IF DE GAULLE DOES NOT RUN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: September 22, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

,qW
Ah AM
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
M 'I)E$ IkL
25X1
std:.T : It Lre Gaulle Does Mot Run
months before the 5 csaber presidential election Is whether
Do Gaulle will seek a* ther seven-year tore. The answer t
that question is still locked within the mind of a Gaulle
if, indeed, be has decided. We have exaaiaed Do Gaulle's
public statements including those in his 9 bepteeber prosy
conference and find tbea tommms indicators at best. The
1. The key question on the `reach political see
opinions at other observers of
and heavily qualified. On balance, we believe he will see
re-election although he way
stay in office t e full to
15X1
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 STAT Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Am A&
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
2. If, as seems likely, ire Gaulle runs
tainly assured of an easy first ballot victory. The late
entry of a major candidate of the left
e center-right
both would have only the effect of reducing the ear ;in of
his win. litAiout such last minute entries, only a sl4able
abstention rate would be likely to detract from a really
give victory.
3. This se raa+desa deals with what we consider to the
less than even chance that ie Gaulle will not run. Because
sally prospective candidates will bold off an their own deci-
sions until Gsuile announces tais, such of what fo1iov
highly speculative. O overall conclusion, however,, is that
an electoral race without DO au11e as a direct participaut
could be very close and its outeo , whether you by a ?iaul.list
or Sava--6*ullist, would have important JuyIicatJe>xw for the
conduct of E"rench policy and hence for the ? .
Election procedures
4. To gain a place on the first ballot a can,
file by 16 Xoveaber a petition bearing the Hasse of 100 elected
french office-holders, local or national, from at least 10 Of
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
This 9 )
Aw by the ,p>, i t i ca l la
=;3 ui ct i the latter
nit the first ballot mi i t
"a d dates
ax1ow f:ir
e Several + 1 Ie
that cap? be *Rid wi
a
The run-
will a eatua1 .y win are
bunday
the votes U4
hold ?.)i 19 a: ce b r.
a,j ! , p . M , ` ~) i " ` . ) V t a .
ltu-rai ra
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
fid
to the C rat ? pf,lietea;
r# a ad
,,:#i)1 wi
record and pr
v ral major candidates
is 1a
uii taa argi
appeared several times >*
activity 64"
fiu:s tip
eietrt+,
")vr a wide area
candidate.
will throw his aup rt 3 --
ettart
run and
Yf several .gh-raA -
public could
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
Christian Fouchet, minister of national education, Jacques Chaban-
Imas, president of the National Assembly, and Nichol Debre,, De
Gaulle's premier from 1959 to 1962.
9. A statement by De Gaulle that he was not a candidate
for re-election would almost certainly be the signal for the
frantic preparations of other, non-Gaullist candidacies. Some
of these prospective candidates, of course, may run whether
e Gaulle withdraws from the race or not.
10. Among the more notable figures is former Premier Antoine
Pinay, who, at 73, still commands a large following in .France.
garded a% a "miracle man;" by the French because of his work
in re-establishing the economy in the 1950'ss, Pinay first
entered public office in 1929 as mayor of Saint-Chamond, a posi-
tion which he holds today. In 1952, Pinay became premier of a
right-center government significant not only for its economic
progress but also for its realignment of the traditional polit-
ical parties. In 1958 Pinay was named minister of financial
and economic affairs in be Gaulle'ss first cabinet, becoming
identified with a sound fiscal and economic policy. Resigning
his post in
Pinay in recent years has been extremely
critical of Gaullist policies both in the domestic and foreign
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Rele 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A0'00010036-1
t FIDEMIAL
policy field. Despite urging by various center-right parties
and committees, Finay has not revealed his intentions. EEO
would be tare likely to enter the race if De Gaulle is not a
edidate. if piny does not run, Maurice Faure or a leader
of the Catholic-oriented Popular Republican party might serve
as a candidate of the center-right. %ven *ithout formal party
such a candidate could hope to draw the votes of the
-European center.
of winning the formal support of a broad spectrum of
11. ftston Defferre, who campaigned for over a year in
.crater and democratic left groups, withdrew from the face in
J "o when the effort to form a federation collapsed. fferre
closed the door on his candidacy, however, and
ova 1
? withdrew from the race he would probably still be
a "draft." Defferre, the Socialist mayor of
Marseeillees and a National Assembly deputy, received considerable
exposure around the country during his active campaign.
