THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001700060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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voi C 0
MONTHLY REPORT
OCI No.0622/65
Copy No. '
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
4 June 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE 25X1
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GROUP I
Excluded from matorriatJ
downgrading and d.cIoikation
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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Nrif
I. SOUTH VIETNAM MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Political tension in Saigon has reached its
highest point since the installation of the Quat
government with a cabinet crisis following upon the
heels of preclusive police action against an al-
leged coup plot, the details of which are still to
be made clear. The cabinet crisis stems directly
from Chief of State Sun's refusal to approve
Premier Quat's dismissal of certain ministers and
accordingly to confirm their replacements on the
grounds that 'Watts procedure is not in accordance
with the provisional constitution. In challeng-
ing the basic powers of the premier to hire and
fire his ministers, Sun created a situation which
could immobilize Quat's administration and shatter
the political stability of the past few months.
2. Quat, who showed considerable finesse
when he effected the dissolution of the Armed
Forces Council (AFC) earlier in May, seems to
have underestimated Sun's determination to main-
tain his position. Sun may well be overly con-
cerned with constitutional niceties, particularly
to the degree that these affect the prerogatives
of the chief of state.
Moreover, Sun's concern with such mat-
ters is not new; in late 1964, his refusal to ap-
prove a decision of the military to force the re-
tirement of several top generals was a major factor
precipitating the political crisis during which
General Khanh dissolved the High National Council.
Whatever Sun's motives, there is no doubt that he
has been influenced by self-seeking politicians
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No"
around him and by two of the outgoing ministers,
Hiep of Interior and Vinh of Economy. Together,
these elements appear to be using the vagueness
of the premier's constitutional powers to embarass
Quat and possibly overthrow the government. Hiep,
a VNQDD party leader, and Vinh, a Catholic, have
refused to resign and have apparently attempted
to arouse public opinion against Quat.
3. The cabinet crisis has been compounded
by the militaft position taken by the Catholic
minority and by the lingering uncertainties be-
hind recent government claims that it squelched
a coup plot by Colonel Thao and General Phat ac-
cused of consorting with the Viet Cong. Taking
advantage of the crisis, certain militant north-
ern Catholic refugee elements have publicly charged
Quat with religious discrimination and have peti-
tioned Suu to remove the "illegal" Quat govern-
ment and establish "a government that all religions
can support." Catholic criticism of Quat has
grown over the past month or so, based on accusa-
tions that the Quat leadership is Buddhist-con-
trolled, is discriminating against Catholic civil
and military officials, and is more interested in
negotiating with the Communists than in pursuing
the war. In the meantime, government attempts to
clarify charges of recent coup plotting have
raised more questions than they have answered.
Despite little evidence to support its charges,
the government has used the alleged plot to ef-
fect certain personnel changes in the military
and others may follow soon. Whatever the real
story, Thao and Phat, under death sentence but
still at large since their involvement in the
abortive coup last February, probably have some
followers within the armed forces and support
among their Catholic co-religionists and might
seek to exploit the tense atmosphere created by
-the cabinet crisis.
4. Despite recent attempts to moderate the
situation, the situation remains in doubt. There
are some immediate indications that Sun has modi-
fied his position and has agreed to the relief of
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140, -imp/
the incumbent ministers of interior and economy
if the National Legislative Council (NLC) approves
such a recommendation by the premier. Whether
this formula will in fact lead to solution of the
deadlock, of course depends on how the NLC votes
and whether Suu keeps his promise. While Chieu
and the NLC claim to side with Quat on the consti-
tutionality of his actions, Chien and his col-
leagues appear more inclined to seek a compromise
between Suu and Quat than to force the issue.
There is also evidence of regional factionalism
within the NLC.
