COMMENTS ON A CITIZEN S WHITE PAPER ON AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA BY MARCUS G. RASKIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000700030018-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 15, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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15.1t. 4
n "A Citizen's White
Vietnam and Southeast
Raskin
White Paper' is a critical re--
and policies in South Vietnam
by certain recommendations for
etical projection of the course
ight take if those recommenda-
Saakin's argument, however, is
lysis that is at best
to, and and often flies directly
. His theses are argued with
tay more peenion than precision, his diction is
faulty as bin logic, and his recommendations--
y are not patently absurd-...appear to relate to a
locr24 quite different from that in ehich we actually live.
Throughout his paper, Mr. Raskin seems to accept Communist
claims or public statements of intent at face value, gives
uniform credence to the Communist version of disputed
events, and systematically denigrates or distorts the
motives of the OS government, its officers (at ail levels)
who have been concerned with the problems of Vietnam, and
the South Vietnamese with whom the VS has been allied and
ehose struggle for independence the VS has endeavored to
support.
2, The errors inaccuracies and direct perversions
truth in Vt. n s paper are so numerous that a
cursive recital and critique would require a monograph
inset as long as his original text. (Detailed comments
greaser errors of fact are given in this memoran.
ppendix.) Xt. Raskin first sets the stage for his
discourse by a brief review of the immediate post-World
War Il background of VS involvement in Indochina..a review
ehose tone is epitomized by his characterization of the
Sohumen Plan as Han attempt to fashion a cool and steel
aorta" and whose level of factual accuracy, by his com-
plete inversion of the actual temporal sequence of the
*convening of the 1954 Geneva Conference, Pierre Mendes-
Pranoe's *occasion to power, and the French National As-
sembly vote against the 'CDC
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firvocurrvri
I ii'LL
rewritten the history of 1945.54 to
suit his covenienco, Mr. Raskin then proceeds to re-.
write the history of Vietnam during the 1954.1960 period
In which the current Communist insurgency in South Viet-
nam began. After placing the entire responsibility for
the insurgency on Diem (which in inaccurate) and contend-
ing that the North Vietnamese took no hand In Southern
troubles until after 1960 (which is untrue), lir. Raskin
embarks on an analysis of the period from 1940 until the
present day-'- an analysis Nanoi would probably be delighted
to publish in its own journals an an example of "ndvancedr
Americen thought but one 'which bears virtually no relation
to the actual course of events and which, in the bargain,
systematically portrays DS officials in Vietnam as fools
and their Vietnamese associates as knaves. Then comes
short discourse on the genesis of current US military
policy, a discourse whose logic and grammar are bard to
follow but sees intended to imply that the DS military
establishment consists of brutes insensitive to human life
and probably prone to sinister domestic political designs.
4, Turning from his demonstrably inaccurate account
t and patently distorted view of the present,
looks to the future and, after a short aside
(Pities of current US barbarism (torture and
of innocents), offers a set of policy proposals
not only naive but betray an ignorance or at
ard of the actual course of recent his-
es Mr. Raskin advocates an International
mechanism which, he contends, "has worked
situationr; but he quite ig.
his system has already been tried in Laos
th a notable lack of success.) Mas
h 4444 Mr. Malkin concludes with a few
d pro octions which beer little, if any, re-
situation in Asia as it actually now exists
the political world in which we actually
history of Indochina in the two decade's since
14 War II is an incredibly complex subject
of which the truth is imperfectly known
argely dependent on one's angle of vision.
concerning 'whom evente..in their very se.
e let alone their genesis or significance--
1 inevitably differ and too confident
of ignorance or disingenuous special
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piesding. Sia.tisrly,the infinitely ccspUoated probless
of Victias involve topics over which honorable
SIM can nd obviouslydo disagree. Our objections to Mt
not from the fact that it le criti
? or from its advocacy of policies
on which the VS Government is
from its uniformly tendentious np.