12. Two recently announced candidates are Paul Antler, a
th Republic leader of the peasant party, and
;errand, the leader of the left-wing splinter
-+--
t7IDEIAL
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
mocratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (UDSR). Antier
can only hope to make a modest showing if Pinay does not run
and reportedly has set a goal of helping to chip enough votes
r ff the Gaullist total to force a second ballot. Mitterrand
apparently hopes to receive the endorsement of a "little federa-
ti .n" comprising the Socialist party, the Itadical Socialist
Party and several other non-party clubs and comsaittees. Al-
though his UDSRR is a member of the federation, it is not oer-
u that he will receive that endorsement. If the federa--
tioax cia,auzes u+t to support Mitterrand, who must overcome a
uontr,:aversia1 p litical reputation, it could turn to the
cialists for a candidate.
its efforts both during and after the D-efferre
French Communist Party (PCF) has not been able
to get the non-commsxunist parties to formulate a cosam*on program
in return for its promise of electoral support. Such a 9"com-
inon-program, common-ca ndidate" agreement is still the goal
of the PC s, although we doubt Detf'erre or any other major,
non-Communist political figure would accept it. The PCF now
seems more willing to back a candidate whose program it coa-
sidars acceptable, even though the party has not participated
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A0b'00010036-1
CON N'TIAL
the actual formulation of the program. It agreement is not
ached we believe the PCF will carry out its threat to put its
didate on the ballot. The names of several party leaders
have been floated, but the PCF has also kept open the possibility
that it will run someone not directly connected with the party;
such as an official of the Communist-dominated labor union or
party.
able individual from the left-wing of a non-cost
a latter contingency, Daniel gayer, a leader of
cub Unified Socialist party, is a likely prospect.
d: Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, a right-
mar
:ign. The other two may, in fact, have only entered
to hold the line for some better-known individual from their
part of the political spectrum. None of the throe
Of these three, only Tixier-Yignancour has conducted an
are, of purse, three previously announced
:ud two members of the French Senate,, Pierre
hacy, a conservative, and Andre Cornu, a Radical Social-
sting a Gaullist cindidates.
lectoral Outcomes
e runs against only the presentl
asaunced
or that group plus a PCF-backed candidate
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 A& Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T0Ask
0472A000800010036-1
COp1IDZRT IAI.
of the left, he has as excellent chance of being elected on
the first ballot although his margin would not be as great as
D. Gaulle**. If, however, there is a candidate of the center-
right such as Pinay in addition to the others, a runoff is
quite likely. The chance of a runoff is further enhanced if
there are four major first ballot candidates: the Gaullist,
a center-right candidate, a center-left candidate without PCY
support and a PCF-backed candidate.
16. There are some important analytical problems involved
in speculation on the outcomes of any of the above hypothetical
confrontations. While past practice is a fair guide to the
eventual decisions of the parties, the reaction of the ultimate
dec ision-raker--the French voter--is difficult to predict in
this, the first direct election of a president since Louis
Napoleon. We are uncertain, for instance, of the degree to
which D. Gaulle's popularity is transferable to his chosen
successor. On the first ballot of the 1962 National Assembly
elections, Ultra candidates throughout the nation received about
30 percent of the popular vote. In an election where local
issues will be less important and De Gau l le's personal inter-
vention greater, the Gaullist Candidate night get a larger
proportion of the vote. On the other hand, the "government"
CONFIDNNTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 a Ak
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
Ct lIFIDUTIA1
(i.e., Pompidou and the cabinet) have always scored poorer in
public opinion polls than has De Gaulle. Bose of the more
troublesome domestic issues, particularly the state of the
economy and dissatisfaction with "social policies" such as
the national education policy, would hurt another Gaullist
sore than they would Do Gaulle.
17. Another important unknown is the size of the PCF
vote. The PC? has consistently received 20-25 percent of the
vote in National Assembly elections, but it is doubtful that
a PCF candidate could do as well in a national election for
the presidency. Many citizens who vote for the ' in local
elections do so an a vague protest against the system or be-
cause the PCF candidate has promised core on particularly
important local issues.
18. Electoral arrangements between the PCB and other
left parties, easily made on the local level as practical
matters, would create significant second-thoughts when it
case to an arrangement on the presidency. -F1O leader Guy
Mallet argued in 1962 that PCB-8710 collaboration was valid
because the election of one more communist to the National
Assembly (where there were only 10) was less of a danger to
the Republic than the election of one more member of the
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
Gaullist party. Moilet specified that this was not to be
construed as a national policy, however, and would not apply
if the PCy' approached a majority.
Granting these unknowns, there are Some hypothetical,
first ballot outcomes and second ballot arrangements worth
noting. (Minor candidates are discounted tros these specu-
lations.)
20. With three major nags on the first ballot the two
leaders would almost certainly retain their places for the
second ballot. If the outcome was: Pompidou, a prominent
center-right candidate such as Pinay, a "-backed leftist
or any other ordering of those assn, this would be true. The
only exception, and it seems very unlikely, in: Pompidou, a
PCl'--backed leftist, an independent center-left candidate.
