THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001700020003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 17, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECR
E
OCI No.0607/65
Copy No.
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
17 February 1965
ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECRET
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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 Aft
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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I, SOUTH VIETNAM MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. The ouster of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong
on January 27 by the bloodless coup de force, of
General Nguyen Khanh and the Bu=s'-lea ership has
ended for the time being militant Buddhist-inspired
agitation. The military and Buddhist leaderships,
the two most powerful political forces on the Viet-
namese scene today, seem to have arrived at a tem-
porary working arrangement or at least a "marriage
of convenience,"
2. The ability of the new premier, Phan Huy
Quat, to hold his government together will depend in
part on the degree of flexibility and compromise he
can maintain in the face of inevitable pressures from
the Buddhists, military, and Catholics. Indeed,
judging from his personal temperament, his first
public statement, and his known views on the complex-
ity of the Vietnamese political situation, Quat seems
keenly aware that flexibility, compromise, and
political realism are crucial to his survival. Quat
also brings to his office the asset of long experi-
ence in the political and governmental affairs of
his country. Finally, he is not without personal
support among the military, and certainly is not
anathema to the Catholics; indeed, some Catholics
tend to regard him as a moderate. More importantly,
however, Quat has worked quietly and carefully to
mend his political fences with the Buddhist religious
and lay leadership and with Buddhist-oriented poli-
ticians.
3. In the final analysis, however, the survival
of Quat's government or any other government of South
Vietnam will depend principally on the attitudes of
the Buddhist and military leaderships. It is not
certain that either the military or the Buddhists will
be content to exercise merely a "watchdog" role over
the government. The personal ambitions of such per-
sonalities as Thich Tri Quang and Generals Khanh, Ky,
and Thi are well known and none would hesitate, at a
propitious moment, to sacrifice political stability
fczthe achievement of personal power. The specific
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or nominal issues that could precipitate further
eruptions in Saigon are many and varied: e.g., Quat's
general effectiveness, the political orientation of
any of several cabinet members, the extent of regional
or religious influence in the government, the course
of the fight against the Viet Cong, internal dissen-
sion within military and Buddhist ranks, etc. In
any event, while no immediate political crisis seems
evident, the next several weeks will likely be a
period of watchful waiting on the part of the diverse
array of military, political, and religious leaders
in Saigon.
4. The Armed Forces Council on 17 February
established its long projected 20-man military-
civilian council, now designated the National Leg-
islative Council. The Council, composed of six
military officers and civilian representing various
religious and political backgrounds, apparently will
exercise the nominal legislative powers which prev-
iously devolved on the now defunct High National
Council. Elections for a permanent national assembly
are being relegated to the indefinite future, and if
held, will apparently convene a constituent assembly
to be charged with drafting a permanent constitution.
5. General Khanh, who is the primary architect
of the present government set-up, probably expects
to hold real behind-the-scenes power. Various Viet-
namese circles, both military and political, continue
to suspect Khanh's long-range ambitions to regain
direct power, and privately question whether any
government will be permitted to develop real authority
while Khanh is on the scene.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. The Viet Cong insurgency was in relatively
high gear as the month opened. The week-long Phuoc
Tuy Province battle, which began with the Communist
occupation of the Catholic village of Binh Gia on
28 December, concluded with a successful ambush of
a government convoy on 3 January. Except for a brief
period of intensification of the insurgency prior to
Tet, enemy activity steadily declined during January.
This reduction probably reflected Communist prepara-
tions for a brief resurgence of activity following
the holidays.
The Viet Cong perpetrated over 2,200 incidents
in January, slightly below the 1964 monthly average
of about 2,380. Communist activity during January
reflected no significant deviations from past patterns;
terrorism and harassments dominated Viet Cong actions.
The enemy, however, did exhibit an increased willing-
ness to engage regular government forces over longer
periods--indicating greater Viet Cong boldness and
confidence in their military potential. Acts of
sabotage against the coastal railroad in January
generally declined but rail traffic remained sus-
pended in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces during
the month, principally as the result of November's
destructive typhoon, but also in part, because of
Viet Cong sabotage and dominance of the area. The
mining of three bridges in Thua Thien caused a tem-
porary disruption of rail travel between Hue and
Da Nang in January.