0 denigration of VS motives, and
of those areas of historical fact
to intellectually honest dispute.
e current situation in Indochina
tion whether or not ]they are critical
113 role therein, but we believe Mr.
sits all claims to consideration as a
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Amer
IAL
APP NDIX
Comments on "A Citizen's White Paper on
Policy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia" by
Marcus 0. Raskin
In the interests of spacel the following comments
are keyed to footnotes which have been marked on the at-
tached copy of Mr. Raskin's text4
SECT/ON I.
1. Part of our present problems did indeed derive
from misconceptions during World War II about Indochina
and the "Indochinese" (no such people exist), but there
is no resemblance between what President Roosevelt had
in mind and what would now be termed a "neutralized area."
2. In March 19450 the French wanted Indochina back
period, and wanted to take up as if nothing had happened
in Indochina during the interval between 1940 and 1945.
This was the root of most of France's subsequent political
troubles in the area.
3. This paragraph is a grossly oversimplified and
distorted summary of a critical and delicate period in
VS-French relations.
4. Quite the reverse, Ho was willing for a time to
dicker politically with the French because his own position
was weak and because he then thought the Communists would
take power in France.
5. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The
French Communist Party consistently opposed and systemati-
cally sabotaged the prosecution of the war in Indochina.
6. This, again, is simply not true.
7. This is the first time we have ever seen the
Schuman Plan described in a non-Communist publication as
a sinister cartel intended to place Western Europe in
economic fiefdom to the United States.
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8, The sentence to which this note is appended
suggests a causal connection between the Schuman Plan
and US support of French activity in Vietnam which simply
did not exist. The following sentences are tendentious
and mendacious.
9. The United States dealt openly in Vietnam,
in support of an ally, but certainly not directly; aid
to Vietnam was funnelled through the French and its ac-
tual employment controlled by the French. The US did
not assume a direct role until 1954.
10. Another distortion; the problem was not French
inability to organize indigenous political groups j'ut
Wrench intransigeance on even discussing the possibility
of eventual independence.
11. Another garbled and inaccurate summary of a
complex set of events. The French, incidentally, did
not lose their military position after Dien Bien Phu;
they lost their political will to carry on.
12. We see nothing sinister in the fact that these
officers of government,,charged with official responsibility
for or seized of legitimate official interest in Far East-
ern affairs)yere uniformaly opposed to a course of action
they considered adverse to US interests. The remainder
of this paragraph sets forth yet another distorted and
oversimplified summary of a complex sequence of events.
13. This sentence and the paragraph which follows
propounds a thesis based on a complete inversion of the
actual sequence of events. The Russians did not pressure
the Viet Minh into a conference "in exchange" for a French
vote against the EDC. The Geneva Conference was already
in sesaion when Mendes-France became Premier and the
Assembly vote came after the conference, not before. Mendes-
France knew that the VietMinh were already prepared to
give serious consideration to partition when he became
Premier; on the strength of this knowledge he made his
grandstand play of promising to resign if he could not
effect a settlement of the war within ten days. The Rus-
sians did take advantage of Mendes-France's position by
offering to put pressure on the Viet Minh in return for a
scuttling of EDC, but it was Mendes France who was out-
maneuvered; for he accepted partition at the 17th parallel
although there are excellent grounds for thinking that
the Viet Minh would have been willing to settle for the 18th.
In any event, Mr. Raskin's version of th4se events is simply
wrong on factual grounds.
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13. Article 19 of the 20 July 1954 "Agreement on
the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam" (to which a dis-
torted reference is here made) also says that the zones
assigned to the respective forces (i.e., North and South
Vietnam) "are not to be used for the resumption of hostili.
ties or to further an aggressive policy," a provision
which North Vietnam has systematically and flagrantly
violated and on which it was specifically charted with viola-
tion by the Canadian and Indian members of the ICC in 1962.
Mr. Raskin also ignores Articles 17 and 18* which North
Vietnam has also consistently and systematically violated.
SECTION II
1. You cannot "view" anything "rhetorically" nor
can you simultaneously "liberate and contain" an enemy.
More to the point, Mr. Raskin is giving a highly colored
description of the US view in 1954 that Communist nations
were embarked on a policy of expansion which constituted
a serious threat to the vital interests of the US and its
allies, for whose defense the US had assumed formal respo
bility by treat$ obligations.
