SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000400050002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 2, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No. 1496/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
2 May 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Situation and Outlook in the Dominican Republic
1. Military Position
The rebel forces continue to dominate the mili-
tary situation and are apparently using the tenuous
cease fire to strengthen their positions. Numbering
between two and five thousand, they are concentrated
in the southeastern area of the city. The rebels ap-
pear to be well armed, adequately supplied and determined
to continue the fight.
2. Loyalist Forces
The loyalist forces are completely inadequate
even to police the cease fire. Most of the troops under
Brigadier General Wessin y Wessin, numbering about
1,250 men, have withdrawn to the east side of the Duarte
Bridge for their own safety. Brigadier General Salvador
Montas Guerrero with about 200 men has apparently aban-
doned the National Palace leaving the entire south-
eastern area under rebel control. Army Chief Rivera
Cuesta is commanding about 400 troops in the north-
western part of the city and 1,200 naval combat troops
are deployed around the fair grounds. Approximately
2,400 police are defending their headquarters and the
police radio station. There are no other loyalist
troops in the city.
3. US Forces
As of 0430 EDT US military forces in the
Dominican Republic totalled 7,874--including 2,955
Marines and 4,919 Army troops. Marine casualties are
two killed and 20 wounded; Army casualties are one
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killed, another probably killed and 16 wounded. A large
gap still remains between the 82nd Airborne and the
Marine phase line in the western part of the city. Many
of the Army casualties occurred early last night when
a patrol was sent from the Army beachhead at the Duarte
Bridge to the Marine phase line.
4. The Interior
Various reports show that the interior generally
remains calm and this may indicate a lack of sympathy for
the rebel cause. The longer the present situation exists,
however, the greater is the chance that the countryside
will grow more restive. A report via ham radio last
night from the US Consul in Santiago, the country's
second largest city, stated that while all communications
are out, conditions in the consular district are generally
good, with Dominican military and police units in effec-
tive control. The highway to Santiago remains closed
since rebels reportedly overran a police post at Villa
Altagracia yesterday.
5. General Political Situation
Neither the rebels nor the loyalists now appear
to have the ability or the means to form an effective
instrument of national political control. The rebels,
aside from their insistence that the "constitutionalist
forces" take over the government, are believed to be
thoroughly divided over how this should properly be
done and who should play what role. This fragmentation
serves only the purposes of the Communists and extremists
who now dominate the rebel movement. Another factor
favoring the Communists is an apparent lack of wide-
spread popular support for Bosch himself to return and
take over the government. yester-
day found more enthusiasm for "constitutionality" per se
than for Bosch during their talks with Dominicans 1n
Santo Domingo hospitals. In addition, the loyalist
force and its junta have no one in whom the public has
any confidence.
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6. Latin American Reactions
Reaction thus far has generally been fairly
restrained, except in the case of Castro's Cuba, but
an increasingly active role by US military forces now
present in the Dominican Republic would probably result
in an almost universal condemnation of the US and in a
flurry of violent attacks on US installations around the
hemisphere. Most informed Latin American officials at the
moment probably have little or no sympathy for the Commu-
nists and extremists whom they have learned are dominating
the Dominican rebel forces. By the same token, however,
neither do they have any sympathy for the military forces
such as General Wessin and other officers leading the
loyalist forces. Any sudden change for the better in
the loyalists' fortunes would be viewed with deep sus-
picion by most other Latin American countries.
7. Conclusions
(a) Neither of the contending forces in the
capital is now capable of imposing its will on the other.
The loyalists are weak, disorganized, and lack popular
support. The rebels, although strongly ribbed by well-
trained extremist leaders and in command of the most
populous parts of the capital, cannot significantly ex-
pand their position in the city as long as US troops
remain.
(b) The rebels probably have two immediate
goals: (1) to use the present lull to consolidate their
positions in the capital and to stimulare provincial
areas to declare for them; and (2) to insure themselves
a "large piece" of whatever arrangement the OAS authori-
ties are finally able to put together.
(c) As the present situation becomes more fixed,
we believe the status of the rebel forces will receive
increasing if grudging support from other Latin Americans.
Certainly the international repugnance to any effort to
"clean out" the rebel area will grow as each day passes.
This could, of course, be reversed if the rebels should
become aggressive and persistently violate the truce.
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