THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010024-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: September 7, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
C O N T ENT S
Page
The Formation of the Front
1
The Manifesto's Ten Points
2
Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts
3
(Organization Chart and Selected Photographs)
The People's Revolutionary Party
(PRP)
7
PRP Rationale
8
Hanoi and the Liberation Front
10
NFLSV-Af'filifted Organizations
11
The Front's Grass-;soots Structure
12
Front Propaganda Machinery
13
NFLSV Program Abroad
16
Recognition strategy
19
Additional NFLSV Goals
20
Forming a Provisional Government
21
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No. 2313/65
7 September 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM:
THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
(NFLSV) is ostensibly a democratic and independent organi-
zation. In reality, it was established by and receives its
over-all guidance from North Vietnam. The NFLSV provides
the Communists with a banner under which all facets of in-
surgent political and military activity in the South are organ-
ized. The Front is also designed to provide an alternative
to the Government of South Vietnam. The Communists have
set out in the Front's name a program of broad political
and economic objectives which can be accepted by the ma-
jority of people in the South. A phalanx of affiliated front
organizations has also been created to give the impression
that the NFLSV embodies every significant social, ethnic,
religious, and professional group.
The top public posts in the NFLSV were studded with a
number of "progressive" South Vietnamese, most of whom
are crypto-Communists. Behind these men are the hard-
core Communist leaders in the South who are members of
the "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP)--the southern
branch of the Communist party in North Vietnam. The evi-
dence indicates that PRP committees exist down to the
hamlet level in insurgent-controlled areas. With the inten-
sification of the war in the past few months, the PRP has
begun to take a more open role in directing NFLSV affairs.
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NFLSV committees have also been established down
to the hamlet level throughout most of the insurgent-held
area. These committees, controlled by the local Commu-
nists, often exercise a wide variety of governmental-type
functions, including the collection cf taxes and the organi-
zation of the local economy. Even in the areas held firmly
by the rebels, however, the NFLSV has failed to pick up an
independent following of any size, and its authority is based
mainly on insurgent coercion. The Front has also been un-
able to attract any significant support from any of the politi-
cally influential groups, such as the Buddhists and the labor
unions, outside the Communist-held sectors.
On the international scene, aided and abetted by the DRV,
Liberation Front efforts to publicize the activities and pro-
gram of the insurgents have steadily expanded since the first
permanent NFLSV office was opened abroad in 1962. There
are now seven permanent Front missions abroad, several
of them in Free World countries. During the past few
months, the Vietnamese Communists have waged an in-
creasingly vigorous campaign to gain Free World acceptance
of the NFLSV as the "legitimate representative" of the South
Vietnamese people. This campaign has involved a broaden-
ing of Communist claims on the extent of Front control in
South Vietnam, and a further open assumption of govern-
ment trappings by the NFLSV. So far, the Communists
have stopped short of declaring the formation of a provisional
Front government at the national level in South Vietnam. A
number of problems still stand in the way of such a move,
and it does not appear likely in the near future.
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The Formation of the Front
1. The Ho Chi Minh - led Communists in Indo-
china have persistently operated under the cover of
a large "front" movement. While resisting the Jap-
anese during World War II, Ho and his comrades
functioned behind the facade of the old Viet Minh
league. In 1946, they formed the Lien Viet, or
Vietnam United Front, to conceal Communist direc-
tion of the war against France. When the struggle
shifted to South Vietnam following the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954, the North Vietnamese organized the
Vietnam Fatherland Front to garner support for "re-
unification" with the South.
2. This organization, headquartered in North
Vietnam, had little success in luring public backing
in the South. In late 1958, Hanoi apparently began
to plan to revitalize its Front apparatus in South
Vietnam. Viet Cong documents captured in that period
disclosed the Communists' chagrin at their failure
to win a significant following in the South. These
documents also indicated that the Viet Cong fully
appreciated the importance of winning popular favor
if their rebellion was to have any chance of eventual
success.
3. The theory underlying the Communist front
movement in Vietnam has been to establish very broad,
general objectives which can be accepted by the ma-
jority of people, and then to enlist support from
every section of the population in an all-embracing
political organization. If properly carried out,
"all the people" will unite in one organization
against the "enemy"--in this case the Saigon gov-
ernment. This theory is implicit in the treatise
on revolution in Vietnam, People's War, People's Army,
written by the North Vietnamese minIsfer office Tense
in 1961.
4. By September 1960, Hanoi had apparently com-
pleted its general plans for a new and widely based
front organization, ostensibly indigenous to the South.
At a North Vietnamese party congress in September, Le
Duan, the party first secretary, called for the crea-
tion of a ",broad united front" in the South which would
have the long-range goal of establishing a "national
democratic coalition government."
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5. The abortive coup against the Saigon regime
in November 1960 provided the final impetus for the
formation of the Front. The insurgents announced the
establishment of the "National Front for the Libera-
tion of South Vietnam" on 20 December. In order to
sustain the fiction that the NFLSV was the product
of an indigenous band of patriots in the South, Hanoi
itself gave no publicity to the new organization
until January 1961.
6. The Front's manifesto was first aired in a
Hanoi radiobroadcast on 29 January 1961--a procedure
which itself testified to North Vietnam's guiding
role in the formation of the organization. When
broadcast again from Hanoi on 11 February, the mani-
festo contained several significant changes. These
changes eliminated material the DRV, on second
thought, apparently believed would tend to undercut
potential support for the Front in South Vietnam.
Some passages which suggested Communist origin or
ambitions were altered or deleted. The term "agrarian
reform," for example, was dropped. Vicious and bloody
excesses had been carried out under this slogan in
North Vietnam, and had caused widespread revulsion
in the South.
7. In its final version, the manifesto bore a
remarkable similarity to Le Duan's speech before the
party congress in Hanoi, even using his words to
describe some of the Front's aims. Outlining a ten-
point program, the document declared that the Front's
most immediate task was to overthrow the Saigon gov-
ernment, implicitly through armed revolution. When
this was achieved, the Front would form a "broad
national democratic coalition administration" to "ne-
gotiate" with North Vietnam on "reunification."
These and other goals of the Front, such as the adop-
tion of a foreign policy of "peace and neutrality,"
and the redistribution of land in the South were iden-
tical with the actions long advocated for South Viet-
nam in Hanoi propaganda broadcasts. The goals were
phrased in such a manner, however, that the politically
inexperienced masses in the South would understand
them to mean little more than the replacement of the
current Saigon government by a more "representative,
humane" administration.
SECRET
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8. The manifesto contained several. highly gen-
eralized statements on the necessity for social and
economic reforms. These were designed to appeal to
many of the politically and socially dissatisfied
elements in the South. Such words as democracy, so-
cial justice, full employment, higher wages, and lower
rents, were liberally used. A general amnesty to all
political prisoners of the Saigon government was prom-
ised. The document also played on Vietnamese senti-
ments of nationalism, calling for the elimination of
foreign cultural influences and a return to Vietnamese
traditions.
