THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001700040003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 14, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No.0615/65
Copy No.
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
14 April 1965
ARMY, DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE 25X1
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
down .ding and declassification
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OCI No. 0615/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(8 April -- 14 April 1965)
C O N T ENT S
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE iv
Map, South Vietnam, following page
I. SITUATI
ON WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
1
A. POLITIC
AL SITUATION
1
Provisional replacement of naval
commander Admiral Cang upsets military
and political balance (p. 1); Premier
Quat hopes to exert greater control
over armed forces (p. 1); Catholic
fear of Buddhist hand in recent events
reflected by Catholic hierarchy in
Saigon (p. 2); Buddhists refrain from
overt political involvement (p. 2);
President Johnson's address welcomed
by GVN officials and Saigon press
(p. 3); Military tribunal sentences
terrorists (p. 4); Da Nang's harbor
channel is opened (p. 4); No improve-
ment has been made in urban rice
situation (p. 4)
B. MILITARY SITUATION 5
Two of three large-scale Viet Cong
attacks turned into significant
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Communist defeats (p. 5); Viet Cong
retain capability of striking in
force at times and places of their
choosing (p. 5); Some indications
noted Viet Cong are feeling effects
of long war (p. 5); Also some evi-
dence Viet Cong being given minimum
training before assignment (p. 6);
Recent GVN military achievement may
be tonic for ARVN (p. 8); For first
time both enemy casualties and
weapon losses surpass those of gov-
ernment forces (p. 8).
C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION 8
Little progress made in rural recon-
struction effort (p. 8); Central
Vietnam continues to be faced with
refugee problem (p. 8); Hop Tac
program reportedly has lost ground
during past two weeks (p. 9).
II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 10
World reaction to President Johnson's
speech was generally favorable (p. 10);
Cambodian press reports a Cambodian
was killed by GVN forces on Cambodian
territory (p. 10).
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 12
Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow denounce
President Johnson's offer for uncon-
ditional talks (p. 12); Communist
China, North Vietnam and Liberation
Front reject nonaligned 17 nations'
conference proposal (p. 14); North
Vietnam has not changed its terms for
over-all settlement (p. 14); Communist
China maintains public position that
"Vietnamese people" must settle Viet-
nam problem (p. 15); Soviet Union's
attitude reflects pressures for support
of Hanoi and Soviet regard for USSR-US
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relations(p. 16); US-GVN air-
strikes on 3 and 4 April evoked
first intervention by enemy air-
craft (p. 16); SAM site under con-
struction southeast of Hanoi (p. 16).
]Page
The Weekly Report on the Situation in South
Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA,
and IMft edited and published by CIA without final
coordination. A fully coordinated Monthly Report
is disseminated the first Friday of each month.
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Last week's naval mutiny in Saigon, which led to the
provisional replacement of naval commander Admiral
Cang, has had unsettling effects on both the military and
political equilibrium. It has set a possible precedent for
junior officers to take matters into their own hands. In
addition, the suspension of both Cang and of Saigon area
commander General Dong, accused of encouraging gambling,
has raised Catholic fears of a Buddhist-inspired military
purge. Cang is Catholic and Dong reacted firmly to Bud-
dhist street agitation against the former Huong government.
Premier Quat, who considers Dong a troublemaker,
and probably encouraged his suspension, now hopes to
carry out a major command reorganization to bring the
military under tighter civilian control. Quat's proposals,
which would leave only one Catholic officer in a top com-
mand post, could risk a serious Catholic reaction if not
the eventual opposition of the military in general. Al-
though it is possible that the views of the Buddhist hierarchy
have influenced Quat's thinking, the Buddhist clergy con-
tinues to refrain from open political activity except for the
further promotion of anti-Communist themes among their
followers.
The Viet Cong, despite recent government military
successes which may have caused a temporary disruption
of enemy plans in some areas, retain the capability of
striking in force at times and places of their choosing and
of maintaining a high rate of violence throughout the nation.
The reported buildup of Communist forces and the advent
of the rainy season, which favors the Viet Cong, indicates
that a major effort can still be expected. The Viet Cong
probably consider that successes are now required to offset
both recent reverses and increased US participation in the
war.