Communist armed attacks totalled only 63
for the entire month. There were six large-scale
attacks reported, slightly less than the 1964 monthly
average of eight. The small number of armed attacks
reported are among the fewest reported in any single
month during the entire war; only November 1964 with
60 had fewer.
Viet Cong activity in January, including armed
attacks, was heaviest in the delta area of IV Corps.
The northernmost I Corps was second, where evidence
indicates substantial Viet Cong forces remaining in
Phuoc Thuy Province east of Saigon, followed by III
Corps. The heavily Viet Cong infested area of
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II Corps reported the fewest number of Communist
initiated activities during the month, probably
because of the high degree of control they already
exert over the area.
The Viet Cong held to their announced cease-
fire for the Tet holidays. Almost immediately follow-
ing the lull in the fighting, however, the Viet Cong
initiated several punishing attacks, many of them
specificially directed against US personnel and instal-
lations. The airfields at Pleiku and Soc Trang were
subjected to severe mortar barrages, a US fuel dump
at Phu Yen was attacked, and a US enlisted men's bar-
racks at Qui Nhon was blown up with heavy loss of
life. Concurrent with these attacks against US in-
terests, the Viet Cong also stepped up their terrorist
and military campaign against government forces.
Several large and small scale attacks were reported
from all areas during the period 6-13 February.
The greatest Viet Cong gains were made in
Binh Dinh Province of II Corps. Following the 7 Feb-
ruary Pleiku attack, the Viet Cong dealt the ARVN
40th Regiment a series of serious defeats in Binh
Dinh Province, where they appear to be consolidating
their power. The Viet Cong now dominate Binh Dinh
Province and clearly have dealt the government's
pacification effort there a heavy blow. Presently,
government control is limited to the immediate vicin-
ity of the district towns.
In another significant action, a Viet Cong
attack on a district town in Phuoc Long Province
resulted in the death and mutilation of three US
advisors and another is missing. A disturbing aspect
of this action is the fact that the Regional and
Popular Forces abandoned the US advisors at the
beginning of the action. Present indications point
to a continued intensified Viet Cong military effort
for the immediate future.
MACV has adjusted its Viet Cong Order of
Battle holdings which represents an increase of Viet
Cong main force strength. Two additional companies
have been confirmed in An Giang Province, one company
in Bac Lieu Province, and one company in Kien Giang
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Province. The 93rd and 97th Battalions, both
operating in Quang Ngai and subordinate to the
2nd Regiment have been accepted and the 800th
Battalion has been confirmed in Thua Thien Province.
The new MACV Order of Battle holdings are as fol-
lows:
Regimental Headquarters 5
Battalions 50
Companies 139
Platoons 29
Main Force Personnel
Strength: 34,900
2. South Vietnamese military operations showed
some improvement in January in scoring impressive
victories over the Viet Cong. There were 11 signifi-
cant operations during the month, eight involving
battalion-sized units. In the eight larger operations,
ARVN casualties were 37 killed, 122 wounded, none
missing and only one weapon lost. Viet Cong casualties
in these same eight engagements were 476 killed, and
155 captured, with 133 weapons lost.
The success achieved by ARVN generally re-
sulted from the sound application of their superiority
of arms, mobility, and air power. These operations
also provided encouraging examples of ARVN's willing-
ness to employ quick reaction forces aggressively and
with good command and control against Viet Cong main
force units.'
While these few military operations have shown
an encouraging sign, they are only a small percentage
of the total large scale government operations conducted
each week. In January, an average of 79 battalion size
or larger operations were conducted each week and averaged
32 in contact with the Viet Cong. Of approximately 15,000
smaller unit actions conducted each week, an average of
only 133 engaged the enemy.