9. Partly because the Front manifesto concen-
trated on the political aims of the insurgency, and
also because early Front propaganda primarily stressed
the political activities of the NFLSV, the impression
was created that Hanoi intended the new organization
to serve mainly as the "political arm" of the Viet
Cong. In fact, however, Hanoi intended that the NFLSV
provide a facade covering all facets of Viet Cong ac-
tivity in South Vietnam, military as well as politi-
cal. Shortly after the Front's formation, for example,
it was publicly announced that all the insurgent forces
had been organized into the "Liberation Army of South
Vietnam" under the leadership of the NFLSV. Today,
the Communists attempt to carry out as much insurgent
activity as possible in the name of the Front, whether
it is a military directive for an attack on a govern-
ment post, a propaganda harangue at gunpoint in a vil-
lage compound, or an official public statement on
policy.
Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts
10. In order to support the assertions in the
Front manifesto that the NFLSV was a broadly based
organization embracing many shades of popular opposi-
tion to the Saigon government, the Vietnamese Commu-
nists studded the announced leadership of the Front
with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese who
could not be positively identified as card-carrying
Communists. These men were to run the day-to-day
activities of the Front's public administrative ap-
paratus, while remaining fully pliable to hard-core
Communist direction in the background.
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NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
SECOND PARTY CONGRESS
Held in January 1964
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PRESIDIUM
(Elected January 1964)
Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho
Vice Chairmen Huynh Tan Phat
Phung Van Cung
Vo Chi Cong
Y Binh Aleo
Thom Me The Nhem
Tran Nam Trung
Thich Thien Hao
Pharr Xuan Thai Tran Buu Kiem
Tran Bach Dang Nguyen Van Ngoi
Nguyen Thi Dinh Nguyen Huu Tho
SECRETARIAT
Secretary General
Huynh Tan Phat
Assistant Secretaries
Le Van Huan
Ho Thu
Members
Ung Ngoc Ky
Ho Xuan Son
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENTS
Nguyen Huu Tho
Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Tian Huu Trang
Thich Thien Hoa
Le Thanh Nam
Nguyen Thi Binh
Huynh Van Tam
Ma Thi Chu (Mrs.)
Nguyen Van Tien
Nguyen Van Hieu
Dang Tran Thi
Le Thi Rieng
Huynh Cuong
Tran Bach Dang
Tran Buu Kiem
Vu Tung
Nguyen Thi Dinh
SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA
DINH ZONE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Chairman: Huynh Tan Phat
Rochom Briu
Huynh Bai
Vo Dong Giang
Lam Tri Chanh
Vo Van Mon
Duong Truong Thanh
Huy Son
Le Van The
Nguyen Hoc
Pham Xuan Thai
Tran Van Thanh
Mai Van Ti
Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Nguyen Van Ti
Hung Tu
Pharr Xuan Vy
Nguyen Thi
Nguyen Van Ngoi
I
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION
EASTERN REGION
ZONE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Chairman: Nguyen Thanh
Long
WESTERN REGION
ZONE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Chairman: Duong Van Vinh
CENTRAL REGION
ZONE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
INFORMATION, CULTURAL,
AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
COMMISSION FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH
Commissioner: Phung Van Cung
QUASI -DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATION
Algeria Huynh Van Tam
Cuba Hoang Bich Son
East Germany Duong Dinh Than
Indonesia Le Quang Chanh
USSR Dong Quang Minh
Communist Tran Van Thanh
China Nguyen Minh Phuong (Acting Head)
Czechoslovakia Nguyen Van Hieu
Nguyen Van Tien
UAR (Permanent Rep. to Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Organization)
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11. The objective was to give the Front the ap-
pearance of broad representation among workers, reli-
gious orders, soldiers, farmers, and intellectuals
in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong also attempted to
select persons who would add prestige to the NFLSV
and who would be capable of winning active public
support. Reports of the organization of bodies af-
filiated with the Front suggest that the Communists
always made sure that at least the secretary of the
committee was a Communist.
12. It appears that the Communists had a good
deal of difficulty in securing enough of the right
type of personnel for all of the top public posts
in the Front. Although the first NFLSV central com-
mittee announced in March 1962 reserved placed for
52 members, it contained only 31 names, most of them
unknowns even in South Vietnam. NFLSV propaganda
claimed that the meeting at which the central com-
mittee was elected was "truly representative of the
people" and heavily attended. Actually, fewer than
200 people participated.
13. The second central committee, announced in
January 1964, had only 41 members. Of the original
31 placed on the first committee, only about half
retained their posts, suggesting that a number of
the original appointees proved incapable of fulfill-
ing their duties. Despite Hanoi's wish to conceal
the real Communist domination of the Front, the
Communist associations of those chosen to fill the
top public posts in the NFLSV stand out clearly.
14. Most of the top NFLSV leaders are known to
have long histories of cooperation with Ho Chi Minh's
old Viet Minh league. The chairman of the central
committee, Nguyen Huu Tho, is a lawyer who has been
involved in pro-Communist political agitation in
Vietnam since 1947. Tho acts as the major public
spokesman for the NFLSV. Although Tho claims in
public to be a "socialist," and to represent an af-
filiated socialist party in the Front, he is clearly
a crypto-Communist.
15. Nguyen Van Hieu, the first secretary general
of the Front central committee, was a leftist journal-
ist who had spent most of his career propagandizing
in favor of the Communists and North Vietnam. In
1963, Hieu relinquished the post of secretary general
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LIBERATION FRONT
SPOKESMEN
Nguyen Huu Tho
Chairman
Huynh Tan Phat
Secretary General
Nguyen Van Hieu
A Leading Official Abroad
Phung Van Cung
A Leading NFLSV Propagandist
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and went to Prague to direct the Front's foreign ac-
tivities. Hieu's eventual successor as secretary
general, Huynh Tan Phat, has apparently been under
North Vietnamese tutelege since he took his "democratic"
party into the Viet Minh fold in the early 1950s. Phung
Van Cung, who heads up both the Front Red Cross and
the Front Peace Committee, is also a former Viet Minh.
Another top public leader of the NFLSV is Tran Buu
Khiem, who heads the Front's Foreign Affairs Commis-
sion. He is reported to have been one of the organ-
izers of the Viet Cong military effort and a former
chief of security for the Communist organization in
South Vietnam.
The People's Revolutionary Party
16. Behind the publicly acknowledged leaders of
the NFLSV, there is another, clandestine, group of
professional revolutionaries, most of whom are ap-
parently fullfledged members of the Lao Dong Party,
the name taken by the North Vietnamese Communists.
They also belong to, and are the leaders in, the so-
called "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP), the
southern component of the Communist party in the DRV.
This southern branch was apparently organized in late
1961, about a year after the formation of the NFLSV.
Its founding was announced publicly by a Liberation
Front spokesman in January 1962. Although the an-
nouncement admitted the PRP's lineal descent from
the original Indochinese Communist Party, it was
phrased so as to give the impression that the deci-
sion to organize the PRP was taken by the Communists
in South Vietnam.