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1. THE SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. A mutiny, staged on 8 April by a group of
fleet commanders against navy chief Rear Admiral
Chung Tan Cang, resulted in the latter's suspension
by Armed Forces commander General Minh. The inci-
dent may well have further repercussions within
the military establishment and within the currently
delicate political alignment.
2. The complaints against Cang concerned pri-
marily his involvement in kickbacks from coastal
shipping contracts under his control. Opportunism
among his subordinates, taking advantage of his
apparent loyalty to ousted General Khanh, was also
a factor. A three-man military board of inquiry
is now looking into the charges of corruption
against Cang, as well as into charges of irregu-
larities by General Pham Van Dong, who was simul-
taneously suspended from the position of Saigon
area commander at the behest of Premier Quat. Mean-
while, Marine Brigade commander General Khang has
been named acting naval commander and Dong has been
replaced temporarily by his somewhat controversial
deputy, Colonel Lam Son.
3. The mutiny and subsequent investigations
have created further uneasiness in two areas.
The danger of setting a precedent for future action
by junior officers--many of whom have been reported
restless over the political opportunism of their
superiors--has not been lost on the generals,
some of whom otherwise favored Cang's ouster. In
addition, some circles view the episode as one
step in a broader power struggle, particularly
on the part of Air Vice Marshal Ky and I Corps
commander General Thi. Ky has publicly referred
to the presence of "bad elements" in the Armed
Forces Council.
4. Premier Quat, long concerned over the
problem of military infighting, has indicated that
he now hopes to take measures to exert greater
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control over the armed forces. He envisages a
reorganization of the command structure to elimi-
nate the positions of commander in chief and
chief of staff. This would be primarily a de-
vice to "dispose" of Generals "Little" Minh and
Huynh Van Cao, whom he considers uninspiring.
They would be replaced with a single chief of
the Joint General Staff, for whom Quat has no defi-
nite candidate. At the same time, Quat hopes to
increase the responsibilities of Vice Premier and
Armed Forces Minister General Thieu, whom he re-
gards as a capable officer. Eventually, Quat hopes
to dissolve the Armed Forces Council, now a po-
tential rival authority.
5. Quat?s proposals, in conjunction with the
suspension of Admiral Cang and General Dong--a
Catholic and Catholic sympathizer respectively--
would have the effect of removing Catholic influ-
ence from the top military echelons, except for
the presence of General Thieu. Although he has
publicly stressed that the suspensions have no
religious connotations, Quat is clearly running
some risk of a Catholic reaction. His ultimate
goal of extending his control over the military
could lead to conflict with the generals as a group.
6. Catholic fear of a Buddhist hand in recent
events is reflected by a reported appeal to Quat
by the Catholic hierarchy in Saigon to prevent a
general purge of Catholic military officers.
General Dong, whom Quat suspects of stirring up
Catholic circles, has privately described the
charges against himself as trumped up, implying
that they represent a Buddhist - Viet Cong con-
spiracy to seize control. The possibility of a
Catholic-instigated coup attempt cannot be fully
disregarded in view of the contacts maintained
by militant Catholic refugee circles with ring-
leaders of the abortive 19 February coup, who
are still at large in the Saigon area.
7. Although the possibility exists that Bud-
dhist influence was exerted, either indirectly
upon Quat or through sympathetic officers, in the
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suspension of Cang and Dong, the Buddhist hierarchy
continues to refrain from overt political involve-
ment. Buddhist efforts to develop a more openly
anti-Communist posture remained evident during the
week. Criticism of Viet Cong oppressive tactics
was voiced by monks, laymen, and students alike at
a 10 April reception by the Saigon University Bud-
dhist Student Association. A speech by Thich Tam
Chau, head of the Buddhist Institute, exhorted
Buddhist worshipers to tighten their ranks against
the Communist threat. Chau's speech, however, also
contained some references to the continued pre-
sence of "Diemist remnants" and warned that, if
these elements sought revenge against Buddhism,
thev would be combated a o- with the Communists
implied that the Catholics
were opposing land reform, and stressing instead
less urgent political reforms.
did express support for the government s dec s on
to hold elections on 30 May for municipal and
provincial elections. Quat's cabinet has also
recently taken some economic decisions calculated
to increase support from organized labor.
