VULNERABILITIES OF THE USSR AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 22, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved ~ Release 20A ,~q~g. IA-RDP79TOQ~2A000 0 50015-1
J~CI.~C
OCI No. ?525/65
Cvpy No ,
~~ duly 1965
SUBJECT: Vulnerabilities of the USSR and the Eastern
European Nations To Psychological Warfare
1, For a variety of reasons the populations of the SQViet
Bloc countries are not susceptible to psychological warfare
programs designed to induce them, or their organized military
units to undertake active resistance against the Soviet Com-
munist regime, the Eastern European camrnunist controlled
governments or their military forces prior to the initiation
of hostilities between the West and the Soviet bloc or,
with one possible exception (see #3), during such warfare.
This would hold true far all-out nuclear war, a conflict in
which only tactical nuclear weapons are being used, or a
limited non-nuclear conflict.
2. Unlike World War II the probable nature of a future
conflict precludes enough lead time in which to conduct an
effective psychological warfare program for the USSR or far
Eastern Europe. Also, as the fallowing discussion demonstrates,
conditions and popular attitudes today in the USSR and Eastern
Europe do not lend themselves to the psychological warfare
techniques employed with some success twenty to twenty-five
year ago.
3. Only in the event that organized Western military
ground forces actually are in control and clearly success-
fu11y an the offensive in a given Eastern European country
or area of the USSR could there be any expectation of active
resistance in support of Allied objectives, Even this general-
ization is subject to further qualification depending on the
nationality of the Western forces in place..
4. This does not mean that there is no dissidence, or
dissident groups, in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. It
does mean that such dissident individuals or groups as may
exist would not be willing to expose themselves except in
isolated cases, until they were convinced they were not going
to be abandoned once again to the local and Soviet security
farces. Words alone can not alter the bitter lessons
56. Mare~er,
learned in Berlin in 1953 or in Hungary in 19
//
'1?i
Approved For Release 200~{~$ CIA-RDP,
 Approved~? Release 20~>CL~C~IA-RDP79T08~72A000700050015-1
one important aftermath of these lessons has been the gradual
working out of a live-and-let-live relationship between the
populations of Eastern Europe .and their respective ruling Com-
munist governments. While this may not seem very satisfactory
in terms of human aspirations, it is the best that these people
have been able to achieve and to them it seems reasonably sat-
isfactory. They would be unwilling to jeopardize this relation-
ship except under conditions assuring na risk of a return a~
Communist overlordship.
5. A concammitant aspect of the adjustment by the popula-
tion to the realities of its circumstances is that the goals
hoped for in the event of war have changed. It may once
have been accurate to say that the population hoped for libera-
tion and a return to something akin to pre-World War II politi-
cal forms. This is na longer true. Not all the communist re-
f orms in Eastern Europe would be or could be tossed aside
Willy-nilly.
6. The Eastern Europeans, it must also be remembered,
no longer are sanguine about the prospects of a war. Whatever
the circumstances of a war between East and West they firmly
believe that their countries will be the battlefield, even in
a nuclear war, and that they will be destroyed. Their entire
incli~natian is to work to prevent a war and, failing in that,
to avoid taking any steps which would tend to involve them-
selves, The willingness to engage in resistance activity
would be low indeed, if not non-existent.
Z. It must also be taken into account that in.recent
years the Eastern European regimes, with the exception of Al-
bania and Bulgaria, have been able more and more frequently to
adopt policies reflecting the national interests of the
country--as apposed to those of the USSR or the bloc as a
whole. As time goes on and this trend becomes a fixed and ac-
ceptable element in bloc affaix?s, it is reasonable to expect
a further lowering of dissidence potential.
8. In the USSR dissatisfaction with various aspects of
the system is widespread, but the gulf between dissidence and
resistance--with the.. possible exception of certain national
minorities--is greater than in the Eastern European countries.
Pride in the Soviet state and a strengthened sense of Soviet
patriotism have flowed from the successes of the USSR during
and after World War II, particularly its economic improvements
and technological achievements. Moreover, the dissidence that
does exist does not necessarily indicate apposition to the
present government, to Communist ideology, or to the Soviet
Approved For Release 2003~O~J~~A-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved F,~on Release 20Q.~O~JZ$.:,+DIA-RDP79TOQQ~'2A000700050015-1
system, although there are some stirrings in that direction
among the intelligentsia. Tt is, rather, a manifestation
of discontent over the neglect or denial by the regime of
popular needs or desires. Generally spearing, however, So-
viet,,citizens appear to feel that their lot has improved and
is going to improve further. The existence of a resistance
potential cannot be ruled out but it is obviously on a level
that differs considerably from that of the other Bloc
countries.
9. With the foregoing qualifications in mind, it must
also be remembered that the information available on the sources
and causes of dissidence and dissident groups in the"Soviet Bloc
nations is sketchy at best. The attached country studies at-
tempt to identify the various possible ethnic, political, social
and religious groups which might broadly be considered suscep-
tible to Western blandishments under the particular conditions
set forth in paragraph 3.
Approved For Release 200 ~1- --RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved o Release 20~>Ct,,~~lA-RDP79T0(~32A000700050015-1
In the event of war between the West and the USSR, Albania
would probably remain neutral, regarding such a war essentially
$s being one between competing imperialist powers. If China
should come in on the side of the USSR, Albania would probably
remain at least a de facto neutral. Rather than taking any
offensive action, Tirana would prepare to defend itself against
an attack from one or more of its neighbors--Yugoslavia, Greece,
and Italy (Albania and Greece are still technically at war).
Although the Albanian populace does not generally support
its Communist masters, these people are extremely nationalistic
and would probably rally around the regime in the face of an
onslaught from any of their traditional,neighbaring adversaries.
Resistance in these circumstances would probably evolve event-
ually into a guerrilla war of the type waged against the Ital-
ians and Germans in World War II from Albania's mountain
fastnesses.
Should no invasion of Albania be undertaken by any forces,
t he Albanian populace would probably grow restive but generally
abstain from any avert action. In this case, however, possi-
bilities might arise for pyychological and unconventional
warfare, particularly if thane engaged in this work could bald
out the possibility of an eventual invasion of Albania by such
Western farces as American, French, or British troops.
Ethnic: Albanians are divided between the Tosks in the
South and the Gegs in the North. There is also a large Albanian
Geg minority in the Kosmet region of Yugoslavia. The Tosks
have traditionally made up the bulk of city populations and
supplied the leadership to the Albanian Communist regime. The
Gegs and Tasks, while rivals, are not, strictly speaking,
antagonists. In Albania, and particularly among the Gegs,
family ties are the most important of various personal
loyalties. Blood feeds between families (clans) were rela-
tively common until world War II.
Under the conditions of an East-West war not involving
an invasion of Albania, certain of the Gegs? mountain clans
might consider the passibility of again settling old scores,
particularly against Task clans or rival Geg clans that have
collaborated with the Hoxha regime. These dissident clans
might provide the fertile soil far psychological warfare and
collaborate in unconventional warfare ventures.
Approved For Release 2003~O~f~~:tA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved ~ Release 20~~:1,KC~lA-RDP79T0~4i'2A000700050015-1
Party: There are no important divisions within the Alban-
ian Communist regime, which has been thoroughly purged by the
Hoxha leadership both after its break with the Yugoslavs in
1948 and with the Soviets in 1961.
Religious: Although several religions are practiced in
Albania, the population is overwhelmingly Moslem, and religious
differences are of little, if any, importance.
Social; Social groups as generally understood in the 'West
are on y beginning to form in Albania and do not represent
cohesive forces which could be the target of or participants
in psychological or unconventional warfare.
Military: The Military forces of the regime would probably
remain oyal until Albania was actually invaded, at which time
individual--as opposed to unit--desertions would be the lil;ely
result.
Security: The Security forces of the regime would remain
loyal to the bitter end.
A-2
Approved For Release 2003/~31~R~~-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved or Release 20~>CL,KC~IA-RDP79T06~'2A000700050015-1
BUIaGAR IA
The f artunes of Bulgaria are tied to those of its big
Slavic brother.,;~Rtass~:a~ under whose protection it has come
closest to realizing its national aspirations in modern time.