17. The fact that the PRP and the Lao Dong Party
are identical was revealed in a secret Lao Dong cen-
tral committee resolution of November 1961:
First of all, it must be clearly understood
that this is only a name change. Although
the overt name is different from what it is
in North Vietnam, nevertheless, secretly...
the party segment in South Vietnam is a
segment of the Lao Dong party under the lead-
ership of the party central committee, headed
by Chairman Ho-except for the name, there
is no change whatever.
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18. All of the hard-core Communist leaders in
the South re shadowy fieures. but several have -
19. Muoi Cuc, or Nguyen Van Cuu as he is also
known, now is reputed to be the top Communist mili-
taey-political leader in the South, and is said to
run the over-all Communist headquarters, the so-
called Central Office for South Vietnam. He was
the Viet Minh political commissar for the Saigon
area during the war against France, and is a south-
erner by birth. He is reported to have been a Com-
munist for more than 20 years.
20. The major military and political posts in
the northern half of South Vietnam--called Military
Region V by the Communists--are believed to be un-
der the command of Major General Nguyen Don. It is
not unusual to find the same man overseeing both
the military and political program of the Vietnamese
Communists, particularly in a war situation. Don
was the commander of the North Vietnamese 305th
Division in 1961, but by 1962 he was operating in
the South. There are a number of other mysterious
figures, known only by their names, who hold top
posts in the insurgent command structure in the
South. One, a Major General Hoang Khiet, has ap-
peared in the DRV to talk to soldiers being trained
for infiltration into South Vietnam.
21. The organization of the PRP furthered
Hanoi's efforts to depict the insurgency in the
South as an indigenous patriotic movement. It also
permitted the Communists to gain an open and readily
explicable voice in the NFLSV. Front conferences
attended by affiliated non-Communist organizations
in the Front, for example, could be more easily
manipulated through the use of the PRP operating
openly at the meetings.
22. The connection of the PRP with the Front
was explained in carefully phrased terms in the
original NFLSV announcement of the PRP's formation.
The impression was given that the PRP was to form
only a constituent element of the NFLSV with a
voice equal, but certainly not superior, to the
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non-Communist groups active in the Front. In its
own initial statement, the PRP was more candid, term-
ing itself the "vanguard" of the insurgency. The
statement also placed the PRP first when calling on
members to "carry out the program of the party and
the program of action" of the NFLSV.
23. During the first two years of its existence,
the PRP was given only a very small amount of public-
ity in both DRV and insurgent propaganda. Recently,
however, Front propaganda has been less discreet in
concealing the influence of the PRP in directing
the NFLSV. Why the Communists are now less con-
cerned with masking their guiding role in the Front
is not really clear. They have also, however, been
more candid during the last four months in alluding
to the existence of bloc material support for the
insurgency, and to the true nature of the DRV's
backing.
24. Recently, Vietnamese Communist propaganda
has publicized the speeches of PRP officials before
NFLSV military conferences. The contents of PRP
journals have also been disseminated over the Front's
radio. PRP statements which clearly reveal Com-
munist-type domestic objectives and programs for
the revolution in South Vietnam are beginning to be
publicized on a limited scale. On 25 April, the
Front radiobroadcast PRP plans for a future gov-
ernment in South Vietnam in which the party admitted
that it was not feasible to rely on coups d'etat to
create a "genuinely revolutionary government" or
a "worker peasant alliance led by a working class."
The Communist Party would lead the future govern-
ment, which would be a "people's democracy" with
the participation of four Communist-style "revolu-
tionary classes" (workers, peasants, and petty and
national bourgeoisie). The Front also reorganized
its movement for workers in April, renaming it in
typical Communist terminology the "Liberation Trade
Union," and placing it under the direct leadership
of the PRP. The announced purpose of the reorganiza-
tion was to "reshape the working class into a more
revolutionary vanguard."
25. The evidence indicates that the PRP organiza-
tional structure is a duplicate, in so far as pos-
sible, of the North Vietnamese party. Committees of
the PRP exist at the regional and provincial levels,
and where possible at the district, village, and
hamlet levels.
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26. The North Vietnamese Communist party and
government have carefully avoided establishing any
direct, public organizational ties with the Na-
tional Liberation Front. Close links clearly exist,
however, and DRV directives can be quickly imple-
mented. Hanoi's control over the Front is organiza-
tionally maintained through the Communist leaders
in South Vietnam to whom the DRV issues over-all
guidance and instructions. The evidence indicates
that these instructions are channeled through the
Reunification Department of the North Vietnamese
Central Committee, and from the Reunification Com-
mission of the DRV Council of Ministers. Both of
these organizations are headed by the same man,
Nguyen Van Vinh. Thus, while the former body is
technically responsible for policy determination
and the latter for policy execution, in reality the
lines of responsibility are probably blurred. The
North Vietnamese Army high command, moreover, is
also tightly integrated into the DRV hierarchy
which directs the insurgency in the South.
27. The Front does not, publicly at least, main-
tain an office or permanent representative in Hanoi
as it does in many other bloc capitals. When the
activities of Front delegations in the DRV are pub-
licized, the delegations are carefully linked offi-
cially with the DRV's own mass front organ, the Father-
land Front, and not with the DRV Government or party.
This facade, of course, is designed to add substance
to Communist claims that the insurgents are completely
self-propelled revolutionaries.
28. Unofficially, Hanoi has adequate opportunity
for close liaison with the top public leaders in the
Front. Some of these individuals apparently visit
the DRV frequently, traveling via Cambodian or Chi-
nese transportation routes into North Vietnam. More-
over, DRV and Front delegations frequently travel to-
gether on tours abroad, with the NFLSV representatives
usually using DRV passports.
29. Occasionally, DRV and Liberation Front propa-
ganda differ somewhat in their treatment of develop-
ments related to Vietnam. These differences do not
appear to indicate significant policy fissures be-
tween the DRV and the insurgents in the South. They
apparently stem mainly from the tactical consider-
ations facing the two groups, and do not relate to
their accord on over-all objectives.
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30. An example of the propaganda differences
can be seen in the treatment by Hanoi and the NFLSV
of the question of foreign "volunteers" to assist
the insurgent fighting forces. The Front, since it
is in the van of the fighting, has taken the lead
in threatening to call in "volunteers" from the DRV
and elsewhere. The threats are hopefully intended
both to deter massive US involvement in Vietnam,
and to bolster the morale of the insurgents by
promises of outside assistance to match any all-
out participation in combat by US troops.
31. Hanoi has rebroadcast the Front threats
and has held rallies at which elements of the DRV
populace pledged their willingness to volunteer.
On the whole, however, Hanoi has been restrained
in its treatment of the subject. It appears that
the DRV's careful handling of the question is partly
designed to avoid adding any unnecessary fuel to
charges by Washington and Saigon that North Vietnam
is the real fountainhead of the insurgency. At the
same time, by rebroadcasting the threats, and by
indicating over-all approval of the NFLSV policy
statements, Hanoi manages to get across the impres-
sion that it will respond when and if it judges the
time ripe for an open move to South Vietnam by out-
side personnel. Meanwhile, one indication of the
over-all coordination between Hanoi and the insur-
gents is the continuing clandestine infiltration of
personnel from North to South Vietnam. Several
thousand reportedly have come in already in 1965,
running the total during the last four years to more
than 40,000.