8. South Vietnamese officials, and the Saigon
press in general, have welcomed President Johnson's
Baltimore speech as a reaffirmation of a firm US
commitment to the country's defense. The US Em-
bassy observes that the speech has provided a further
lift to morale. Although there were some expres-
sions of uneasiness in the Catholic press, and in
statements attributed to Foreign Minister Than Van
Do, over the offer to entertain "unconditional
discussions," Premier Quat's public statements
have softened the effect. He stressed the US
pledge of support and noted that the US merely at-
tached no conditions to discussions which could
lead to peace, as opposed to a peace settlement.
Quat further hailed the US proposal of cooperative
aid to Southeast Asia as a means of "stemming the
Red tide." In contrast, some other Saigon comments
have indicated concern over any inclusion of North
Vietnam in the project.
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9. A military tribunal on 9 April sentenced
to death Nguyen Van Hai, the terrorist captured in
the recent bombing of the US Embassy. A death
sentence was also meted to another terrorist, cap-
tured earlier with explosives, and a possible ac-'
complice of Hai received five years at hard labor.
Despite normal procedure, in which the death sen-
tence is carried out within 48 hours, no date was
set for Hai's execution. Premier Quat had indicated
his full sympathy with the need to delay the execu-
tion in view of the Viet Cong threat to retaliate
against a US civilian official in their hands.
Clemency can be authorized by Chief of State Suu,
or Hai may possibly be held temporarily for further
questioning, as was done with a terrorist similarly
sentenced in Da Nang. Meanwhile, evidence has ac-
cumulated that another US civilian, a USOM provincial
representative captured by the Viet Cong last August,
was shot and killed by the Viet Cong in January
when he was discovered trying to escape.
Economic Situation
10. Initial work on the dredging of Da Nang's
harbor channel was completed last week. A channel
35 meters wide was opened; dredging will continue
until the channel, which was severely silted during
last fall's floods, is 90 meters wide. The GVN
also signed contracts for two transportation sur-
veys. One calls for a comprehensive technical
and economic study of transport facilities, includ-
ing rail, road, and port requirements. The second
contract provides for study of port facilities and
shipping for the major coastal ports, including
Saigon, and some inland ports.
There has been no improvement in the urban
rice situation: rice deliveries to Saigon remain
unseasonally low, and the price rose again. The
implementation and effectiveness of planned mili-
tary sweeps to provide security for rice shipments
remains unknown.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. Although there was a moderate rise in Viet
Cong activities last week, Communist military suc-
cesses were limited. Two of the three reported
large-scale Viet Cong attacks were turned into signif-
icant Communist defeats. Despite some indications
that the Viet Cong are suffering from effective
US-GVN assaults, they remain capable of intensifying
the war when and where they choose.
Communist-initiated activity increased in
I and IV Corps but remained at the low level of the
previous week in II and III Corps. Two company-size
attacks were reported from I Corps: On 7 April a
Viet Cong company simultaneously attacked two New
Rural Life hamlets in Quang Tin Province and on
8 April, in Quang Ngai Province, a Viet Cong company-
size attack force suffered greater losses than the
Popular Forces platoon it ambushed. A determined
Viet Cong battalion-size attack against a South
Vietnamese marine battalion bivouacked along Route 1
was turned into a significant Communist defeat.
The marines combined a strong defense with an ag-
gressive counterattack to kill 205 Viet Cong while
losing only four killed and 22 wounded. Almost all
of the Viet Cong were killed by well-disciplined
small arms fire in this purely infantry engagement.
Enemy activity in the delta picked up noticeably
but consisted mostly of small-scale activities.
In Kien Giang, a Viet Cong force overran and com-
pletely leveled an outpost manned by 55 paramilitary
forces. Only four in the garrison escaped and the
others, along with their weapons, are missing. De-
spite the overall increase in Communist-initiated
activity last week, the pattern remained unchanged.
There are some indications that the Viet
Cong are feeling the effects of the long war. The
number of Viet Cong military personnel returning
to government control under the Chieu Hoi Program,
while still modest, has reached its highest level
since COMUSAIACV started recording this statistic in
January 1964. Recent ARVN operations have uncovered
large caches of food, particularly in and around
Viet Cong War Zone D, a factor which could disrupt
the Communist timetable for future offensive opera-
tions. For the fourth time in a month, the Viet
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Cong have failed to react militarily to the sub-
stantial losses of foodstuffs. The recent dis-
coveries of la.- ;e caches of weapons and the
partial compromise of the sea in:"iltration system.
along the northern coastal provinces probably
represents some acHitional logistical loss to the
Viet Cong.