5. Should this formula fail and Quat capitu-
late, he may set a precedent that could immobilize
his administration. Most of the generals and
Buddhist leaders are believed to support the gov-
ernment, but there have as yet been no real indi-
cation of the views of many of them on the present
crisis. Despite voluntary dissolution of the
Armed Forces Council, the generals almost certainly
continue to look upon the armed forces as having
a "watchdog" responsibility with respect to the
government. Should Quat be unable to contain the
crisis, he cannot be entirely certain that inter-
vention by the military would be in his behalf or
that, if it were, the generals would remain con-
tent with restoring him to full power once they
had "resolved" the crisis. Finally, the Buddhist
leadership, though somewhat discontented with Quat
in recent weeks, probably still feel that they
can work with him. However, should Quat appear
too acquiescent to Catholic pressures, he might
well lose the support of the Buddhists whose
suspicions of the Catholic leadership are again
on the rise.
Economic Situation
Rice prices remained high during the month
and rice deliveries to Saigon from the Mekong
delta continued to be below normal in quantity.
Viet Cong interdiction of traffic on most roads
leading out of Saigon, together with sabotage of
electric power lines from the Da Nhim dam to
Saigon were further moves to harass the capital
and cut communications between Saigon and the
areas to the north.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. The violence of Viet Cong actions was greater
in May than in any month this year. Despite rela-
tively few attacks, the enemy conducted more suc-
cessful company-size or larger actions during the
month than in any other month this year.
The Viet Cong fully demonstrated their tacti-
cal flexibility by altering somewhat the pattern and
location of their activities. The Viet Cong mounted
a high rate of terrorism throughout the nation, but
at the same time increased the emphasis on inter-
diction of land lines of communications. Highly suc-
cessful attacks and ambushes of government troop
convoys were more frequent and acts of sabotage in
general more than doubled that of April. Major por-
tions of the coastal transportation routes in I and
II Corps remained closed to through traffic. Ben
Cat, 25 miles to the north of Saigon, is virtually
isolated by road, leading COMUSMACV to speculate
that the town may be a possible Viet Cong objective
in the near future.
In total number of incidents, the southern-
most rv Corps sector reported the greatest amount,
while the northern I Corps zone had the fewest.
However, the provinces immediately north and north-
east of Saigon experienced the greatest intensity
during the month with several highly successful
large-scale Communist ambushes of government convoys.
This activity was capped by a Viet Cong attack on
Song Be, the provincial capital of Phuoc Long Prov-
ince, which was costly to both sides.
During the last few days in May, the Viet
Cong sharply intensified their activities and dra-
matically shifted the focus northward, principally
to the coastal areas of I and II Corps. Several at-
tacks and ambushes were reported this past week,
some in multiple battalion strength. One Communist
attack directed against Ba Gia in Quang Ngai Province
was carried out in regimental strength.
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.
Despite the sudden shift away from Saigon
to the northern provinces, there is evidence of
a sizable concentration of Viet Cong just to the
north of Saigon, centered principally in War Zone D.
There are also indications that the Communists in
the area are improving their tactical capabilities,
and the tempo of the war around the periphery of
Hop Tac could again erupt without warning.
The prospects of further intensification
of the war appears likely, with the greatest enemy
effort focused in the highlands. The pattern of
the enemy's recent attacks and interdiction efforts
against major transportation routes suggests an at-
tempt to tie down large portions of friendly forces
around Saigon and in the coastal region, possibly
in order to isolate the highland interior provinces.
The bulk of the enemy main force Still has not been
committed to the offensive and thus poses a signifi-
cant threat throughout the nation, but especially
in the area comprising Viet Cong Military Region 5.
The Viet Cong can be expected to attack at times
and places of their choosing and to extract maximum
tactical advantage from the summer monsoon weather,
a factor which is already beginning to affect air
operations over South Vietnam.
2. Government operational activity was main-
tained at a fairly constant pace throughout the
month. Several significant Viet Cong contacts were
made which resulted in government victories, how-
ever, the great bulk of friendly initiated opera-
tions failed to contact the enemy.
The several successful Viet Cong ambushes
of government convoys during the month has led
COMUSMACV to stress ambush countermeasures through-
out the country. As a result, there has been some
improvement noted in recent weeks. A few ARVN
commanders have demonstrated that they are capable
of turning the tables on enemy ambushes through the
employment of sound tactics.