Government operations increased sharply after
the Tet lull and attempted to match the accelerated
Viet Cong tempo of operations. There were several
ARVN successes, notably in Quang Tin Province where
230 Viet Cong were killed by a superior reaction force.
The few successes, however, were offset by enemy successes,
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particularly in Binh Dinh Province, and by the in-
ability to protect the railroad and major highways
in the central coastal provinces which were again
subjected to intense sabotage efforts by the Viet
Cong last week.
3. Despite the relatively moderate level of
enemy activity in January, when compared to the
1964 monthly average, total casualties for both sides,
including killed, were among the highest for any
single month of the war. Government losses were
3,316 (904 KIA) compared to Viet Cong casualties of
2,768 (2,203 KIA). The trend towards higher casualties
has continued into February. During the week of 6-13
February the government sustained 1,558 casulaties in-
cluding 290 KIA. Included in the total are some 611
MIA, most as a result of the series of Binh Dinh en-
gagements; however, many of those previously reported
missing are beginning to filter back to the government.
In any event, the government's casualty list, except
KIA, is the highest for any single week of the war.
Similarly, Viet Cong casualties were higher during
the same period although not as dramatically, and
totalled 628 (505 KIA).
The weapon loss ratio in January was approx-
imately 2.5:1 in favor of the Communists. In the
first two weeks of February, the government lost a
total of 1,312 weapons compared to only 279 captured
from the Viet Cong.
Conclusions
The greater intensity of the war is accurately
reflected in the trend towards higher casualties for
both sides, truly making the current insurgency a
war of personnel attrition, principally through small-
scale actions. The Viet Cong continue to make signifi-
cant gains, particularly in the north where the ominous
buildup of their military forces continues, through
significant clandestine infiltration. Viet Cong main
forces in the northern provinces are the best organized
and strongest in South Vietnam and, as yet, have not
been committed to their full military potential. ARVN
efforts to dislodge the Viet Cong from areas formerly
considered as government controlled and to destroy the
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Viet Cong infrastructure have thus far proved fruitless.
The Viet Cong, as recently demonstrated, retain the
initiative and remain capable of striking at times and
places of their choosing and in strength of up to several
battalions.
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C. PACIFICATION
1. Nationwide, the pacification effort has
barely moved ahead since 1 January; there has been
serious deterioration in some areas, mainly the I
and II Corps zones. The slowdown in the pace of
pacification is due to several factors which in-
clude: the preoccupation of some senior commanders
with Saigon politics, the Tet holiday period, and
Viet Cong strength, which in some areas has forced
the GVN military forces into static or defensive
roles.
2. The security situation is particularly
serious in I and II Corps zones, with Quang Ngai
and Binh Dinh provinces being the most critical.
COMUSMACV recently described the pacification effort
in Binh Dinh Province-as having received a severe
blow and characterized the Viet Cong position there
as being "dominant."
3. The government continues to claim fairly
significant achievements for the high priority Hop
Tac pacification effort which touches on seven
provinces surrounding Saigon. Since the beginning
of January, 20 hamlets have been accepted as meeting
the six-point criteria for completed hamlets,
bringing the total to 299. During the past week
no additional hamlets were completed. A total of
1,146 hamlets are scheduled for completion in the
Hop Tac zone. The government now claims that
834,000 persons live in secured areas, an increase
of some 127,000 since the beginning of January.
4. Pacification throughout the III Corps zone
(excluding Hop Tac) has made moderate progress, but
there has been some decay in the situation in Phuoc
Long and Phuoc Tuy provinces.
5. In the IV Corps zone, the pacification effort
has been confined largely to planning activities.
Local GVN officials have been marking time and seem
to be waiting for direction from higher authority.
In several areas of the zone, the Viet Cong have
stepped up the pressure and caused a further decline
in the security situation.