There is also some evidence that the Viet
Cong now being encountered are being given mini-
mum training before their empioyment in main force
front line units. Viet Cong recently captured in
Binh Dinh after their encounter with the South
Vietnamese marines indicated that they had received
only 15 days basic military training. Five of the
10 captives were newly infiltrated and on initial
interrogation displayed little basic military
knowledge. Viet Cong prisoners taken after the
government victory in Chuong Thien Province last
week stated that their units had not been active
in the southern reaches of the delta because they
had withdrawn to the U-Minh Forest for training.
The prisoners said that Viet Cong morale in these
units is low and that some were experiencing diffi-
culty recruiting to offset a high desertion rate.
Two-thirds of the Viet Cong 303d battalion, located
in Chuong Thien Province, were said to be new
recruits, many of them young boys of 16-17 forcibly
drafted from hamlets. Additionally, the expanded
application of combat air power within South Viet-
nam is increasing the number of Viet Cong killed
in all operations, according to COMUSMACV.
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I COMUSMACV points
out tnat a number an geographical spread of
these reports appears to indicate a centrally-
directed Communist campaign to create the impression
of a Viet Cong withdrawal. They could also reflect
a general regrouping in preparation for renewed
attacks. Recent contacts with enemy units and the
locale of current Viet Cong activity indicate that
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Communist forces remain in place ready to intensify
the war when and where they choose. In particular,
COMUSMACV reports that the enemy has been building
up a strong force in War Zone D9 possibly in prepara-
tion for a major operation along the periphery of
the Hop The Zone.
In sum, despite recent government successes
and despite evidence that the Viet Cong are feeling
the effects of stepped-up US-GVN assaults and of
attrition generally, the Communist force in South
Vietnam currently remains capable of significantly
intensifying the war beyond present proportions,
20 Government military forces maintained the
high tempo of effective offensive operations during
the past week resulting in a number of significant
victories over the Viet Cong. Another favorable
indicator bearing on military operations was the
report that the estimated personnel gains for
March exceeded 10,000, two-thirds of whom were
volunteers.
In Chuong Thien Province, a large operation
launched on 4 April under the control of the 21st
Division in the delta, forced a major engagement
with two Viet Cong main force battalions in the
approaches to the UU?Mfinh Forest, While the govern-
ment forces were moving into the objective area,
a Viet Cong battalion ambushed a river assault
force. After three days of Intense fighting, in-
volving river, air, and ground elements, ARVN suc-
cessfully broke off the engagement when their
advance units were in danger of overextending
their supply lines and the troops were nearing the
limit of their physical endurance. Eventually
a government victory was achieved. The final re-
sults heavily favored the government forces:
278 Viet Cong were killed (body count), 7 captured
in battle and 12 other suspects taken later who
turned out to be Viet Cong9 and considerable material
losses. Friendly casualties amounted to 22 killed
(including 6 US), 85 wounded plus three aircraft
lost.
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A sector-controlled operation in Binh
Dinh Province on 4 April, resulted in the virtual
destruction of a Viet Cong company. Rapid re-
sponse and flexibility in changing the scheme
of maneuver after contact was made enabled the
government force to envelope the Viet Cong flank.
Extremely effective air strikes completed the
victory. Final results show 42 Viet Cong were
killed, compared to government losses of 10 killed
and 15 wounded.
The significant government military
achievements over the past several weeks could
act as a tonic for ARVN and enable it to continue
the aggressive offensive against enemy main force
units in order to exploit, as much as possible,
recent Viet Cong reverses.
3. Communist casualties and weapon losses
reflect the intensified government offensive
last week, and for the first time both enemy
casualties and weapon losses greatly surpass those
of the government. Viet Cong personnel losses
dropped to 777 (643 KIA) from 875 (795 KIA) from
the previous week. Government casualties declined
to 666 (155 KIA from 685 (189 KIA) last week. The
Viet Cong lost 238 weapons compared to the 198
lost last week, while the government lost only
115 weapons this week compared to the 241 lost one
week ago.
