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CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5
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RIPPUB
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S
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44
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November 16, 2016
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March 10, 2000
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1
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Publication Date: 
October 4, 1965
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LETTER
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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 version for the feel sight i '.. *a ra a taa of a dec i meant memorandum the Natter at outb. Yiatuan for batever use you 1 t h WO b i. fidbjoc, coat. have to aaa ar qi the f and the p` Mae an may from Cores, a r in th. light of policy d 1 v*r to whomever you f d ignate forward. carry the project arty , of it to the bUUC Information vem$ t th* *ec zr cy of the n defend tba j eta made, on I would suggest that t draft ,xcltrad fr '7 Ia'taltati d e ';.ii2n Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 O/DDI : pwh: 3? Sept 65 Distribution: Grig & I - Addressee w/encls. I - DDCI w/encl. I -- DDP w/encl. I - SAVA w/encl, I --' D/OCI w/encl. 25X1A I * IMF/C/Fl w/encl. 1 -- O/DDI Chrono w/o encl. I - Exec Staff Chrono w/o encl. 1 .- O/DDI Policy Dissem file w/enc . Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved F6 Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP 00472A000300030001-& 22 September 1965 MEMORANDUM: THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) is ostensibly a democratic and independent organi- zation. In reality, it was established by and receives its over-all guidance from North Vietnam. The NFLSV provides the Communists with a banner under which all facets of in- surgent political and military activity in the South are organ- ized. The Front is also designed to provide an alternative to the Government of South Vietnam. The Communists have set out in the Front's name a program of broad political and economic objectives which can be accepted by the ma- jority of people in the South. A phalanx of affiliated front organizations has also been created to give the impression that the NFLSV embodies every significant social, ethnic, religious, and professional group. The top public posts in the NFLSV were studded with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese, most of whom are crypto-Communists. Behind these men are the hard- core Communist leaders in the South who are members of the "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP)--the southern branch of the Communist party in North Vietnam. The evi- dence indicates that PRP committees exist down to the hamlet level in insurgent-controlled areas. With the inten- sification of the war in the past few months, the PRP has begun to take a more open role in directing NFLSV affairs. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved F6.Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP'00472A000300030001-5 NFLSV committees have also been established down to the hamlet level throughout most of the insurgent-held area. These committees, controlled by the local Commu- nists, often exercise a wide variety of governmental-type functions, including the collection of taxes and the organi- zation of the local economy. Even in the areas held firmly by the rebels, however, the NF LSV has failed to pick up an independent following of any size, and its authority is based mainly on insurgent coercion. The Front has also been un- able to attract any significant support from any of the politi- cally influential groups, such as the Buddhists and the labor unions, outside the Communist-held sectors. On the international scene, aided and abetted by the DRV, Liberation Front efforts to publicize the activities and pro- gram of the insurgents have steadily expanded since the first permanent NFLSV office was opened abroad in 1962. There are now seven permanent Front missions abroad, several of them in Free World countries. During the past few months, the Vietnamese Communists have waged an in- creasingly vigorous campaign to gain Free World acceptance of the NFLSV as the "legitimate representative" of the South Vietnamese people. This campaign has involved a broaden- ing of Communist claims on the extent of Front control in South Vietnam, and a further open assumption of govern- ment trappings by the NFLSV. So far, the Communists have stopped short of declaring the formation of a provisional Front government at the national level in South Vietnam. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved FdwRelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP7"W00472A000300030001-5 THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM C O N T E N T S SUMMARY Page The Formation of the Front 1 The Manifesto's Ten Points. 2 Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts 3 (Organization Chart and Selected Photographs) The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) 7 PRP Rationale 8 Hanoi and the Liberation Front 10 NFLSV-Affiliflted Organizations 11 The f'ront's Grass-Roots Structure 12 Front Propaganda Machinery 15 NFLSV Program Abroad 16 Recognition strategy 19 Additional NFLSV Goals 20 Forming a Provisional Government 21 STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fdrtelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP00472A000300030001-5 The Formation of the Front 1. The Ho Chi Minh - led Communists in Indo- china have persistently operated under the cover of a large "front" movement. While resisting the Jap- anese during World War II, Ho and his comrades functioned behind the facade of the old Viet Minh league. In 1946, they formed the Lien Viet, or Vietnam United Front, to conceal Communist direc- tion of the war against France. When the struggle shifted to South Vietnam following the Geneva agree- ments of 1954, the North Vietnamese organized the Vietnam Fatherland Front to garner support for "re- unification" with the South. 2. This organization, headquartered in North Vietnam, had little success in luring public backing in the South. In late 1958, Hanoi apparently began to plan to revitalize its Front apparatus in South Vietnam. Viet Cong documents captured in that period disclosed the Communists' chagrin at their failure to win a significant following in the South. These documents also indicated that the Viet Cong fully appreciated the importance of winning popular favor if their rebellion was to have any chance of eventual success. 3. The theory underlying the Communist front movement in Vietnam has been to establish very broad, general objectives which can be accepted by the ma- jority of people, and then to enlist support from every section of the population in an all-embracing political organization. If properly carried out, "all the people" will unite in one organization against the "enemy"--in this case the Saigon gov- ernment. This theory is implicit in the treatise on revolution in Vietnam, People's War, People's Army, written by the North Vietnamese minTsTer of ce ense in 1961. 4. By September 1960, Hanoi had apparently com- pleted its general plans for a new and widely based front organization, ostensibly indigenous to the South. At a North Vietnamese party congress in September, Le Duan, the party firtt secretary, called for the crea- tion of a "broad united front" in the South which would have the long-range goal of establishing a "national democratic coalition government." Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fa&Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP00472A000300030001-5 5. The abortive coup against the Saigon regime in November 1960 provided the final impetus for the formation of the Front. The insurgents announced the establishment of the "National Front for the Libera- tion of South Vietnam" on 20 December. In order to sustain the fiction that the NFLSV was the product of an indigenous band of patriots in the South, Hanoi itself gave no publicity to the new organization until January 1961. 6. The Front's manifesto was first aired in a Hanoi radiobroadcast on 29 January 1961--a procedure which itself testified to North Vietnam's guiding role in the formation of the organization. When broadcast again from Hanoi on 11 February, the mani- festo contained several significant changes. These changes eliminated material the DRV, on second thought, apparently believed would tend to undercut potential support for the Front in South Vietnam. Some passages which suggested Communist origin or ambitions were altered or deleted. The term "agrarian reform," for example, was dropped. Vicious and bloody excesses had been carried out under this slogan in North Vietnam, and had caused widespread revulsion in the South. The Manifesto's Ten Points 7. In its final version, the manifesto bore a remarkable similarity to Le Duan's speech before the party congress in Hanoi, even using his words to describe some of the Front's aims. Outlining a ten- point program, the document declared that the Front's most immediate task was to overthrow the Saigon gov- ernment, implicitly through armed revolution. When this was achieved, the Front would form a "broad national democratic coalition administration" to "ne- gotiate" with North Vietnam on "reunification." These and other goals of the Front, such as the adop- tion of a foreign policy of "peace and neutrality," and the redistribution of land in the South were iden- tical with the actions long advocated for South Viet- nam in Hanoi propaganda broadcasts. The goals were phrased in such a manner, however, that the politically inexperienced masses in the South would understand them to mean little more than the replacement of the current Saigon government by a more "representative, humane" administration. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fotelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP700472A000300030001-5 8. The manifesto contained several highly gen- eralized statements on the necessity for social and economic reforms. These were designed to appeal to many of the politically and socially dissatisfied elements in the South. Such words as democracy, so- cial justice, full employment, higher wages, and lower rents, were liberally used. A general amnesty to all political prisoners of the Saigon government was prom- ised. The document also played on Vietnamese senti- ments of nationalism, calling for the elimination of foreign cultural influences and a return to Vietnamese traditions. 9. Partly because the Front manifesto concen- trated on the political aims of the insurgency, and also because early Front propaganda primarily stressed the political activities of the NFLSV, the impression was created that Hanoi intended the new organization to serve mainly as the "political arm" of the Viet Cong. In fact, however, Hanoi intended that the NFLSV provide a facade covering all facets of Viet Cong ac- tivity in South Vietnam, military as well as politi- cal. Shortly after the Front's formation, for example, it was publicly announced that all the insurgent forces had been organized into the "Liberation Army of South Vietnam" under the leadership of the NFLSV. Today, the Communists attempt to carry out as much insurgent. activity as possible in the name of the Front, whether it is a military directive for an attack on a govern- ment post, a propaganda harangue at gunpoint in a vil- lage compound, or an official public statement on policy. Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts 10. In order to support the assertions in the Front manifesto that the NFLSV was a broadly based organization embracing many shades of popular opposi- tion to the Saigon government, the Vietnamese Commu- nists studded the announced leadership of the Front with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese who could not be positively identified as card-carrying Communists. These men were to run the day-to-day activities of the Front's public administrative ap- paratus, while remaining fully pliable to hard-core Communist direction in the background. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fd Release 2000/05/12 CIA-RDPI 00472A000300030001-5 NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM SECOND PARTY CONGRESS Held in January 1964 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PRESIDIUM (Elected January 1964) Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho Vice Chairmen Huynh Tan Phat Phung Van Cung Vo Chi Cong Y Binh Aleo Thom Me The Nhem Tran Nam Trung Thich Thien Hao Pham Xuan Thai Tran Buu Kiem Tran Bach Dang Nguyen Van Ngoi Nguyen Thi Dinh Nguyen Huu Tho SECRETARIAT Secretary General Huynh Tan Phat Assistant Secretaries Le Van Huan Ho Thu Members Ung Ngoc Ky Ho Xuan Son CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENTS MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE Director: Tran Nam Trung Nguyen Huu Tho Nguyen Ngoc Thuong Tran Huu Trang Thich Thien Hoa Le Thanh Nam Nguyen Thi Binh Huynh Van Tam Ma Thi Chu (Mrs.) Nguyen Van Tien Nguyen Van Hieu Dang Tran Thi Le Thi Rieng Huynh Cuong Tran Bach Dang Tran Buu Kiem Vu Tung Nguyen Thi Dinh Rochom Briu Huynh Bai Vo Dong Giang Lam Tri Chanh Vo Van Mon Duong Truong Thanh Huy Son Le Van Tha Nguyen Hoc Pham Xuan Thai Tran Van Thanh Mai Van Ti Nguyen Ngoc Thuong Nguyen Van Ti Hung Tu Pham Xuan Vy Nguyen Thi Nguyen Van Ngoi REGIONAL aIQANIZATION SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH ZONE CENTRAL COMMITTEE Chairman: Huynh Tan Phat EASTERN REGION ZONE CENTRAL COMMITTEE Chairman: Nguyen Thanh Long WESTERN REGION ZONE CENTRAL COMMITTEE Chairman: Duong Van Vinh CENTRAL REGION ZONE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INFORMATION, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE Chairman: Tran Buu Kiem ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE COMMISSION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH Commissioner: Phung Van Cung REPRESENTATION Algeria Huynh Van Tam Cuba Hoang Bich Son East Germany Duong Dinh Than Indonesia Le Quang Chanh USSR Dong- Quang Minh Communist Tran Van Thanh China Nguyen Minh Phuong Czechoslovakia Nguyen Van Hieu Nguyen Van Tien ig Head) UAR (Permanent Rep, to Afro-Asian People's Solidarity organization) 48076 7-65 UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fd 'Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP- r00472A000300030001-5 . 11. The objective was to give the Front the ap- pearance of broad representation among workers, reli- gious orders, soldiers, farmers, and intellectuals in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong also attempted to select persons who would add prestige to the NFLSV and who would be capable of winning active public support. Reports of the organization of bodies af- filiated with the Front suggest that the Communists always made sure that at least the secretary of the committee was a Communist. 