NFLSV-Affiliated Organizations
32. In addition to acquiring the proper person-
nel to fill the top offices in the Front, the Com-
munists have expended considerable effort in flesh-
ing out the NFLSV with a phalanx of affiliated "lib-
eration" organizations. These groups have been added
to give the impression that the Front is representa-
tive of every significant social, ethnic, religious,
and professional group in South Vietnam. The com-
plexity of this task was mitigated by the fact that
the Communists already had experience in conducting
a similar operation during the war against the French.
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33. In the first several months after the forma-
tion of the NFLSV, associations specifically for
farmers, students, women, youth, and urban workers
were set up. Many others have been added since that
time. By early August 1964, the Front had publicized
the operation of some twenty affiliated bodies. The
top echelons of most of these groups appear to be
maintained with very small staffs, if any at all.
The Communists have put more effort into the organiza-
tion of active farmer, women, and youth groups of the
Front at the local levels in South Vietnam, where
advantage could be more effectively taken of the
natural inclinations and aspirations of these ele-
ments of society.
34. Where possible, the affiliated organiza-
tions of the NFLSV have been tied in with correspond-
ing international Communist front organizations. This
gives them an international character, stimulates
publicity about them, and makes them appear far more
important than they actually are.
35. Two "political parties" in addition to the
PRP have also been attached to the Front as constit-
uent bodies. They are the so-called Radical Social-
ist Party and the Democratic Party. It is interest-
ing to note that the only two political parties per-
mitted to exist in North Vietnam, aside from the Com-
munist Party, bear almost identical names to those
in the South. In the North, they supply a facade
of democracy to the political process in the country,
and operate in such a manner as to attract support
from the intellectual and "bourgeois" classes. They
have the same function in the South. Similar groups
existed in the Communist front during the war against
the French, and it is probable that some of their mem-
bers were ordered by Hanoi to remain in the South
after the 1954 war settlement.
The Front's Grass-Roots Structure
36. Efforts to develop the NFLSV at the local
level in South Vietnam began shortly after the Front
was established. A captured Communist document is-
sued in March 1961 urged the immediate organization
of full NFLSV committees in villages and towns. It
was apparent that the Vietnamese Communists intended
to follow the pattern already established in North
Vietnam, where general committees of Hanoi's Father-
land Front exist alongside Communist party committees
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down to the local level. The available evidence in-
dicates that regular NFLSV committees now have been
formed at these levels throughout most of the Viet
Cong - controlled area where, according to the most
reliable statistics available, approximately 20-25
percent of the rural population resides.
37. To assure broad representation on these com-
mittees the - ying Communists
s limited to two
i s o e total mem ers ip. In one village, which
has been controlled by the insurgents for more than
two years, the NFLSV committee is composed of repre-
sentatives of all classes and organizations existing
in the village. There is a representative for the
landowners, one for the farmers, one for the women,
and representatives for other groups. In this vil-
lage, the secretary of the Front committee represents
the local PRP element, since he is also a member of
the village PRP committee. The PRP chapter receives
its orders from the higher district party committee.
These orders are passed to the village Front commit-
tee, which is responsible for carrying out the orders.
38. It appears that the regular Front committees
in Communist-controlled areas exercise a wide variety
of functions. They are the body used by the Commu-
nists insofar as possible to collect taxes, con-
script manpower for military and economic services,
organize the local economy, and to run rudimentary
schools, hospitals, and courts. The Front committees
provide an organization with a potential for winning
the voluntary support of the population by various
activities of a welfare or civic-action nature. Work-
ing through the Front, the Communists try to show
that the insurgency is a more efficient, honest, and
humane administration than is the Saigon regime.
39. At the grassroots level in the Communist-
controlled areas, the insurgents appear to be follow-
ing much the same strategy with the NFLSV as they did
with the local "administrative-resistance" councils
set up by the Viet Minh in rebel-held territory dur-
ing the war against the French. Captured Viet Minh
documents frequently dealt with programs carried out
under the authority of the councils to raise the liv-
ing standards. Such documents often contained sta-
tistics on the establishment of schools, numbers of
children and adults in school, medical dispensaries,
sanitation efforts, and other civic responsibilities.
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40. In the rebel-dominated areas, there appeared
to be an initial surge to participate in the NFLSV
as a reincarnation of the former Viet Minh. The
Front thus picked up former Viet Minh activists and
recipients of land redistributed by the Viet Minh.
This surge appears to have been short-lived how-
ever. e r y attempts to o ce
"middle-class" peasants to give land to the poor
were too harsh and resulted in a considerable loss
of popularity for the NFLSV. The subsequent growth
in influence of local Front organizations appears
to have been largely the result of rural passivity,
combined with the growing threat from the expanding
insurgent military arm.
41. Because it lacked attractiveness, the grass-
roots structure of the NFLSV appears to have required
greater direct Communist nontrol than nrlyinn1ly ex-
pected.
the use o e NFLSV during 196.5 to "positively
implement the party's policy" in the countryside.
In some villages in the insurgent-controlled areas,
the PRP unit has had to engage openly in such activi-
ties as the collection of taxes, and the organiza-
tion of the local economy.
42. Outside the areas held firmly by the rebels,
NFLSV activity varies in intensity and effectiveness.
It is most intense in those rural regions where ir-
regular insurgent bands and sympathizers are able
to operate almost at will, and where there is often
little in the way of effective governmental machinery
answerable to Saigon. Organization and proseliza-
tion activities in the name of the Front are car-
ried on actively in these areas, where about 25 per-
cent of the rural population resides. In the rural
regions where the government has begun planning or
has begun to implement pacification programs, there
is less Front agitation. Approximately 10 to 15
percent of the rural population lives in such re-
gions. NFLSV influence is nearly negligible in the
remaining sections of the rural area where govern-
ment military and civil control is firm. Some 35
percent of the rural population lives in these areas.
43. Probably only a few NFLSV committees exist
at the local level in those rural areas not firmly
controlled by the Communists. In the contested re-
gions, the greater part of the influence exerted by
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the insurgents appears to stem directly from Commu-
nist Party action. For example, one source from a
village of 8-9,000 people in the delta, where a
negligible amouhtof security was provided by the gov-
ernment, indicated that the PRP openly exercised
direct administration over village affairs.
44. Front influence among the nearly 3,000,000
residents in the major cities and towns of South Viet-
nam is also nearly negligible. 25X1
I las of November 1964, Front or-
ganizations in the aigon - Gia Dinh Special Zone
were purely nominal. Communist organizers had been
unable to establish either a Front committee or set
up any of the Front's mass organizations. In prac-
tice, the hard-core Communist under
the 25X1
I lincreasing
specs ca y in the urban
areas, was an urgent, critical problem that must be
solved. There is no evidence that the NFLSV has been
successful in attracting significant support from any
of the politically influential groups in South Viet-
nam. Both overt propaganda and extensive clandestine
penetration nevertheless continue to be directed at
the Buddhists, students, labor union members, and
armed forces personnel.