C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
1. There was little significant progress in
the nationwide rural reconstruction effort during
the past week. The main problem in Central Viet-
nam continues to be the disposition of refugees.
The high priority Hop Tac program reported only
slight gains.
In the I Corps zone, emphasis continued
to be centered on the refugee problem. The three
provinces of the 2nd Division tactical zone (Quang
Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai)--where most of the
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refugees are now concentrated--have formulated plans
for their disposition. Six refugee centers have
been established in Quang Ngai and appear to be
operating effectively.
3. In Binh Dinh Province, Route I has been
opened to the Quang Ngai border following repair of
more than 50 miles of the road north of Qui Nhon.
Although commercial traffic has not yet started
to use this portion of the road, refugees have
started to move back into a town about 50 miles
north of Qui Nhon.
4. Progress in the rural reconstruction effort
in the Hop Tac area is slow. There was a net gain
of three hamlets added to the list of hamlets
meeting the six-point criteria. The total of "com-
pleted" hamlets in the Hop Tac zone is now 359--
six less than reported by MACV two weeks ago.
Recruiting for the Popular Forces showed
some improvement during the past week. Four
hundred personnel were recruited for the Popular
Forces, mainly in Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa provinces.
Rural reconstruction budgets have been
prepared by the joint GVN-US rural reconstruction
budget team for all of the Hop Tac provinces except
Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa.
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II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. Reactions to President Johnson's April 7
Speech on Vie nam. --
World reaction to President Johnson's speech was
generally very favorable. United Nations'Secretary
General U Thant wrote the President welcoming the
speech as "positive, forward-looking, and generous."
Thant met with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and Eugene
Black, former President of the World Bank, to discuss.
President Johnson's proposals for Southeast Asia
economic development. British Prime Minister Wilson
issued a statement praising the speech. Canadian
Prime Minister Martin stated in the Canadian House of
Commons that Canada was prepared to participate fully
in the Southeast Asia economic development program
and that he hoped other industrial countries including
USSR and eventually Communist China would participate.
The French press expressed general approval of the
speech saying it was what de Gaulle had long recom-
mended; adding however that US should not exclude
negotiations with the Viet Cong "Liberation Front."
Non-Communist Asian comment was favorable for
the most part, with the exception of that originating
in Djakarta. The semi-official Indonesian Herald
criticized-the speech as "calculated to eive.11
Japanese Prime Minister Sato told Ambassador Reischauer
he strongly welcomed the President's clear exposition
of US objectives in Vietnam and expressed the willing-
ness of Japan to participate in the Southeast Asian
economic development plan.
Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika told our
Ambassador Porter that he felt speech was very con-
structive and leaves the United States in a strong
position. Algeria may aspire to play a mediating
role in the Vietnam situation through its contacts
with Communist China; there is little evidence, how-
ever, that the Chinese have any interest in Algerian
mediation.
B. Cambodia.
The Cambodian official news service reported on
12 April that a Cambodian was killed by GVN forces on
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Cambodian territory. No further details are available,
though the incident is presumed to have occurred on the
same day. This is the first reported Cambodian fatality
on the border since Prince Sihanouk's most recent threat
on 24 March to break relations with the United States
if a single Cambodian life were lost in a border incident.
Sihanouk has made similar threats in the past without
following through.
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III. Developments in the Bloc
A. Communist Reaction to President Johnson's
Johns Hopkins speech.
Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow have all commented
negatively on President Johnson's 7 April speech.
In essence, they have denounced the offer for un-
conditional talks as an attempt by the US to justify
its "aggression in Vietnam."
1. Hanoi on 11 April published a commentary in
Nhan Dan, attacking President Johnson personally and
a e ln-g the speech a "deception" full of "all the
tricks of the most wicked sorcerers." The Hanoi
commentary characterized the call for unconditional
talks as "hypocrisy," designed to secure the US
goal "that is recognition of US aggression." The
article attacked the US offer of aid to Southeast
Asia as an attempt to "buy the peoples" of the area
and asserted that the "Southeast Asians decidedly
will never take ten dollars each for selling out their
country to the US imperialists." Anti-American re-
marks by Sihanouk and Sukarno were quoted as proof
that Southeast Asians will not be swayed by offers
of aid. Despite US attempts to divide "our nation,"
the article concluded, and despite the fact that the
US "feverishly" seeks to split "our international
solidarity bloc," the Indochinese peoples "will
always unite with us in a rocklike bloc."
