CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE JUNE 1964

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 11, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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11 January 1965
OCI No. 0746/65
'Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
SINCE JUNE 1964
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
GROUP
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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OCI No. 0746/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
11 January 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Cuban Subversion in Latin America
Since June 1964
1. recent
statements by Cuban leaders, leaves no doubt that
"export of the revolution" continues to be a key
policy of the Castro regime.
2. Nevertheless, several reverses for Castro-
supported groups and individuals in Latin America
during the last year, combined with a possible tac-
tical realignment of priorities in Havana, appear
to have led Fidel Castro to be less sanguine about
prospects for achieving any quick revolutionary
successes. The July OAS resolutions condemning
Cuba's past activities in Venezuela may also have
caused Havana to adopt a more cautious subversion
policy. In addition, the subsequent severance of
diplomatic relations with Havana by Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Chile deprived Cuba of three important
diplomatic posts which *could be used to facilitate
subversive activity in southern South America.
3. Confronted with such additional obstacles
to the promotion and spread of violent revolutionary
activity, the Cuban leadership seems to be focusing
its subversive efforts today largely on three coun-
tries--Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--where
guerrilla-terrorist organizations have been operat-
ing for some time. Castro probably does not have
much hope of full-scale revolution in the near
future even in these countries; he probably does
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regard them as the best bets over the longer run.
This does not mean that Cuba will cut out other
subversive efforts, but that it is now more likely
to concentrate on targets of opportunity in the
other Latin American countries.
4. Fidel Castro stated to a Western corres-
pondent in Havana in late October that the contin-
uance of the Cuban revolution depends on "other
Cubas" succeeding on the continent. Castro ex-
pressed this thought again in his public address
on 2 January in which he said that the US will ul-
timately be forced to come to terms with Cuba
when it has to deal also with "several" other
revolutionary regimes. On 30 November, Che Guevara
made the most militant public statement on the
"anti-imperialist struggle" in Latin America to
be delivered by a ranking Cuban official for some
months. He hailed what he called the growing
strength of the Latin American "liberation move-
ment," and called for greater efforts by the revo-
lutionaries in the hemisphere. Guevara made special
reference to the progress of the revolution in
Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia. On 13 December,
while in New York to address the UN General Assembly
session, Guevara said that "bullets not ballots"
will bring revolution to Latin America. He candidly
admitted that Cuba has helped the "freedom fighters"
of Venezuela "acquire military Iznowledge." He once
again singled out revolutionaries in Venezuela,
Guatemala, and Colombia for special praise.
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7. Providing guerrilla warfare training and
political indoctrination remains the majar form of
Cuban support for Latin American revolutionaries.
Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and other Cuban leaders
continue to proclaim that "Cuba's example" is the
most important "support" they give to Latin Ameri-
can revolutionaries. Havana also continues to give
relatively uodest sums of money to some Castroist
groups. Propaganda support from Cuban press and
radio media is still a major Cuban means for reach-
ing pro-Cuban groups on the continent.
the 3-ton Cuban arms cache found in Vene-
zuela in November 1963 clearly reveals Favana's
capability for giving material support to Latin
American revolutionaries.
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712i AVILI
9. In focusing on Venezuela, Havana is prob-
ably most encouraged by the well-established Commu-
nist-terrorist apparatus with which it can work.
the Vene-
zuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)
can draw upon some 1,800 supporters--several hun-
dred of whom are full-time activists--spread through-
out the country. The FALN is well-organized,
reasonably well-financed, and most importantly--in
Havana's eyes--willing to take action against the
Venezuelan Government. The FALN stepped up its
activity considerably beginning in late September,
although it has since had to curtail its urban
terrorist activity and concentrate on operations in
the countryside. Havana's propaganda support rose
accordingly, nearly reaching the level it achieved
in the autumn of 1963 when the FALN was making a
determined effort to bring down the administration
of former president Betancourt. Among Cuban gestures
in 1964 were: participation of Cuban officials in
the launching of a new "solidarity with Venezuela
committee"; launching of a new domestic radio pro-
gram specializing in reports on Venezuela; and an
islandwide "solidarity" celebration held from 14 to
22 November, which included the opening of an FALN
mission office in Havana, elaborate ceremonies,
speeches, and interviews with FALN leaders.
10.
Havana is basing its hopes for the struggle against
"imperialists" in Colombia on a relatively new or-
ganization, the Army of National Liberation (ELN).