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D. ECONOMIC
1. During the past month, there has been a per-
sistent upward pressure on rice prices in Saigon
which has caused an increase in the overall cost
of living index. Contributing to the climb in rice
prices are worsening security conditions in the
Mekong River delta where, according to a US Mission
assessment, 40 to 60 percent of the rice producing
areas are under Viet Cong control. Other factors
include increased Viet Cong taxation on rice ship-
ments, a reported Viet Cong campaign to have the
peasants withhold their rice and speculation by
rice traders. The wholesale price of rice has re-
mained above the government guarantee price before
Tet, causing rice dealers to complain that they
could not meet delivery contracts at the present
official price levels. The government has held
firm and has threatened to cancel the business
licenses of dealers who do not live up to their
contracts. In the meantime, the government is ex-
ploring whether sufficient stocks for Saigon can
be supplied by small rural dealers, and has requested
an additional 25,000 tons of P.L. 480 rice.
2. Worsening security conditions also have
affected both rail and highway transport and caused
a general increase in transportation costs. It is
becoming increasingly difficult for Saigon firms to
do business in the provinces.
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II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
1. International reactions to the US/GVN air
strikes against North Vietnam have generally followed
established attitudes toward US foreign policy.
Friendly countries have supported the action, with
the United Kingdom and Australia giving particularly
strong support. However, on 10 February Prime
Minister Pearson, while approving the strikes, stated
that Canada would support a Geneva Conference be-
cause the Vietnamese conflict could escalate into
a "full-scale Chinese-American war." President De
Gaulle also called for a new Geneva Conference.
2. Neutrals have ;reacted generally along pre-
dictable lines. Fear of escalation and hope that
the incidents will lead to a negotiated peace were
common themes in many neutralist reactions. India's
Prime Minister Shastri on 12 February repeated his
earlier call for negotiations in a joint statement
with Burma's General Ne Win, asking for an inter-
national conference "to insure peace in Indochina
and Southeast Asia." Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia
sent essentially identical telegrams to De Gaulle,
Mikoyan, Ne Win and Radhakrishnan, requesting a new
approach be made to the United States and the United
Kingdom for a new Geneva Conference.
3. The South Vietnamese government informed the
United Nations Secretary General and the ICC on its
position on the air strikes, noting these were the
result of persistent and recently intensified North
Vietnamese aggression. Saigon also replied to the
Indian government's call for a Geneva conference by
pointing out that the problem would be solved if
North Vietnam would stop its aggression.
4. In Phnom Penh, the long heralded preparatory
meeting of the "Indochinese People's Conference"
was convened on 14 February. Except for the scheduling
of a plenary conference on 25 February, the conference
has produced no public announcements.
5. An advance party of the Korean military con-
tingent consisting of communication, security, trans-
portation and command elements is due to arrive in
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South Vietnam on 24 February. The main body of the
1,966-man contingent is scheduled to arrive 7 March.
Final details of billeting and liaison are not yet
settled and could cause further delays.
6. Philippine Defense Minister Peralta brought
negotiations over the proposed 2,300-man Philippine
contingent to South Vietnam to a standstill by
insisting that the United States provide per diem
payments equal to those paid US personnel. Ambas-
sador Blair will discuss the final US proposal after
President Macapagal returns on 20 February. Per
diem arrangements likely to be settled at this time
for an additional 34-man medical team, although
discussions on the larger contingent are likely to
be prolonged further.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
1. Communist reaction to the US airstrikes
against North Vietnam on 7, 8, and 11 February
ranged from the open defiance of the South Viet-
namese Liberation Front to the more cautious and
restrained protestations of Moscow. North Vietnam
made a studied effort to demonstrate that it had
not been intimidated by the strikes and that it was
ready and able to cope with further aerial assaults.
Radio Hanoi is encouraging the Viet Cong to continue
their offensive in the South. The theme of a united
Vietnamese people--both North and South--partici-
pating in a common struggle against the US "imperialists"
is prominent in the propaganda statements of both
Hanoi and the Front.
2. Peiping responded to the attacks with a
belligerent outpouring of propaganda designed to
deter the US from further action. The Chinese have
used language which is harsh but no more specific
than that used in their statements following the
August Tonkin Gulf crisis. Mass rallies protesting
the new bombings, for example, were not half as large
or extensive as those organized after the Tonkin
Gulf strike against the DRV, according to Peiping
Radio's descriptions.
