29 November asserted that the protest marc in Wash-
ington on 27 November shows that the American people
"have begun to feel that they can no longer tolerate
the Johnson administration's policy of escalating the
war" in Vietnam. The article declared that the present
anti-war movement in the US "is quite different" from
previous peace campaigns in that it does not stop at
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demanding peace in general terms "but clearly directs
its fire at the US ruling circle's policies of aggres-
sion and war."
5. Although Peking almost certainly holds an
exaggerated impression of the strength and influence
of the Vietnam protest movement in the US, the Chinese
have indicated that they believe the movement will
have a long-range rather than an immediate effect on
US policy in Vietnam. Peking probably hopes its heavy
coverage of the protest movement will help bolster the
morale of the Vietnamese Communists.
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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. KHMER SEREI
1. Ambassador Martin, in reply to State Depart-
ment instructions to the US embassies in Bangkok and
Saigon on Thai and Vietnamese support of Khmer Serei
activities against Cambodia, reports that he is pre-
pared to make representations to the prime minister
but would prefer Thanom to wait until Ambassador
Lodge talks to Premier Ky since the GVN role is the
most critical. Martin notes that the Thais continue
to believe that the US supports Khmer Serei efforts,
if only because they feel that the US could stop the
entire affair if it wished. Martin also feels that
without strong GVN backing of the Khmer Serei, the
Thais are not likely to give anything more than
nominal support.
2. In conversations with Deputy Ambassador
Porter, Premier Ky stated that he had learned after
assuming office that considerable sums of money were
being paid to the Khmer Serei and that he was puzzled
by this since he saw no tangible benefits. He said
that although he had agreed at the time to continue
supporting the Khmer Serei, he also had made it clear
that the support was temporary. Ky promised Porter
that he would review the entire question and suspend
GVN support, including weapons.
B. CAMBODIA
Secretary General Thinh of the GVN Foreign Min-
istry informed the US Embassy in Saigon that the
Cambodian prime minister had told the GVN through the
ICRC that it was interested in sending a delegation
to Saigon to discuss the possibility of exchanging
prisoners. Thinh has the impression that the Cam-
bodians are thinking of exchanging all Vietnamese
prisoners for all Cambodian prisoners. This is es-
pecially desirable from the Vietnamese standpoint
because of the number of Vietnamese now under death
sentence in Cambodia. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do
also told our Embassy that this development is another
indication that Sihanouk was shifting toward a more
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friendly policy, partly because of recent US/GVN
military successes. Do indicated that the GVN is
prepared to be receptive to these overtures.
C. DIPLOMATIC ASSIGNMENTS
1. The US Embassy in Saigon reports that another
indication of the extreme paucity of qualified Viet-
namese diplomatic personnel came to light last week.
Although Secretary General Thinh of the Foreign Min-
istry told an Embassy officer that he is scheduled
to be assigned to Geneva to open the Vietnamese mis-
sion there, Foreign Minister Do was apparently torn
between assigning him to Geneva or to London to replace
Ambassador Vu Van Mau, and was also concerned over a
suitable replacement for Thinh in the Foreign Ministry.
In any event, both Do and Thinh fear that, if he does
not leave soon for Geneva, the military leadership will
probably find an unqualified military officer for the
Geneva post.
D. FREE WORLD AID
2. IRAN. The Iranian Government and the Iranian
Red Lion andSun Society are preparing to send a
medical team consisting of a surgeon, an assistant
surgeon, and 20 nurses.
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
SECRET
WEEKLY REPORT
20 NOV - 27 NOV
PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, PTURED)
GOVERNMENT
Jan I Feb I Mar I Apr I May I Junel July I Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec I
Wounded not included Such figures unavailable on Viet Cong.
WEAPONS LOSSES
I Jan ; Feb I 'Mar I Apr I May I June I July
Aug I Sept I Oct I Novli?ec I
Jan Feb I Mar I Apr I May I June I July I Aug I Septl Oct I Nov I Dec I
Q,rnrI ; 7orrnr
SECRET
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US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
I JAN I FEB MAR I APR
MAY JUNE I JUL I AUG
VIET CONG ATTACKS
SEPT, OCT NOV I DEC
- Company and battalion sized attacks
IU,
-- Battalion sized (and larger)ottacks only
s
/T
N, V
R 2
EM
E
"
N
1
il
1
JAN I FEB
MAR I APR MAY
I JUNE JUL AUG SEPT ~ OCT NOV DEC
Fatalities
Non- fatal
Non
- fatal
Wound
s
Wounds
Cumulative, 1961. 1964 255 1524
-
Fat
alities
Cumulative, 1965 to date 1064 4523
Total 1319 6047
(Figures do not include 110corried as missing
or 27 carried as captured.)
1
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I
I
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R
2 N
V M
E
I
2
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I
1
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I
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