12. It appears that the Communists had a good deal of difficulty in securing enough of the right type of personnel for all of the top public posts in the Front. Although the first NFLSV central com- mittee announced in March 1962 reserved placed for 52 members, it contained only 31 names, most of them unknowns even in South Vietnam. NFLSV propaganda claimed that the meeting at which the central com- the was elected was "truly representative fewer than mittee people" and heavily attended. Actually, 200 people participated. 13. The second central committee, announced in January 1964, had only 41 members. Of the original 31 placed on the first committee, only about half retained their posts, suggesting that a number of the original appointees proved incapable of fulfill- ing their duties. Despite Hanoi's wish to conceal the real Communist domination of the Front, the Communist associations of those chosen to fill the top public posts in.the NFLSV stand out clearly. 14. Most of the top NFLSV leaders are known to have long histories of cooperation with Ho Chi Minh's old Viet Minh league. The chairman of the central committee, Nguyen Huu Tho, is a lawyer who has been involved in pro-Communist political agitation in Vietnam since 1947. Tho acts as the major public spokesman for the NFLSV. Although Tho claims in public to be a "socialist," and to represent an af- filiated socialist party in the Front, he is clearly a crypto-Communist. 15. Nguyen Van Hieu, the first secretary general of the Front central committee, was a leftist journal- ist who had spent most of his career propagandizing in favor of the Communists and North Vietnam. In 1963, Hieu relinquished the post of secretary general Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fo Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 THE LIBERATION FRONT SPOKESMEN Nguyen Huu Tho Chairman Huynh Tan Phat Secretary General Nguyen Van Hieu A Leading Official Abroad Phung Van Cung A Leading NFLSV Propagandist Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fditelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP7'7f00472A000300030001-5 and went to Prague to direct some of the Front's for- eign activities. Hieu's eventual successor as secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, has apparently been under North Vietnamese tutelege since he took his "democratic" party into the Viet Minh fold in the early 1950s. Phung Van Cung, who heads up both the Front Red Cross and the Front Peace Committee, is also a former Viet Minh. Another top public leader of the NFLSV is Tran Buu Khiem, who heads. the Front's Foreign Affairs Commis- sion. He is reported to have been one of the organ- izers of the Viet Cong military effort and a former chief of security for the Communist organization in South Vietnam. The People's Revolutionary Party 16. Behind the publicly acknowledged leaders of the NFLSV, there is another, clandestine, group of professional revolutionaries, most of whom are ap- parently fullfledged members of the Lao Dong Party, the name taken by the North Vietnamese Communists. They also belong to, and are the leaders in, the so- called "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP), the southern component of the Communist party in the.DRV. This southern branch was apparently organized in late 1961, about a year after the formation of the NFLSV. Its founding was announced publicly by a Liberation Front spokesman in January 1962. Although the an- nouncement admitted the PRP's lineal descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party, it was phrased so as to give the impression that the deci- sion to organize the PRP was taken by the Communists in South Vietnam. 17. The fact that the PRP and the Lao Dong Party are identical was revealed in a secret Lao Dong cen- tral committee resolution of November 1961: First of all, it must be clearly understood that this is only a name change. Although the overt name is different from what it is in North Vietnam, nevertheless, secretly... the party segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong party under the lead- ership of the party central committee, headed by Chairman Ho...except for the name, there is no change whatever. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Felease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP00472A000300030001-5 18. ALL of the hard-core Communist leaders in the South are shadowy figures, but several have be- come known from the interrogation reports of defectors. and captured Viet Cong. Hanoi inadvertently revealed in 1960 that some members of the DRV party central committee were operating in South Vietnam. 19. One Muoi Cue was among those listed. 'Muoi Cue, or Nguyen Van Cue as he is also known, now is reputed 'to be the top Communist military-political leader in the South, and is said to run the over-all Communist headquarters, the so-called Central Office for South Vietnam. He was the Viet Minh political commissar for the Saigon area during the war against France, and is a southerner by birth. He is reported to have been a Communist for more than 20 years. 20. The major military and political posts in the northern half of Mouth Vietnam--called Military Region V by the Communists--are believed to be un- der the Command of Major General Nguyen Don. It is not unusual to find the same man overseeing both the military and political program of the Vietnamese Communists, particularly in a war situation. Don was the commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division in 1961, but by 1962 he was operating in the South. There are a number.of other mysterious -figures, known. only by their names, who hold top posts in the insurgent command structure in the South. One, a Major General Hoang Khiet, has ap- peared in the DRV to talk to soldiers being trained for infiltration into South Vietnam. PRP Rationale 21. The organization of the PRP furthered Hanoi's efforts to depict the insurgency in the South as an indigenous patriotic movement. It also permitted the Communists to gain an open and readily explicable voice in the NFLSV. Front conferences attended by affiliated non-Communist organizations in the Front, for example, could be more easily manipulated through the use of the FRP operating openly at the meetings. 22. The connection of the PRP with the Front was explained in carefully phrased terms in the original NFLSV announcement of the PRP's formation. The impression was given that the PRP was to form -8- Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Felease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP00472A000300030001-5 only a constituent element, of the NFLSV with a voice equal, but certainly not superior, to the non-Communist groups active in the Front. In its own initial statement, the PRP was more candid, term- ing itself the "vanguard" of the insurgency. The statement also placed the PRP first when calling on members to "carry out the program of the party and the program of action" of the NFLSV. 23. During the first two years of its existence, the PRP was given only a very small amount of public- ity in both DRV and insurgent propaganda. Recently, however, Front propaganda has been less discreet. in concealing the influence of the PRP in directing the NFLSV. Why the Communists are now less con- cerned with masking their guiding role in the Front is not really clear. They have also, however, been more candid during the last four months in alluding to the existence of bloc material support for the insurgency, and to the true nature of the DRV's backing. 