Front Propaganda Machinery
45. The NFLSV boasts an especially well-organ-
ized propaganda arm, the Liberation News Agency
(LNA). The LNA was set up early in 1961, parallel
with the establishment of the Front itself. The
LNA provides an easily controlled mechanism for
the information dissemination which the Communists
have found so essential and effective in coordinat-
ing and backstopping their political agitation ac-
tivities, Several major LNA broadcast stations pro-
duce a steady diet of propaganda for public dis-
semination in the South.
46. Hanoi often rebroadcasts NFLSV statements
within an hour or two of the time they were first
issued by LNA. NFLSV propaganda publications are
printed in several languages in Hanoi by the gov-
ernment's official publishing houses, apparently to
be distributed abroad under the aegis of the North
Vietnamese Government. English-language editions
of Front documents, for example, have been distrib-
uted in England by the correspondent of the DRV
newspaper Cuu Quoc.
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tnrougn orricial DRY channels. The several perma-
nent Front offices abroad also distribute mountains
of NFLSV propaganda; several of them put out peri-
odic information sheets which are distributed to
local leftist press sources for inclusion in local
newspapers.
NFLSV Program Abroad
48. One of the main aims of the Front since
its formation has been to publicize its activities
and programs abroad. By representing itself as an
organization struggling to free Vietnam from "colo-
nialist and imperialist aggression," the NFLSV has
made a special effort to enlist the sympathy and sup-
port of the newly emerging countries in Africa and
Asia. A steady flow of telegrams of greeting and
congratulations go,out from the Front to foreign
governments and heads of state. Coordination and
advice for this kind of activity probably comes
from the more experienced bureaucrats in Hanoi.
49. The Front has long been sending representa-
tives on overseas tours, at first mainly to the Com-
munist bloc, but with increasing frequency to Africa
and Asia. Front delegates have also been attending
meetings of leftist- and Communist-sponsored con-
ferences abroad since late 1962. The attendance of
Front representatives at foreign conferences and meet-
ings has been gradually accelerated. Under Hanoi's
sponsorship, these delegates now often appear at
Communist-sponsored world or regional conferences on
an equal footing with national delegations. It is
believed that a hard core of "delegates" for the
Front is stabled in North Vietnam, where entrance
and egress is easier than from South Vietnam.
50. The first permanent Front office abroad was
opened in Cuba in August 1962. By mid-1964, permanent
Front "missions" had also been established in Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Algeria, Indonesia, and the
UAR, where the NFLSV man is accredited to the Afro-
Asian Solidarity Organization.
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53. One of the most active of the NFLSV posts
abroad is the office in Peking, which was established
in September of 1964. Its representatives have been
invited to Chinese receptions for foreign dignitaries
and have been increasingly successful in arranging
private audiences with the stream of Afro-Asian per-
sonalities flowing through Peking. In April of this
year, the NFLSV also opened an office in Moscow--its
seventh full-time post abroad. The Communists prob-
ably hope that Soviet propaganda support derived from
this new publicity outlet will significantly boost
their cause, and that the office will also open new
avenues for NFLSV contact with the non-Communist world.
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54. In Asia during the past year, the Vietnamese
Communists have concentrated mainly on pumping up
NFLSV relations with Cambodia. They have tried to
elicit statements and actions by the Sihanouk regime
supporting the Front's claim to be the "legitimate"
representative of the South Vietnamese people. With
Chinese encouragement and the active backing of the
North Vietnamese, Front representatives sat down
with Cambodian officials in Peking last December to
discuss a formal treaty defining and guaranteeing
the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Although the ne-
gotiations failed to produce an agreement, Sihanouk's
publicly demonstrated willingness to engage in treaty
discussions with the NFLSV was a decided plus for
the Communists. Sihanouk has also insisted that
the NFLSV should represent South Vietnam in any in-
ternational conference to guarantee Cambodian neutral-
ity.
55. The Front has also found some support this
year in Indonesia. In late April, at Sukarno's invita-
tion, Front delegates attended the tenth anniversary
celebrations of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung
as the only representatives of South Vietnam. They
were feted by the host Indonesian Government and
readily mixed with many of the visiting Afro-Asian
state officials.
56. By far the strongest international initia-
tive by the NFLSV this year was undertaken in con-
nection with the now-postponed Bandung II meeting
which was to have been held in Algiers in June.
Throughout the late spring, NFLSV and other Asian
Communist representatives maneuvered behind the
scenes to line up support for excluding Saigon from
the gathering and to have the Front accepted as the
representative of South Vietnam. Both Chinese and
North Vietnamese foreign ministry officials made
preconference trips to friendly African countries to
enlist support. An NFLSV delegation later toured
the same circuit.
57. Just before the Algiers meeting was sched-
uled to start, the Front released a memorandum sup-
porting its claim to represent South Vietnam. While
castigating the Saigon government, the memorandum
catalogued all the "evidence" that the Front operates
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as a de facto government in South Vietnam and that
it also as widespread popular support. The memo-
randum claimed that the Front "wields genuine,
steady, and widespread power, whose basis is the self-
managing committees elected by the population in lib-
erated areas." The memorandum in effect summed up
the propaganda line of the NFLSV during the past six
months, which has stopped just short of announcing
he formation of a provisional Front government at
the national level in South Vietnam. The chief NFLSV
representative to the Algiers conference told the
Cairo press that the Front "is a government, but it
is not yet official."
Recognition Strategy
58. This past March, Hanoi and the NFLSV be-
gan to put greater emphasis on their long-standing
demand that any settlement of the war in South Viet-
nam be "in accordance" with the Front program. In
a major policy statement of 22 March, the Front as-
serted for the first time that it must have the
"decisive voice in any negotiations to end the Viet-
namese war."
59. In apparent support of such assertions, the
NFLSV and the DRV suddenly increased their propaganda
claims concerning the size of the "liberated areas"
under front control in South Vietnam. Throughout
1964, the Front's standard claim was that it con-
trolled about two thirds of the territory and about
half of the population in the South. Beginning in
1965, however, the claim was expanded to four fifths
of the territory and almost 75 percent of the popula-
tion.
60. The long-standing allegation by the Front
that it is the "genuine" or "legitimate" representa-
tive of the South Vietnamese people was also given
greater emphasis this spring. In a 22 March state-
ment, the Front proclaimed itself the "only" legiti-
mate representative. At about the same time, propa-
ganda from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow began to give
greater play to NFLSV claims of legitimacy, identify-
ing the Front in some cases as the only "legal" agent
of the people in the South. This line, intended as
a counterpoint to the slipping prestige of the Saigon
regime, also appears to have reflected a Vietnamese
Communist estimate that Saigon and the United States
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could eventually be brought around to deal directly
with the Front as an independent political entity,
thus strengthening the Communist position in any
war settlement.
61. The Vietnamese Communists appear to be-
lieve that it is no longer possible to force a bi-
lateral settlement of the war on a weakened Saigon
government. They have probably concluded that, be-
cause of the direct and growing US participation in
the conflict, an end to the fighting can be obtained
now only in a multilateral, internationalized ar-
rangement of the type which ended the Indochina War
in 1954. In the course of such a settlement, the
Communists realize that a strong image of NFLSV
prestige and physical control in South Vietnam will
be extremely important. It will not only help under-
mine the standing of the Saigon authorities, but
will also assist the Communists in gaining an effective
position in any postwar political establishment in
South Vietnam.