2. Another set of distortions. Dulles, in fact,
simply felt that the line now had to be drawn in Indochina
as it had been drawn in Korea.
S. Every sentence in this paragraph is replete with
factual errors. Sao Dai never backed Diem against General
Minh or the sects (he did exactly the reverse). The Binh
Xuyen's control was confined to Saigon-Cholon and did not
extend "throughout South Vietnam"; Gen. Hinh was not fEir
original "first choice" but an alternative that Sao Dai and
the French came to consider better than Diem for their pur-
poses.
4. He not only seemed to be; he
5. Gen. Minh never had much Vietnamese support
and, again, the Binh Xuyen's pawer never extended much
bebond Saigon.
6. This sentence is one of Mr. Raskin'of two sops to
"objectivity."
7. The actual number was around 900,000; Mr. Raskin
neglects to mention that, by contrast, the number leaving
South Vietnam for the North was infinitesimal.
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6. These were operative reasons, but the main reason,
which Mr, Raskin neglects to mention, was fully justified
fear of Communist brutality and oppression.
9. Technically accurate, but nonetheless a distor-
tion. Diem had no real power base other than a small
group of Central Vietnamese Catholics and did welcome
the support of the northern Catholic refugees. The religious
issue as such, however, did not then exist, nor did it
arise for several years.
10. The election was quite genuine (hence the quotes
e tendentious) and though it was certainly not free in
e Western sense, few observers at the time questioned
the fact that Diem was overwhelmingly preferred by the
South Vietnamese people to Bow Dai.
11. These fears were well founded and were based on
North Vietnam's overwhelming numerical superiority (a
result of Mendes-France's accepting partition at the 17th
parallel) and realistic knowledge of how elections are run
in areas under Communist control.
12. The Hanoi government never did any such thing.
It did initially concentrate on consolidating its contb*
over the North, but the reason was that it expected the
Diem regime to collapse and anticipated acquiring control
over all of Vietnam through the scheduled 1956 elections.
As soon as it became apparent that Diem had a chance of
surviving and that the elections were not going to be held,
Hanoi issued orders to the cadre it had left behind in the
South (in violation of the Geneva Accords) to begin terror-
ist and insurgent activities.
13. Diem's errors and mistakes certainly contributed
to South Vietnam's problems, but what turned "the wheel of
fortune" was Hanoi's calculated decision to begin an insur-
gencicampaign in order to effect the downfall of the Saigon
goveenment when it became apparent that this government had
a chance to survive.
14. A tendentious account indeed of Diem's move to
break the Chinese stranglehold on economic life and to
force the Chinese community to accept the responsibilities
of citizenship. The moves were tactically bungled on occa-
sion 1011t strategically sound and politically essential.
The disruption of the economy was a very short-lived tempo-
rary phenomenon.
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15. This whole paragraph is tendentious* the Viet
Cong (no longer Viet Minh) were a threat to internal se-
curity, but Diem needed no Wing on this score; indeed
be was more aware of the implications of the rising insur-
gent menace than were some Americans. Devilliers (from
whom Mt. Raskin seems to have borrowed heavily) hardly
classes as an objective or unbiased source.
16. This change in emphasis was necessitated by
the rising pace of Communist-directed insurgency.
17. This assignment of the adjective "treacherous"
to a North Vietnamese operation is the other of Mk. Raskin s
two sops to objectivity.
18. gr. Raskin uncritically accepts the Communist
propaganda version of a very minor incident of alleged
food poisoning in a South Vietnamese prison in December
1958. NO prisoners died and there were strong grounds
at the time for thinking that the incident* picked up and
replayed with suspicious alacrity by a variety of Vietnam-
ese Communist propaganda organs had been planned from the
outset as a stage maneuver. Armed bands of Communist-
controlled rebels were active in the south at least two
years before this "incident" occurred.
SECTION 11I.
1. That is to say* Communis nations' prefer to wage
aggression by subversion and terrorism rather than the ?
more risky methods of frontal military assault.
