PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
28 October 1965
OCI No. 2343/65
Copt No, ~9
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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nffi~-P ~f Current Intelligence
GROUP 1
Excluded from automotic
downgrading and
declassification
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No, 2343/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
1 November 1965
MEMORANDUM
Intelligence Memorandum OCI No, 2343/65 of
28 October, entitled Philippine Elections, should
be changed to read as'-Ir'oTlows
(1) The third sentence of Para 2 in the sum-
mary should read, "The small Party for Philippine
Progress under Raul Manglapus.,.."
(2) Para 12 on Page 3 should read, "Roxas
will have some competition from Senator Manuel
Manahan, the Philippine Progressive candidate.
Manahan, a newspaperman...."
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OCI No. 2343/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
2$ Odtrber 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Philippine Elections
Summary
1. Philippine elections on 9 November will
decide between the inr~.umber~t President Diosdado
Macapagal of the Liberal Party and his Nacionalista
Party opponent, Ferdinand Marcos. The race appears
to be a close one, and the last weeks of the cam-
paign are regarded as crucial. Also contesting the
election will be candidates for eight seats in the
Senate--one--third of that body--and all 104 seats
of the House of Representatives.
2. Intensive campaigning has been unders~~v~[y
for nearly a year. The issues have been almost
entirely domestic, and have printed up the lack
of fundamental policy differences between the two
major parties. The small People?s Progressive
Party under Raul Manglapus entered the picture in
June, and its chief effect will be to draw votes
from both major candidates,
3. All three of the presidential candidates
are Western?~?oriented and pledged to continue close
and equitable relations with tt~e.~.~i?~ and thy;-West on
matters of mutual interest. The significance of
the election lies not so much in who wins but in
whether the winner institutes and pursues a basic
~oc~.t~econ~xmia~c~ reform program. Without reforms,
generalized public discontent is likely to increase
and the small leftist element in the Philippines
will probab~.y;, grow.
The Candidates
4. Diosdado Macap~gal, the Liberal Party can-
didate, is considered barely a middleweight in terms
of political know-how, administrative ability, and
intellectual capacity. He was elected to the presidency
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wan by
rogram? Although he?n Tess.
in 1961 on a reform P he did not control c g
oi~.se of Representat Ives Senat e
a comfortableathenH minority in the
His majority and he had a legislation for
not manageable of the enabling His one suc-
As a result., most assed. which
ram was never P law on sign
his "reform Pro~,ssage of a land-ref oreated camp
cess was the P during his rep
he has leaneelhoutvthe country.
swings throug began to absorb
election campaign a a1 had in-
s. Until the ear, Macap g
of his,time last Y himself and
almost all interest in asserting rincipal ve-
decided Asian affairs. His P British
dicated a Ines in of then Fed-
the Philipp ine claim to pastate of the
hide was a Philipp a member a
North Borneo, now SabaThis claim in turn led to
of Malaysia. with Indonesia and oPPo-
eration close relations Macapagal
period of Malaysia. Iii 1964, however, and at re-
sition to Indonesian militancy phil-
became alarmed by within the D akarta
of Indonesian subversion with ~
ports and allowed relationsdbuhleL,~a'lk to
ippines itself Despite some hose
to cool considerably his pro-Indonetoabe both
the United States duringmade an effort With
enerally in his relations
l~lta:capagal has g
reasonable and accommodating
~Na,shington
Ferdinand Marcos
Marcos, the Nacionalista
d'inand of t"he Libera11964.
6 , Senator E_dx' 3t~in[e member
candidate , was' a Tong?' , arty from 1960 to
resident of that P
'Party and 964 he abruptly left the Libafr~hatayear
In November candidacy over
jainedathe Nacionalistas. ast two
Nacionalista President For the P
he won the s .a~pfirants .
several othQr ~s'~rbn[, .,. Senate .
res.iid,esit of she
years ~.e has been P' - brilliant lawyer
has a record as a a1i.~ .