3. Moscow's response was initially confined
to a reiteration of previous pledges to provide
North Vietnam with all "necessary defensive assist-
ance." Kosygin's trip to the DRV, China, and North
Korea provided a timely opportunity for high level
consultations on joint efforts to assist North
Vietnam, but Soviet statements about the purpose
and results of the trip were relatively non-committal.
The joint statement signed in Hanoi endorsed the
principal of the "unity" of communist interests--
the Soviet Premier's theme throughout his Asian
trip--but gave no specifics on the planned level of
increased Soviet military assistance to Hanoi. The
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statement said only that measures to "consolidate
DRV defense had been agreed upon" and would be
subject to "regular consultation." The announce-
ment of the economic agreement, which was signed
while Kosygin was in Hanoi--the first in more than
three years, also failed to specify any new ex-
tensions of Soviet credits or grants to the DRV.
4. Hanoi has requested the ICC to withdraw its
field teams from North Vietnam. Although Hanoi
alleges that this move is necessary because the
security of the teams can no longer be guaranteed,
it would also serve to restrict the already limited
western observation of military deployments and
shipments into and within the DRV. ICC field teams
are located in Haiphong (the only significant port
of entry in the country), at Vinh and Dong Hoi,
and at Langson and Lao Kay (two points where the
rail line from Communist China enters North Viet-
nam). The Canadians and the Indians have resisted
the request on the grounds that such action would
constitute unilateral public denunciation by Hanoi
of the 1954 agreements.
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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons
Losses: 1962 - January 1965
1. General Statistical Data:
Viet Killed Wounded
Cong in in Captured Total Weapons
Time Inci- Action Action or Missing Casualties Losses
Period dents GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
1962
1825
299
1294
475
211
116
391
890
1396
-
-
Jan 1963
927
453
1754
90?3
318
102
379
1463
2451
457
683
1964
1770
343
1223
913
-
555
240
1811
1463
917
532
1965
2206
904
2203
1938
-
471
565
3313
2768
1700
711
1962
1460
244
1205
300
316
124
353
668
1874
-
-
Feb 1963
788
379
1082
656
303
82
292
1117
1677
253
399
1964
2078
374
1055
916
-
303
289
1593
1344
708
471
1962
1961
523
1456
737
551
140
523
1400
2530
-
-
Mar 1963
1282
410
1443
851
368
66
205
1327
2016
467
367
1964
2160
439
1456
1249
-
345
531
2033
1987
814
532
1962
1933
387
1596
532
292
151
415
1070
2303
-
-
Apr 1963
1331
506
1660
878
256
96
388
1480
2304
797
46S
1964
2284
594
1671
1584
-
398
245
2576
1916
990
424
1962
1825
390
1756
509
352
94
524
993
2632
-
-
May 1963
1208
435
1895
389
256
94
695
1418
2885
463
564
1964
2143
458
1135
987
-
202
242
1647
1377
723
281
1962
1477
325
1666
613
416
77
441
1015
2523
-
-
Jun 1963
1311
389
1862
772
310
90
437
1251
2609
580
394
1964
2062
494
1005
1145
-
313
230
1952
1235
718
387
1962
1564
384
1544
686
424
212
542
1282
2510
Jul 1963
1363
529
1918
1071
372
306
387
1906
2677
934
374
1964
3045
900
1427
18.12
-
510
219
3222
1646
1889
447
1962
1642
377
2271
626
367
63
669
1066
3307
Aug 1963
1349
411
1685
804
237
352
482
1567
2404
637
428
1964
2580
721
1449
1612
-
478
282
2811
1731
1106
619