24. Recently, Vietnamese Communist propaganda has publicized the speeches of PRP officials before NFLSV military conferences. The contents of PRP journals have also been disseminated over the Front's radio. PRP statements which clearly reveal Com- munist-type domestic objectives and programs for the revolution in South Vietnam are beginning to be publicized on a limited scale. On 25 April, the Front radiobroadcast PRP plans for a future gov- ernment in South Vietnam in which the party admitted that it was not feasible to rely on coups d'etat to create a "genuinely revolutionary government" or a "worker peasant alliance led by a working class." The Communist Party would lead the future govern- ment, which would be a "people's democracy" with the participation of four Communist-style "revolu- tionary classes" (workers, peasants, and petty and national bourgeoisie). The Front also reorganized its.movement for workers in April, renaming it in typical Communist terminology the. "Liberation Trade Union," and placing it under the direct leadership of the PRP. The announced purpose of the reorganiza- tion was to "reshape the working class into a more revolutionary vanguard." 25. The evidence indicates that the PRP organiza- tional structure is a duplicate, in so far as pos- sible, of the North Vietnamese party. Committees of the PRP exist at the regional and provincial levels, and where possible at the district, village, and hamlet levels. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved F1cle ?ppO lgat iW B tOO472A000300030001-5 26. The North Vietnamese Communist Party and government have carefully avoided establishing any direct, public organizational ties with the National Liberation Front. Close links clearly exist, however, and DRV directives can be quickly implemented. Hanoi's control over the Front is organizationally maintained through the Communist leaders in South Vietnam to whom the DRV issues over-all guidance and instructions. The evidence indicates that these instructions are channeled through special departments of the North Vietnamese Central Committee tasked with the direction of the insurgency in the South. One of these is the Reunification Department of the Central Committee, which is headed by Major General Nguyen Van Vinh. Vinh also heads the Reunifi- cation Commission of the DRV Council of Ministers. The North Vietnamese Army high command, more- over, is tightly integrated into the DRV hier- archy which directs-the insurgency in the South. 27. The Front does not, publicly at least, maintain an office or permanent representative in Hanoi as it does in many other bloc capitals. When the activities of Front delegations in the DRV are publicized, the delegations are carefully linked officially with the DRV's own mass front organ, the Fatherland Front, and not with the DRV Government or party. This facade, of course, is designed to add substance to Communist claims that the insurgents are completely self-propelled revolutionaries. 28, Unofficially, Hanoi has adequate op- portunity for close liaison with the top pub- lic leaders in the Front. Some of these indi- viduals apparently visit the DRV frequently, traveling via Cambodian or Chinese transportation routes into North Vietnam. Moreover, DRV and Front delegations frequently travel together on tours abroad, with the NFLSV representatives usually using DRV passports. 29. Occasionally, DRV and Liberation Front propaganda differ somewhat in their treatment of developments related to Vietnam. These differ- ences do not appear to indicate significant policy fissures between the DRV and the insurgents in the South. They apparently stem mainly from the tactical considerations facing the two groups, and do not relate to their accord on over-all ob- jectives. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fbr-'Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP 00472A000300030001-5 30. An example of the propaganda differences can be seen in the treatment by Hanoi and the NFLSV of the question of foreign "volunteers" to assist the insurgent fighting forces. The Front, t, the since is in the van of the fighting, has in threatening to call in "volunteers" from the DRV and elsewhere. The threats are hopefully intended both to deter massive US involvement in Vietnam, and to bolster the morale of the insurgents by promises of outside assistance to match any all- out participation in combat by US troops. 31. Hanoi has rebroadcast the Front threats and has held rallies at which elements of the DRV populace pledged their willingness to volunteer. On the whole, however, Hanoi has .been restrained in its treatment of the subject. It appears that the DRV's careful handling of the question is partly designed to avoid adding any unnecessary fuel to charges by Washington and Saigon that North Vietnam is the real fountainhead of the insurgency. same time, by rebroadcasting the threats, and by indicating over-all approval of the NFLSV policy statements, Hanoi manages to get across the impres- sion that it will respond when and if it judges the time ripe for an open move to South Vietnam by out- side personnel. Meanwhile, one indication of the over-all coordination between Hanoi and the insur- gents is the continuing clandestine infiltration of personnel from North to South Vietnam. Several thousand reportedly have come in already in 1965, running the total during the last four years to more than 40,000. NFLSV-Affiliated Organizations 32. In addition to acquiring the proper person- nel to fill the top offices in the Front, the Com- munists have expended considerable effort in flesh- ing out the NFLSV with a phalanx of affiliated "lib- eration" organizations. These groups have been added to give the impression that the Front is representa- tive of every significant social, ethnic, religious, and professional group in South Vietnam. The com- plexity of this task was mitigated by the fact that the Communists already had experience in conducting a similar operation during the war against the French. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved For Reuse 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T02A000300030001-5 33. In the first several months after the forma- tion of the NFLSV, associations specifically for farmers, students, women, youth, and urban workers were set up. Many others have been added since that time. By early August 1964, the Front had publicized the operation of some twenty affiliated bodies. The top echelons of most of these groups appear to be maintained with very small staffs, if any at all. The Communists have put more effort into the organiza- tion of active farmer, women, and youth groups of the Front at the local levels in South Vietnam, where advantage could be more effectively taken of the natural inclinations and aspirations of these ele- ments of society. 