Even when compelled by political expediency during World War
II into an alliance with Nazi Germany, no Bulgarian units
were sent against the Russians. Although the advent of a
Soviet-imposed Communist regime in Bulgaria has dissipated
this sentiment in some measure, it seems likely that the
regime would fight loyally on the sic of the USSR and
would enjoy the passive support of the people, particularly
if in such a war, they.were fighting against their traditional
enemies, the Turks and Greeks. Few possibilities for
psychological and unconventional warfare would be available
under these conditions.
Ethnico Bulgaria has a large Turkish minority (656,000
in 19 , or 8.6 percent of the population) which is disenchanted
with the regime and Bulgaria in general. The dissatisfaction
of this group was dramatically demonstrated last year when,
following the spread of inaccurate rumors about new possibil-
ities for emigration to Turkey by Bulgarian Turks, riots
occured in front of Turkish diplomatic missions between the
Turks and Bulgarian police. This minority group would be
particularly vulnerable to psychological warfare and might
supply manpower for unconventional warfare adventures.
Party< Although the Bulgarian party is the most faction-
ridden in Eastern Europe, none of these factions would be will-
ing tv collaborate with the West against the USSR.
Religiousa Significant religious differences generally
follow' e~11n~ c lines--i.:e. , Moslem Turks against Christian
Bulgarians and might be subject to exploitation.
Social: None of Bulgaria?s social classes are politi-
cally enough aware as groups to supply fertile ground far
psychological or unconventional warfare.
Military: The Bulgarian officer corps has a tradition
of inter erence in the political life of the country. The
military figured prominently in the 9 September 1944 coup--
which led eventually to the Communist take-over--and a plot
against the present Zhivkvv regime involving primarily
military atoithesbest availabledinformationy haweperl 1965.
Accords g
Approved For Release 2003/ J,L2~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved or Release 20~3~,3/IA-RDP79T0~2A000700050015-1
dissidence in the Bulgarian officer corps currently concerns
which faction of the Bulgarian Communist party should be on
top. We doubt, therefore, that this dissidence is exploitable
by the West, for none of the factions of the Bulgarian party
advocate ending the country's basic allegiance to the USSR.
Security: The Bulgarian security forces would remain
loyal to the regime and the USSR in any eventuality,
B-2
Approved For Release 2003/312$RC~-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved Fly Release.~~l~/~8~CIA-RDP79TOf2A000700050015-1
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The vast majority of the Czechoslovak population for
one reason or another is potentially vulnerable to psycholo-~'.
gical warfare depending upon a wide range of circumstances.
An estimated 75% to 90~;is opposed to the regime with the
intensity of feeling ranging from the violent hatred of those
persecuted by the regime to the disgruntled acceptance of pre-
sent conditions by the more favored industrial warkers.
Both Czechs and Slovaks are masters in the art of .passive
resistance, but a highly effective police apparatus and
d isililliaesionment with the West as a result of the "sell-out"
of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938 and the latter "lesson of
Hungary" have generally prevented open or organized resistance.
These factors would still be significant impediments to open
collaboration or active resistance in wartime. Also, there is
no strong tradition~of an.a~nti-Russian feeling,. despite the lon~-
stan~li,rkg Western orientation.
If the West were clearly involved -- including the US -- in
conventional warfare and clearly on the offensive with the
likelihood of defeating the Soviet Union, passive resistance,
and possibly limited active resistance, could be elicited from
the civilian population. Unit defections among the military
would be most unlikely but covert resistance by certain special-
ized units might be induced. If, however, West German troops
were deployed in Czechoslovakia or used for an offensive into
or out of Czechoslovakia both the military and civil~.an popula-
tion would mast likely remain entirely loyal to the communist
regime ,
Ethnic: The Slovak minority, which makes up approximately
one-third of the population, has traditionally been bolder in
its resistance to communism than the Czechs. Never satisfied
with the domination of the Czechs over theta, the Slovaks have
long been responsive to promises of autonomy or independence.
The Germans on the eve of World War II successfully exploited
this ethnic friction and established a puppet state in Slovakia.
Although the ethnic animosity continues, aggravated by,?their
distaste for communism, the Slovaks today are less interested
in independence than in greater autonomy..ar greater representa-
tion in the central government in Prague. Nonetheless, the
appeal of independence is still quite strong among the general
Slovak public. F
Of the other minorities in Czechoslovakia, the Germans
and Ilungarians, depending on the specific war conditions,
might respond to psychological warfare approaches. These
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SE CRE T
 Approved ~; Release 20~3~~~-~IA-RDP79T0(~3~1A000700050015-1
minorities are dissatisfied and would probably work towards
return to or reunion with their homelands, The Germans, who
are mainly in the Czech lands, would probably not remain loyal
to the Prague government, just as in the pre-Munich days they
were more German than Czech in allegiance and activity. They
might be induced again to engage in active resistance, at
least of a covert nature. The Hungarians, the largest minority
in Czechoslovakia next to the Slovaks, for the most part
reside in parts of Slovakia which have been the subject of
dispute with Hungary. Although this minority is not as
unreliable as the Germans, the Hungarians would probably
prefer to have their areas brought back under Budapest?s
jurisdiction,
Social: With nearly the entire population opposed to the
Communist regime, almost every group within the society is
a potential source of dissidence. The Communists have been
singularly unsuccessful in forming a Communist-minded youth.
In fact, young people, be they workers, students, farmers,
Czech or Slovak, are one of the greatest irritants to the
regime. In particular the young resent the loss of the
right to choose freely their educational courses and future
careers, the regimentation of their leisure time, the regime-
imposed isolation from the social and cultural values of the
West, and the fear engendered by the arbitrary rule of the
party. Curiosity about, and popularity of, the West have
increased among Czechoslovak youth. In some cases sans and
daughters of pro-Communist working class parents have been
among the more vocal dissidents against the regime. Mare
daring in showing their dissidence than their elders, Czech-
oslovak young people have been responsible for numerous riots
and demonstrations and have harassed the regime with vandalism,
work absenteeism, and what is called "hooliganism."
Intellectua~.s across the land constitute the most effec-
tive group in opposition to the Communist regime. Non-com-
munist as well as disaffected or liberal communist intellec-
tuals have combined since 1962 in a bold campaign which has
brought about cabinet changes and forced the party to reexamine
almost every aspect of its policies. These dissident intel-
lectuals have outlets in the press, television, and cultural
centers throughout the country, but mainly in Slovakia. This
articulate and relatively powerful group, however, is not
likely to turn on the regime in time of war. It is the group
mast aware of the past, i.e., Munich of 1938 and the palitical-
georgraphic rea~.ities of today. They might, however, be
induced to engage in covert or passive resistance but are
unlikely to engage in overt resistance to subvert the regime's
war efforts.
C-2
Approved For Release 200~1Q3J~~~lA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For lease 2003/Q3~;.~4gr.RDP79T004700700050015-1
Neither the peasantry nor the industrial workers are sat-
isfied with the Communist "workers' paradise." Passive resist-
ance and strong dissidence in rural areas have been important
factors in the failure of Czechoslovak agricultural.'.. production
to meet planned goals. The rural population is predominately
Catholic, attached to its ancestral holdings, anti-Communist
and opposed to collectivized farming. In addition to passive
resistance, there are frequent cases of vandalism and acts
of violence..
Industrial workers are generally dissatisfied with their
material lot, often pointing to the higher standard of living
in nearby West Germany. Skilled workers, who had once regarded
Communism as a more militant form of social democracy, have
become disillusioned with Communist political repression and
the non-fulfillment of promises of rapid improvement in their
living conditions. Unskilled workers, once the firmest sup-
porters of the Communists, have undergone great economic
hardships and have particularly resented various forms of
"labor competition" and a system of wage differentials and
favoritism toward those whose political attitudes and work
performance are considered by the regime as "exemplarya" The
thousands of former tradesmen, farmers, civil servants, profes-
sional men, and housewives who have been forced to become
industrial workers have added to the unrest since they resent
their loss of freedom and opportunity to practice their former
occupations or properly to care for their familiesq Spontaneous,
unorganized actions have been the chief expressions of discontent
among the workers. These include slowdowns, absenteeism,
evasion of regulations, poor quality or erratic production,
willful negligence, theft, vandalism and occasional strikes
and demonstrationse Even in peacetime under strict police
state controls there have sporadic appearances of illegal
trade union leaflets and anti-regime pamphlets.