With this standing, the P1 candidate might withdraw although
the PCF would exact a heavy price in terms of a common program
and control of the electoral machinery for so doing.
21. In the first cited result or any other which would
put Pompidou and a leading center-right candidate in the
ru xotf election, the result could be very close, although
ink Pospidou would win. The center-right candidate would
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
probably benefit from the formal support of most of the non-
communist parties but they probably could not control all of
their voters. Further, it is quite possible that, faced with
a choice between Po apidou and a more Atlantic and European-
minded ceuter.rigbtist, the PCT' would prefer Pompidou.
2. With four candidates on the first ballot and no one
of them gaining a majority, the second ballot arrangements be-
cc even more complex and the role of the PC! voters could
become crucial.
fret ballot Outcome
Ponp idou
Center-rightist
PCY-backed leftist
Independent leftist
Pompidou
center-rightist
Dependent leftist
PCB'-backed leftist
Pompidou
PCF-backed leftist
Center-rightist
Independent leftist
Center-rightist
Pompidou
PCi-backed le f t is t
Independent leftist
Lid Ballot Arrangeme o t
Top two stay in; outcome as
suggested in above paragraph.
Probably top two stay in, but
some chance that anti-Gaulliat
coalition achieved around in-
dependent leftist with center-
rightist then withdrawing.
Latter more likely if Pompidou
close to first ballot majority.
Top two stay in; MY concen.
trates on demon tratiag it
second most powerful political
force in France and foregoes
chance of winning.
Top two stay in; extremely
close second ballot.
C)$i I DBBTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
PouRp idou
Independent leftist
Center-rightist
PCI-backed leftist
?IndepewudeDt leftist
*Ceeteer-r ightiat
Posp idou
PCF-backed leftist
Pompidou
PCF--backed leftist
independent leftist
Center-rightist
The hffect of the Election
Top two stay in; extremely
close second ballot.
Top two stay in; center-
rightist most likely to
benefit from Gaullist votes.
PCF candidate likely to
withdraw but only after
exacting heavy price from
third place finisher.
23. Although Pompidou (or some other Gaullist) running
on a straight platform that promised to continue the policies
of De Gaulle would seem likely to win a narrow victory, a close
election could have some interesting effects on French policy.
It Is not the purpose of this paper to estimate how the policies
of some non-Gaullist president might differ in substance from
e of Do Gaulle, or even to speculate on substiputive differ-
ences between Pompidou and De Gaulle. Rather, we Would note
three genera i effects of the close election of w successor
woeid be likely to be felt across the whole
range of French po l is y .
(I) Just the absence of the De Gaulle pessonality will
limit the power of the presidency. There can be no doubt that
t Gaulle has sssterluily built up and used a mystique that has
-13-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
served very practical political ends. din history of personal
devotion to France is unchallenged even by the groat majority
his political opponents, Certainly the vigor and determina-
tion with which h*_ formulates and carries out French policy
could not be duplicated by any prospective successor.
(2) A close election, particularly one that goes to the
second ballot, will detract from the image of the president
the locus of the national will. In his 9 ptesber press
conference, De Gaulle reminded French voters that they will
Coon have to choose between his concept of government where
the presidency is "the keystone, designated by the nations- i
asajority, that holds and welds togebter the edifice of our
titutions," and "the practices of the past." while we
believe lie Gaulle has overdrawn the prospect that French
politics could revert to the parliamentary domination of the
Fourth Republic, a more even balance between the powers of the
presidency and the powers of parliament seem a likely result
of a close election. in turn, would bring about a greater
tnter-pia), of opposing policies and an increased need to
oepro ise on, although not necessarily abandon, those current
policies such as the crew t t.on of a nuclear force and the defense
such n;itionai sovereignty that are opposed by a significant
body
ac.b political l=.,aders.
-14-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1
CONE ID TIAL
(3) Without the De Gaulle cost-tails and having been
through a close (even it victorious) election, the UNR would
be weakened as a political party. There already exists con-
siderable difference of opinion within the UER and between
d its allied party, the Independent Republicans,
We would expect these differences to grow after a close
election and they could result in defections from the majority
on some issue such as a controversial budget item sufficient
to formally block the government policy. Furthermore, the UNR
alight well lose its majority in the 1967 National Assenbiy
e was able to operate successfully for
ionr years without a U majority in the National Assembly.
A successor, however, would be without his prestige and
demonstrable public support, and would be faced with a parlia-
u t a r y Ora j or i t y that fe I t It had been chosen to oppose
Gau l l i.s t policies. In such circumstances, there would be far
more give and take between the two branches of the French
and increased attention would be focused an domestic
social problems at the expense Of Gaullist national prestige
piograss in both the political and nilixary fields.
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010036-1