34. Where possible, the affiliated organiza- tions of the NFLSV have been tied in with correspond- ing international Communist front organizations. This gives them an international character, stimulates publicity about them, and makes them appear far more important than they actually are. 35. Two "political parties" in addition to the PRP have also been attached to the Front as constit- uent bodies. They are the so-called Radical Social- ist Party and the Democratic Party. It is interest- ing to note that the only two political parties per- mitted to exist in North Vietnam, aside from the Com- munist Party, bear almost identical names to those in the South. In the North, they supply a facade of democracy to the political process in the country, and operate in such a manner as to attract support from the intellectual and "bourgeois" classes. They have the same function in the South. Similar groups existed in the Communist front during the war against the French, and it is probable that some of their mem- bers were ordered by Hanoi to remain in the South after the 1954 war settlement. The Front's Grass-Roots Structure 36. Efforts to develop the NFLSV at the local level in South Vietnam began shortly after the Front was established.. A captured Communist document is- sued in March 1961 urged the immediate organization of full NFLSV committees in villages and towns. It was apparent that the Vietnamese Communists intended to follow the pattern already established in North Vietnam, where general committees of Hanoi's Father- land Front exist alongside Communist party committees -12- Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved FcP1elease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP 00472A000300030001-5 down to the local level. The available evidence in- dicates that regular NFLSV committees now have been formed at these levels throughout most of the Viet Cong - controlled area where, according to the most reliable statistics available, approximately 20-25 percent of the rural population resides. 37. To assure broad representation on these com- mittees, the number of card-carrying Communists, ac- cording to captured documents, is limited to two fifths of the total membership. In one village, which has been controlled by the insurgents for more than two years, the NFLSV committee is composed of repre- sentatives of all classes and organizations existing in the village. There is a representative for the landowners, one for the farmers, one for the women, and representatives for other groups. In this vil- lage, the secretary of the Front committee represents the local PRP element, since he is also a member of the village PRP committee. The PRP chapter receives its orders from the higher district party committee. These orders are passed to the village Front commit- tee, which is responsible for carrying out the orders. 38. It appears that the regular Front committees in Communist-controlled areas exercise a wide variety of functions. They are the body used by the Commu- nists insofar as possible to collect taxes, con- script manpower for military and economic services, organize the local economy, and to run rudimentary schools, hospitals, and courts. The Front committees provide an organization with a potential for winning the voluntary support of the population by various activities of a welfare or civic-action nature. Work- ing through the Front, the Communists try to show that the insurgency is a more efficient, honest, and humane administration than is the Saigon regime. 39. At the grassroots level in the Communist- controlled areas, the insurgents appear to be follow- ing much the same strategy with the NFLSV as they did with the local "administrative-resistance" councils set up by the Viet Minh in rebel-held territory dur- ing the war against the French. Captured Viet Minh documents frequently dealt with programs carried out under the authority of the councils to raise the liv- ing standards. Such documents often contained sta- tistics on the establishment of schools, numbers of children and adults in school, medical dispensaries, sanitation efforts, and other civic responsibilities. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fdielease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP M00472A000300030001-5 40. In the rebel-dominated areas, there appeared to be an initial surge to participate in the NFLSV as a reincarnation of the former Viet Minh. The Front thus picked up former Viet Minh, activists and recipients of land redistributed by the Viet Minh. This surge appears to have been short-lived, how- ever. For one thing, informants and Viet Cong prisoners indicate that early attempts to force "middle-class" peasants to give land to the poor were too harsh and resulted in a considerable loss of popularity for the NFLSV. The subsequent growth in influence of local Front organizations appears to have been largely the result of rural passivity, combined with the growing threat from the expanding insurgent military arm. 41. Because it lacked attractiveness, the grass- roots structure of the NFLSV appears to have required greater direct Communist control than originally ex- pected. A captured TOP SECRET PRP document directed the use of the NFLSV during 1965 to "positively implement the party's policy" in the countryside. In some villages in the insurgent-controlled areas, the PAP unit has had to engage openly in such activi- ties as the collection of taxes, and the organiza- tion of the local economy. 42. Outside the areas held firmly by the rebels, NFLSV activity varies in intensity and effectiveness. It is most intense in those rural regions where ir- regular insurgent bands and sympathizers are able to operate almost at will, and where there is often little in the way of effective governmental machinery answerable to Saigon. Organization and proseliza- tion activities in the name of the Front are car- ried on actively in these areas, where about 25 per- cent of the rural population resides. In the rural regions where the government has begun planning or has begun to implement pacification programs, there is less Front agitation. Approximately 10 to 15 percent of the rural population lives in such re- gions, NFLSV influence is nearly negligible in the remaining sections of the rural area where govern- ment military and civil control is firm. Some 35 percent of the rural population lives in these areas. 43. Probably only a few NFLSV committees exist at the local level in those rural areas not firmly controlled by the Communists. In the.contested re- gions, the greater part of the influence exerted by Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved F6PItelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP00472A000300030001-5 the insurgents appears to stem directly from Commu- nist Party action. For example, one source from a village of 8-9,000 people in the delta, where a negligible amoutrt of security was provided by the gov- ernment, indicated that the PRP openly exercised direct administration over village affairs. 