Religious: None of the organized religions as such offer
resistance to the regime, even among the deeply religious
Slovaks. The Czechs have a generally anti-clerical tradition
and would not be likely to rally around a religious group
as such to work against the regimes Moreover, the Church
hierarchy itself in Prague is not entirely united in its
ideas on howcbest to survive communism. The Church carries
much greater weight in Slovakia--where it has been generally
more defiant of communist decrees and efforts against religion:-?
but it has lost most of its notable leaders and therefore much
of its leadership abilityk
~?C$-3
Approved For Release 2003/~ItC.R~ I -RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For lease 2003/0~/~$.:..C'.4Ar.RDP79T004700700050015-1
Communist Party; There is a great deal of dissension
within a zec os ovak Communist party and within its adjunct,
the Slovak Communist party, as well as between the two parties,
but these problems are an internal party affair which basically
has not or would not affect the loyalty of the party leaders
to communism. As Communists they would see very little
liklihood of survivial after a Soviet defeat by the West.
On the other hand, the Czechoslovak party is permeated
with opportunists who at. the lower-party levels aright be
vulnex?abl~. to psychological warfare. As opportunists,
however, their willingness to engage in active or overt
resistance to the communists would be limited.
The political parties dating from pre-Communist years
still exist as part of the national front in some form or
another in Czechoslovakia and might provide a source of resist-
ance. Their willingness to collaborate would, however, be
greatly limited by their lack of influence upon society or
the population. The communists have, over ?the years, disposed
of the members of these democratic parties capable of forming
a dangerous opposition and, by taking over the parties as
puppet organizations, so infiltrated them as to assure their
impotence..
Militarye Czechoslovakia does not have a strong military
tradi ~,o~ n as such and, because of the survival of old nation-
alistic ideals, the conscript armed farces are not regarded
by the regime as wholly reliable. There has been, however,
a thorough Communist take-over and indoctrination of the officer
corps, The likelihood of regular army units defecting is
negligible. F'or certain conscript units, particularly the
labor units which consist of politically unreliable ar unde-
sirable elements, the situation might be differenta There
also have been reports of friction between Czech and Slovak
unitso
In the paramilitary units such as the worke~?s militia and
Union for Cooperation with the Army, vulnerability to psycho-
l~gical warfare or potential for active resistance would
depend largely on the individuals ethnic-social background.
Security; The interior guard and secret police are
undaubtedly~oyal cadres of the party. They would have
nothing to gain by resistance,
C-4
Approved For Release 2003/(~3~,2~~Lqr.RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved Forv~+lease 2003/0~/~~~RDP79T00472p,~00700050015-1
Czechosloval~ia has a highly efficient and effective police-
security apparatus. The security forces are best equipped far
the conditions of a strict police states and,therefore, have
shown certain inadequacies in dealing with the effects of the
less repressive policies of the past few years. Riot dispersal.
is efficient, but rnilits~?y units often must be called upon to
aid the police or peoples militia. The security farces are
currently undergoing beefing up and improvement even though
years of,a repressive police state have provided dossiers on
everyone of even the slightest interest to the police and
created networks of informants and "helpers" throughout the
country?
C-5
Approved For Release 2003/0~3/~~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For lease 2003/Q3/~~RDP79T0047~,pB00700050015-1
The promise of reunification with West Germany under a
non-Communist regime is till sufficiently compelling to in-
duce the vast majority of East Germans to side with the West
in any East-West conflict. Because of the West's failure to
help the June, 1953, uprising and the Hungarian revolt of 1956,
and its failure to act when the Berlin Wall went up in 1961,
this majority would be reluctant to commit itself, however,
unless-the West clearly were winning any conflict. Any
opportunity for active popular resistence, moreover, would
be minimal in time of conflict because of the large numbers
of Soviet troops and security units, and the probable con-
tinued existence of local security forces, in what would pro-
bably be a major combat zone extending throughout the country.
Ethnic: There are no ethnic differences within East
Germany to exploit. It would be unwise to seek popular East
German support by promising restitution of the territory lost
after World War II to Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia.
The West already has the sympathy of most East Germans, and
this promise would gain it little more. It would, however,
increase Polish and Czechoslovak willingness to remain allied
to the Soviets.
Partye Such factionalism as there may be within the East
German party (SED) is not significant and in any case is not
exploitable. The so-called collaborating political parties
within the GDR National Front are similarly not exploitable
-- they have no power, nb following and their leaders are
tainted by long years of collaboration with Ulbrieht.
Religious: Although most East Germans are- either
Evang~'~, ~~'$0~) or Roman Catholic, there is little friction
between the two religions. The churches, furthermore, appear
to exert little day-to-day influence over the lives of most
East Germans, and have never become the repositories of national-
ism or antl.mCommunism that they have in some other Eastern
European countries.
Socials The available evidence indicates that the majority
of the peasants continue to oppose the collective farm system,
but incidents, such as barn burnings, which reflect their
attitude are declining.
The industrial workers ge~aerally dislike the production
norms, the absence .of a good incentive system, and the low
pay. They tend to admire the higher standard of living in
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SECRET
 Approved For,B,~lease 20~~Y~'>~I~k-RDP79T0047~00700050015-1
in West Germazay, There are signs, however, that they are
beginning to accommodate themselves to the regime, and the
chanties of another June, 1953, type of uprising are remote.
The youth are the first social group in East Germany to
display even the beginning of an East German consciousness.
They are distressed, however, lay their physical and cultural
isolation, and many see better opportunity in West Germany.
At this junctune their attitudes are ambivalent and they
would be a difficult group to target.
The intellectuals resent the ideological straitenjacket
imposed an them by the regime, but, except in a few isolated
instances, have been unwilling to oppose the regime,
Military and Para_Military: The reliability of the
East erman arme orces de pen s on whether the Warsaw Pact
is winning. The continual escape of border guards across
the Berlin sector borders, for example, suggests mass de-
fections of enlisted personnel would oceur in time of war if
there were no fear of eventual apprehension and retribution.
Volksarmee units probably would cease fighting after East
Germany was overrun by NATO forces,
Security Forcese The well-trained and effective security
forces are ate y the populace as henchmen of the oppressive
regime. In a conflict in which the Communists were winning,
they would prove effective and loyal; if the West were winning,
they would dissolve and see k, in one way or another,to conceal
their past role in the regime,
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SECRET
 Approved Folease 20~ib'312$"CI~RDP79T0047~A00700050015-1
Hungary has a long tradition of anti-Russian, anti--
Slavic prejudices and an equally deep-rooted affinity for
Western political and social ideals. Contemporary political
realities, however, have strongly influenced these concepts,
with the result that Hungarians generally are unwilling to
take any action that might jeopardize the gains in their
well-being acquired since 1957.
Only in the event of a Western military offensive
successfully penetrating well into Hungary is it likely
that segments of the population might be induced to turn
against the regime. Moreover, the extent of popular
response would probably be significantly less if the
Western troops in question were not Arnericany it is possible
that the response would be almost nil if the troops were
German.
Assuming the offensive to be successful and the troops
American, the time lapse between their entrance onto
Hungarian soil and the first encounter with Soviet forces
would be extremely brief. The Hungarian sources which might
be vulnerable to Western blandishments during this time
span-would probably be limited and their potential for
effective resistance small.
Ethnic Hungarians are an ethnically unique race in
Eastern Europe, unrelated to their Slavic and Rumanian
neighbors. The strongly nationalistic population -? over
96 percent Magyar ?- contains no separatist elements, nor
is there any tendency towards regional autonomy. Moreover,
Hungarians have traditionally sought to assimilate neigh-
boring areas of Slovakia and Transylvania inhabited by
Magyar minorities. These lands, under Hungarian administration
before 19201, remain a major source of dissention between
Hungary and Rumania in particular. Psychological warfare
supporting Hungarian Irredentist claims would undoubtedly
find a high response, but would require considerable time
to be effective. Such an approach would have to be con-
sidered of course in terms of its negative effects in
Slovakia and Rumania.