Compared to the start of the rainy season
one year ago, the former tendency of ARVN to remain
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in a defensive posture around province capitals,
district 'towns and key military installations is
gradually being replaced with a more aggressive
spirit, according to COMUSMACV. In contrast to
past periods when Viet Cong activity was high, this
represents a major improvement and reflects a favor-
able response to US advice for aggressive operations'
to spoil enemy attacks.
3. Statistically, the figures for May tend to
favor the Viet Cong. (See Annex A for figures.)
While the KIA ratio continued to favor the govern-
ment, the Viet Cong KIA figures for May remained
relatively constant when compared to April's figures.
On the other hand, the government's KIA increased
moderately from April's total. This becomes signifi-
cant when viewed in the light of an increased tempo
of enemy initiated activity during the month. (It
should be noted that Viet Cong KIA figures are ob-
tained from ARVN and are supposed to be based on
body count.) The weapon loss ratio favors the Viet
Cong by approximately 1.8:1, reversing April's
ratio which favored the government. Viet Cong mili-
tary defectors totaled over 860, the highest number
on record for a single month.
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C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
1. On a nationwide basis, Rural Reconstruc-
tion efforts achieved few significant results dur-
ing May. In I and II Corps areas, in fact, the de-
terioration apparent since January continued in
May despite the relatively low level of Viet Cong
activity. Only in the Hop Tac area itself, and in
scattered districts in IV Corps, were any gains re-
ported during the past month.
2. In the Hop Tac area, satisfactory operation
of the resources control program continued. Clear-
ing operations are proceeding in the Zone C area of
Hop Tac, Securing in Zone B, and development in Zone
A, but operations are behind schedule and the Viet
Cong continue fairly active in the area. Limited
gains in population control in some provinces of III
and IV corps appear primarily due to population re-
settlement from insecure areas or reevaluation of
census estimates.
3. The refugee population in the eight north-
ern coastal provinces stands at about 214,300. How-
ever, increases during the month in Quang Tri, Quang
Nam, and Quang Tin were partially offset by a drop
in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces. In the latter
province, the decrease was attributed to recruitment
among males for the paramilitary forces and to the
return of some refugees to their former homes after
government forces cleared the areas of Viet Cong
main force units. The relief burden, however, con-
tinues heavy on the Social Welfare Ministry, and
has been abetted by new pockets of refugees in Lam
Dong and Phuoc Long Provinces of III Corps, which
were hard hit by Viet Cong actions during the month.
4. Government civic action programs in most
areas continue to be hampered by problems of coor-
dination at the ministerial level in Saigon, by lack of
trained or well-motivated cadres, and by conscrip-
tion of civil cadres for the armed services.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet Union continued throughout the month
to supply Military assistance to North Vietnam.
Photography revealed that missile-associated equip-
ment and jet fighters, presumed to be Soviet-supplied,
had arrived. In addition a number of airfields have
been improved for use by jet aircraft. The inven-
tory of North Vietnamese jet fighter aircraft now
stands at a minimum of 63. In addition, IL-28 jet
light bombers began to arrive at Phuc Yen airfield
in late May. Three missile sites are now known to
be under construction around Hanoi. The first site,
detected in early April, appears to be nearing com-
pletion; it is occupied with missile-associated
equipment.
B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
In line with its increased military assistance
to North Vietnam and as a part of its effort to re-
assert the Soviet presence in Communist Asia, the
Soviet Union also concluded a military aid agreement
with North Korea on 31 May. These Soviet overtures
appear to have contributed to an improvement in the
USSR's position in both Hanoi and Pyongyang. Neither
North Korea nor North Vietnam has echoed Peiping's
reopening of the polemic attack on the USSR. None
of the recent Peiping editorials critical of Soviet
policy on Vietnam have been published in North Viet-
nam or North Korea.
The Communist attitude toward negotiations
showed little sign of change during May, and Hanoi
vehemently rejected what it called US demands that
Viet Cong attacks be halted in the South as a condi-
tion for continuing the mid-May "pause" in US
strikes. During that time--on 18 May, Hanoi's chief
representative, in Paris, Mai Van Bo, called on the
French Foreign Ministry and emphasized, under in-
structions, that Pham Van Dong's four-point proposal
of 8 April amounted to "working principles for
negotiation" and did not constitute "prior conditions."
