INDONESIAN ARMY ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600040009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 22, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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OCI. No. 2943/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
22 November 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Indonesian Army Attitudes Toward Communism
1. For six weeks the Indonesian Army has been
engaged in a major campaign against the Communist
Party of Indonesia (PKI)0 Party byythe
pathizers are being rounded up
military; others are being purged from local govern-
ment positions; and in Central Java PKI adherents
are reported to be shot on sight by the army,
political
army has risked much of its prestige
future on this campaign. It wants to ban the PKI
and to cripple the party permanently, but its atti-
tude toward Marxism is far more complicated than
simple anti-Communism,
2. The army has a long record of opposition
to the PKI as a political force, In addition, some
army leaders undoubtedly view Communism as an ide-
ology which is essentially evil, totalitarian,
alien to the "Indonesian way of life." But this
view is by no means universal. Army officers and
enlisted personnel, like Indonesians in all other
walks of life, have for the past several years
been subjected to a fairly constant barrage of pro-
Communist propaganda., This propaganda, echoed and
often initiated by President Sukarno, has had its
effect. While some army officers' beliefs are
firmly rooted in a fundamentalist and essentially anti-Communist Moslem tradition, many others, cpar-
ticularly in the lower ranks, equally firmly con-
sider themselves to be Marxist socialists, Nearly
all army leaders, however, are united in regarding
the PKI as a rival for power within Indonesia.
They are at present engaged in a power struggle, not an ideological struggle, with the party.
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PKI, but not anti-Communist. This is a good capsule
summary of the military's position, for clearly a
large segment of the army is by no means opposed to
Marxism per se. Indeed, officially the army gives
full assent to the frequently stated proposition
that the Indonesian revolution is a socialist revo-
lution. Probably few army leaders would oppose some
sort of state-controlled Marxist party, even one
calling itself Communist, if this party were clearly
nationalistic--that is, wholly oriented toward Indo-
nesian national interests. The Yugoslav model is
instructive in this regard.
4. The army leadership at present finds itself
opposed to the PKI on a variety of grounds. First,
the murder of a number of high-ranking officers in
the course of the insurrection on 1 October has made
it clear to the army leadership that its very sur-
vival may be at stake in the present struggle.
Second, the PKI, 'with its high degree of political
motivation and discipline, has developed an inde-
pendent power structure that is not necessarily re-
sponsive to the organs of government. Finally, the
army believes the PKI's ties to Peking make it in
effect the agent of a foreign power. For all these
reasons the army finds the PKI a threat to its own
power position. But it also finds in these factors
useful arguments in the propaganda war it is now
waging against the PKI. It is claiming the party
is out of phase with Indonesian ideals and a "traitor"
to the Indonesian revolution, and is emphasizing
Chinese Cor.:munist involvement in the 1 October up-
rising. This last argument is particularly effective,
given the Indonesians' general antipathy to the
numerous Chinese merchants living in their midst.
5. In pressing this campaign against the PKI,
however, the army has had to tread a delicate path
with respect to President Sukarno, who is not only
emotionally committed to Marxism, but is also con-
vinced that the PKI, with its high degree of disci-
pline, is a unifying factor on the Indonesian po-
litical scene, where centrifugal forces have plagued
the government from its inception. In addition, the
army must consider Moscow's attitude. The Indonesian
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military establishment is almost totally Soviet-
supplied, and the army is well aware of its de-
pendence on the Soviet Union for spare parts, re-
placements, and ammunition.
6. Whatever its feelings about Peking, the
army certainly wants no break with Moscow. It has
been careful to exclude the Soviet Union from its
recent denunciations of the PKI and of the Chinese
ist
7. Moscow has been playing the recent events
in Indonesia in a low key in its current propaganda.
It has been making the minimum noises necessary when
Communist Party members are being harried and shot
by government forces--criticism far milder, for ex-
ample, than that directed at Iraq in 1.963 when similar
conditions obtained in that country. Arms deliveries
have continued to reach Indonesia without interrup-
tion over the past six weeks. There is no indication
that they will be cut off.
The army leaders m
also feel that continued evidence of Soviet good
will, as expressed in uninterrupted arms shipments,
may infuriate the Chinese Communists and lead to re-
criminations that the army could then use to advantage
in its attempt to orient Indonesia away from Peking.