Partyo The organization of both party and government
is essen~aally stable and carefully controlled by the pre-
sent leadership. Dissident elements in the party have
either been purged, put out to pasture, or reeducated
along the lines of Kadar?s policy of national reconciliation.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SECRET
 Approved For lease 200~~/:?8~'Ei~F RDP79T0047?~A y00700050015-1
In any case it is highly unlikely that this group ?- essentially
hardliners m- would cooperate with any non?Commuxnist forces,
Religious Over two-thirds of the population are ?- at
least nomina ~y -- Roman Catholic, The role of the Church,
however, is a passive one. The clergy did not, for example,
participate in the 1956 revolt, The Churches open endorse-
ment of resistance measures would play an important role,
however, in influencing some segments of the population,
especially the peasants.
Socials Though intellectuals played a major role in
the dra~~matic prelude to the 1956 revolt, their active partici-
pation in resistance groups was quite limited, The Hungarian
intellectual community is far more likely to react sharply
to internal pressures than to external influences. At pre-
sent, Hungarian intellectuals enjoy -- and know they enjoy
-- greater freedom of expression than their colleagues
anywhere else in Eastern Europe, There would be little
pre-disposition therefore to respond favorably to any psy-
chological warfare blandishments.
Hungarian youth and the urban industrial workers -- who
were the backbone of the revolt in 1956 -- would again be the
element most susceptible to psychological warfare. At the
same time, they would probably remain indifferent to external
propaganda influences -- as they now are to the exhortations
of the Kadar regime -m unless a Western victory seemed assured.
Once Western troops entered Hungary, however, the emotional
momentum would be likely to carry across the entire country
and give rise to widespread and unpredictable insurgency. It
would then be difficult, it not impossible, to mould the..
youth into a cohesive force with definite objectives,
Security Forcese Hungary?s internal security personnel
are t e most Dare u ly selected, the most highly paid, and
the most frequently purged personnel in the Hungarian govern-
ment. They are among its most avid supporters, as well.
Military and Para-Military Forceso The loyalty to the
regime o s mi terry orces s u ous at best, While it
is likely that Hungarian military units would refrain from
direct action against their countrymen, the fear of com-
munist reprisal is likely to lead them to aa~~apt an attitude
of inaction or neutrality during the crucial period. They
would not constitute an effective opposition either to ad-
vancing Western forces or to indigenous resistance efforts,
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
s~c~z.~T
 Approved For.~lease 2003/O~~S;C. ~I~~DP79T0047?~00700050015-1
There are no known subversive organizations operating
in Poland on a national scale, but there is evidence that
passive, small-scale, localized, potentially subversive groups
do exist. However, members of these groups, primarily youths,
do not appear to be identified with any specific social or
political group and appear to be motivated by little beyond
their general resistance to authority as exemplified by the
Communist regime.
In general, the attachment of the people to the Catholic
Church, and their predominantly anti-Communist, anti-Russian,
and anti-German attitudes are balanced by political realism.
Tightening of internal discipline, the steady retreat from
the relatively liberal policies of the immediate post-1956
era, and continuing poor economic conditions have engendered
a rise in dissatisfaction among all strata of the population.
These factors, however, have been more than outweighed by a
concurrent rise in public apathy and the increased effective-
ness of the reconstituted police apparatus,
The Polish people are strongly nationalistic and tradi-
tionally Western-~orientod. Their nationalism, however, is
dominant and they would oppose any regime which they would
consider imposed either from East or West, Circumstances
surrounding the outbreak of World War II and the subsequent
occupation of the eastern half of the country by the USSR
further strengthened the predisposition of the average Poles
toward the Western powersa Warta.me undergound resistance
was also predominantly Western-oriented, and Poland was the
only country in Eastern Europe where Communist rule was
significantly resisted by force of arms- with covert Western
h?lp--in the postwar period.
However, the courageous but futile resistance of Palish
military forces to the German war machine in 1939 had a
significant effect on postwar attitudes toward active and
organized resistance. Together with the unsuccessful postwar
resistance to Communist rule, and the fdilures of the East
German and Hungarian uprisings in 1953 and 1956 respectively,
the sobering effect on the people of the 1939 defeat has
resulted in a decline of the reckless, heroic element in
the Polish national character and in a growth of political
apathy and fear of war.
Approved For Release 2003/0~/~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For-$@iease 2003/03~I~~DP79T0047??Q~00700050015-1
Ethnice Ethnic minorities form an insignificant part of
the Po-fish population. The largest of these are some 300,000
Ukrainians and White Russians, predominantly peasants, residing
in the eastern portions of the country, and some 100,000 to
300,000 remaining ethnic Germans, mainly industrial workers,
in the so-called Western Territories. Neither of these two
groups, however, posses the cohesion to make them vulnerable
to psychological warfare. Although the German minority is
especially closely watc3~ed by the regime, the strong anti-
German attitudes of the Pales aloa~e would probably be suffic-
ient to obviate any subversive activity an the part of this
minority.
Partyo Although policy differences exist within the
Communist leadership, all members of the ruling class owe
their present position and power to the fact of Communist
rule. Certainly none of them entertain .the idea that they
could survive in any manner an overthrow of the present system.
Although a large part--if not the overwhelming majority--of
the Communist party rank and file composed of people who are
not ideologically convinced Communists, and of outright
opportunists, these people would probably be no more impelled
toward subversive activity as party members than as members
of the specific population groups to which they belong.
Rel,igiouse Although the regime and the Raman Catholic
Churchin~o~and--to which almost 95 percent of the people
belong--have been locked in an ideological struggle throughout
almost the entire postwar period, the regime would probably
seek to make peace with the Church in the event a conflict
were imminent. For this reason,~the vulnerability of the
people an religious grounds would probably be minimal, For
its part, the Church hierarchy probably realizes that its
pre-World War II inf luence on the political and social order
of the country would not be regained even under a non-Communist
regime. Its traditionally strong support of Polish nationalism
would generally make it subject to the same considerations of
national survival as the bulk of the population,
Socialo The vulnerability of most educated Poles,
especia y the youth and the intellectuals, has been lessened
by widespread apathy: and fear of the effecl~~s of any conflict
on Palish national existence, Although these elements would
probably support the establishment of a non -Communist regime
brought about by external forces and presented as an accom-
plished fact, most of them would probably be unwilling to take
part in the preliminary subversive activity under conditions
which would likely involve span conflict.
Approved For Release 2003/0~~~:~-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For lease 2003/ORI~~2DP79T0047~,~{J00700050015-1
Few educated Poles would consider a
return to
the prewar
political and social order. Most of them
favor a
Western type
of racial democracy as a social order and
believe
in Polish
nationalism based on a vague allegiance
to Europe
as an
entity. While these beliefs are strong,
people do
not appear
prepared to struggle for them.
Most average Poles of worl~ing class or peasant origin,
while hoping that Communist rule will someday be replaced by
some other order, no longer envisage war as a viable instrument
for such a change, Most of them fear that Poland as a state
would cease to exist in the event of another world conflict,
and that even a limited action in Central Europe would again
find Polish territory devastated.
Military; The vulnerability of the Polish armed forces
to psyc o og cal warfare would probably depend almost entirely
on the circumstances surrounding the development and escalation
of an East-West conflict, the specific issues involved, and
the nationality of the opposing forces. Unit defection to
Western forces in the event of a conflict would probably occur
provided, however, that destruction of Polish territory could
thereby be mitigated, and that German forces did not play
any large role in the Polish sector. Individual desertion could
occur on a mare widespread basis particularly if troops were
convinced that their presence "at home'' would be more beneficial
to Poland than armed resistance in the field.
Although numerous.,- the Polish pare-military forces do
not form a cohesive exploitable element, In spite of increas~.ng
controls over the pare-military forces by elite security units,
they would probably respond to psychological warfare directed
at the specific population stratum from which individual members
originate.
Securitye The regime's prime security forces, having
most to lose from an overthrow of the present leadership, would
probably be unresponsive to psychological warfare.
Approved For Release 2003/0~~~~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For R~iease 200'37~/;?'~}t1~RDP79T004720700050015-1
In
the
event of any future war in Europe between the
West and
the
Communist world, the Rumanian regime could be
expected
to
side with the latter. The country's geographic
position
and
military strength would offer it no other choice,
at least
in
the first stages of any future conflagration.
Moreover, the country's territorial integrity could not be
genuinely guaranteed by any Western country or alliance at
such a point. Faced with this stark situation, the Rumanians
would undoubtedly prefer ?? as the lesser of two evils --~ to
have foreign Communist troops on their territory as allies
rather than as occupiers.