DRV language was even stronger in a 14 April
Nhan Dan commentary in which the speech was character-
ized Fsa spiteful hoax and the President described as
"lecturing on peace while brandishing his gun." On
the subject of a conference, the commentary said "with-
out the participation of the Front, it is impossible
to settle the South Vietnamese question."
2. The first Liberation Front comment on the
President's speech came from its representative in
Prague who characterized the President's proposals
as "untrue and deceptive." This was followed by an
11 April Liberation radiobroadcast which accused the
President of pretending to be "eager for peace," at
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the same time that he sends "aircraft to attack the
DRV and Hainan Island." The broadcast demanded US
troop withdrawal and threatened that if the US con-
tinues the war it will be disastrously defeated.
However, the commentary added, "there is still time
for... (President Johnson) ... to think it over."
3. Peiping's most authoritative reaction to
the speech, contained in an article by "observer" in
People's Daily on 11 April, sought to emphasize the
unswervingg unity of purpose among the various Viet-
namese Communist elements as well as its own deter-
mination to continue to support the Vietnamese Com-
munist cause. The "observer" dismissed the call for
unconditional talks as a "big swindle" and a "hoax"
requiring the unconditional surrender of the South
Vietnamese people to the "US imperialists."
The article focused attention on President
Johnson's remarks about the "deepening shadow of
Communist China" looming over the South Vietnam war,
and alleged that the President's repeated mentioning
of Communist China was meant to "'carry out war threats"
and "make the Chinese people stop supporting the revolu-
tionary struggles" of the Vietnamese and other peoples.
This idea was rejected as "sheer day-dreaming."
"Observer" went on to declare that the "Chinese
people are definitely not the kind-who, tremble
before the war blackmail and provocations of imperial-
ism."
4. Soviet propaganda reaction to the President's
address was highlighted by a 10 April Pravda article
which attempted to dismiss the speech as a mere
propaganda exercise reflecting no real change in US
policy. Pravda claimed that the President's reference
to unconditional negotiations had no substantive mean-
ing, because in the US reply to the 17 nonaligned
nations' appeal, the US had made it clear that an
"indispensable condition" for stopping US military
action in Southeast Asia "could be only the discon-
tinuance of the national liberation struggle of the
Vietnamese people."
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B. Communist Reaction to Third Party offers of
Mediation.
In contrast to President Johnson's response to the
17 nonaligned nations' conference proposal, Communist
China, North Vietnam, and the Liberation Front have re-
jected the appeal out of hand. China was reportedly
very cool to the nations who delivered the proposal
and on 4 April. North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van
Done dismissed the anDeal as "t'
1 771
e Front representative in Prague said the proposal
was unacceptable because it did not denounce "US aggres-
sion" or demand an immediate cessation of US attacks
against North Vietnam. To date, Moscow's treatment
has been confined to a l April TASS item merely noting
that Soviet Premier Kosygin had received the appeal.
Peiping has also refused U Thant's good offices.
In a 12 April editorial, Peiping declared that the UN
should be barred from any role in reaching a settlement
of the problem. Referring to press reports that U Thant
desired to visit China and the DRV, the editorial as-
serted that U Thant was "knocking at the wrong door."
Peiping and Hanoi also refused to allow Patrick Gordon-
Walker to visit their countries.
1. North Vietnam.
the Vietnamese Situation
Hanoi has addressed itself to the subject of
a conference on Vietnam several times this week at the
highest official levels. The effect of all these
statements is to indicate that North Vietnam has not
changed its terms for an overall settlement of the war.
DRV party and state Chief Ho Chi Minh reiterated the
standard regime formulation for settling the Vietnamese
situation, and for the first time put the formula in
the context of preconditions for a conference. Ho's
remarks were contained in an interview with a Japanese
Communist journalist published by Hanoi on 9 April.
The timing of the publication of the interviews suggests
that it was intended as an oblique reply to President
Johnson's 7 April call for unconditional negotiations,
although the President's speech was not mentioned.