2. Absolute nonsense and a complete perversion of
the truth. The activity of the Communist rebels in the
South was initiated in response to Hanoi's orders and by
1960 Hanoi was supporting and directing a growing civil
war. The remainder of the paragraph continues in a similar
distorted vein.
3. The National Liberation Front was created* by
Hanoi* in the fall of 1960 because the war had reached the
stage where the Communists felt the need of a political
"front" mechanism. The remainder of the paragraph is in-
accurate and disingenuous.
4. The recommendations made were dictated by the
objective realities of the then current situation* not
by the OSS background of Mt. Rostow or Mr. Hilsman.
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6. There was, admittedly, considerable peasant
apathy towards Saigon, but hardly total alienation.
6. Distorted and untrue. In 1962 US pilots were
doing very little flying Oxcept on training missions)
and though South Vietnamese pilots could have been more
discriminating in their target selection, the picture
was nowhere near so stark as Mt. Raskin paints it.
7. Both, unfortunately, did occur; but it is false
to say they were commonplace. The following sentence is
simply not true.
8 This whole paragraph is overdone and distorted,
and the one which follows merits even harsher criticism.
9. Another gross overstatement of an admittedly
existent problem. No troops in combat are excessively
gentle towards the source of hostile fire.
10. This statement is simply not true, nor are the
two sentences which follow.
11. A prime example of Mr. Raskin's technique of
elliptical telescoping and distortion. The US was respond-
ing to an unprovoked attack on the high seas (which Mr.
Raskin neglects to mention) and our Tonkin Gulf actions
had a number of favorable results as well as stimulating
the Communists to their own retaliation.
12. Gross exaggeration.
13. The account of this period during which Khanh? as
a de facto as well as de Jure head of the military establish-
miff was very much in rower--is quite distorted.
14. The contention that the US had "lost" the war and
the analysis which precedes it will simply not stand up
under scrutiny.
15. This in simply not true.
16. Nor is this.
17. Few believed the supply routes would dry up;
many (with reason) felt the bombing had military value.
Obviously the bulk of the evidence and comments involved
were contained in highly classified material to which Mr.
Raskin would not have access. From his former service
on the White Rouse staff, Mr. Raskin should have realized
this.
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A distorted overstatement of a very complex
19. An 'Omitted joke suddenly becomes the whole
20. The figure never was this high, and this is
certainly not the situation today. Instead, there are
signs that the bulk of the Viet Cong regular units are
converting to a 7.62 mm family of weapons all of which
(and the ammunition they use) must be supplied from ex-
ternal sources.
21. AS in Burma, perhaps, where insurgency is
chronic and endemic?
22. Quang Lien's fuzzy-minded peace movement, which
was directed against all foreign troops including those
sent from North Vietnam, was explicitly disavowed, and
quashed, by the Buddhist leadership.
23. The gas employed #in very limited are as
not lethal. Pilots are never allowed to "pick their own
targets" in the sense that W. Raskin is implying. (They
may under certain conditions, as when patrolling a desig-
nated stretch of road, be permitted to select targets of
opportunity from within precisely defined categories, but
that is something quite different from the notion Mr.
Raskin seems to be conveying.)
24. Mr. Raskin depicts the administrative structure
the US Government as some kind of sinister cabal.
25. Their verbal response would hardly be described
as mild. Their physical response has obviously been
limited by their own weaknesses in areas where they are
faced with overwhelming US strength.
26. Is Mr. Raskin suggesting that the US should
let other nations, particularly its avowed enemies, se-
lect its means or define its ends?
27. The US bombings were prompted by wanton attacks
on US personnel, timing was dictated by the Communists who
launched the attacks at times and places of their, not our,
choosing. So far as we (though perhaps not the Vorth Viet-
namese) were concerned, the presence of Kosygin was acci-
dental and irrelevant.
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28. This is simply not trues if anything, the area
of GYN control in the region around Saigon has been expend-
ing in recent months (not contracting), American quarters
have never been bombed regularly, parts of the Embassy
were severely damaged but the Embassy itself was certainly
not destroyed (indeed, its continuous use was never sus-
pended), the Viet Cong control no towns. Mr. Raskin simply
has no respect for factor apparent interest in them.