44. Front influence among the nearly 3,000,000 residents in the major cities and towns of South Viet- nam is also nearly negligible. One Communist Party member reported that as of November 1964, Front or- ganizations in the Saigon - Gia Dinh Special Zone were purely nominal. Communist organizers had been unable to establish either a Front committee or set up any of the Front's mass organizations. In prac- tice, the hard-core Communist underground located in the area acted in the Front's name. A captured TOP SECRET PRP document recently stated that increasing the prestige of the NFLSV, specifically in the urban areas, was an urgent, critical problem that must be solved. There is no evidence that the NFLSV has been successful in attracting significant support from any of the politically influential groups in South Viet- nam. Both overt propaganda and extensive clandestine penetration nevertheless continue to be directed at the Buddhists, students, labor union members, and armed forces personnel. Front Propaganda Machinery 45. The NFLSV boasts an especially well-organ- ized propaganda arm, the Liberation News Agency (LNA). The LNA was set up early in 1961, parallel with the establishment of the Front itself. The LNA provides an easily controlled mechanism for the information dissemination which the Communists have found so essential and effective in coordinat- ing and backstopping their political agitation ac- tivities, Several major LNA broadcast stations pro- duce a steady diet of propaganda for public dis- semination in the South. 46. Hanoi often rebroadcasts NFLSV statements within an hour or two of the time they were first issued by LNA. NFLSV propaganda publications are printed in several languages in Hanoi by the gov- ernment's official publishing houses, apparently to be distributed abroad under the aegis of the North Vietnamese Government. English-language editions of Front documents, for example, have been distrib- uted in England by the correspondent of the DRV newspaper Cuu Quoc. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Foo-Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP00472A000300030001-5 47. In France, NFLSV publications reach the large resident Vietnamese community through the Pre- North Vietnamese economic mission in Paris. sumably the material is sent to Paris from Hanoi through official DRV channels. The several perma- nent Front offices abroad also distribute mountains of NF1,SV propaganda; several of them put out peri- odic information esourcescforrinclusionuinalocal local leftist press newspapers. NFLSV Program Abroad 48. one of the main aims of the Front since its formation has been torepublicize presentingtitself asian and programs abroad. By organization struggling to free VietnamefromS"cols nialist and imperialist aggression," ath and sup- port a special effort to enlist the and port of the newly emerging countries Asia. A steady flow of telegrams of greeting and congratulations go'out from the Front to foreign governments and heads of state. Coordination n and a advice for this kind of activity probably from the more experienced bureaucrats in Hanoi. 49. The Front has long been sending rapr senta- Com ts on loc ours ' at mainly to Africa munist bloc, , and Asia.- Front delegates have also beenredtending con- meetings of leftist and Communist-sp The attendance of ferences abroad since late 1962. Front representatiatforeign nfeUndersHanoimset- ings has been gradually accelerated. e.ar at sponsorship, these delegates now often app regional delegationsereIteison an equal footing believed that a hard core of "delegates" for the SouthhVietnamrance than fromVietnam, Front is sti~leasierNorth and egress Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP7T00472A000300030001-5 50. The first permanent Front office abroad was opened in Cuba in August 1962. By mid-1964, permanent Front "missions" had also been established in Czecho- slovakia, East Germany, Algeria, Indonesia, and the UAR, where the NFLSV man is accredited to the Afro- Asian Solidarity Organization. 51. In view of the long history of Algerian op- position to French "colonialism," the Vietnamese Com- munists doubtless view Algeria as a fertile area in which to enlist support for the insurgency in South Vietnam. The organization and operation of the Front office in Algiers thus provides a good illustration of the NFLSV techniques and activities abroad. This mission was established by Huynh Van Tam in February 1963. Tam had arrived in Africa in October 1962 to attend an Afro-Asian lawyers' conference in Conakry. 52. Tam has contributed articles to French- language newspapers in Algeria and has undertaken many other,quasi-political activities, including film showings and speeches to leftist youth meet- ings. In May 1963, for example, he addressed a con- ference of "Anti-Colonialist Youth" in Algiers, and appealed for world-wide support of the Viet Cong. Tam also attended the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity meeting in Algiers in March 1964. His speech, pre- dictably, dealt with the "certainty of final victory for the South Vietnamese people" and appealed for moral and material support. 53. One of the most active of the NFLSV posts abroad is the office in Peking, which was established in September of 1964. Its representatives have been invited to Chinese receptions for foreign dignitaries and have been increasingly successful in arranging audiences with the stream of Afro-Asian personalities flowing through Peking. In April of this year, the NFLSV also opened an office in Moscow--its seventh full-time post abroad. The Communists probably hope that Soviet propaganda support derived from this new publicity outlet will significantly boost their cause and that the office will also open new avenues for NFLSV contact with the non-Communist world. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fdrqtelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP00472A000300030001-5 Recent Activities Abroad 54. In Asia during the past year, the Vietnamese Communists have concentrated mainly on pumping up NFLSV relations with Cambodia. They have tried to elicit statements and actions by the Sihanouk regime supporting the Front's claim to be the "legitimate" representative of the South Vietnamese people. With Chinese encouragement and the active backing of the North Vietnamese, Front representatives sat down with Cambodian officials in Peking last December to discuss a formal treaty defining and guaranteeing the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Although the ne- gotiations failed to produce an agreement, Sihanouk's publicly demonstrated willingness to engage in treaty discussions with the NFLSV was a decided plus for the Communists. Sihanouk has also insisted that the NFLSV should represent South Vietnam in any in- ternational conference to guarantee Cambodian neutral- ity. 55. The Front has also found some support this year in Indonesia. In late April, at Sukarno's invita- tion, Front delegates attended the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung as the only representatives of South Vietnam. They were feted by the host Indonesian Government and readily mixed with many of the visiting Afro-Asian state officials. 