62. US and South Vietnamese agreement to deal
directly with the Front and to treat it as a "partner"
in settling the war would by no means guarantee that
the Communists would move quickly toward a political
settlement of the conflict. If the US and Saigon
recognized the independent status of the Front while
the Communists still retained the military initiative
in South Vietnam, Hanoi and the Viet Cong would cer-
tainly take it as a sign of weakness and probably
would hold out for additional concessions before
acquiescing to any meaningful discussions on the con-
flict.
63. Beyond broad statements of Front policy such
as the intent to form a "national, coalition govern-
ment" and to move toward "reunification" with North
Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists have been very
vague concerning specific NFLSV goals when the fight-
ing ends. An intent to leave considerable maneuvering
room seems to lie behind the basic Vietnamese Commu-
nist line that any settlement of the war must be in
"accordance" with the NFLSV program.
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64. It is probable, however, that at a minimum
the Communists would seek to gain the key defense,
foreign policy, information, and economic offices in
any coalition government so that they could make a
quick move toward implementing such policies as land
redistribution and socialization of industry. The
Front's secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, reportedly
told that a "socialist
economy" would be developed in the south after the
war at the same time as the war devastation was being
repaired. Possession of the key offices in a coali-
tion government would enable the Communists, operat-
ing through the Front, to stifle quickly any op-
position to a full and open Communist take-over. The
Communists sought these offices during the political
settlement in Laos in 1962, under which a coalition
government was set up.
Forming a Provisional Government
65. The NFLSV's failure so far to declare the
formation of a national provisional government is due
partly to its failure to attract support from the
grass roots and from individuals of stature in South
Vietnam. This was implicit in the recent remarks of
a DRV newsman in Moscow who claimed that the question
of forming a provisional Front regime was under active
consideration. The NFLSV has gone so far as to set
up committees--"ministries in embryo"--for military
affairs, external affairs, information, education,and
public health. According to the newsman, however,
before such a government is proclaimed the NFLSV
needs wider popular representation, including some
elements of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces; it
also lacks sufficient well-trained cadres to run a
government.
66. Formation of a national government of obscure
personalities at this time would reveal the Front's
lack of volunteer backing. It could also provoke con-
siderable active opposition from other politically
ambitious groups in South Vietnam, such as the Bud-
dhists, who themselves aspire to a position of in-
fluence in any postwar government.
67. The DRV newsman in Moscow also implied that
the Communists were holding off on the formation of
a provisional government until they obtain control
of more real estate in South Vietnam. In reality,
they still lack a fairly extensive, unified geographic
base. The major Communist "war zones" are still
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scattered and vulnerable to government raids and in-
terdiction. It would be difficult at present for
the Communists to set up a "capital," receive foreign
visitors, or conduct business securely in South Viet-
nam. Current Communist military activities may be
designed to cope with this problem. They are in part
aimed at eliminating government influence from a
large Area of the central highlands of South Vietnam
contiguous with the Cambodian border.
68. If the Communists believed that for politi-
cal reasons the situation now was propitious for
the establishment of a provisional government, they
would probably do so regardless of the amount of
territory they control in South Vietnam. It would
be possible to conduct the government's activity from
outside South Vietnam, possibly under bloc protection.
Such a decision based on political considerations
might come following acceptance of the Front as the
sole representative of South Vietnam at an influential
international conference like the now-postponed Bandung
II meeting. The Communists might see this as the
possible fulcrum with which to tip the balance in
favor of the NFLSV.
69. The Communists at the moment, however, are
clearly concerned with the political repercussions
of such a move while the Viet Cong power position
in South Vietnam is still fluid. DRV and NFLSV ef-
forts to develop international pressure on the US and
the Republic of Vietnam to agree to Front participa-
tion in settling the war would almost certainly be
complicated by the official establishment at this
time of a formal Front government. Some Afro-Asian
states which have urged direct negotiations with the
NFLSV might be less forthcoming if their support
were suddenly tied in with the question of recogniz-
ing the Front as a legal government. Moreover, the
interjection of a formal Front government into the
picture would make it more difficult for the US and
the Saigon regime to concede any role to the Front
in settling the war. In sum, it appears that the
Communists do not intend to proclaim the formation
of a provisional NFLSV government in the near future.
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The following study of the NFLSV organization attempts to identify
as many of the leaders of the front as possible. Most of the affiliated
associations have been identified by Radio Hanoi and the NFLSV Libera-
tion Broadcasting Station, and others have appeared in Communist publi-
cations and documents. Many of the groups exist only on paper, and it
has not been possible to identify the membership of a number of these
organizations. It should be noted that some of the names may have been 25X1
used without permission and that some may be totally fictitious. In many
instances names are received orally and may be spelled incorrectly or
rendered phonetically.
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1. CENTRAL ORGANIZATION
Central Committee
Central Committee Departments
Page A-1
II. QUASI-DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION Page A-3
III. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS Page A-4
Liberation Federation of Trade Unions
Liberation Peasants Association (Liberation
Agricultural Association)
Liberation Youth Association
Liberation Women's Association
Liberation Students and Pupils Association
Liberation Writers and Artists Association
Association of Former Resistants
Patriotic and Democratic Journalists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Buddhists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Teachers Association
Highland Peoples Autonomy Movement
Liberation Red Cross
Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee for Solidarity with the Latin American People
Committee for Protection of World Peace
Military and Civil Medical Council
Liberation Army and Popular Armed Forces
People's Revolutionary Party
Radical Socialist Party
Democratic Party
Liberation Press Agency
Liberation Broadcasting
Association of Writers and Artists of the Saigon-
Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
*People's Liberation Youth Group
*Industrialists and Businessmen Against the
US-Diemists
*Democratic Lawyers Association
*Council of Heroic Disabled Servicemen
*South Vietnam Veterans Association
*Association of the Families of Patriotic Soldiers
*Association for the Improvement of Morality (of the
Hoa Hao Buddhist sect)
*Patriotic and Peace-Loving Boys and Girls Group
*Reformed Cao Dai Sect
*Group of Fighters for Peace, Reunification, and
Independence of the Vietnamese Fatherland-Patriotic
Servicemen in the Ranks of the US-Diem Army
*Committee for the Peace and Amelioration of South
Vietnam
*Membership not available
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ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS (cont.)