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4,111.0 /ftr
Bo indicated, however, that "recognition" of these
principles,--which include settlement according to
the program of the Viet Cong's National Liberation
Front--was necessary to create favorable conditions
for an agreement. Mai Van Bo's approach was prob-
ably designed in part to indicate that the DRV
position on negotiations is not rigid and that Hanoi
wishes to give at least the impression that it is
interested in exploring possibilities for discussion
on the Vietnamese problem.
Peiping treated the subject of negotiations sev-
eral times in its propaganda in early May. A brief
reference was made in a People's Daily editorial on
VE Day celebrations and was followed up by a Lo
Jui-ching Red Flag article on 10 May. Both times
the Chinese admitted that under some conditions
negotiations with imperialist countries are "necessary
for the interests of the people and the revolution."
The main emphasis of the articles, however, was on
the dangers involved in dealing with "perfidious"
imperialist powers and the need for extreme caution
and firm resolution in such circumstances. On 28 May
Peiping Radio broadcast excerpts from an interview
of Foreign Minister Chen Yi with a French correspondent
in early May. Chen reiterated that the Chinese were
not opposed to negotiations as such, but that Peiping
regarded the "unconditional discussions" proposed
by President Johnson as nothing more than a US at-
tempt to buy a "breathing space" in the war. Al-
though these references may be intended to answer
charges put forward by the Soviets that the Chinese
are intransigent war maniacs, they do put the Chi-
nese on the record as being willing to negotiate
under some circumstances. All of these references
have been sufficiently vague to permit a variety of
interpretations, and put the Chinese, at least publicly,
more in line with the somewhat flexible Vietnamese
position on negotiations.
Jltk...KC I
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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
1. The GVN intensified the drive to improve
its diplomatic image by sending goodwill missions
abroad in May. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do headed
a delegation to New Delhi and Bangkok in' early May.
Indian officials have stated that Do's visit gave
them a better understanding of the situation in
Vietnam, and of the varied problems facing the GVN.
They have indicated that the Indian Government will
oppose the seating of the NFLSVN at the Afro-Asian
Conference and support Saigon's participation in
the conference as the government of South Vietnam.
2. Deputy Premier Tran Van Tuyen resumed his
goodwill trip to Africa in May (it was tut short in
April by political developments in Saigon), visit-
ing the UAR, the Malagasy Republic, Kenya, and
Ethiopia. Tuyen and other GVN officials have in-
dicated that the visits in April and May were
highly successful, particularly in Malagasy, Sene-
gal, the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia. In response
to Emperor Haile Selassie's wish, the GVN will open
an embassy in Ethiopia shortly; Nguyen Van Thinh,
designated Counselor of Embassy in Addis Ababa,
will depart Saigon on June 3 whereas VinhTho,
ambassador-designate will leave Saigon next week.
3. Vinh Tho, Secretary General of the Foreign
Office, told a US Embassy officer that the GVN
doubted the utility of an official goodwill trip
to Malaysia, Burma, and Pakistan but that they were
seriously considering a trip around Southeast Asia
and the Middle East.
B. AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
According to the press, Foreign Minister Do
will head the GVN delegation to the Foreign Minis-
ters' meeting of the Afro-Asian Conference to be
held in Algiers on 24 June, while Prime Minister Quat
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will head the delegation to the heads of govern-
ment meeting beginning on 29 June. In preparation
for the conference the GVN representatives will
contact Japan, Morocco, Iran, and other moderate
African countries to enlist their support for
Saigon's participation in the conference as the
government of South Vietnam and for the exclusion
of the NFLSVN at the conference.
C. FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE
1. Philippines. In response to a GVN re-
quest for additional assistance4 the Macapagal
administration has introduced a bill (HB 17828)
to Congress asking for 25 million pesos (US$ 6.58
million) to send an engineering battalion with
necessary security troops to South Vietnam. The
proposal handily passed the House on 12 May, but
no final action has yet been taken in the Senate
owing mainly to Nactionalista opposition. Al-
though President Macapagal has promised to re-
certify the bill to the Senate as a result of a
recommendation by the bipartisan National Security
Council, the ultimate decision of the Senate is
still uncertain. Macapagal has also approved the
use of US bases in the Philippines and the Manila
International Airport for Australian troop move-
ments to South Vietnam.
2, Australia. Some 100 Australian troops
arrived in South Vietnam on 2 June, in advance of
an 800-man infantry battalion which may be at-
tached to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade to defend
Bien Hoa or Vung Tau and serve as a mobile reserve
force.
3. New Zealand. On 28 May, the New Zealand
Government won a vote of confidence in the Parlia-
ment (39-33 votes) on its decision to send an
artillery battery to South Vietnam, The New Zea-
land Chief of the General Staff announced on 30 May
that the unit would arrive in South Vietnam within
several weeks.
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4. South Korea. On 17 May General Howze,
CINCUNC, informed Prime Minister Chong that he
had received authority to release from his oper-
ational control 281 ROK army personnel (an in-
fantry company) to augment the ROK forces in
South Vietnam.
5. Republic of China. In view of Father
Hoa's recent admission to US officials in Saigon ?
that he has indicated to GRC political warfare
advisers his interest in augmenting his forces
in Hai Yen with additional GRC military person-
nel, it is assumed that Taipei is aware of the
request. In the meantime, China News, the of-
ficial GRC news agency announced on 21 May that,
according to shipping business circles in Taipei,
Chinese shipping companies have-decided to assign
more Chinese commercial vessels for service to
Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and other ports to help ex-
pedite the shipment of US supplies to the cen-
tral provinces of South Vietnam.
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
WEEKLY REPORT
PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED) *
1000
500
0
2000
1500
1000
I I I I I I I
GOVERNMENT
VIET CONG
B1
52
2
3
IJAN
FEB MAR I APR I MAY J JNE
*WOUNDED NOT INCLUDED, SUCH FIGURES UNAVAILABLE ON VIET CONG
JUL
AUG I SEPT OCT NOV I DEC
WEAPONS LOSSES
GOVERNMENT
VIET CONG
500
2
JAN FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUNE JUL
AUG
VIET CONG ACTIVITIES
JAN
65 06 03
FEB
ATTACKS
APR
JUNE
JUL
AUG
SEPT
SEPT
TERRORISM SABOTAGE El PROPAGANDA III ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE
SECRET
OCT
OCT
NOV
NOV
DEC I
DEC
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2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTH LY REPORT
SECRET
VIET CONG*
GOVT
I. CASUALTIES
J FMAMJ J A SOND J FMAMJ J A SOND
1962 1963
*Wounded riot included. Viet Cong figures unavailable.
65 05 20 - 3A
2398
II
1590
J FMAMJ J A SOND J FMAMJ J ASOND
1964 1965
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3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
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111[1111
TOTAL INCIDENTS*
? ATTACKS
55 05 20 - 313
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT
II. INCIDENTS - VIET CONG
MAMJ J A SOND J FMAMJ ASOND
1962 1963
(\i
J FMAMJ i ASOND
1964
*comprises terrorism, sabotage, propaganda, and antiaircraft fire in addition to armed attacks.
120i1G2c ,^/tAY
.1 FMAMJ J ASOND
1965
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT
GOVERNMENT
VIET CONG
J FMAMJJASOND
1962
6505 20 -3C
III. WEAPONS LOSSES - VIETNAM and VIET CONG
J FMAMJ J A SOND
1963
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13
86
91
J FMAMJJASOND JFMAMJ JAsOND
1964
1965
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SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY BOUNDARIES
As of 8 March 1965
Corps boundary
HON PANJANG
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Special zone boundary
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Hop Tac area
46993
0 2'5 50 75 190 Miles
I ., 1.1 ?
,
r"'
0 25 5.0 75 100 Kilometers
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
4 NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE ,,,,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001700060001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A00170006000117
'gore NNW
SECRET
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001700060001-7