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9. The embassY suggests that in reaching an
the arms shipment
understanding with the Soviets on to Soviet
question the army may leave itself open ro-Moscow
pressure to resuscitatesshe K ible~ ia t ois by no means
appear-
While this is po at the appear-
line would not be happy
likely. ly. The army t Party with strong
ance of a revivified Comm nis ifathis power were
ties to a foreign power, even e it is
Furthermor,
Moscow rather than Peking. elves do not particu-
led in the thickets of
likely that the Soviets thems
larly wish to become eTheyghave before them the
Indonesian politics.
example of Peking's involvement in this
led to a diminu-
clear
an involvement which Indonesia. Moscow
manner--
tion of Chineinterestedcinlclose government-to-
is primarily Indonesians, and may
government hr atattsnvirt.ual tarms_SUPP1Y monopoly ian policies
well feel that a
affords it greater influence on PKIInwhich the army
as
than would a Moscow-oriented , consider to
party.
may at some future date comeoes thespres o be b
great a threat to it as en the
Government-to-government relations l.emented by and
shipments
Ian
of middle-gradetheesisame in-
training
the USSR, gives the Soviet
fluence they enjoy in Egypt-
10. Indeed, even the hpartytaWOUld prove
PKI as a "national Communist While the
difficult in present circumstances.
might have no ideological difficulties
army it has the present
to
accepting such a party) would like
on the run and almost certainly w
the party's organizational structure while
destroy oy the chance. It has made no attempte PKI
a new
the less militant ele entcof the
cultivate ected to form the re of
that might be exp
In practice it has made no des edninl
dir party. the
"safer" party
1 Octnoberhinsurrection andeother, local
when making arrests and purging
members October
Moreover, the PKI, like
government machinery. Mor arties, is organized
other traditional Cistmembers are inclined
constituted leadership.
from the top down, and its
to follow the lead of its c
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These leaders have international. considerations as
well as Indonesian interests in mind, and if
forced underground would probably take a large por-
tion of the more dedicated rank-and-file with them,
On the other hand, the PKI has a strong nationalist
coloration, and some lower level party members may
eventually be induced to join a tame, government-
organized and sponsored party professing Marxism.
The army would, however, attempt to see that such
a party did not have a real voice in governmental
policy making,
11, Even a development along this line, how-
ever, presupposes a victory for the army in its
present attempt to influence Sukarno to accept its
view of the PKI as a threat to the Indonesian state.
This outcome is by no means certain; the army may
yet be outmaneuvered by the politically astute Presi-
dent. In the end, the army may be forced by Sukarno
to acquiesce in a rehabilitation. of the PKI, or to
accept the party almost whole but reconstituted
under a different name, For that which worries
the army most--the PKI's tight organizational struc-
ture--is precisely what makes it so attractive to
Sukarno. And while it is true that the army has
gone further in present circumstances in pursuing
its own ends, it has retreated in the face of
presidential pressure before and may do so again,
12, Whatever the outcome of the present scramble
for power, it is unlikely that there will, be a major
change in Indonesian foreign policy, Should the
army emerge on top, Indonesian policies would prob-
ably be more genuinely neutral in balancing between
East and West, and the tendency to follow Peking's
lead :in international affairs certainly would be
reduced. However, no break with Moscow is in the
cards, and the army would find it difficult to
extricate itself from present foreign policy atti-
tudes to reach a genuine rapprochement with the
West. In part this is true because the army itself
believes these policies to be correct, and in part
because to reach an accommodation with the West
would expose the army leaders to charges of "selling
out to the neocolonialists', from leftist Indonesian
elements independent of the PKI. Specifically, the
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army is deeply involved in confrontation with
Malaysia and, despite some indications that its
leaders are having second thoughts about this
policy, it is unlikely that they can stand down
on confrontation without a considerable loss of
face. Furthermore, the army leadership, like
Sukarno, would probably find confrontation a use-
ful symbol around which to unify the many divisive
forces at work in the archipelago,
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22 November 1965
OCI No. 294W~5
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
INDONESIAN ARMY ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNISM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
/6 c/
GROUP 1
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