If the war became protracted, however, circumstances
could arise which would lend themselves to exploitation by
psychological warfare techniques. Thus, if the Rumanian
leadership believed that it was on the losing side, the
entire regime might transfer its allegiance, as it did during
World Wars I and II. In such circumstances, traditional
Rumanian Russophabia could be exploited and the country's
territorial aspirations against the Soviet Union (Bessarabia)
and Hungary (Transylvania) could be used as incentives,
If the war reached a point at which nonmCommunist foreign
troops were on Rumanian soil, the success of psychological
warfare methods probably would be largely influenced by the
nationality of these troops. Thus, French and US troops
would almost certainly be best received by the~Rumanian populace.
France was Rumania?s patron during the period between World
Wars I and II. US troops would be well regarded because of
the large resevoir of goodwill extant between Rumanians and the
US. The inclusion of German troops in an Allied army probably
would not cause any significant problems. Conversely, in
the unlikely situation that allied forces included large
elements of Hungarian.. or Bulgarian troops, they would be
very poorly received, because these nationalities constitute
Rumania's traditional antagonists,
Ethnic The only serious minority problem in Rumania is
that Hungarians living in Transylvania and in the Banat.
The antagonism between Rumanians and Hungarians has deep his-
torical roots and stems from their linguistic, religious, and
cultural differences ?- an almost insurmountable barrier to
assimilation or adjustment, Thus, the Rumanians regard the
Hungarians as foreigners, whereas the Hungarians look upo~a the
Rumanians with disdain, considering them both racially and
culturally inferior.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SECRET
 Approved For ~ekease 200/~l;?'S"~#1~F-RDP79T00472?~0700050015-1
Tensions between Hungarians and Rumanians are exacerbated
by remembrance of Hungarian attempts to Magyarize the Rumanian
population of Transylvania before 1918, when the area was
under Hungarian jurisdiction< Since the Communist takeover
in Rumania following World War II, the Rumanians have seized
the opportunity to f1Rumanianize" Hungarians living in Transyl-
vania. Without respect to which side Rumania joins in the
event of war, the traditional antagonisms between Hungarians
and Rumanians offer a fertile area for application of psycho-
logical warfare techniques, but support for one side in this
problem will antagonize the other.
Partyo The strength and stability of the Rumanian party
leaders~p now and during the past decade has stemmed from its
unusual unity. There is little or no likelihood of successfully
employing psychological warfare methods against this leader-
ship core to create divergencies and differences. The only
exception would seem to be in the event that some elements of
the leadership concluded it was on the lasing side of the con-
flict. Lower levels of the Rumanian party also are free of
factionalism, accordi~ag to usually reliable sources.
Religiouse There is no significant religious divisive-
ness to exp ait in Rumania, because the people overwhelmingly
adhere to the Orthodox Church.
Socials Neither Rumanian social classes nor the Rumanian
peoples a record of successful nationwide resistance. As
a result of frequently being under foreign domination, Rumanians
have developed a capacity for passively resisting actions they
do not wish to take as well as an attitude of considerable
caution toward foreign overtures.
Military: Like the Rumanian populace, the Rumanian
military establishment is essentially nationalistic in aut-
look. In the event of war, however, the military and para-
military forces at least initially would follow the regime?s
leaders< However the possibility that the military leaders
might meek ~t.o take matters in there own hands and establish
a military dictatorship loyal to the there winning side can
not be ruled out.,
Security: .Regime security forces are loyal to the regime
axed woix~d riot be vulnerable to psychological warfare techniques<
Indeed their personal well being would defend on supporting
the regime.
R?2
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
sEC~T
 Approved For ease 200?~~1~4-RDP79T00472~0700050015-1
In the event of a US-USSR war, Yugoslavia would probably
declare a pro-Soviet neutrality. At the same time its armed
forces would prepare to defend the countryQs borders from
any attack -- either East or West. The army ultimately would
expect to repair to the mountainous hinterland from which
they would wage a partisan war as in World War II.
In the inital phase of a limited, non-nuclear cl~nflict,
it would be difficult for the West to kindle an active resistance
campaign since the Titoist regime would maintain effective
control.
However, if the war became prolonged and there was an
imminent threat of invasion, expressions of the suppressed dim
ferences:between Yugoslavia?s nationalities would be likely,
particularly in Yugoslavia's two northern republics - -Slovenia
and Croatia ?? and among the Albanian minority in the Kosmet,
In Croatia, popular hopes would revive for establishing an
independent Croatian state. Unconvential warfare might break
out, sines the Croatian Liberation bdovement -- the most im-
portant of the nationalist subversive groups in Yugoslavia
and a successor to the wartime Ustashi -- has some support
within Croatia. While part of the Ustashi remained in Yugo-
slavia after the war, a large number of its leaders and
members fled to the Americas, Italy and West Germany. Pre-
sently, its free-world headquarters is in Buenos Aires.
In Western-oriented Slovenia, hopes of eliminating the
Communist regime would be reborn. Furthermore, the Organization
of Slovene Anti-Communists -- the Slovenian underground move-
ment -- would become mare active.
In the Kosmet, the possibility of reunion with Albania
would arise. Among the Serbs, remnants of General Mihailovicps
Yugoslav Army probably would reorganize. Subversive activity
would probably appear in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- the area of
greatest concentration of non-Albanian Yugoslav Muslims.
For an Eastern invasion the population would provide little,
if any, support. US backing fora partisan war, as in World
War II, would be welcomed. However, the regime would not
welcome the presence of organized Western units; on the con-
trary, the3:~?-entry would be actively resisted by the regime.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SE CRE T
 Approved For lease 2003/~3h?'St`~1~E-RDP79T0047~p0700050015-1
However, in the event of a Western invasion, the popu-
lations of Croatia and Sloven3.a would probably actively support
Allied forces. In Serbia and the other Yugoslav republics,
the populace would probably remain apathetic and passive far
the most part.
In any event weighing and balancing off the competing
interests of the Yugoslav nationality groups would be a dif-
ficult and discouraging task.
Furthermore, Western?inspired agitation among minorities
would pr?sent a difficult, if not impossible task to clean up
should the Western forces assume occupation of the country.
Ethnics There are four major ethnic groups in Yugoslavia
-- Ser s, coats, Slovenes and Macedonians, as well as two
sizeable minority groups -- Albanians and Hungarians. As
indicated above, the Croats and Slovenes would be susceptible
to Western psychological warfare techniques, and furnish re-
cruits for uncanvential warfare ventures. The possibility
also exists that under these circumstances, the Slovenes and
Croats would unite to help the West. The Serbs and Macedonians
would tend to remain passive, unless Yugoslavia were invaded
by the USSR. Partition of Yugoslav lands in order to return
minority groups to their native areas would not encounter the
same adverse reaction as would, for example, a similar move in
Rumania. Except for the immediate geographical area affected,
Yugoslavs in general would remain apathetic to this development.
Partyo The regime would remain united and unsusceptible
to Western efforts The party hierarchy would probably run
to the hills, and try to establish a second front.
Religiouso The Groats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic,
while ta~S~rmTas and Macedonians subscribe to the Orthodox
faith. There are also a number of Albanian Muslims and
Slavic stock in the Kosmet and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Religious
frictions for the most part parallel competing aspirations
among Yugoslavia's nationalities. Because during World War II,
the non-Albanian Muslims sided with the Groats the former
would provide some potential for Western psychological war?
fare successes.
Socialo The nationality problem, mare than social posi-
tion, would be vulnerable to Western psychological warfare efforts.
At the present time, the intellectual movement is not suffi-
ciently organized and has na single spokesman to provide a
good entre for Western psychological warfare attempts.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SECRET
 Approved For lease 20~~1;?'8'~`~~1~E-RDP79T0047?~00700050015-1
The Yugoslav man-on-the-street tends to be apathetic and
passive in his outlook. As a sacial group, peasants and
workers would be apathetic to psychological warfare efforts
since this group is~p~imarily interested in its own
existence. The young would also be passive in outlook
essentially because the regime has succeeded in keeping youth
from developing into an organized political force.
Militarye The military could be expected fully to back
the reg me at least initially. In the event of a takeover
by either the East or West, the military would probably be
an ineffective,opposition~ and remnants of the military
hierarchy would probably follow the regime into the hi11s.