7. I~1a.rcoa As president
re utation as a skila~ue]:ection.hless onality
and a p never lost ers
ti~iax~. He has emerge as a strongea al. He might
he would probably than Macap g
administratorosition vis-a-vis the US,
and a better independent P Philippine relations.
take a more friendly US-
but would continue
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Raul Mang~laPus
or Manglapus, the stanboltedether Liberals
g? Senate ressive Party,
the new People s Prog a al had failed
ear on the grounds that MacaP Manglapus hopes
last y romis~ed program`? many members
to carry out his P 40-year age group,
e believes are dissatisfied with both Li -
to attract the 20-to- us is attractive -
of which h NLanglaP nif scant f roan
stale and Nacionalistabut has no rig
and well intentioned, ort? The effect of his caTher,e
olitical suPP artier remains unclear?
cial or P or candidate
dacy on the other two P
indication as to which maJ
is no firm
he will hurt more?
'~ic__ presidential Candidates residential
g? Philippine presidential and vice-P
ter do not run in tandem but are elected se -
elect the president
eandlda Hence, one party may a al,
arately? osition the vice president? Macap g from
osition vice president"
and the oPP was an '#?pp residency is one of
for example= Since the vice~P there is
1957 to 1961?stones to the Presidency,
the stepping
rally almost as much enterest in this race a
ge~#e resid
in the one for the P
Although the Presidential election ~yout-
10? to be little doubt about the
close, there seems inning
of the vice_Presidential race? The Libera
come has been ticketed to win from the baron
candidate is Senator Gerardo Roxas,
of the contestQSt~war president?
of the -first P
of Rep-
Roxas has served in both tholledsthe highest
11? and h? P
resentatives and the Senate, assisted
r of votes in the 1963 senatorial elections ate
numbs name has certainly
Although his father's teat appeal to an elector
him, he seems to have g image build-
ears hungry for ear?blem forrtheonsable o -
that app intense
f icials? He has been no Pr
looks, talks, and behaves ?nsibility?
ers? He h sense of rasp
young-man with a hig
etition from Senator
12? la's Progressive candidate?
Roxas wiltheh peOpsome com olitician,
Emmanuel ~anerbwsP~Perman turned reformist P
Maraban, o appeal to some of the same elements of
seems likely t
the electorate who favor Roxas?
_3?
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13. The Nacionalista canalitician andaleading
Fernando Lopez, a long-time p vice~pres-
businessman who served as Liberal Party
ident in 1949-53. Although he has a large following
in his home area, the central Philippines, he seems
unable to match the appeal of Roxas?
Senatorial and House Elections
14. Senators are elected at largea~ne electedl-
ippines. Eight of the 24-member body
Given the
every two years far a six-year term.
present 1:Ine.;xxp in the Senate, it seems unlikely
that either the Liberals or the Nacionalistas will
win enough of the eight contested seats to gain
control of the upper house. The andethesNacionalistas
win six seats to gainthemtworincumbent Progressive
seven. Accordingly,
senaters~ and ane independent will probably hold
the deciding votes in the Senate.
15. Control of the 104-member House of Rep-
resentatives depends not only on lower-house
elections but also an the outcome oifstdecpdedi a
dential race. ?nce the presidency
number of minority-party representatives usually
defect to the majority.- Depending on the ability
of the new president to manipulate pwQllebenmore~-
pense patronp:ge, his House majority
or less manageable and loyal.
Issues and Campaign
15. The campaign has fc~r~used principally on
the record of the Macapagal administration Qni the
one hand and the personal qualifications of Marcos
on the others
17, Marcos has charged the Maca~a~tlaridm carrup~ian,
with broken promises, high prices, g
.and a lack of attention to law and o1"der which has per-
mitted increased smuggling and a general incrreliable
crime. Marcos presents himself as a~idtnotes his war-
leader who will keep his promises,
timer.ecord as a guerrilla commander.
