THE INDONESIAN SITUATION (REPORT #25 - AS OF 4:00 PM EDT)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00472A001500040025-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 21, 2006
Sequence Number:
25
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 9, 1965
Content Type:
IM
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00472A001500040025-5.pdf | 144.62 KB |
Body:
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104
OCI NO. 2763/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
9 October 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Indonesian Situation
(Report #25 - As of 4:00 PM EDT)
1. The Indonesian situation appears to be
moving into a struggle employing maneuver and shift-
ing alliances as the army seeks to keep Sukarno and
the Communist Party (PKI) on the defensive, and they
in turn seek to retrieve their positions. The army,
although looking ahead toward a possible contest of
force with the PKI, does not seem willing to defy
Sukarno by a major and direct crackdown on the
Communists.
I -fl
the army will proceed with its investigations of
the 30 September movement and try to build a case
against the individuals responsible. The army is
continuing its house to house sweep in Djakarta and
environs for weapons and suspects.
3 the army itself cannot
take direct action against the Communist Party (PKI)
and its affiliated groups. Instead it is obliged
to rely on anti-Communist civilian organizations.
Sukarno's continued absence from Djakarta--he is still
40 miles away at his Bogor palace--makes it easier for
the army to wink at actions which go against the spirit
of Sukarno's public pronouncements.
DIA review(s) completed.
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SECREI
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4. The army has placed the Antara4 news agency
temporarily under the control of the Regional War
Administrator for Greater Djakarta. Antara, the
official government news agency, has been Communist-
dominated for some time. The army has also issued
orders to all newsmen covering President Sukarno's
press conferences to apply for new passes since the
ones in use are no longer valid. The order seems
to be a move to screen news personnel who have access
to the president and thereby partially control his
use of public media;
5. The US Army Attache learned from one of his
contacts that Third Deputy Prime Minister Chairul
Saleh returned from Communist China on 7 October.
Army troops dismissed elements of Sukarno's palace
guard that had come to meet him and the army escorted
him from the airport.. The source avoided stating
whether the army is holding Saleh or protecting him.
During the past year, Saleh had become a target of
the PKI,
6.. Brig. Gen. 'Sukendro, who has been in China
on an economic mission, is also back in. Djakarta
and will be working with General Subarto and General
Nasution. Sukendro was one of the officers targeted
for assassination.
7. Meanwhile Sukarno's influence seems evident
in the latest pronouncement by the executive board
of the large Moslem party, Nahdatul lama (NU). The
announcement of 8 October states that although the
NU leadership understands the people's anger against
elements involved in the 30 September movement, it
cannot condone forceful actions which can only benefit
the neocolonialists and imperialists. It urges party
members to realize the need for discipline. It places
full confidence in the policy of President Sukarno
"which he will set forth within the shortest possible
time and which is.eagerly awaited by all Moslems."
Affiliated organizations of the NU have been in the
forefront of some of the recent anti-Communist demon-
strations in Djakarta.
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9. There is still no firm evidence as to
Aidit's whereabouts; he has been variously reported
to be in hiding in the Chinese Communist Embassy in
Djakarta or to be somewhere in Central Java.
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