THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001700030002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 10, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
Approved For Re
OCI No. 0610/65
Copy No.
lease 2004/07/28: CIA-RDP79T004724170003000
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
10 March 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Approved For Release 2004/07/28: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01
25X1
 Approved Fcelease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T0047001700030002-9
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001700030002-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700030002-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700030002-9
 Approved
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Although Premier Quat is showing commendable in-
terest in programs to increase government effectiveness
in Saigon and in the provinces, he continues to be pre-
occupied with the problem of political intrigues among the
military and with relations among the Catholics and the
Buddhists. Quat is evidently considering ways to bring the
armed forces leaders, at least, under government control
although such a course runs the risk of countermoves against
his government.
Rumors of military coup plotting during the week
related primarily to underlying rivalries among the armed
forces leaders, although there is still no firm evidence of
an early power move by any faction.
There are indications, in a set of Buddhist requests
for satisfaction on past grievances, that the Buddh ists may
be preparing to put the Quat government to a test. Buddhist
leader Tam Chau has now publicly disavowed the peace move-
ment headed by monk Quang Lien, although the subject of
peace in Vietnam continues to receive Buddhist attention.
Government forces in rural areas north of Saigon are
continuing to abandon some areas to Viet Cong and to with-
draw into district and provincial capitals. The situation in
I and II Corps is becoming similar to that which has long
prevailed in the Mekong delta. The Viet Cong are continuing
to make steady and the significant gains in the coastal areas
of the northern and central provinces.
Various reports continue to indicate the presence of
increased numbers of Viet Cong in the coastal provinces
northeast of Saigon up to Phu Yen Province and in the central
highlands, possibly foreshadowing intensified operations in
these areas.
Government pacification activity has all but ceased,.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 20P4/07/28 : CIA-RDP719T00472A001700030002-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700030002-9
T H A I L A N D
SiemReap
0
Duong Dong\'
HON PANJANG
G.U
1 \
CAPITAL MILI R DIST hCTL
5th Divis on
KILN
PHONG-
Cao Lan
9th Division
0Kampot Chain oc
C }IAU D
Kempong-:-'
Thom of
KIEV : alaN
I Nc?
Rach Gi
u6
NORTH
VIETNAM
DIIN tl 5
LONG o
st Divi
Hue'
IIUA
rHIPN
HANG
goun9
2d Di
Q U
lu ,1 ~
oc Binh Thanh f(UANo)
Gia
~ecial Zone NghiaDUC
N?? ?Bo Duc - -~
oNm oPhuoc Bin
h oA,( YHI- OC1
PHUGC
o Phuoc Vah
t} {'
)1 C)NCs h .A N H -
Pr
THY
LAM DC
Boo Leo
Kontum
22d D~vlslbn
ARLAC
0
Ban Me Thuot
23d DiYisio
TLIYEN
Da Lat?
? D t J t;
PHU
YIIN
NINH'
THt A
01
BIFN (-10A Sat Special
' Zo'eN
N FLOA CIA DIN
7th Division
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY BOUNDARIES
As of 8 March 1965
Corps boundary
Special zone boundary
Division boundary
Hop Tac area
46993
0 25 5U 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 ISloa, lcrs
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700030002-9
 Approved For R lease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472A00 700030002-9 25X1
I. SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A.
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Premier Quat, although not satisfied with
the performance of some ministers, is showing con-
siderable grasp so far of his need to develop a
coordinated effort in Saigon and to project a
favorable government image in the provinces. He
is still feeling his way, however, and government
effectiveness continues to be hampered by feuding
among the military as well as among civilian polit-
ical and religious groups.
2. Quat has implied that his time and energies
are being diverted by the need to keep close tabs
on political maneuverings of the generals and by
efforts to keep both Buddhist and Catholic leaders
in line. Although Quat says he hopes soon to an-
nounce a program of short-term goals toward which
concrete government progress can be demonstrated,
he is still giving high priority to efforts to bring
the military under government control, a course which
could lead to new conflicts.
Approved For Pelease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T004712A001700030002-9
 Approved For
25X1
5. A flurry of coup rumors disturbed Saigon
during the past week, abetted in part by unusual
deployments of police and marine security elements
at the orders of Genera:L Thi and police director
Colonel Lieu as well as by air force buzzing of the
capital on 6 March. The various reports of coup
plotting were vague and the information conflicting
as to whether a move might come from Thi's supporters,
General Thieu, Generals "Little" or "Big" Minh, Gen-
eral Khiem and Colonel Thao, or an unspecified group
of middle-grade junior officers. The troop movements
now appear to have been primarily precautionary. The
rumors nevertheless reflect the mutual suspicions
and divisions within the military following the
abortive 19 February coup and the rival. ambitions
to fill General Khanh's vacated role of military
strongman.