56. By far the strongest international initia- tive by the NFLSV this year was undertaken in con- nection with the now-postponed Bandung II meeting which was to have been held in Algiers in June. Throughout the late spring, NFLSV and other Asian Communist representatives behind scenes to line up support the gathering and to have the Front accepted as the representative of South Vietnam. Both Chinese and North Vietnamese foreign ministry officials made preconference trips to friendly African countries to enlist support. An NFLSV delegation later toured the same circuit, 57. Just before the Algiers meeting was sched- uled to start, the Front released a memorandum sup- porting its claim to represent South Vietnam. While castigating the Saigon government, the memorandum catalogued all the "evidence" that the Front operates Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fcelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP700472A000300030001-5 as a de facto government in South Vietnam and that it also as widespread popular support. The memo- randum claimed that the Front "wields genuine, steady, and widespread power, whose basst the self managing committees elected by the population erated areas." The memorandum in effect summed up the propaganda line of the NFLSV during the past six months, which has stopped just short of announcing the formation of a provisional Front government at The chief NFLSV the national level in South Vietnam. "is conference a government, bute representative to Front Algiers the the Cairo it Cpress is not yet official." Recognition Strategy 58. This past March, Hanoi and the NFLSV be- war long-standing the their gan to greater Viet- settlement emphasis of on demand that any nam be "in accordance" with the Front program. In a major policy statement of 22 March, the Front as- serted for the first time at it endetheeViet- "decisive voice in any namese war." 59. In apparent support of such assertions, the NFLSV and the DRV suddenly increased their propaganda claims concerning the size of the "liberated areas" under front control in South Vietnam. Throughout - 1964, the Front's cthelaimterritwas andcabout trolled about t two half of the population in the South. Beginning in 1965, hhowever, of the the popula- tterritory and almost 75 percent tion. tion. 60. The long-standing allegation by the Front that it is the "genuine" or "legitimate" representa-- tive of the South Vietnamese people was also given ate-~ greater emphasis this spring. In a 22 March sltatei- ment, the Front proclaimed itself the "only" pgiti- began time, Mothe scow same mate representative. At about give ganda from Hanoi, Peking, idgivefy- greater play to NFLSV claims of legitimacy, i e tfnt ing the Front in some cases as the only as of the people in the South .inThis li ne, in in thetended Saigon ia counterpoint to the slipping presige of regime, also appears to have reflected a Vietnamese ConMunist hope that Saigon and the United States -19- Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fo''telease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP7`00472A000300030001-5 could eventually be brought around to deal directly with the Front as an independent political entity, thus strengthening the Communist position in any war settlement. 61. The Vietnamese Communists appear to be- lieve that it is no longer possible to force a bi- lateral settlement of the war on a weakened Saigon government. They have probably concluded that, be- cause of the direct and growing US participation in the conflict, an end to the fighting can be obtained now only in a multilateral, internationalized ar- rangement of the type which ended the Indochina War in 1954. In the course of such a settlement, the Communists realize that a strong image of NFLSV prestige and physical control in South Vietnam will be extremely important. It will not only help undermine the standing of the Saigon authorities, but will also assist the Communists in gaining an effective position in any postwar political estab- lishment in South Vietnam. Additional NFLSV Goals 62. Beyond broad statements of Front policy such as the intent to form a "national, coalition government" and to move toward "reunification" with North Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists have been very vague concerning specific NFLSV goals when the fighting ends. An intent to leave considerable ma- neuvering room seems to lie behind the basic Vietnamese Communist line that any settlement of the war must be in "accordance" with the NFLSV program. 63. It is probable, however, that at a minimum the Communists would seek to gain the key defense, foreign policy, information, and economic offices in any coalition goverment so that they could make a quick move toward implementing such policies as land redistribution and socialization of industry. The Front's secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, reportedly Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fo elease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP7100472A000300030001-5 told a Western newsman recently that a "socialist economy" would be developed in the south after the war at the same time as the war devastation was being repaired. Possession of the key offices in a coali- tion government would enable the Communists, operat- ing through the Front, to 'stifle' quickly any op- position to a full and open Communist take-over. The Communists sought during settlement in Laos government was set up. Forming a Provisional Government 64. The NFLSV's failure so far to declare the formation of a national provisional government is due partly to its failure to attract support grass roots and from individuals of stature in South Vietnam. This was implicit in the recent remarks of a DRV newsman in Moscow who claimed that the question of forming a provisional Front regime was under active consideration. The NFLSV has gone so far as to set up committees--"ministries in embryo"--for military , and affairs, external affairs, information, education, public health. According to the newsman, before such a government is proclaimed the NFLSV needs wider popular representation, including some caarmed dres torrun;ait elements sfthe Republic well-trainedVietnam also lacks sufficient government. 65. Formation of a national government of obscure personalities at this time would reveal the Front's lack of volunteer backing. It could also provoke con- siderable active opposition from other politically ambitious groups in South Vietnam, position of Bind dhists, who themselves government. fluence in any p 66. The DRV newsman in Moscow also implied that the Communists were holding off on the formation of a provisional government until they obtain rcoltrol of more real estate in South Vietnam. In , they still lack a fairly extensive, unified geographic base. The major Communist "war zones" are still -21- Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Foelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP700472A000300030001-5 scattered and vulnerable to government raids and in- terdiction. It would be difficult at present for the Communists to set up a "capital," receive foreign visitors, or conduct business securely in South Viet- nam. Current Communist military activities may be designed to cope with this problem. They are in part aimed at eliminating government influence from a large area of the central highlands of South Vietnam contiguous with the Cambodian border. 67. If the Communists believed that for politi- cal reasons the situation now was propitious for the establishment of a provisional government, they would probably do so regardless of the amount of territory they control in South Vietnam. It would be possible to conduct the government's activity from outside South Vietnam, possibly under bloc protection. Such a decision based on political considerations might come following acceptance of the Front as the sole representative of South Vietnam at an influential international conference like the'now-postponed Bandung II meeting. The Communists might see this as the possible fulcrum with which to tip the balance in favor of the NFLSV. 