29. This is also just plain false. US Marines are
in he Da Nang area and at Phu Bait both regions under
VM control when the Marines arrived (though admittedly
the Marines were landed to ensure the continuation of that
ntrol). It is perversity to claim that the Marines re-
main in Da Nang on VC sufferance, for this is simply not
true.
30. A gross distortion. Some officials may have
questioned the competence or skill of individual ARVN
units, but no responsible US official has ever made state-
ments such as these either in public or in privileged of,-
ficial communications.
31. And apparently Mr. Raskin is prepared to accept
ommunist claims or boasts uncritically at face value.
32. The retired officers of the Titanic would hardly
be the most qualified commentators on matfers of nautical
safety.
33. This sentence would make more sense if one sub-
stituted "not possibly" for "only." The type of conference
De Gaulle was advocating would almost invariably result in
Communist control over all of Vietnam.
34. If De Gaulle ever made the unqualified assertion
that the Chinese and North Vietnamese wanted to negotiate
(which we doubt) he was wrong. Hanoi has evinced cold
disinterest in any form of negotiations except under con-
ditions involving US surrender. Peiping has been adamantly
and vituperatively opposed to negotiations and to any who
advocate them at the present time.
35. Malaysia, a political idea vindicated by a UN-
supervised popular referendum, cannot be described with
any pretense to objectivity or acCdirfAy as a "British
Uffation," though Sukarno, of course, consistently uses
such formulations to justify his policy of aggression.
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38. This whole paragraph is ssue of misrepresen-
tations, untruths, and distortions,
37. This seems regrettably true. It is certainly
not understood by Mr. Raskin.
38. Given the highly vocal activities of a number
of Congressmen--including Senators Morse* Church, Ful..
bright and others--Congress could hardly be described as
silent. From the standpoint of accuracy, this statement
is about on a par with many of Mr. Raskin's other conten-
tions.
39. We see nothing sinister in the President's listen.,?
ing to and occasionally acting upon the foreign policy
information and. advice provided by those agencies of gov-
ernment tasked by lawful statute with providing such ser-
vices.
40. This is not only the "official position," but
it also happens to be the truth. And it is not open to
serious question by anyone who is well informed or willing
to face facts as they exist.
41. We do not regard Mr. Matsumoto as a particularly
competent or qualified observer and disagree with his find-
ings. If he believes that the US Mission in Saigon thinks
that only 30% of the VC are Communists* then he is
greevously misinformed.
42. 1 is correct, 2 is wrong, 3 is fooltabneas,. and
44, as written, makes no sense at all.
43. The insistence referred to is based on a realistic
appraisal of who controls the Viet Cone and an unwillingness
to be duped into accepting the Communist front tactic on its
own pretentious.
44. Mr. Raskin is apparently ignorant of Hanoi's oft
reiterated and quite unequivocal position on reunification
and the echoes of this position voiced by HanoiRAI wholly
-
controlled puppet the P.
45. However, we are determined to ensure that this
activity is not bossed from Hanoi or Peiping.
46. Nonsense. Hanoi has never indicated the slightest
willingness to consider a neutralization of North Vietnam
and, in fact, has repeatedly and adamantly insisted that
this point is not negotiable.
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47. Apparently Mr. Raskin and the unnamed diplomats
be r fers to do not see a continuation of Hanoi-directed
izwurgency in the South as any inhibition to meaningful
negotiations.
48. Xxcept for such trivial matters as collapsing
the morale of our South Vietnamese allies, confirming the
Chinese thesis about the non-Communist world's inability
to cope with aggression by subversion (i.e., "wars of
national liberation"), viOdication of the "paper tiger"
image of the US so loudly trumpted from Peiping and Hanoi,
a strengthening of the Chinese hand in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, an encouragement to the incitement of similar
insurgencies in Thailand and elsewhere, and a serious re-
appraisal by all our Asian allies of US constancy and
ability to defend them from subversive assault. Aside
from such considerations as these, of course, the
cost would be trivial.
ONS V V and VI, we believe do not require comment;
we could add that will not be readily
apparento any objective reader.
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