18. Macapagal retaliates by pointing to his 3and-
reform law and the availability of low-priced rice as
major accompl~.shrnents and as proof of his concern for
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the common mane He blames the Nacionalista-con-
trolled Senate for obstructing his reform program
and alleges that Marcos is unfit for the presidencye
Liberals pain officedtoamurderith everything from
corruption
1190. Each party is claiming that the other will
fraud or violence to thwart the popular will
seek by
befores durings and after the election,..; Every Phi -
ippine election campaign Produces a Certain amount
of violence at lowo~rt ~~v~exs?sonsdhavesalready beeping
no exceptiono Ab
killedo
20o It is an axiom of Philippine politics that
a presidential ticket cannot win on an ~~eip~~sident
platform, At the same times ~i? Philipp
wants to be accused of not profiecting the national
interests especially where the UnaboutSanyest?p that
cernede Macapagal has been wary
might reflect subservience to US influences and
Marcos has gone no further than~Ptowerfulefareigngal
on occasion of subservience to p
interests" or truckling to "'alien bu~3:nesso"
21, Foreign policys howevers including US-
Philippine relationss has attracted little attention
in the carnpaigno In a mid-October Presolicyervlnws
Marcos stated his position on foreign p
Vietnam he is willing to continue nonmilitaryaidi~~ly
ippine assistances but would extend military
if it.~hould become clear that a mlresident~lheiwould
possible theree Should ~e bee?me p
"normalize'? relationsawni~~ an S~uth~~stsAsian commonbah
claims and try to org
marketo He foreseeina? "H~bstatedathatathere isl.a?licy
toward Communist Ch among Filipinos toward
deep end extensive friendship this
Americanso He addede howeveif i~S~ Philippinelrelations
friendship can survive only and equalitye
are modified toward greater reciprocity
The Electorate
?~.,~-~-
22o The Philippine electoratewellsinformedomil-
lion voters is literate and fairly
23, The Fhilippines Free Presss a crusading weekly
news magazine s is I?emen~oLl~ poprx~ar tYaroughout the
islands and is published in both English and Tagalogo
The last four years have seen a doubling and perhaps a
?5?
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triplin{; of transistor radios in the country, This
prolifsratibn has not only brought individual .can-~
didates closer to a greater number of people, but has
also broadendd' v3l~lage awareness cif dome~tie arld
foreign issues.
24, Despite the efforts of both major presidential
candidates to arouse grass-roots support by extended
tours of the countryside, neither has stirred any
great popular enthusiasm. A veteran Filipino columnist
probably reflected the sentiments of many observers
when he commented a month before the election that he
had no "feeling in his bones" as to who the winner
would be .
25. The Philippine electorate craves efficient
and honest government and increasingly feels it does
not get it. There is a generalized condition of dis-
content and lawlessness in the Philippines that is fed
by several basic and interrelated factors: widespread
rural poverty; deep social and economic cleaYage be.-
tween upper and lower classes; extensive unemployment
and underemplo;yment;, widespread graft, corruption,
and favoritism in government and in business. In the
cities, especially among the youth, there is frustra-
tion over the lack of political and economic opportunity.
Remnants of a Communist insurgent organization--
People's Liberation Army, or "Huks"--are still at large
in densely populated Central Luzon. Although currently
concerned chiefly with self-preservation, the Huffs rep-
resent a nucleus for a revived Communist movement.
26. A renascent nationalism is growing rapidly
in the Philippines. To some extent it feeds and is
fed by these frustrations. Further, elements among ,the
intellectuals and the press-?perhape up to lQ percent=
are attracted to an anti-Western posture.
The t)ut look
27. Whatever the outcome of the presidential
race, the preservation of a friendly US-Philippine
r-ei~.tionship will remain one of the bases of Philippine
policy, At the same time, however, since growing na-
tionalism is now an established trend, the new ad-
ministration will be highly sensitive to any indications
that Filipino interests are being subordinated to Chase
of the United States,
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28. Both ma,~or candidates have promised to attack
basic domestic socioeconomic? problems. The prospect
that such a program--long delayed and greatly needed--
will be instituted and pursued by either candidate
is uncertain. The chief obstacle will be continued
official preoccupation with politics. Without such a
program, nationalism and discontent are likely to
lend themselves to leftist exploitation.. This would
present increasing problems to the Philippine Govern-
ment in domestic administration and in the maintenance
of a strong pro-US and pro-West position.
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