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Time
Period
Viet
Cong
Inci-
dents
Killed
in
Action
GVN VC
Wounded
in
Action
GVN VC
AQV 700020003-9
Captured Total
or Missing Casualties
GVN VC GVN VC
Weapons
Losses
GVN VC
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1962
1375
419
2218
646
365
59
446
1124
3029
-
-
Sep 1963
1763
672
1982
1155
234
566
347
2393
2583
607
389
1964
3091
819
1187
1759
--
737
230
3315
1417
1465
525
1962
1357
365
1967
619
286
64
373
1048
2626
-
-
Oct 1963
1422
428
1520
989
244
398
236
1815
2000
753
330
1964
2827
739
1617
1583
-
693
576
3015
2193
1510
482
1962
1311
410
1982
834
368
92
561
1336
2911
-
-
Nov 1963
3182
664
2333
1554
373
665
252
2883
2958
1595
455
1964
1982
574
1747
1404
-
410
570
2388
2317
1104
515
1962
1346
294
2203
618
289
78
463
990
2755
-
-
Dec 1963
1882
389
1440
961
191
320
190
1670
1821
724
546
1964
2504
1,002
1813
2053
-
1092
503
4147
2316
2111
666
Composite Annual Totals
Time
Period
VC
Inci-
dents
KIA
GVN VC
Total Weapons
Casualties Losses
GVN VC GVN VC
1962
19076
4417
21158
7195
4237
1270
5701
12882 30896
5195
4049*
1963
17813
5665
20574
11488
3462
3137
4290
20290 28385
8267
5397
1964
28,525
7477
16785
17017
-
6036
4157
30510 20942
14055
5881
** Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
Approved For Rp'
Captured
WIA or Missing
GVN VC GVN VC
*
 Approved For Releaso 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP79T00412AO01700020003-9 25X1
2. Viet Cong Incidents
A T T A C K S
Time Viet Cong small-
Period Incidents Scale BN. Size
1962
Jan 1963
1964
1965
1962
Feb 1963
1964
1962
mar 1963
1964
1962
Apr 1963
1964
1962
may 1963
1964
1962
Jun 1964
1825
927
1770
1460
788
2078
1961
1282
2160
1933
1331
2284
1825
1208
2143
528
242
218
480
181
211
561
333
198
470
371
211
490
344
170
1477
1311
2062
1962 1564
Jul 1963 1368
1964 3045
1962 1642
Aug 1963 1349
1964 2580
385
398
128
437 1
398 1
166 12
368 0
356 1
107 3
Co. Size Total Terrorism
!8 252 48 47
5 6 112,. 9
13
3
11
4
9
6
13
3
21
10
10
8
7
9
3
613
433
1389
660
653
1632
1024
688
1738
892
608
1418
736
652
1390
735
698
2132
885
647
1775
Anti-
Sabotage Propaganda Aircraft
180
49
129
272
257
1779
170
212
137
69
201
290
131
158
220
105
169
154
93
217
157
107
176
158
80
286
146
113
315
500
195
27-7
588
344
203
497
383
220
528
357
175
407
410
140
448
407
185
377
368
3.13
_S3-
'92
155
157
251
150
140
222
142
162
223
183
224
233
221
173
193
218
204
25X1
Approved For Relea
210
91
271
423
154
167
 Approved For ReleaO
,.,~"ont inueV
A T T A C K S
Time Viet Cong Small-
Period Incidents Scale BNa Size Co., Size Total
1962
1375
382
0
9
391
624
178
182
ep 1963
1763
483
3
17
503
889
164
207
--
1964
3091
110
4
4
118
1938
482
178
375
1962
1357
406
1
12
419
583
189
166
-- 4
Oct 1963
1422
363
0
6
369
802
105
150
--
1964
2827
75
6
2
83
1790
480
197
277
1962
1311
411
3
7
421
614
144
132
--
Nov 1963
3182
631
3
11
645
1990
269
278
--
1964
1982
57
1
2
60
1391
247
109
175
1962
1346
375
1
8
384
670
107
185
--
Dec 1963
1882
258
0
3
261
1228
111
251
--
1964
2;504
81
6
9
96
1,719
318
128
S
243
Com
posite Annu
1 Totals
1962
19,076
41
173
5509
8875
2060
2676
No Data
1963
17,813
4358
15
121
4494
9735
1396
2161
No Data
1964
28.526
1732
46
55
1833
18 656
3178
2080
1879
-54-
25X1
Anti-
Terrorism Sabotage Pro anda Aircraft
Approved For
 Approved Fq elease 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP79TO044A001700020003-9
SECRET
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020003-9