*Association of Patriotic Teachers of the
Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
*Association of Patriotic Teachers of the Western
Region of South Vietnam
*Vietnamese Nationals of Chinese Origin
*Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee
*Patriotic Khmer Monks Solidarity Association
*Khmer Buddhist Research Institute of South Vietnam
*Group of Soldiers Who Have Returned to the People
A-iv
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S-E-C-R-E-T
NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Presidium
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
*HUYNH TAN PHAT
*PHUNG VAN CUNG
*THOM ME THE NHEM
*TRAN NAM TRUNG
*VO CHI CONG
*Y BINH ALEO
*DANG TRAN THI
*NGUYEN HUU THE
*NGUYEN THI DINH
*NGUYEN VAN NGOI
*PHAM XUAN THAI
*THIEN HAO (Thich)
*TRAN BACH DANG
*TRAN BUU KIEM
Secretariat
Secretary General *HUYNH TAN PHAT
Deputy Secretaries General *LE VAN HUAN
*HO THU
Members *UNG NGOC KY
HO XUAN SON
Members of the Central Committee (elected January 1964)
DUONG TRUONG THANH
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HUNG TU,aka Hong Lien, aka Nhan Tu
*HUY SON
*HUYNH BAI
*HUYNH CUONG
*HUYNH VAN TAM
LAM TRI CHANH
*LE THANH NAM
*LE THI RIENG
*LE VAN THA
*MA THI CHU
MAI VAN TI
*NGUYEN HOC
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Members of the Central Committee (elected January 1964) (cont.)
*NGUYEN NGOC THUONG
NGUYEN THI (_)
*NGUYEN THI BINH
*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN TI
*NGUYEN VAN TIEN
*PHAM XUAN VY
*ROCHOM BRIU
*TRAN HUU TRANG
*TRAN VAN THANH
*VO DONG GIANG
*VO VAN MON
*VU TUNG
*XAT
Members of the First Central Committee (elected in 1962)
*DANG TRAN THI
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HO THU
*HUYNH CUONG
HUYNH DANG (1)
*HUYNH TAN PHAT
*HUYNH VAN TAM
*LAM KIEN KHANH (1)
*LE NGOC QUANG (1)
*LE THANH NAM
LE THI DUONG (1)
*LE THI RIENG
LE VIET HUNG (1)
*MA THI CHU
NGOC TU (1)
NGUYEN CUU BICH (1)
*NGUYEN HUU THE
*NGUYEN HUU THO
*NGUYEN NGOC THUONG
NGUYEN THACH (1)
*NGUYEN THI BINH
*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN NGOI
NGUYEN VIET MAU (1)
NHU SON (1)
*PHAM XUAN THAI
PHAN TUYEN (1)
*PHUNG VAN CUNG
*ROCHOM BRIU
(1)not currently a Central Committee member
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Members of the First Central Committee (elected in 1962) (cont.)
SON VONG (died March 1963) (1)
*THIEN HAO
*TRAN BACH DANG
*TRAN BUU KIEM
*TRAN HUU TRANG
*TRAN NAM TRUNG
*UNG NGOC KY
*VO CHI CONG
*XAT
*Y BINH ALEO
Central Committee Departments
MILITARY COMMITTEE
Director
Members
*Tran Nam Trung
Le Van Tien
Bay Quan
INFORMATION, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE
Chairman
Deputy Chairman
EXTERNAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Chairman
DEFENSE OF BUDDHISM COMMITTEE
Representative
PUBLIC HEALTH COMMISSION
Commissioner
INSPECTORS GROUP
Representative
Quasi-Diplomatic Representation
ALGERIA
*Tran Bach Dang
Muoi Tai
*Tran Buu Kiem
Thich Vinh
*Phung Van Cung
*Nguyen Van Hieu
*Huynh Van Tam
*Vo Cong Trung
Truong Van Loc
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Quasi-Diplomatic Representation (cont.)
*Tran Van Thanh
*Nguyen Minh Phuong
Nguyen Trong Kha
Hoang Bich Son
*Ly Van Sau
Hoang Kinh
*Nguyen Van Hieu
*Dinh Ba Thi
*Ma Thi Chu
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC *Nguyen Van Hieu
*Duong Dinh Thao
Tran Huu Kha
*Le Phuong
INDONESIA *Le Quang Chanh
*Huynh Van Ba
Dang Quang Minh
Nguyen Van Dong
*Nguyen Thanh Long
Luu Xuan Thanh
Ngo Ton Hoan
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC *Huynh Van Nghia
*Nguyen Van Tien
ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS
LIBERATION FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (Formerly Liberation Labor
Association -IOI LAO DONG GIAI PHONG])
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Standing Committee Members
*Pham Xuan Thai, aka Xuan Thai
*Dang Tran Thi
*Dinh Ba Thi
*Huynh Van Tam
*Le Thanh Nam
*Nguyen Minh Phuong
*Tran Hoai Nam
*Tran Van Thanh
A-4
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LIBERATION PEASANTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NONG DAN GIAI PHONG)
Chairman *Nguyen Huu The
Member Tu Lap
LIBERATION YOUTH ASSOCIATION (HOI THANH NIEN GIAI PHONG)
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Secretary General
Deputy Secretary General
Members
*Tran Bach Dang
Nguyen Van Chon
Nguyen Van Yen
Cao Van Tai
Anh Theo
Cao Van Sau
Cao Xuan Bo
Do Duy Lien
Ho Bao Hon
Ho Phong
Huynh Van Tuan
*Le Phuong
*Le Quang Chanh
Minh Tanh
Nguyen Dong Ha
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Nguyen Van Phuc
Nguyen Van Tai
Nguyen Van Tan
Nguyen Xuan Thuy
*Thanh Hai, aka Luu Thanh Hai
Tran Tien Dung
Tran Tri Dung
Tran Van An
Tran Van Thuan
Trinh Van Thanh
LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG)
Chairman, Standing Committee *Nguyen Thi Binh
*Mi Doan
*Le Thi Rieng
*Thanh Loan
A-5
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LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG)(cont.)
Standing Committee Members *Nguyen Thi Thanh
*Nguyen Thi Tu
Phung Van Cung (Mrs.)
Tran Thi Lieu
*Bui Thi Me
Buu Hoa
Do Duy Lien
Hai Lua
Ho Thi Buu, aka Ho Thi Buoi
*Ma Thi Chu
Ngoc Dung (see *Nguyen Ngoc Dung)
*Nguyen Thi Chon
Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly
Nguyen Thi Ha
Nguyen Thi Hoa
Nguyen Thi Sang
Thua Hoa
Tran Thi Dan
Tran Thi Dau
Tran Thi Dinh
Tran Thi My
Tran Thi Tu
Tran Thi Trung
Truong Thi Hue
LIBERATION STUDENTS AND PUPILS ASSOCIATION (HOI LIEN HIEF SINN VIEN
HOC SINH GIAI PRONG)
*Ly Van Sau
*Nguyen Ngoc Dung
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Tran Van An
Tu Le
Viet Hung
LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE GIAI PHONG)
Chairman *Tran Huu Trang
Van Tung
Tran Hieu Minh
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LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE GIAO
PHONG) (cont.)
