(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 8, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

FORM o) LL (XIMPLaw 17
JAS' 196
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30 :
CIA-RDP79T00472A000~40yy//0~0110006-1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30 :
CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010006-1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010006-1
8 January 1965
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
INDONESIA VS. MALAYSIA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of ' Current Intelligence
_. SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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 25X1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010006-1 3x1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
S January 1965
Indonesia vs. Malaysia
the Indonesian confrontation of Ma-
laysia is entering a new and probably more danger-
ous phase. A deployment of Indonesian forces
along the Malaysian Borneo border will increase
the buildup there by March from about 5,000 to at
least 16,000 men.
Paralleling these developments
are Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations,
Sukarno's continuing and probably increased incli-
nation to cooperate with Communist China, and
domestic developments favoring the Communists. The
latter would probably reap still further gains from
escalated military activities against Malaysia.
2. The buildup in Borneo indicates that a
higher level of cross-border activity is probable;
there is the possibility of open if still unde-
clared warfare.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010006-1
4. The Indonesian buildup may be another in-
stance of the strategy of international "blackmail"
which Indonesia pursued during its campaign to take
over West Irian. If this is Sukarno's line, the
military buildup is intended to pressure Malaysia,
the UK and the US into suggesting new talks toward
a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia problem. The
Indonesians may well reason that, if the blackmail
fails, their troops would in any event be deployed
for actual military activity.
5. Chen I, the Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, visited Indo-
nesia from 27 November to 2 December. He held
what appears to have been wide-ranging conversa-
tions with Sukarno. Subandrio. and a few other top
officials, the
major topics were Afro-Asian affairs, Chou E-n--11
ai's
visit to Moscow, and the new Soviet leadership.
Malaysia was discussed, but we do not know what
prominence it had compared to the other topics.
The joint communique published at the end of the
visit promised that the Chinese would give "full
support" to Indonesia's struggle to "crush Malaysia."
6. Specific reports of Chinese support and
possible advice on the Malaysian issue are second-
hand and often fragmentary accounts of the discus-
sions.
Chen I opposed Indonesian military action in ma n-
land Malaysia for the present, but indicated agree-
ment with such action in Borneo, even to the point
of supporting Indonesian occupation of all or part
of Malaysian Borneo.
7. Indonesia's withdrawal from the United
Nations has been applauded by the Peiping People's
Daily. There is no indication that withdrawal
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010006-1 3x1
was prearranged with Peiping, although there is now
much after-the-fact speculation that this may have
been the case. Indonesia's withdrawal certainly
further removes Sukarno from moderate influences,
and will tend to enlarge the growing mutuality of
interests between the Indonesian and Chinese govern-
ments.
8. In relation to Malaysian confrontation,
Sukarno perhaps chose the dramatic withdrawal ges-
ture to show the world what it means to "cross
Indonesia" and to give expression to his contention
that the UN is a "tool of the old established forces."
Withdrawal also presumably enables Indonesia to avoid
answering charges before the Security Council. There
is still no firm information as to whether Sukarno's
announcement was the result of caprice or is part
of a calculated effort, in conjunction with the
military buildup in Borneo, to pressure the UK and
the US. 25X6
9. Domestically, the government is taking
action against individuals and-organizations in-
volved in the now banned anti-Communist "Sukar-
noist" movement. A reportedly imminent cabinet
reshuffle almost certainly will further assist
Communist interests. Escalation of the military
situation in Borneo would also play into Commu- -
nist hands. With Indonesians absorbed in an in-
tensified confrontation campaign, the Communists
could be expected to press for and probably achieve
an increased political role at both national and
local levels.
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9
DISTIBUTIONLIST
?
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CATEGORY B - ROUTINE
OCI Special Paper Notice No.
Isdonssis n. Na3aysia
Subject:
INTERNAL
1-5 DCI
4 DDCI
5 EXEC. DIR.
31,32 DD/NIPE
33 G. COUNS,
34 1. G.
35,36 DD/S&T
37 DD/S&T
38-44 DDP
25X1 45 DIR/BPAM
46,47 ONE
48 ONE Reading Room
49,50 AD/RR (CSS)
51 AD/SI
52 AD/CR (SR/OCR)
53',54 DIR/NPIC (LS/PID)
55,56 'DDI/CGS
57 DDI/CGS (NMCC)
EXTERNAL
THE WHITE MOUSE
ova"
Smith
17-19 PICL
20-28 SIDO
29,30 INDICO
DDI/RS
DDI
SA%
CD/West
CS/Pres
MCO
ADMIN (VM)
CA/SSB
CA/West
CA/AA
Orig Div.
Orig. Br.
DO/CI
tow
Asst. for Afr. Affs
Inter-Am R-44&n Afto -1
O-IN-C WH
High Point for:
James G. Chandler) -1
BUDGET
25X1 Capron
Amory
6-65
Date 8 Jam *ry 1965
6-10 DDI
11 AD/NE
12-16 AD/CI
-2 58
-1 59
-1 60
-2 61
-1 62-64
-7 65
11 66
-2 67., 68
-1 69,70
-2 71, ?,2
-1 73,74
-1 75,76
-2 77
-2
-1
European Affs,
FE Affs.
NE & f s .
Org.Affs. -1
on. Affs. -1
AID
Chiefs and Distribution Points)
-5
g,. hoc S1.a
4" 1 "to
NON=USIB (Intelligence
ACSI, DA
Special Instructions:
State Codeword) -5
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DIA (Codeword)
Chiefs and Distribution
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Distribution authorized by
USIA
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ACDA
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To be released IM OE
LJ^ I
No. copies 185
.SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010006-1
' 9 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
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