OUTCOME OF INDIA-PAKISTAN WARFARE
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CIA-RDP79T00472A000600020013-0
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 1, 2003
Sequence Number:
13
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Publication Date:
October 1, 1965
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OCI No. 2388/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
1 October 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Outcome of India-Pakistan Warfare
Summary
1,In finite military terms India won the
September war with Pakistan. India seized the
most territory and suffered less relative loss
in manpower and materiel. Moreover, when the
cease-fire occurred, India was in a much bet-
ter position to continue the fighting. How-
ever, the Indian performance against a much
smaller adversary was quite uninspiring--the
territory taken was inconsequential, actual
military losses were greater than those of
Pakistan, and the probable strategic objec-
tives of Lahore and Sialkot were not achieved.
2. In the sense that the Indian posi-
tion on Kashmir remains unchanged, Pakistan
is the political loser as of now. However,
Pakistan did achieve its tactical purpose of
advertising the Kashmir question. Long-
range political victory depends on a variety
of unpredictable external military and po-
litical pressures, Indeed, there is consider-
able danger that the war may be resumed at
any time,
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Casualties and Gains*
3. Personnel losses on both sides in the re-
cent conflict were relatively light, but in terms
of over-all strength Pakistan's losses were the
more severe. It is estimated that Pakistan suf-
fered between 3,000 and 5,000 army personnel
killed, wounded or captured, from a total army
strength of some 189,000. Indian Army losses
are assessed as between 4,000 and 6,000 killed,
wounded, and captured, from a total strength of
942,0000
4m Pakistan is believed to have lost at
least 250 tanks from an inventory of about 900,
while Indian tank casualties are estimated to
be up to 300 of a total of about 1,500. Air-
craft losses on both sides cannot be assessed
with any degree of confidence; it would appear that
the Pakistani Air Force performed better than the
Indian and suffered fewer losses. By the end of
the fighting, however, Pakistani air and ground
forces were suffering severe shortages of fuel,
ammunition, and spare parts.
5m In territorial gains, India has the edge.
India claims--probably accurately--to be in posses-
sion of 320 square miles of Pakistani territory in
the Punjab (the Sialkot and Lahore sectors), but a
*Accurate assessment of casualties and gains
is handicapped by the exclusion of Western observers
from the battle area and a marked unwillingness on
the part of the armed forces of both sides to con-
tinue the normal flow of information to US military
missions.
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further claim of some 150 square miles ofterritory.i-
in Sind (east of Hyderabad) seems exaggerated.
occupies about 190 square miles of Indian. ter-
ritory in southern Kashmir (the Chhamb sector) and
about 20 square miles in the Indian Punjab (around
Khem Koran). In addition, it holds some posts across
the boundary in the Indian state of Rajasthan (op-
posite Sind). While these figures put India in the
better position, they do not take into account the
continued presence in Indian Kashmir of at least
3,000 Pakistani-backed infiltrators who began their
intrusions across the cease-fire line in early
August and who continue to constitute a major se-
curity threat there.
Political Considerations
6. in terms of political objectives gained,
Pakistan has succeeded in its intent, after years
of frustration, to focus international attention on
the Kashmir problem. However, given India's con-
tinued adamancy against negotiating or voting a
change in the status of Kashmir, Pakistan appears
to have fallen far short of its ultimate goal of
removing Kashmir from Indian control.
7. In addition, there are increasing rumblings
of discontent in Pakistan over the lack of real prog-
ress toward wresting Kashmir from India. This dis-
content is heightened by the fact that the govern-
ment publicized the battles as a series of Pakistani
victories, therefore making it difficult for the
public mind to understand a government agreement to
a cease-fire without having achieved the ultimate
goal of Kashmir. There have also been signs of dis-
illusionment in the army over the results of Presi-
dent Ayub's policies.
8. In India, the popular mood at the moment is
one of satisfaction at having established the superi-
ority of Indian military might over the Pakistanis.
The conflict is viewed as having redressed the poor
Indian performance against the Chinese Communists in
1962 and against the Pakistanis in the Rann of Kutch
episode earlier this year. Prime Minister Shastri's
position has been strengthened, at least for the
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present, and the government's intransigence over
the Kashmir issue reinforced.
conclusion point
g, Over-all, then, India seems at this p
the recent conflict in the
to have emerged from umerically superior
better position. Given its ne sui ment
forces and its wider range of militar
sources,
and reserve supplies from a variety
it can more easily than Pakistan absorb its casual-
ties and losses of equipment. India's larger area captured territory places it in a better bang
in io n, and the morale of the Indian Govern -
B posit
The political ment and armed forces has risen.
the verity,lict have yet full and
economic repercussions of se
to be felt in their possibility that they may be
there is a distinct possibility
further fighting if the current
compounded by
cease-fire violations escalate.
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