6. Moves appear to be afoot to convene the AFC
on 15 March to remove General Minh, who is allegedly
being blamed for poor troop morale in some areas
where combat awards and promotions have been nea1eeted
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For RoIease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T004724001700030002-9
 Approved For elease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472A0 100030002-9
7. The current uneasiness may have sparked a
clash reported by the press to have occurred near
Saigon on 7 March between Buddhist villagers and
Catholic refugees being resettled from the hard-
pressed northern provinces. The same day, Catholic
refugee leader Father Hoang Quynh organized a rally
in Saigon designed to unify various religious sects
and groups behind a strong anti-Communist policy,
and told the press that his group was "not opposed
to the government, but there is little sympathy
for it. "
3. Despite his apparent promise to Buddhist
leaders to cease his activities on behalf of peace
which could be subjected to Communist exploitation,
monk Quang Lien reiterated his proposals for ending
the war at a public meeting on 3 March. Although
his references to the Viet Cong were harsher and
earlier criticisms of "foreign" influences were
deleted, the presence of another official of the
Buddhist Institute gave the meeting an aura of
official Buddhist sanction. However, Tam Chau has
since issued a public statement disavowing Lien's
movement and indicating that the latter broke dis-
cipline.
9. Tam Chau's own earlier statements on peace
were attacked during the week by the Viet Cong's
clandestine Liberation radio as a "sell-out to US
imperialism." However, a possibly genuine Commu-
nist document provides the first tangible indication
that a now banned peace movement, organized by
certain Saigon intellectuals and believed distinct
from twang Lien's movement, may be a Communist front
as charged by the Quat government.
10. Vietnamese contacts of the US mission con-
tinue to voice approval of both the air strikes against
North Vietnam, and US jet strikes in South Vietnam.
Some have even claimed that a resultant morale boost
among troops is already being translated into greater
willingness to resist the Viet Cong. In general, the
strikes are identified as US rather than Vietnamese
actions and as indicative of a deeper US commitment.
Most of the Vietnamese expressing these views have
25X1
25X1
Approved For F9elease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472A0g1700030002-9
 25X1
Approved For
urged continuation of the strikes in the expectation
that the war will be shortened, and probably in
the belief that some of the burden will shift from
the Vietnamese to the US.
11. A terrorist incident in Saigon at midnight
on 3/4 March may have been aimed at Americans. A
device exploded on a sidewalk outside a bar and
across the street from a US barracks, killing four
Vietnamese, three of them children, and causing
minor injuries to three US personnel and five Viet-
namese. The fourth Vietnamese killed was a teenager,
believed to have carried the device.
12. Increased rice sales by traders caused a
modest drop in the rice price during the last week.
These sales were triggered by the refusal of banks
to extend additional credit to the traders, who had
apparently been withholding supplies in speculation
of a further price rise. The price to date remains
above the GVN stockpile price, and government stocks
are unusually low. To counter speculation, the GVN
has indicated that it will import rice from Thailand
to meet its needs.
13. Deteriorating rural security has added
further difficulties in the supply and distribution
of rice and other goods. The situation is especially
critical in Central Vietnam, a rice-deficit area, in
view of the interdiction of main roads and the strain
on sea and air facilities. In addition to the increas-
ing refugee problem in Central Vietnam, a plague out-
break has been reported in Binh Dinh Province.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO017QO030002-9
 Approved For Rep
B, MILITARY SITUATION
1. Communist-initiated activity during the
period 28 February - 6 March remained at about the
same intensity of recent weeks, although a slight
decline in the number of incidents was reported
from the previous week. Strong Communist pressure
in the northern and central provinces of South Viet-
nam was maintained, contributing to the deteriorating
security situation, particularly in II Corps. Serious
Viet Cong G.-~.tacks occurred in Phuoc Thanh and Long
Khanh Provinces of III Corps while activities in the
remainder of South Vietnam declined. Overall rail-
road sabotage declined, but the Communists stepped
up bridge minings north and south of Hue. The major
highway in I and II Corps received heavy Viet Cong
attention again this week. During the week, 14 dis-
trict towns throughout the province were harassed by
the Viet Cong. Increasing Viet Cong boldness in
I Corps was demonstrated by the increased number of
incidents against the traditional seats of govern-
ment control. Singled out were district towns and
particularly the province capital at Quang Tri.