Enlisted men, where possible9 would tend to return to their
native regions and participate in whatever activities their
nationality groups would be undertaking.
Securityo The security forces would be unlikely to
defectt t~fie West and would remain loyal to the bitter end
to the Communist regime realizing full well that they are
despised by the population at large and would have no other
recourse<
Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
SE CRE T
 Approved For ~+ease 2003/ORI~,~DP79T00472~00700050015-1
1, Since the death of Stalin, dissidence in the Soviet
Union has decreased, There has been grumbling and criticism,
particularly following the denigration of Stalin at the 2Uth
OPSU Congress in early 1956 and again following the disastrous
harvest of 19634. But, on the whole, this criticism has not
been "counter-revolutionary" nor has it envisaged the ovex?-~
throw of the Soviet state. On the contrary, during the past
four decades widespread identification with the Soviet national
state and many of its institutional features has unquestion-
ably developeda
2? The people of the USSR have had to endure extra-
orBinary hardships for yearso Improvements in their standards
of living and the relaxation of political terror since 1953
served ,to decrease the intensity of dissidence and probably
have eliminaioed, for the time being, actual resistance
potentials Although the improvement of living standards
has lagged far behind over-all rates of economic growth,
the Kremlin has been putting increasing emphasis on raising
levels of consumption? Discontent arising from economic
causes will diminish as consumer welfare improves, although
this effect gill be partially offset as expectations aroused
by reg3.me promises are disappointed and as familiarity with
Western standards growsd It should not necessarily be
assumed, however, that closer contacts with the West will
inevitably generate more dissatisfaction among the Soviet
rank and file4 The spectacular successes of Soviet science
have almost certainly strengthened the allegiance of the
people to the regimeq Many have come to believe that the
eventual supremacy of the USSR is certain and that ulti-
mately the Russian people wi11 be better ofd than the
peoples in the free worlds
34 There remain, however, some sources of dissidence
that ccantinue to create difficulties for the regime. The
national minorities, constituting 45 percent of the Soviet
population of a little over 229 million have for many years
provided~c~nters of resistances The degree of dissidence
has varied sharply; many of the more backward have viewed
Russian dominion favorably and would probably remain as
loyal to the regime as Russian citizens generally. Ethnic-
national feelings, however, remain particularly strong in
some areas The principal ones .are discussed below:
Approved For Release 2003/O~~~~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For R,~4+ease 2003/03~~R~~RDP79T00472~p00700050015-1
a. The Baltic Republics
1) Resistance potential in the Soviet Union
is probably highest in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The
most important single factor in Baltic opposition to Soviet
rule is the experience of national independence between the
world wars, The bitter memory of forced Soviet annexation
is intensified by the brutality of Soviet rule, which brought
the exile or liquidation of hundreds of thousands of natives,
by the radical depression of living standards, and by the
imposition of the rule and immigration of the traditionally
hated and feared Russians. Outright Communist sympathizers
comprise only a minute fraction of the native population.
Many native Communist Party leaders lived in the USSR when
the Baltic states were independent and returned only upon
Soviet annexation of their native countries, Balts in general
look on them as renegades,
2) The regime brought the Baltic states under
control through the use of militarized security forces and
Army troops. Suspect elements of the population were de?
ported during the 1B45~54 period and later replaced by other
ethnic groups, mainly Russian. Subsequent penetration of
resistance groups by security organs along with individual
deportations; depleted the Baltic states of resistance
leadershipq urganization9 and activity. Russification of
government organizations has proved effective in keeping
potential resistance in check. Feelings of dissidence are
widespread but cannot be evaluated accurately because the
populations have little opportunity to translate dissidence
into action. Both because of the strategic position of the
area axed the known disaffection of the native-population,
security measures in the Baltic have been more stringent
than elsewhere in the USSR.
3) The outbreak of war between the Soviet
Bloc and the West would undoubtedly increase resistance
potential in the Baltic states. In any future warn how-
ever, Soviet security measures would probably be adequate
to prevent large scale organization of military and political
warfare in the Baltic of more than nuisance value. Only
if the Soviet control force were demoralized and its coan-
munications disrupted could widespread resistance be ex-
pected, Under anti?Soviet occupation, native Belts would
bb unlikely to participate in pro-Soviet partisan activity
and most would lend their hearty support td the liquidation
of Russian partisans or pro-Soviet native elements in the
area,
Approved For Release 2003/Ot~~DP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For~,piease 2003/03JJ~ ~~A~RDP79T0047~00700050015-1
4) Baltic resistance peatential in wartime
wcauld be little affected by such matters as the nationality
of the attacking forces ear which side initiated he~stilities,
Even German rule would be ca~nsidered preferable to Seaviet
the Nazi occupation eaf the area having been c?mparatively
mild)s although Balts might resist Soviet rule with soured
what greater deter~aination if the attacking fearees were
non~Germano
1) Ukrainian nationalisms although of
dwindling imp?rtances continues teabea political factor with
which the Soviet regime must reck~and The Ukrainians are
the largest minority group in the USSR and the politicals
economic and strategic importance of the Ukraine is second
on 1y to the RSI?SR e
2) The intensity of Ukrainian nationalist
feeling is difficult to measured A great many Ukrainians
probably the ma,)earitys are loyal members of Soviet societys
particularly now that living standards are gradually rising
and police ceantr?ls have been slightly relaxedo Russifi-
catiean haa~ probably gene further in the eastern Ukraine
than in any other of the non_Russian lands and has been
much more successful in industrial cities, which now con-
tain large numbers of Great Russians than in taawns and
villagesp Russians and Ukrainians have mingled together
there fear hundreds of years and the educated meanbers of
seaciety know both languages equally wells Nationalistic
sentiments increase as ~ ? moves westward in the Ukraine
away from the Russian landed Oppos itiean to Soviet rule
is believed to be most intense in the territea~ies absearbed
during World War II aleang the S?aviet Union?s western
borders where memearies of Sovietization are freshestm
Resentment of the Russians is neat ceanfined here teg Ukrainians
alone but is shared by such ether minority groups in the
area as Poles Czechs ~Iungarians and Rumaniansa
3) Ukrainian nationalist tensicans howevers
although a c?ntinuing Nuisance fear the Soviet administratiepng
do not now represent any serious threat tea the regimen Only
in the :event of a disintegration of Scaviet central controls
might Ukrainian nati?nalism rise to the surface and serve
as a fescue for an anti?Soviet resistance move~nenta Since
the suppression of the Hungarian revolts there is reportedly
little sympathy for a violent fearm of resistance, Instead,
sophisticated Ukrainian natieanalistss staying within the
Approved For Release 2003/0~/~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved Foreease 2003/0~~~~RDP79T0047z~,p~00700050015-1
bounds of the law and officially approved behavior, work
for the maintenance and fostering of a Ukrainian natis~nal
feeling. Apparently it is hoped that this nationalism can
be kept alive and that it will serve as an ideological
basis for a free Ukraine in the future. Meanwhile, however,
life within the Ukraine is becoming more tolerable, thus
acting to decrease resistance potential,
4) In the event of war, Ukrainians would
probably not try to engage in large?scale resistance
activities while Soviet military controls remained in
force. They reanember the tragic results of their resin-~
tance to the Soviet regime during World War II. They would
be unlikely to commit themselves to resistance against the
Soviet regime unless they were convinced the USSR would
lose the war. In other wards, Ukrainian dissidence could
not be expected to serve a potential enemy of the USSR until
the outcome ?f a war were largely determinede In fact,
most Ukrainian soldiers would probably fight fiercely on
the Russian side. The question of who initiated the war
probably would matter little, nor would the nati?nality of
invading forces, with the exception of Germans, who almost
certainly would be fiercely resented even as part of an
international forcee Their presence on Ukrainian soil would
seri?~usly impair the development of anti~Communist resistance.
1~ Any evaluation of disaffection in the
Caucasus must take into account the differing peoples of
this area. While there are elements of discontent common
to all the indigenous peoples oaf the area which unite them
against the regime, there are also factors-which set the
Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaydzhani pe?ples apart from
each otherp The Georgians and Armenians, for reasons ~sf
longer independent natie~nhood and a common religion (Christi-
anity), feel superior to the Azerbaydzhani, a Moslem people.