Secretary General Ly Van Sam
Giang Nam
Pham Minh Hoa
Bui Kinh Lang
Bui Xuan Lang
Ly Van Phung
Nguyen Hien
Nguyen Van Vinh
Pham Van Hoa
Phan The
*Thanh Hai
*Thanh Loan
Thanh Quy Minh
Trieu Van
Truong Binh Tong
Truong Thanh
Tung Long
Van Nam
ASSOCIATION OF FORMER RESISTANTS
Secretary General *Tran Bach Dang
PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NHA BAO YEU
NUOC VA DAN CHU)
Chairman *Vu Tung
*Tam Duc
*Nguyen Van Hieu
Nhi Muc
Secretary General Thanh Nho
Deputy Secretary General *Nguyen Thi Chon
*Thanh Huong
*Duong Dinh Thao
Hieu Chan
Hoang Xuan Ba
*Nguyen Thi Binh
*Nguyen Van Tai
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PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NHA BAO YEU
NUOC VA DAN CHU) (cont.)
*Phan Lac Tuyen
*Rochom Thep
Thach Thien Chi
Tu Chung
SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC BUDDHISTS ASSOCIATION (TRUNG UONG HOI LUC
HOA)
Members *Hung Tu
Giac Hao
*Biui Thi Me
*Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
*Nguyen Thanh Long
Secretary General Le Thuoc
HIGHLAND PEOPLE'S AUTONOMY MOVEMENT (UY BAN DAN TOC TU TRI TAY
NGUYEN)
*Mi Doan
*Rochom Briu
*Rochom Thep
*Xat
Members Ba Quan
Rochom Ban
LIBERATION RED CROSS (HOI HONG THAP TI GIAI PHONG)
President *Phung Van Cung
Chairman, Executive Committee Vu Ngoc
A-8
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COMMITTEE FOR AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY (UY BAN DOAN KET A PHI)
Chairman *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Vice Chairman *Thien Hao
Secretary General *Huynh Cuong
Members *Huynh Van Nghia
*Huynh Van Tam
*Le Thanh Nam
*Ma Thi Chu
Ngo Tan Dao
*Nguyen Van Tien
*Rochom Briu
*Tran Hoai Nam
COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE LATIN-AMERICAN PEOPLE (UY BAN DOAN
KET DAN TOC MY LA TIN)
Chairman *Le Van Huan
Member Chau Hoang Nam
COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF WORLD PEACE (UY BAN BAO VE HOA BINH
THE GIOI)
Chairman *Phung Van Cung
Members *Ma Thi Chu
*Ho Hue Ba
MILITARY AND CIVIL MEDICAL COUNCIL
Director *Phung Van Cung
Member *Ho Thu
LIBERATION ARMY AND POPULAR ARMED FORCES (GIAI PRONG QUAN VAN CAC
LUC LUONG VO TRANG NHAN DAN)
Deputy Commander *Nguyen Thi Dinh
Sau Hoang, aka Cao Dan Chiem,
aka Dom, aka Sau Cia, aka Sau Rau
*Tran Nam Trung
Nguyen Van Luong
Nguyen Van Huu
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PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (DANG NHAN DAN CACH MANG VIET NAM)
Chairman Nguyen Van Muoi, aka Muoi Cuc
Secretary General Nguyen Trung Thua
Executive Committee Member *Vo Chi Cong
Member, Youth Group Nguyen Chi Trung
RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY (DANG XA HOI CAP TIEN)
Secretary General *Nguyen Van Hieu
Deputy Secretary General *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Member, Standing Committee *Le Van Tha
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DANG DAN CHU)
Chairman
Secretary General
Secretary
Central Committee Members
LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY
Deputy Director
Director, East German Bureau
LIBERATION BROADCASTING
Director
Deputy Director
Ngo Ngoc Sang
*Huynh Tan Phat
*Nguyen Thanh Long
*Duong Van Le
Ho Kim Son
Nguyen Van Lan
*Tran Buu Kiem
Tran Van Huong
*Ung Ngoc Ky
*Duong Dinh Thao
A-10
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Chairman Vo Hoai Linh, aka Hoai Linh,
aka Truong Vinh Tong
Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh,
aka Phong Anh
*Thanh Loan
Regional Organization
SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH ZONE
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
Ngoc Tung
Pham Huy
Tran Chinh Truc
*Tran Huu Trang
Tran Tan Thanh
Tran Thanh Dat
Tran Van Choi, aka Chin Choi,
aka Tran Van Chau
Vu Hien Thinh
*Huynh Tan Phat
*Le Van Tha
Phan Trong Dan
~huoc Thang
*Tran Huu Trang
Secretary General *Nguyen Van Tai
Assistant Secretary General Nguyen Dong Ha
Doan Cong Chanh
Hoang Hai
Hoang Minh Dao
Lu Sanh Loc
Ngoc Dinh
Nguyen Thi Phan
Nguyen Van Cung
Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh, aka
Phong Anh
Thanh Tam
A-11
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EASTERN REGION ZONE
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
*Nguyen Thanh Long
*Hung Tu
Lien Van Chan, aka Le Van Chan
Nguyen Kien Quoc
Nguyen Van Chi
Tran Van Son
Secretary General Nguyen Dinh Nho
*Huynh Thanh Mung
Le Sac Nghi
Vo Thanh Nguon
*Vo Van Mon
Ho Chi Tieng, aka Ho Chi Tong
Luu Kiet
Nguyen Bach Tuyet
Nguyen Duc Quang
Nguyen The Phuong, aka Nguyen
Thi Phuong
Nguyen Van Hung, aka Nguyen Van
Trung
Nguyen Van Nong
Nguyen Van Xuan
Nguyen Viet Hong
Sorc Phrum
Thieu Nhu Thuy
Tran Van Binh
Truong Thang
Vo Van Voi, aka Vo Van Doi
Waifa Sam, aka Wai A Sam
Bui Duc Tam, aka Bui Duc Tan
Cao Van Sau
*Ho Hue Ba
Le Hong Thang
Luc Ta Soc
Ngoc Binh Thang
Nguyen Thai Binh
Nguyen Thi Dinh
Nguyen Thien Tu, aka Huynh Thien
Tu
Nguyen Trong Xuat
Nguyen Van Chin
A-12
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CENTRAL REGION ZONE (cont.)
WESTERN REGION ZONE
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
*Nguyen Van Ngoi
*Thien Hao
*Duong Van Vinh
Tran Van Binh, aka Bay Thang
Tran Thanh Dai
Secretary General
Ngo Tan Dao, aka Ngo Dai Dao
Commissar (Current Affairs) Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly
Commissar (Interprovincial
Committee)
Commissar (Central Commit-
tee)
Commissioner, Standing Com-
mittee
*Nguyen Van Nhon
*Huynh Cuong
Ma Ha Thong, aka Muoi Thong
Le Van Phien
*Bui Thi Me, aka Thi Me
Khiet
Le Minh Thanh, aka Minh Tan
Le Thi Toi
Nguyen Thi Sang
Pharr Cong Chanh
Pham Minh Ly, aka Muoi Ly
Pham Van Be
Phan Huu Phuoc, aka Thanh Quynh
Phan Van Nam, aka Thuc Nguyen,
aka Luc
Tran Van Phan
Tran Van Thuan
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SECRET
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I'- WdWn'1-1
THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
7 September 1965
D I R E C T O R A T E O F I N T E L L I G E N C E
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GROUPI
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01002- a d clossifi cat ion
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USG, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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