Reported acts of Viet Cong terrorism continued
at a steady pace averaging between 90-100 each day
over the past week. A minimum of 10 per cent of this
number involved the assassination or kidnaping of
civil officials and other civilian noncombatants.
Fifty per cent of the incidents causing civilian
casualties occurred in the northern provinces of
Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam (I Corps area).
The IV Corps area accounted for the majority of the
remaining incidents of this typo.
The most dramatic enemy action last week was
the 7 March attack on Camp Kannack, a CIDG camp in
Binh Dinh Province. An estimated Viet Cong main force
battalion reinforced with a heavy weapons company and
a local Viet Cong company initiated the attack with
a mortar barrage, gaining possession of two outposts.
An assault to capture the camp was beaten back by a
determined defense. The failure of the Viet Cong to
take their objective was due to: (1) a break in
the mortar barrage before the main attack was launched;
25X1
Approved Fot Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AP01700030002-9
 25X1
Approved For R se 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79TOO 2AQOy700030002-9
this permitted the defenders to man their positions;
(2) good leadership by the CIDGs and extensive
friendly use of mortars to provide illumination;
and (3) the addition of a third protective fence
only three days before the attack which confused
and slowed down the Viet Cong attack. Losses by
both sides were as follows: ARVN - 30 KIA, 21 WIA
(including three U3), four MIA and four weapons.
Viet Cong losses were placed at 100 KIA by body
count, 64 weapons and some grenades and ammunition.
2. Major government military operations de-
clined slightly this past week to 71 although the
35 operations making contact with the Viet Cong rep-
resents a slight rise from last week. Small unit
actions totaled 16,577 for the week, the second
highest on record. The number in contact with the
Viet Cong, however, totaled only 79.
A successful search-and-destroy operation
was carried out in Thua Thien Province. This
operation, initiated on 10 February, conducted con-
tinuous saturation patrolling which resulted in
the location of the enemy on several occasions and
the killing of 79 Viet Cong, so far with a minimum
of government casualties. In addition, two Viet
Cong 60-mm mortars plus a quantity of mines and
explosives were captured. The operation is con-
tinuing.
3. Government casualties remained high, de-
clining slightly to 1,014 (232 KIA) from 1,205
(294 KIA) the previous week. Viet Cong losses
increased to 570 (498 KIA) from 452 (364 KIA).
The government lost 542 weapons compared to 713
last week and the Viet Cong lost only 133 weapons
as compared to 150 the previous week.
25X1
Approved Ford Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO011700030002-9
 Approved For Rolease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79TO04T
2AQW00030002-9
C. PACIFICATION
1. The national pacification effort remains
stagnated; some areas are regressing. In the I and
II Corps, pacification has all but ceased. In the
rest of the country, only in a few widely scattered
areas are there reports of achievement.
2. It is anticipated by the US Mission that
the USOM role in the I Corps area, and probably in
parts of II Corps also, will change from the paci-
fication to refugee relief. Any pacification programs
carried on in these areas will be largely confined
to the environs of province capitals.
3. The flow into refugee centers in I Corps
has increased markedly, and in the 2nd Division
area alone totals 73,000. The most significant
increase has been in Quang Nam Province, where there
are now approximately 46,000 refugees. The rise in
the number of refugees has been concomitant with
the increase in Viet Cong activity since early
February. The security situation, compounded by
flood relief,. and are al.'eady taxing air and sea
transport facilities between Saigon and the north.
The inability to send supplies by land illustrates
the growing isolation of the northern provinces.
4. In II Corps, the deteriorating security
situation continues to occupy the free attention
of the local military commanders. Little, if any-
thing, in the way of a pacification effort seems
to be under ray in the Corps.
5. In Binh Tuy Province, the district of Hoai
Duc has all but been abandoned to the Communists.
II Corps Commander General Co has recommended that
this province be dissolved so that the Viet Cong
will be unable to claim that they have captured a
provincial capital--in this case Ham Tan--which
apparently is vulnerable. Such a rationalization
to cushion losses of territory to the Viet Cong is
a dangerous precedent.
25X1
Approved For elease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472 001700030002-9
 Approved For
6. In the III Corps zone, outside of Hop Tac,
the pacification effort has shown some regres-
sion, particularly in Phuoc Long and Phuoc Tuy
province, where further deterioration of the se-
curity is clearly in evidence. A Montagnard
village was destroyed last week in Phuoc Long,
where since 1 December 1964, 22 hamlets have
either been abandoned by the government or de-
stroyed by the Viet Cong. In Phuoc Tuy Province,
most of the northernmost district of Xuyen Moc
has been abandoned to the Communists.
