CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN JAPAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 8, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30:
CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010005-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30:
CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010005-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010005-2
111 LI.E4 UsICE.,
OCI No. 2866/?5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
8 January 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Current Political Situation in Japan
1. Prime Minister Sato heads a moderate, pro-
Western government which is securely in power. The
Liberal Democrats--a conservative party--enjoy about
a two to one majority in the lower, more powerful,
house of the Diet and an even greater preponderance
in the upper house. The economic strength of the
country is encouraging its leaders to make Japan
more influential in world affairs. At present, Sato
sees Japan's role as one of cooperation with the US
in maintaining the Western security position in East
Asia.
2. The principal opposition, the doctrinaire
Marxist Japan Socialist Party, is still far from
power. Demographic trends have contributed to a
long?term increase in its popular vote, but the rate
of this increase fell off in the last general elec-
tion in November 1963. The next legislative elec-
tions are those for the upper house in June. The
Socialists and their left-wing allies are capable of
challenging the government by organizing street demon-
strations like those that overthrew the Kishi govern-
ment in 1960. Since 1960, however, they have lacked
issues and failed in their recent attempt to arouse
popular opposition to the visit of a US nuclear-
powered submarine,
3. The Japan Communist Party is increasing its
membership, but it remains a minor political force.
The JCP supports Peiping. A splinter pro-Moscow
element is still less effective.
4. Sato's agreement to continue the policies
of the Ikeda government and retain the Ikeda cabinet
as the price of his succession has kept the political
Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010005-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010005-2
aritaltEi
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pot quiet. Sato made no basic policy decisions be-
fore his visit to Washington, but there are indica-
tions that on his return he will move to assert a
more activist "Sato line." Because he will wish to
retain the broad support from Ikeda's coalition of
factions in the LDP, however, Sato is unlikely to
undertake controversial policies that might encourage
the key factional leaders to gang up on him. Domes-
tic areas in which Sato is interested include strength-
ening defense, tightening up security measures, and
curbing inflationary trends in the economy.
5. Relations with China--both "Chinas"--is
probably the most important foreign policy issue in
domestic politics. Takeo Miki, LDP Secretary Gen-
eral, has made himself the chief exponent in Sato's
entourage of a "flexible" policy toward Peiping,
which can satisfy the many elements in Japanese so-
ciety who clamor for some rapprochement with Com-
munist China. Sato may not personally sympathize,
but as an astute politician he will try to preserve
at least Ikeda's "forward-looking" posture on in-
creasing trade and cultural contacts, and perhaps
move on toward some form of political liaison with
Peiping.
6. It is important for Sato politically to
project an image of flexibility toward Peiping, par-
ticularly if his Washington visit strengthens the
popular impression that he is America's "best friend"
in the LDP. He has to be careful not to become
vulnerable to any charge of selling out Japanese in-
terests, especially now that Japan's economic strides
and growing self-confidence are being reflected in a
renascent nationalism. As an early and consistent
exponent of a more independent role in the world, "a
scion of the Samurai of western Japan," Sato must
assert Japan's national interests in every quarter.
-2-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010005-2