BALANCE OF FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000400030013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 12, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10 :
CIA-RDP79T00472A000400030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10 :
CIA-RDP79T00472A000400030013-1
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OCI No. 0936/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
12 March 1965
1. Official US estimates of the respective
strengths of the total South Vietnamese Government
and Viet Cong military establishments in South
Vietnam show a ratio less than 5:1 as contrasted
with the accepted ratio of at least 10:1 required
for a force to defeat guerrilla insurgency. The
ratio is even less favorable to the government,
using unofficial estimates which show Viet Cong
regular and irregular strength to be substantially
above the official figures. The real picture is
even grimmer, when other factors such as relative
strength per unit mission and deployment, command,
growth rate, and morale are taken into account.
These factors tend to offset the government's
superiority in terms of air power and artillery.
2. Government force strength on 15 Febru-
ary totaled 567,000 including 245,000 regulars.
MACV's latest Viet Cong Order of Battle holdings,
on 6 March 1965, show a confirmed strength of
37,000 in regular, identified units. MACV has
tentative evidence of as many as 43,000 Viet Cong
regulars, and ARVN J-2 holdings, considered
realistic by many US observers, put Viet Cong regu-
lar strength at between 50,000 and 60,000. In
addition, the Viet Cong are variously estimated
to have between 80,000 and 120,000 irregular forces.
3. Government force strength has been ex-
panded substantially since late 1961 when US as-
sistance was dramatically increased. Despite a
continued high desertion rate.government strength
has been rising monthly for about the past nine
months, after showing signs of serious attrition
in early 1964. Training and performance have also
improved.
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4. Viet Cong regular force strength has shown
a steady growth during the same period, and has
risen by more than a third since a year ago, accord-
ing to MACV's holdings. This sharp increase re-
sults in part from MACV's confirmation during the
year of units already in place in late 1963. There
is an average time lag of about 13 months between
the first reports of a new unit and its acceptance
for OB purposes. Some other units newly accepted
in MACV's latest OB holdings were formed largely
by infiltrators who entered during the first eight
months of 1964.
5. MACV's OB holdings are based on positive
unit identification by at least two Viet Cong
prisoners or two captured documents, and are con-
sidered extremely conservative. The current OB
includes five regimental headquarters, 50 battalions
(an increase of eight since a year ago), 145 separate
companies, and 35 separate platoons. (ARVN, by com-
parison,has a total of 214 battalions.) Taking into
account-the reports of still unconfirmed Viet Cong
battalions, actual contact in combat and ARVN's own
OB holdings at corps level, there may by now be
some 20 Viet Cong battalions in place in addition
to the 50 confirmed by MACV. A recent ARVN J-2
study uncovered at least 21,000 in-country Viet
Cong recruits during a four-month period from July
to November 1964. Projecting for the entire year,
there may have been more than 60,000 troops re-
cruited within South Vietnam in 1964, more than
enough to offset losses and--together with infil-
trated elements--to permit the creation of these
unconfirmed battalions.
6. Moreover, there is evidence of five or
six Viet Cong regimental headquarters in addition
to the five already confirmed. These include pos-
sibly two more in the northern provinces and three
or four south of Saigon where no regiments are yet
confirmed but where some regimental-type operations
have been encountered.
7. Since about mid-1963, there has been evidence
of a fleshing out of Viet Cong units. The average
strength of a Viet Cong regiment in the field is now
about 2,000 to 2,500 as compared with the average
strength of an ARVN regiment of about 1,000 to 1,500.
A Viet Cong battalion now averages about 600 to 800,
compared to an average ARVN battalion in the field of
about 300. Thus, on a unit for unit basis, ARVN is
often outmanned.
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8. A substantial number of Viet Cong regular
battalions, particularly those known or believed
assigned to regiments, appear to be equipped with
the new 7.62-mm, family of automatic and semi-
automatic weapons. If possession of these weapons
is now as widespread as feared, the Viet Cong would
have a firepower superiority over ARVN units, which
use primarily equipment of World War II design.
Use of new bloc equipment also suggests Viet Cong
confidence in an outside supply system, since
the ammunition is not available from in-country
capture. In any event, for nearly two years Viet
Cong battalions have appeared to hold adequate
firepower in terms of mortars and recoilless rifles;
mortar fire against a variety of government tar-
gets including hamlets is now frequent.
9. The growth in Viet Cong military capabilities,
in terms of both strength and combat potential, is
reflected in Viet Cong activities over the past
year. The number of Viet Cong - initiated incidents
in 1964 was about 60 percent higher than in 1963;
empahsis was on terrorist, harassing, and sabotage
activity, but the number of battalion size or
larger attacks doubled over 1963. Erosion of gov-
ernment control in the northern provinces, particu-
larly along the populated coastal areas, is giving
the VC increased access to manpower. This Communist
encroachment seems to be accelerating in 1965.
10. Throughout the northern provinces, gov-
ernment forces are now clearly on the defensive,
and in several provinces have virtually withdrawn
into the district and provincial capitals, thereby
largely abandoning the countryside to the Communists.
Viet Cong interdiction of both the north-south
coastal railroad and the main highway, Route 1, have
been increasingly successful in isolating the north.
Lateral roads in the north, running toward Laos
and northern Cambodia have been interdicted or sub-
ject to frequent harassment. Government pacifi-
cation efforts in many of the northern provinces
have been abandoned in order to concentrate on
defenses, and pacification throughout most of the
country is stalldd. Even the Hop Tac area around
Saigon is being affected, with one battalion al-
ready diverted elsewhere and one regiment still suf-
fering command changes in the aftermath of the latest
coup attempt.
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11. Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam are be-,
lieved capable of mounting up to ten regimental-size
attacks almost simultaneously. ARVN forces are
capable of meeting most of these attacks with a
regimental-size force, either from locally avail-
able forces or from the general reserve. Unfortu-
nately, because of the size and firepower of Viet
Cong units, ARVN is often unable to react with
sufficient forces to insure defeat of attacking
Viet.Cong forces. This has been demonstrated re-
peatedly in engagements during the past half year
in all four corps-areas.
12. The ARVN general reserve totals 11 marine
and airborne battalions, plus a possible five to
nine infantry battalions in the corps areas. How-
ever, these reserves are almost continually com-
mitted in one area or another. Their withdrawal
from one commitment and deployment to another re-
flects a condition of "robbing Peter to pay Paul."
13. The Viet Cong have virtually achieved a
balance of strategic forces. Although they have
far fewer battalions than ARVN, their manner of
deployment gives the greater flexibility. ARVN
has greater mobility in the sense of flexible de-
ployment (air transportation, etc.), but the Viet
Cong are able to achieve a kind of strategic
mobility by posing successive threats in widely
separated areas of the country, thus whipsawing
the ARVN general reserves.
14. Moreover, most ARVN battalions are now
committed either to security or pacification
operations and thus are not engaged with the Viet
Cong main force units. Neither the government's
Regional Forces nor Popular Forces have the capa-
bility to relieve ARVN on a full-time basis for
commitment against the Viet Cong regulars. Many
of these paramilitary units are already on static
security duties, and other lack the morale or
strength to move in and maintain security in an
area that has been cleared or is being held by
ARVN.
15. The Viet Cong, whether engaged in large-
scale attacks or smaller-scale harassment against
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government outposts, hamlets,a.nd communications,
are exercising the initiative. It is the Viet
Cong who normally fix the time and place of attack.
ARVN for the most part is merely reacting to Viet
Cong moves.
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