7. In IV Corps, only two out of 15 provinces,
An Giang and Bac Lieu, report that pacification
efforts are proceeding satisfactorily. In An
Giang, 195 of the planned 255 hamlets are reported
to be "completed." Hamlets are being completed
at an average rate of six per week. Also in this
province the Viet Cong are reportedly collecting
only about five percent of all taxes being col-
lected whereas in surrounding provinces the Com-
munists collect in taxes as much in taxes as the
government does. Further evidence of success in
the pacification effort in An Giang is the clear-
ing of an important province communication route
and the recovery of a former Viet Cong controlled
village complex. This area of the province has
not reported any Viet Cong incidents in a six-
month period.
8. On 5 March, at a joint GVN Internal Se-
curity Council-US Mission Council meeting, Prime
Minister Quat expressed a desire to intensify
the Hop Tac effort. He also wishes to publicize
its successes to date for the twin purposes of
stiffening the morale of the people in general,
and of offsetting Communist gains elsewhere in
the country.
. In the Hop Tac area, the anticipated
slowdown in the pacification effort--the result
of shifting military commanders and province and
district officers--has begun. For the first
time in several weeks, there were no hamlets
added to the "completed"list. Civil action ef-
forts have also slowed,
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001700030002-9
 Approved Foil
Two battalions of the independent 43d
regiment, assigned to clearing operations in Hau
Nghia Province, were shifted to Phuoc Tuy Prov-
ince. Their replacements, two ranger battalions,
are reported to be less experienced in clearing
operations and will probably require some time
to learn to conduct this type of operation;
further depression of the pacification effort
in this province may therefore be expected.
More serious was the transfer of a battalion of
the independent 48th regiment from its Hop Tae
zone in Phuoc Thanh Province to the III Corps
general reserve without the concurrence of the
Chairman of the Hop Tac Council.
25X1
25X1
Approved For (Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472A 001700030002-9
 25X1
Approved Fo
U700030002-9
II, THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
B. CAMBODIA
The plenary session of the "Indochinese
People's Conference," opening of which was post-
poned from 25 February to 1 March because of dif-
ferences between Communist and neutralist elements
over procedures and over organizations to be in-
vited, closed on 9 March with the differences
unresolved. Prince Sihanouk, who had hoped to
use the meeting to create pressure for peace and
neutralization of the Indochinese countries,
was forced to accept the conference's resolution
calling for the expulsion of the Americans from
Vietnam. Although the conference thus became a
sounding board for the Indochinese Communists in-
stead of neutralists, Sihanouk labeled the con-
ference a success--even though he said he did not
agree with the resolutions.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AOQ1700030002-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700030002-9
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700030002-9
 Approved For Rep
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
25X1 conclusion that there has been no hint of a
desire or willingness on the part of the North
Vietnamese to enter into negotiations on terms
which might be accentable to S. The con-
sensus was that
Hanoi continues to believe that Viet Cong suc-
cesses plus the political instability and war
weariness in South Vietnam, are playing into
Communist hands.
25X6
25X1 C
3. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong public
statements during the past week appear to confirm
that Hanoi is not now
interested in negotiations. At a press con-
ference in Peiping on 8 March reported by NCNA,
the deputy chief of the NFLSV mission ruled out
any negotiations "so long as there is one single
shadow of US imperialism in Vietnams" Although
the Vietnamese "welcome the good intentions of
those seeking a peaceful settlement," the Front
representative added, "we must achieve our aims."
4 Hanoi on 10 March broadcast a Liberation
Front Central Committee statement reiterating
the Front's determination to "drive the US out
of Vietnam" The statement affirmed that the
situation in South Vietnam can "stabilize" only
when the US has been "driven out of Vietnam ter-
ritory," a national democratic coalition govern-
ment formed, and the "stooge" administration in
25X1
25X1
Approved For
 Approved For 9
Saigon abolished. The Front called on the "people
and Liberation Army" to "continue to deal deadly
blows at the US aggressors."
5. Recent Chinese Communist broadcasts have
displayed arrogant certainty of Communist victory.
Peiping's statements concerning the situation in
Vietnam assert that the US faces a choice between
ultimate military defeat and unconditional with-
drawal.
6. Moscow is continuing its efforts to fan
international concern over the dangers of the
Indochina situation. Pravda on 10 March called
the landing of US marines n South Vietnam a
"case of direct invasion." Izvestia on 8 March
stated that the introduction o ie marines
signified that Washington has decided to widen
the Indochina war.
25X1
Approveq For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO91700030002-9
 Approved Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00A001700030002-9
SECRET
1 -1
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700030002-9