REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001100050015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 24, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMURANI~UlVI
REVIEW 4F INSCTR.GENCY ~FOBLENiS
This pu`~lic`ati~n providesa periodic review of internal
security'in undexde~reloped countries where here is
a threat from ~ornmur~ist-:supported insurgency.....
I~IRECTORI-~.`I'E (QF ;1I~I'~',~I.LICENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
State Department review completed
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,~E C~E ~`
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS
.'his publication provides a periodic review of internal
securit$~ in underdeveloped countries where there is
a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.
-Page
Thailand.. 1
Guatemala 2
Venezuela 3
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OCI No. 0591/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
24 November 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Review of Tnsurgency Problems
1. Thailand
The Thai Independence Movement (TIM) is
joining the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF), according
to a recently received communique marking the 1 No-
vember anniversary of the formation of the TIM. The
TIM, finding the six-point program of the TPF "cor-
rect, clear, and agreeable," will accept the "po-
litical guidance" of the front in order to form a
"collective force strong enough to fight our enemies."
This is the first Communist statement de-
fining the relationship between the two groups since
they were formed in late 1964 and early 1965. Although
the reason for placing TIM under the TPF banner is
not clear, it may be related to reports that the
Communists intend to switch from defensive to offen-
sive tactics.
A 13 November broadcast of the clandestine Voice of
the Thai People, mentioning "patriotic people's armed
units," is the first public reference by the Commu-
nists to armed insurgents.
A clash between police and subversives oc-
curred in Nakhon Phanom on 7 November, the first
since mid-August. Two subversives were killed and
some propaganda material was captured.
o e ive ire ig s reporte his year in the north-
east has :been reci itated b the subversives. 25X1A
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2. Guatemala
During the first part of November, security
forces killed from 15 to 30 guerrillas and destroyed
a training camp and numerous campsites.
Notwithstanding government successes, in-
surgents have continued their activities. The leader
of the Communist Party action arm, FAR, has claimed
responsibility for recent terrorism, but continuing
division among insurgent groups still clouds the issue.
There is increasing concern in government
and commercial circles over stepped-up threats against
the lives and property of wealthy Guatemalans. Be-
sides several known recent kidnapings and murders in
Guatemala City, there are persistent reports of many
victims of extortion. The number of victims cannot
be established, because they fear the instant re-
prisals promised by the terrorists for informing tie au-
thorities. The low morale of business circles re-
flects lack of confidence in the government's ability
to cope with the threat. The regime's own concern
is evident in official announcements encouraging
private citizens to form vigilante-type protective
committees.
The government's suppression of news media's
efforts to publicize guerrilla and terrorist activity
probably is counterproductive. Censorship merely
serves to inspire rumor and leads to exaggerated
public suspicion.
Some conservative elements in the city have
begun to suggest postponement of the election set
for March and reinstitution of the state of siege.
The United Fruit Company (UFCO) has advised the US
Embassy that it is approaching the point of with-
drawal from Guatemala because of terrorist harass-
ment. UFCO's departure would have serious economic
consequences for Guatemala and would feed the anti-
American propaganda mill.
The US ambassador in Guatemala has pointed
out the danger that the Peralta regime may overreact;
to the insurgent problem, either by counterterrorism
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which would arouse popular antagonism or by canceling
elections. Either move would hand a victory to the
terrorists.
Student organizations have announced plans
to use the observance of National Student Week (21-
26 November) to air grievances against the govern-
ment and to "repudiate" the visits to Venezuela of
Secretary Rusk and Senator Robert Kennedy. The US
Embassy in Caracas believes the Communists may use
the student ceremonies to whip up sentiment for a
hostile demonstration during Senator Kennedy's visit,
originally scheduled from 26 to 30 November, but,
according to ress now shortened to a few hours on
30 November.
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Recent actions by the Venezuelan. Government
against the Communist Party (PCV) and the Armed Forces
of National Liberation (FALN) have created what PCV
spokesmen call a "serious situation" in the party.
The US Embassy believes that FALN actions
in western Venezuela, such as the assassination of
two municipal officials will damage the FALN cause
rather than bolster it. 25X1A
One practical result is the government's
decision to issue light defensive arms to peasants
in the western regions.
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