At the same time, theGeorgians, because of a longer and more
unbroken pe~?i od of independence than the Armenians, feel
superior- to the latter, who harbor a latent distrust of
their mountain neighbors. The anderlyi~tg basis for regime
oriented dissatisfacti?n and discontent, however, is to
be found in an anti?Russian attitude on the part of all the
native peoples, Such factors as n~an~Slavic lineage, distinct
];ax~guages, different cultural and hista~rical heritages have
imparted a sense of national distinctiveness which make the
peoples look upon the Russians as interlopers, late?comers,
and foreign colonizers,
Approved For Release 2003/0~/~~~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For~ease 2003/O~~~I~~DP79T0047~Q,0700050015-1
2) while difficult to document as to sc~spe
and intensity, anti-Russianism is demom~trated by the limited
amaaunt of social contact between minearities and Russians.
Certain areas of large Caucasian cities appear ter tae separated
iota Sla~ric and Wean?Slavic sections. Intermarriage dares ndt
appear t? be too comm?rn and is frequently frea~vned on. Apart
from the Party and government elite, discontent would appear
t? extend tea all strata of the populati?n in varying degrees.
The p?litically ~aasre mature Ge?rgians have been most veacal
in expressing dissidence in the paast-Stalin period, f?11?wed
by the Armenians and the Azerbaydzhani in that carder. Among
the Gecargians, students and intellectuals are-the most note?
worthy dissident elements. In Armenia9 the most disaffected
gr?up appears t? be the Armenians who returned to S?viet
Armenia in the early post?World War II peri?d. Estimates of
the numbers when returned range from 25,400 tea 140,040 Their
disaffecti?n results mainly from very poor economic c?nditions
and the fact that they are n?t c?mpletely accepted by the
lmcal population. Nowhere in the Caucasus, however, deuce
discontent appear to be intense enaugh.'; to translate itself
into resistance activity. Furthermore the past-war histcary
of dissidence in the Caucasus suggests that while there was
s?me resistance, it was on an unorganized basis and without
particular g?als in mind.
3) Anti?regime resistance under conditions
of actual warfare would depend considerably on the type and
location cif war being fought . As leang as the theater erf
operaticans remained outside the Caucasusfl the likelihocad
?f resistance caperati?ns v~csuld remain small because of the
increased security measures. If the tide of battle turned
conclusively against the Soviet ~?e~iane, the potential for
carganized resistance on an expanded basis would increase
sharply. t5therwise, the memory of Soviet punishment oaf
Wcarld War II collaboratears would militate against resi~t?
Vince movements. The eaptimum ceanditions for organized
resistance would9 of courses occur if the Caucasus became
a theater oaf war or if the ccallapse of central authearity
were imminent, If e~.ther should ?ccur, resistance activities
would probably be limited tee assistance t~ enemy forces in
pr~~riding intelligence inf?rmati?n, harassment of Soviet
security and armed forces9 and help in escape and evasion
operaticans. Independent military activity against Se~viet
fs~rces probably would be beyond the capacity eaf resistance
groups,
4) With the exceptiean of the Germans whea
might encounter herstility because of their W?rld War II pealicies,
tanly the Turks might arouse Armenian antagonism; the Armenian
Approved For Release 2003/0~//~~:~-RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For~'ease 2003/03~C~I~~DP79T0047~0700050015-1
massacres in the late 1890's and dining World War' I are not
yet forgotten. The question of the responsibility for the
instigation of hostilities would have little effect on
resistance activities. However, the occupation policies of
the invading force would have a strong impact on the 1oca1
populations. The Soviet postwar propaganda compaign de-
picting the horrors of German occupation in other parts of
the country was designed in part to overcome any latent
sympathy in such areas as the Caucasus for futura "liberating"
forces.
4. Despite efforts by the Communist rulers to establish
complete control over the thinking of the Soviet people and
to ensure their loyalty in all contingencies, there is evidence
that each social glass and occupational division has its
own set of grievances, a number of them common to all groups.
Among the more important of the latter are'th? extensive inter-
ferenee of the state in the lives of the citizenry and the
unremitting pressures for the fulfillment of national economic
plans. A11 groups also resent the saturation of the citizenry
with propaganda and the limitations on free irstellectual in-
quiry which are characteristic of Soviet rule. Dissidence
within defined groups is discussed below
a. Intellectuals -~ The intelligentsia, in general,
stands high in ov a soc ety in terms of income and prestige,
and many of them, particularly among the bureaucrats and
engineers, have a vested interest in the regime. Most
scientistsy moreover, sewn to enjoy bath official support
and relative freedom of pursuit in their fields, The limited
relaxation of controls in recent years-has emboldened intel-
lectuals in many less favored fields to prat?st against party
controls, though usually by implication only. These protests
show that virtually all prominent writers, artists, composers,
and scholars w?uld welcome more freedom of expression. Al-
though the post-Stalin regimes have somewhat relaxed the
extremely stringent Stalinist conformism, ..they have maintained
most of the old doctrines, and merely enforce them with
greater flexibility and leniency. Strictures on creative
expressman remain tight enough to cause widespread dissidence
among the more s?n~:~itive intellectualsa The dissidence of
Soviet intellectuals is not necessarily one eaf hostility
against the Soviet system as such, -- alth?ugh questioning
of the system has become increasingly implicit in recent
years-?but is more aaften directed against specific abuses
and the excessive conformism demanded by the Soviet leaders.
b. Students and Youth -- There is some student
dissidence, an ere ave een~demonstrations by young people
Approved For Release 2003/0~/~~~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For lease 2003/0~~ ~~~2DP79T00473Q,~0700050015-1
against the discipline and the drabness ?f S?viet lice, As
a result of a higher intellectual level achieved by improved
Soviet education, of the atmosphere of relaxation following
the death of Stalin, the lessons of the Hungarian revolution,
the 1963 harvest failure, and the fall of Khrushch ev, youth
has turned an increasingly critical eye on the disparity be?
tween Communist theeary and practice, But in spite of the
fact that students are n?w at least better equipped to think
for themselves and that the regime apparently allows for
greater leniency in dealing with young deviati?nists, it
wcauld be incorrect to c?nsider Soviet youth a generally
disloyal groups Y?ung people remain Soviet patriots even
though their understanding of ideology may be superficial
and their adherence to it perfunctory, The fact remains
that they as yet know comparatively little of the Western
world and that their thinking is strongly influenced by
state defined ideological indoctri~aatione It is doubtful,
theref~are, that their dissidence constitutes a serious threat
to the regimeg it is much more likely to be directed towards
gradual reform than revolutiono
co Peasants ?? C9f all social groups, the peasants
have perhaps suere~-most under- Soviet ~?ulea During the
all?out collectivization drive in the 30$s peasants resisted
the central aut~aearities by burning crops, destroying Farm
implements and slaughtering livestock wholesales The regime
resented tee ruthless meth?ds to impose collectivization and
as a result some 1,44?,Of~O peasants died from famine, Many
xaf the present rural populati?n have vivid recollections
oaf those days and h?stility continues strong ta~ward the
collective farm system and the low living standards identified
with it These living standards have risen substantially
since 193 because of successive increases in the prices paid
for c?mpulso~?y state deliveries, but they generally remain
bel?w what the peasant thinks he could-obtain imam a free
market In addition, bureaucratic rigidities and past attempts
to eliauinate their private plots and personal livestock of?
tend the peasants? sense of individuality and tend to alienate
them from the regimes Nevertheless, they have been virtually
free fncam police terror in recent'years9 and with the older
generation dying out, the agricultural workers' resistance
potential is decreasingm
d~ Industrial W?arkers ~? Grievances caf the workers
stem mainly from ow pay, s r c discipline, and bureaucratic
arbitrarinessa The semi?skilled and unskilled, receiving
much lower pay and fewer privileges than the highly skilled,
are pr?bably the most disaffecteda However, their living
standard has steadily improved and there is now less emphasis
Approved For Release 2003/0~/RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For lease 2003/03~~~~DP79T004700700050015-1
on the harsh labor discipline that was once a chief factor
of dissidence among ~rorkers during Stalin?s rule, Generally,
the resistance potential of this group is low, and, with
further economic improvements as well as over-a11 successes
of the regime, may fur-that- decrease.
e. Armed Forces -- The Soviet armed forces .form
the backbone o e coon ry?s security system and its members
are one of the most favored groups in Soviet society, Be-
sides purchasing loyalty through material benefits, the regime
maintains an extensive system of Party controls and secret
police informants in an effort to insure the reliability
of military Personnel and uncover any instances of subversive
activity. While there seems little reason tc~ doubt the over-
all loyalty of the armed forces, areas of discontent do exist.