The ELN is the clandestine terrorist arm of the
Colombian Liberal Revolutionary Youth Movement
(JMRL), and is called the country's "number one ter-
rorist group" by the US Embassy. Fabio Vasquez,
probably the most influential ELN leader and the
group's new chief of guerrilla activities, is be-
lieved to have returned to Colombia in late Novem-
ber after having gone to Cuba the previous month
seeking new funds. I
active guerrilla operations probably would begin
early in 1965 if Vasquez succeeded in obtaining
additional funds from Cuba. The ELN had previously
received US 825,000 from Havana,
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11. The ELN is said to be planning a two-
pronged guerrilla-terrorist operation, coordinat-
ing an urban campaign modeled after the familiar
tactics of the Venezuelan FALN with a program of
rural violence. On 7 January ELN guerrillas at-
tacked a small town in Santander state, where they
killed three police agents, robbed a local bank,
and herded the townspeople into the central plaza
for an anti-government, anti-US haranguing. After
the assault, the ELN band withdrew to the nearby
mountains. Meanwhile, Cuban propaganda media con-
tinue to emphasize Bogota's "brutal repression" of
the people of the "Independent Republic of Marque-
talia." Colombia's military has been engaged in
a prolonged operation against Communist bandits in
that department.
12. Primary advantages from the Cuban point
of view in the case of Guatemala are the existance
there of an active guerrilla movement led by Marco
Antonio Yon Sosa and the unsettled political situa-
tion in the country. Also potentially advantageous
are Cuba's geographical proximity to Central America
and the large Cuban diplomatic establishment in
neighboring Mexico. There is no doubt that Yon
Sosa's group receives inspiration and some money
from Havana, and that Fidel considers it the one
organization in Guatemala with the capability to
sustain violent revolutionary activity. The guer-
rillas operate over a fairly wide area in Guatemala
in small but highly mobile bands. They harass
military outposts, assassinate certain military of-
ficers or persons unpopular with the peasants, and
raid small businesses. There are increased indica-
tions of local support for the guerrillas among the
peasants of the area.
On 31 December, 5 terrorists
burned the US AID garage in Guatemala City, destroy-
ing it and 23 vehicles. This raid occurred less
than three weeks after Guatemalan authorities cap-
tured large amounts of terrorist equipment and,
they believed the headquarters complex of the sub-
versives in the capital. Yon Sosa's organization's
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militant propaganda organ, "Revolucion Socialista,"
is an unusually well-printed periodical for a clan-
destine insurgency group, and may actually be pro-
duced in Havana. It is distributed widely in various
parts of the country. This periodical is far su-
perior in layout and content to the official propa-
ganda published by the Guatemalan Communist party.
13. Former Guatemalan President Arbenz and
his ex-foreign minister and their families reside
in Havana, and are active in the propaganda effort
directed against the present Guatemalan Government.
There is strong indication that Cuban direction
and funds enter Guatemala from Mexico. It is also
likely that considerable cooperation exists between
insurgents in Guatemala and neighboring Honduras.
14.
Havana still is in contact with leaders of
the extremist wing of Peron's followers in Argen-
tina, with some of the Brazilian exiles in Uruguay,
with some of Panama's radical-nationalists and
Communists, and with a resurgent Eucadorean pro-
Communist youth group and perhaps the Ecuadorean
"hard-line" Communist followers of Rafael Echever-
ria. The Cubans' attitude toward these and other
revolutionary hopefuls in Latin America seems to
be: "We will give you support when you begin the
armed struggle." One of the most frustrating situa-
tions for the Cubans has been the inability of the
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Peru
to initiate anti-government activities. At one
time, the MIR had over 500 personnel who had re-
ceived training in guerrilla warfare or political
indoctrination in Cuba. Similarly, Cuba's apparent
lack of success in promoting a pro-Castro insurgency
effort in Bolivia probably is a disappointment.
15. In summary, Cuba appears to be concentrat-
ing its support of Latin American revolutionaries
on those who are willing to fight and have the best
prospects for success. Although Cuba's leaders are
much less confident than formerly about the quick
emergence of "new Cubas" in Latin America, there is
little reason to believe that Fidel Castro will
abandon the "revolutionary struggle." He may how-
ever, move cautiously in this regard for tactical
reasons.
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