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Ho stated that the US must "first of all" withdraw
from South Vietnam. It must also stop its "provocative
attacks" against the DRV, and let the "South Vietnamese
people decide their own affairs." The carrying out of
these basic points, according to Ho, will "bring about
favorable conditions for a conference along the pattern
of the 1954 Geneva conference."
These same conditions have been restated as the
official DRV Government position in the course of the
National Assembly session which met from 8 to 10 April.
The National Assembly'is a legislative body comparable
to the Chinese National Peoples' Congress and is a vehicle
for disseminating regime decisions to the mass of the
population. Ho Chi Minh, Premier Pham Van Dong, and
Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh all addressed
the assembly. Hanoi propaganda on the session indicates
continuing regime concern with sustaining morale and
with making sure that party policy is followed at all
echelons in the government apparatus as the US military
pressureon the DRV continues. Deputies at the session
were tasked with convincing the people of the government's
determination to further mobilize everyone to defend the
DRV, step up domestic production, and "actively support"
the insurgency in South Vietnam.
In this context Ho Chi Minh spoke at length on
the determination of the Vietnamese to refuse to bow
to US attempts by "force" to bring "our people to terms."
He also repeated in essence the demands for "settling"
the Vietnam war set forth in his interview broadcast
on 9 April. He admitted that the assembly was meeting
in "a very tense atmosphere," but claimed that it was
also convened in "high spirits and with the utmost
confidence." Vietnamese terms for a settlement were
repeated by Premier Pham Van Dong and incorporated
into the National Assembly's final resolution.
Chinese views on negotiations were indicated
this week in the course of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's-
visit to Algiers from 30 March to 1 April. Chou report-
edly told the Algerians that the Chinese will not intervene
in the Vietnam conflict and will refuse to take part in
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negotiations on Vietnam.. Chou predicted that a coalition
government would soon be formed in Saigon which would
ask the US to leave Vietnam and would negotiate with
the Viet Cong.
Although Chou's reported comments were probably
intended to convey the impression of a "reasonable"
China, the remarks are consistent with the established
Chinese public position that the "Vietnamese people"
are the only ones able to settle the Vietnam problem.
The Soviet Union's attitude toward negotiations
continues to reflect the conflicting pressures of Moscow's
support for Hanoi's position and the USSR's regard fear
the future direction of Soviet-US relations. During a
talk with Ambassador Kohler on 3 April, Soviet Deputy
Premier Polyansky vigorously countered the ambassador's
remark that the USSR had rejected negotiations out of
hand. Polyansky said Soviet policy was "the peaceful
negotiation of all international disputes, including
Vietnam." The Soviets have not retreated from their
position that even preliminary discussions to arrange
negotiations are impossible as long as US raids on North
Vietnam continue.
D. Military Developments in North Vietnam
1. The US-GVN air strikes on 3 and 4 April
against the Thanh Hoa and Dong Phong Thuong road and
railroad bridges evoked the first intervention by enemy
aircraft. The bridges are only about 80 miles south
of Hanoi, and the Phuc Yen - based MIGs reacted on both
days. On the 4th, two MIGs came with little warning,
Jumped two US F105s from behind while carrying their
full bomb load, and downed both of them. Since then
no North Vietnamese MIGs have reacted to the subsequent
strikes. However, they can be expected to react in areas
witl'in cheer range when US aircraft are striking targets
they consider critical.
2. I Irevealed a
surface-to-air missile site under construction about
15 miles southeast of Hanoi. No missiles or other weapons
equipment have been noted at the site, but the construc-
tion is about three-quarters finished.
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only an
antiaircraft battery site there.
The equipment for the missile site is probably
coming frorm the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists
probably would not supply it. Whereas, a week ago
the Soviets were circulating reports that the Chinese
Communists were obstructing Soviet attempts to ship
military equipment overland to North Vietnam, in the
past week the Soviets have floated new reports that
Moscow and Peiping have reached agreement on such
shipments, and that the equipment is flowing to Hanoi.
To date no new Soviet equipment has been detected arriving
in North Vietnam. Soviet ships continue to arrive in
North Vietnam, but we have had no grounds to believe that
any of them have brought specific military cargo.
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