OUTCOME OF INDIA-PAKISTAN WARFARE

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00472A000600020013-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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5
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 1, 2003
Sequence Number: 
13
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Publication Date: 
October 1, 1965
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IM
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Approve' 91472A000600020013-0 OCI No. 2388/65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 1 October 1965 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Outcome of India-Pakistan Warfare Summary 1,In finite military terms India won the September war with Pakistan. India seized the most territory and suffered less relative loss in manpower and materiel. Moreover, when the cease-fire occurred, India was in a much bet- ter position to continue the fighting. How- ever, the Indian performance against a much smaller adversary was quite uninspiring--the territory taken was inconsequential, actual military losses were greater than those of Pakistan, and the probable strategic objec- tives of Lahore and Sialkot were not achieved. 2. In the sense that the Indian posi- tion on Kashmir remains unchanged, Pakistan is the political loser as of now. However, Pakistan did achieve its tactical purpose of advertising the Kashmir question. Long- range political victory depends on a variety of unpredictable external military and po- litical pressures, Indeed, there is consider- able danger that the war may be resumed at any time, 0% w . ru , . Approved For elease 200311 06472A000600020013-0 S .1A -EUXUA SECRET Approve`do Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RD 9472A000600020013-0 Casualties and Gains* 3. Personnel losses on both sides in the re- cent conflict were relatively light, but in terms of over-all strength Pakistan's losses were the more severe. It is estimated that Pakistan suf- fered between 3,000 and 5,000 army personnel killed, wounded or captured, from a total army strength of some 189,000. Indian Army losses are assessed as between 4,000 and 6,000 killed, wounded, and captured, from a total strength of 942,0000 4m Pakistan is believed to have lost at least 250 tanks from an inventory of about 900, while Indian tank casualties are estimated to be up to 300 of a total of about 1,500. Air- craft losses on both sides cannot be assessed with any degree of confidence; it would appear that the Pakistani Air Force performed better than the Indian and suffered fewer losses. By the end of the fighting, however, Pakistani air and ground forces were suffering severe shortages of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts. 5m In territorial gains, India has the edge. India claims--probably accurately--to be in posses- sion of 320 square miles of Pakistani territory in the Punjab (the Sialkot and Lahore sectors), but a *Accurate assessment of casualties and gains is handicapped by the exclusion of Western observers from the battle area and a marked unwillingness on the part of the armed forces of both sides to con- tinue the normal flow of information to US military missions. Approved Fo DP7914W472A000600020013-0 further claim of some 150 square miles ofterritory.i- in Sind (east of Hyderabad) seems exaggerated. occupies about 190 square miles of Indian. ter- ritory in southern Kashmir (the Chhamb sector) and about 20 square miles in the Indian Punjab (around Khem Koran). In addition, it holds some posts across the boundary in the Indian state of Rajasthan (op- posite Sind). While these figures put India in the better position, they do not take into account the continued presence in Indian Kashmir of at least 3,000 Pakistani-backed infiltrators who began their intrusions across the cease-fire line in early August and who continue to constitute a major se- curity threat there. Political Considerations 6. in terms of political objectives gained, Pakistan has succeeded in its intent, after years of frustration, to focus international attention on the Kashmir problem. However, given India's con- tinued adamancy against negotiating or voting a change in the status of Kashmir, Pakistan appears to have fallen far short of its ultimate goal of removing Kashmir from Indian control. 7. In addition, there are increasing rumblings of discontent in Pakistan over the lack of real prog- ress toward wresting Kashmir from India. This dis- content is heightened by the fact that the govern- ment publicized the battles as a series of Pakistani victories, therefore making it difficult for the public mind to understand a government agreement to a cease-fire without having achieved the ultimate goal of Kashmir. There have also been signs of dis- illusionment in the army over the results of Presi- dent Ayub's policies. 8. In India, the popular mood at the moment is one of satisfaction at having established the superi- ority of Indian military might over the Pakistanis. The conflict is viewed as having redressed the poor Indian performance against the Chinese Communists in 1962 and against the Pakistanis in the Rann of Kutch episode earlier this year. Prime Minister Shastri's position has been strengthened, at least for the Approved For 9T00472A000600020013-0 25X1 Appro For Rele 9100472A000600020013-0 present, and the government's intransigence over the Kashmir issue reinforced. conclusion point g, Over-all, then, India seems at this p the recent conflict in the to have emerged from umerically superior better position. Given its ne sui ment forces and its wider range of militar sources, and reserve supplies from a variety it can more easily than Pakistan absorb its casual- ties and losses of equipment. India's larger area captured territory places it in a better bang in io n, and the morale of the Indian Govern - B posit The political ment and armed forces has risen. the verity,lict have yet full and economic repercussions of se to be felt in their possibility that they may be there is a distinct possibility further fighting if the current compounded by cease-fire violations escalate. Approved For Relea 25X1 25XApproved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000600020013-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000600020013-0