CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000700020039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORT

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9. For a time Peiping apparently hoped to use
Cuba as a base for operations and was counting on
Castro's cooperation to increase Chinese Communist
influence in Latin America. In 1960 the Chinese
offered the Cubans a $60-million economic develop-
ment loan--of which only about $4 million has thus
far been drawn--and trade has been substantial.
Last year over-all economic exchange amounted to
about $185 million; Chinese rice,medicines,and indus-
trial goods were traded for Cuban products, mainly
sugar. The Chinese Communist Embassy in Havana has
about 50 officers and functionaries. In addition,
there may be as many as 150 Chinese Communist ad-
visers--mostly agricultural technicians--working
in Cuba.
10. Although Castro's revolutionary program
coincides to a large degree with Peiping's and has
disagreed with Moscow's, the Chinese Communists
have been prevented from taking full advantage of
their presence. This is partly because Chinese
Communist ambitions at times conflict with Castro's
own ambitions. Moreover, as the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute intensified, Moscow probably used its consid-
erable economic leverage on Havana to step up the
pressure for support against Peiping. Cuban lead-
ers, while continuing to assert their determination
to maintain an independent posture, have recently
appeared to have edged over more closely toward
Moscow.
12. The meeting of Latin American Communist
leaders in Havana last November seems to have been
a kind of watershed. This meeting, arranged by
Moscow, represented a major bid to isolate the more
radical, pro-Chinese splinter factions in Latin
America. Peiping was reportedly disgusted with the
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Cubans for hosting a gathering which, though it sup-
ported revolutionary struggle in certain areas of
Latin America, adopted positions useful to the So-
viets in their world-wide struggle with Peiping.
Chinese anger, kindled by the Havana gathering, was
undoubtedly intensified by Cuba's decision to at-
tend the March "consultative" meeting in Moscow
and to send a high-level delegation headed by Raul
Castro.
13. Party relations have now reached an all-
time low, and the Chinese Communists may begin to
criticize Cuba as "revisionist" and try to turn
Latin American Communists against Castro. In early
February Chd Guevara, Havana's most militant revo-
lutionary spokesman, went to Communist China in an
attempt to smooth matters over, but the Chinese
leaders apparently were in no mood for reconcilia-
tion.
14. Both sides continue to be bitter and no
early easing of tensions is in prospect.
Mexico
15. Chinese Communist trade representatives ar-
rived in Mexico in mid-1963 to set up a trade fair,
a few months after two NCNA men had set up a news
bureau. The press officials are still there manning
an official NCNA office. The trade group remained
in Mexico nearly a year
Although previous Sino-Mexican trade had been
insignificant, Communist China received grain and
cotton totaling about $35 million in 1964.
16. The government of Diaz Ordaz is more con-
servative than that of his predecessor Lopez Mateos,
and the present administration appears unlikely to
permit a major expansion of formal contact with Com-
munist China, although trade will probably continue.
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Chile
18. In Chile, as in Mexico, the Chinese Commu-
nists have been allowed to set up a permanent office.
This mission, established in 1961, was recently en-
larged from two to six officers and now is described
as a trade mission rather than a press office. Pei-
ping's representatives, especially the chief NCNA
man, are extremely active and travel widely through-
out Latin America, The Chinese Communists stationed
in Chile try to promote Sino-Chilean trade, distrib-
ute anti-US propaganda, and wean Communists from
the Moscow-oriented Old Guard leadership. Chile,
however, is one of the few countries in Latin America
where the party is legal and may still hope to gain
power eventually by parliamentary means. There is
little evidence of any widespread attraction to Pei-
ping's militant line.
19. Communist China has purchased relatively
small quantities of copper and nitrates since 1959
on a contract basis. In 1964 Chilean exports to
Communist China totaled only about $1 million and
sales this year will be considerably larger.
Argentina
20. Since 1961 Communist China has purchased
substantial quantities of wheat and some corn from
Argentina. Last year sales to Peiping totaled 1.5
million tons of grain worth $100 million. Under a
long-term trade agreement signed last fall, the Chi-
nese Communists are concluding contracts which are
expected to cover at least one million additional
tons by the end of 1966, and an Argentine wheat
board delegation in Hong Kong in late March re-
portedly sold Peiping 700,000 tons of wheat. Chinese
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Communist commercial representatives are reportedly
attempting to arrange trade promotion visits to
Buenos Aires and neighboring Montevideo. For sev-
eral years Peiping has been angling unsuccessfully
for the establishment of a permanent trade or press
office.
Brazil
21. Peiping suffered a resounding setback in
Brazil early last year when the Castello Branco gov-
ernment shut down the NCNA office and arrested the
two Chinese Communist press representatives and
seven trade officials who were to set up a trade
fair and permanent commercial office. All were
tried and convicted of subversion and were recently
expelled from Brazil.
22. Prior to last year's change of government
Sino-Brazilian trade was just beginning to develop,
and in early 1964 totaled more than $800,000.
23. In 1962, a small faction of the Brazilian
Communist Party split away to form a separate party.
This group, now numbering less than 900, has en-
dorsed Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute and advo-
cates militant revolutionary tactics in Brazil.
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Peru
25. The Peruvian Communist party formally
split in January 1964 into two organizations, one
recognized by Moscow and the other by Peiping. The
two groups appear to be of approximately equal
strength.
Colombia
26. A small pro-Peiping faction has formally
split away from the pro-Soviet leadership and has
formed the Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist-
Leninist). This group has split the Youth Movement,
land
is oeginning to make serious inroaes into orthodox
party ranks.
Bolivia
27. Pro-Peiping elements are now in the proc-
ess of formally breaking away from the Moscow-
oriented party and have set up their own National
Secretariat. They reportedly have considerable
strength in the crucially important mining districts.
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Chinese Trade With Latin America
Imports
Million US
$
Exports
1963
1964
(est)
1963
1964
(est)
Argentina
3.6
91.7
0.1
0.1
Brazil
0.2
0.2
1.4
0.5
Chile
-
1.0
-
-
Cuba
76.0
75.0
95.0
110.0
Mexico
-
32.0
0.1
-
Uruguay
0.2
-
-
-
Total
80.0
199.9
96.6
110.6
Chinese Economic Credits and Grants to Latin America
(through 1964)
Cuba
Extended Drawn
60.0 (development loan) 4.0 (est)
40.0 (balance of pay- 36.0 (est)
ment aid)
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