Some dissatisfaction among conscripts is a reaction to un-
pleasant aspects of military life,- such as low pay, harsh
discipline, and lack of free time--conditi?ns which are con-
siderably more severe for the ordinary Sctiviet soldier than
for his American counterpart. Servicemen?S attitudes also
reflect various forms of discontent found among the population
at large, such as minority nationalism or dislike afthe
collective farm system. However, aside from occasional
individual defections to the West, there is little evidence
of resistance on the part of Soviet military personnel.
While the Soviet enlisted man detests compulsory political
indoctrination, his patriotism, as distinct from his "political
consciousness,"' is believed to be high. Moreover, the
permanent cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers,
which constitute about 20% of the total strength of the
armed forces, is composed of patriotic and,~at least in the
highest ranks, thoroughly indoctrinated men. The majority
of officers are Party member's, and virtually all in the
highest ranks belong to the Party. On the whole, there is
little if any resistance potential to be found in the Soviet
armed forces.
5. The regime seeks to inhibit dissidence by a vast
propaganda campaign designed to pop~ilari~e the Com~sunist
Party and the Soviet system and to discredit alI Western
countries in the eyes of the populace, The r~~ime also
maintains a secret police organization under the control of
the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR, for the purpose of maintaining com-
plete surveillance over the population and ferreting out
any individuals or organizations exhibiting actual or
potential anti-regime '~?ndencies. A large number of mili-
tarized security forces (most of them Border and Interior
Troops) are kept in constant readiness to quell anti-regime
Approved For Release 2003/0~~~~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For ~Yease 2003/03~~~~DP79T00470700050015-1
uprisings. Punitive measures, including prison sentences
and exile to remote areas of the USSR, serve both to remove
active resistance elements and to discourage further resisi~
ance activity. The effectiveness of the government?s actimns
is reflected in the evident stability of the regime. While
the trend in the Soviet Union appears to be toward less
stringent application of security controls, there is every
indication that the security appar-etas itself has lost
none of its effectiveness.
6. The regime has shown its ability to control local
and sporadic disturbances. In the event of a revolt in a
national minority area, Soviet military units in the area,
which usually consist of cross sections of many Soviet
nationalities, would hardly be vulnerable, as were the
Hungarian and Polish forces, to any nationalist appeal.
In case of a simultaneous or rapidly spreading revolt in
several heavily populated areas, the Soviet regime, due
to its formidable security apparatus, would appear to be
in a better position to defend itself than any other govern?
ment in the world.
7. Present capabilities for resistance-are virtually
nonexistent. The maximum that can be expected from the
overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, and particularly
the Russians, is dissidence of a type that is not necessarily
directed against the system as such. Qn the-other hand,.
in a mone~lithic state, apposition to a part of the system
can be regarded as tantamount to opposition to the system
as a w&aole; the ~ioviet leaders almost certainly so consider
it. A steady improvement in-the living standard would al-
most certainly reduce an important source of dissidence,
but not that of intellectuals and students, for example. A
deterioration in living conditions would add to other sources
of dissidence and raise resistance potential in time of crisis,
8. Anti~Communist or anti regime resistance in the USSR
in wartime would depend largely on the length, severity,
and location of the war and on the coux?se of its military
operations. The mere-initiation of hostilities would not
ipso facto incre ase the resistance potentials It is almost
cer a~`~I-at the regime?s appeal to Soviet patriotism would
not fall on dear ears and that most of the Soviet peoples,
with the exception of some national minorities, would work
and fight for the defense of their ho~aeland. Moreover,
security control would undoubtedly be stepped up and dis-
sidents would find it more difficult to organize and more.
dangerous to state their views than in peacetime.
Approved For Release 2003/0~~~~RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For~fease 2003/03~~RI~~DP79T00472~0700050015-1
9. It the war were prol?nged and the USSR suffered major
reverses, resistance potential w~zuld probably increase. How?
ever, in view of Soviet behavior during World War II and
cansidering the fact that since then the USSR has become
str?nger and has acquired m?re prestige, it cannot be assumed
that popular suffering ~~?om great hardships, tensions, and
tighter controls would in itself catalyze dissidence into
resistance. Only if war damage were sufficient to cause a
breakdown of central authority would organized resistance
develops Short ?~ this contingency, even if the regime
were weakened, anti_regime resistance would still be ra?
garded as treason and enough security controls would remain
tes render organization of resistance very difficult.
10. Active resistance would. becoua.e more likely if the
tide of the war turned definitely against the USSR and
foreign troops ea~tered the countrye Until that point, many
anti~Soviet elements w?~uld be afraid to act, remembering
the severe penalties imposed on ccsllaborator~ with the Germans
after world War IIe Particularly in minox?ity areas along
the b?rder, extensive anti~Svviet activity could be expected
as anti?Sc~viet ~?rces approachede Many natives inspired
with the visi?n of liberati?aa would take to the woods and
form partisan bands, as they did during and after World War
II, raiding supply lines, pert?rming acts of sabotage, pro?
viding intelligence and helping in escape and evasia~n operations.
Some groups in other parts of the USSR would be willing to
offer assistance if communication could be established with
them. Many exiled Germans, ~'?rth Caucasians, Crimean Tatars,
and Balts in Central Asia, the Altay territory, and Siberia
probably we~uld be willing intelligence collectors. However,
it would be difficult to organize active resistance in areas
still under Soviet coratrc~le
il, In the event of an impending c?llapse eaf the Soviet
gcavernment, anti~Soviet elements of the population could
attain significant resistance capabilitiesn particularly
with external, supp~srt. But apart from these elements,
resistance ama~ng the br?ad masses of the Great Russian
people would be difficult to organizes Patriotism, in-
dssctrinated respect for S?viet authority, and apathy
probably would r-ender them passive and disinclined to active
opposition. Therefore, even if the security apparatus were
sericausly weakened, little resistance activity c?suld be
expected from the mass of the Great Russian population be- .
yond local harassing a~perations and defections, similarly,
the most common reaction tc a foreign occupation of Soviet
territory probably would be passivity and suspicion. Memories
Approved For Release 2003/0~~~:RDP79T00472A000700050015-1
 Approved For R~ease 2003/0$/.28~CJA~DP79T00472~0700050015-1
of the last war are still fresh and the people have not
forgotten the brutality of the German occupation, as well
as the subsequent Soviet revenge for collaboration. Since
Soviet propaganda would try to equate the activities of the
invaders with those of the Germans in the last war, occupation
policies would be c~?ucial in determining the attitude of
the masses.
12, A nuclear attack on any scale is unlikely immediately
to either increase or decrease resistance activities among
the survivors to any appreciable extent. However, within a
short period of time the extreme hardships brought about by
even a small nuclear attack would tend to create actions of
desperation which, whether intended or not, would have the
effect of resistance. At the same time inevitable disruption
of the control structure resulting from such an attack would
reduce the regime?s capability to deal with such elements,
If a limited nuclear attack were planned and executed so
as to reduce Soviet administrative, political and military
control but to minimise general populati?n casualties ixi
national minority areas, such as the Latvian, Eston~.an and
Lithuanian SSR?s, the Georgian SSR,, and to a lesser extent
the Ukraine, it is probable that resistance activities in
these areas would become greatly intensified, particularly
if they received external support,
13, Such resistance potential as does exist would
probably not be affected by the questi?n of which side
started the war. It can be taken for granted that the
Soviet government would do all it could to shift the blame
to the free world in gen?ral and the United States in
particular, It may be assumed that potential resisters
as well as many dissidents would anticipate such propaganda
and not pay too much attention to ita 'The population as a
whole, even if impressed with Soviet arguments at the
beginning of the war, would in the long run~be influenced
by the trend of the war rather than by the question as to
who attacked whom first. Also, the nationality of the
attacking forces would probably have little effect on
long-range popular attitudes, except that popular opposition
to the invaders would almost certainly be much stronger
against Germans than other nationalitieso
Approved For Release 2003/OSE~RE~DP79T00472A000700050015-1