68. The Communists at. the moment, however, are clearly concerned with the political repercussions power of such a move while the Viet Cong in South Vietnam is still fluid. DRV and NFLSV ef- forts to develop international pressure on the US and the Republic of Vietnam to agree to Front participa- tion in settling the war would.almost certainly be complicated by the official establishment at this time of a formal Front government. Some Afro-Asian states which have urged direct negotiations with the NFLSV might be less forthcoming if their support were suddenly tied in with the question of recogniz- ing the Front as a legal government. Moreover, the Communists may feel that the interjection of a formal Front government into the picture would make it more difficult for the US and the Saigon regime to concede any role to the Front in settling the war. In sum, it appears that the Communists do not intend to pro- claim the'.formation of a provisional NFLSV government in the near future. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved FowRelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP700472A000300030001-5 The following study of the NFLSV organization attempts toffilntify as many of the leaders of the front as possible, adio Hanoi and the NFLSV Lib associations have been identified by Rubli- tion Broadcasting Station, and others have appeared in Communistapu it cations and documents. Many of the groups exist only on pap has not been possible to identify the membership of a number of these organizations. It should be noted that some of aleY names may havelbeenny used without permission and that some may be spelled incorrectly or . ma nd may ll y a instances names are received ora ndered phonetically. STATINTL STATINTL STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Foelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP70472A000300030001-5 I. CENTRAL ORGANIZATION Central Committee Central Committee Departments II. QUASI-DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION III. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS Page A-4 Liberation Federation of Trade Unions Liberation Peasants Association (Liberation Agricultural Association) Liberation Youth Association Liberation Women's Association Liberation Students and Pupils Association Liberation Writers and Artists Association Association of Former Resistants Patriotic and Democratic Journalists Association South Vietnam Patriotic Buddhists Association South Vietnam Patriotic Teachers Association Highland Peoples Autonomy Movement Liberation Red Cross Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee for Solidarity with the Latin American People Committee for Protection of World Peace Military and Civil Medical Council Liberation Army and Popular Armed Forces People's Revolutionary Party Radical Socialist Party Democratic Party Liberation Press Agency Liberation Broadcasting Association of Writers and Artists of the Saigon- Cholon-Gia Dinh Area *People's Liberation Youth Group *Industrialists and Businessmen Against the US-Diemists *Democratic Lawyers Association *Council of Heroic Disabled Servicemen *South Vietnam Veterans Association *Association of the Families of Patriotic Soldiers *Association for the Improvement of Morality (of the Hoa Hao Buddhist sect) *Patriotic and Peace-Loving Boys and Girls Group *Reformed Cao Dai Sect *Group of Fighters for Peace, Reunification, and Independence of the Vietnamese Fatherland-Patriotic Servicemen in the Ranks of the US-Diem Army *Committee for the Peace and Amelioration of South Vietnam *Membership not available Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved FoiRelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP700472A000300030001-5 . ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS (cont.) *Association of Patriotic Teachers of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Area *Association of Patriotic Teachers of the Western Region of South Vietnam *Vietnamese Nationals of Chinese Origin *Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee *Patriotic Khmer Monks Solidarity Association *Khmer Buddhist Research Institute of South Vietnam *Group of Soldiers Who Have Returned to the People IV. REGIONAL ORGANIZATION Page A-11 STATINTL Page A-14 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fo'MKelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP7100472A000300030001-5 NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM Presidium Chairman Vice Chairmen *HUYNH TAN PRAT *PHUNG VAN CUNG *THOM ME THE NHEM *TRAN NAM TRUNG *VO CHI CONG *Y BINH ALEO Secretariat Secretary General Deputy Secretaries General *DANG TRAN THI *NGUYEN HUU THE *NGUYEN THI DINH *NGUYEN VAN NGOI *PHAM XUAN THAI *THIEN HAO (Thick) *TRAN BACH DANG *TRAN BUU KIEM *LE VAN HUAN *HO THU *UNG NGOC KY HO XUAN SON Members of the Central Committee (elected January 1964) STATINTL DUONG TRUONG THANH *HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie *HUNG TU,aka Hong Lien, aka Nhan Tu *HUY SON *HUYNH BAI *HUYNH CUONG *HUYNH VAN TAM LAM TRI CHANH *LE THANH NAM *LE THI RIENG *LE VAN THA *MA THI CHU MAI VAN TI *NGUYEN HOC Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472AMR300030001-5 Members of the Central Committee (elected January 1964) (cont.) *NGUYEN NGOC THUONG NGUYEN THI (_) *NGUYEN THI BINH *NGUYEN VAN HIEU *NGUYEN VAN TI *NGUYEN VAN TIEN *PHAM XUAN VY *ROCHOM BRIU *TRAN HUU TRANC *TRAN VAN THANH *VO DONG GIANG *VO VAN MON *VU TUNG *XAT Members of the First Central Committee (elected in 1962) *DANG TRAN THI *HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie *HO THU *HUYNH CUONG IIUYNH DANG (1) *HUYNH TAN PRAT *HIIYNH VAN TAM *LAM KIEN KHANH (1) *hE NGOC QUANG (1) *LE THANII NAM LE THI DUONG (1) *LE LE THI VIET RIENG HUNG (1) %;MA THI CHU NGOC TU (1) NGUYEN CUU BICH (1) *NGUYEN HUU THE *NGUYEN HUU THO *NGUYEN NGOC THUONG NGUYEN THACH (1) *NGUYEN THI BINH *NGUYEN VAN HIEU *NGUYEN VAN NGOI NGUYEN VIET MAU (1) NHU SON (1) *PHAM XUAN THAI PHAN TUYEN (1) *PHUNG VAN CUNG *ROCHOM BRIO (s)not currently a Central Committee meml,Fr A-2 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Ff?Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP700472A000300030001-5 Members of the First central committee (elected in 1962) (cont.) SON VONG (died march 1963) (1) *THIEN HAO *TRAN BACH DANG *TRAN BUU KIEM *TRAN HUU TRANG *TRAN NAM TRUNG *UNG NGOC KY *VO CHI CONG *XAT *Y BINH ALEO Central Committee Departments MILITARY COMMITTEE Director Members Le Van Tien Bay Quan INFORMATION, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE Chairman *Tran Bach Dang Deputy Chairman Muoi Tai EXTERNAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE Chairman DEFENSE OF BUDDHISM COMMITTEE Representative PUBLIC HEALTH COMMISSION Commissioner INSPECTORS GROUP Representative suasi-Diplomatic Representation ALGERIA Thich Vinh *Phung Van Cung *Nguyen Van Hieu *Huynh Van Tam *Vo Cong Trung Truong Van Loc Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 jolk Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A00'300030001-5 Quasi-Diplomatic Representation (cont.) *Tran Van Thanh *Nguyen Minh Phuong Nguyen Trong Kha tloang Bich Son *I,y Van Sau Iloang Kinh *Nguyen Van Hieu *Dinh Ba Thi *Ma Thi Chu GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC *Nguyen Van Hieu *Duong Dinh Thao Tran Huu Kha *Le Phuong *Le Quang Chanh *Huynh Van Ba bang Quang Minh Nguyen Van Dong *Nguyen Thanh Long Luu Xuan Thanh Ngo Ton Hoan UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC *Huynh Van Nghia *Nguyen Van Tien ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS LIBERATION FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (Formerly Liberation Labor Association ~OI LAO DONG GIAI PHONG]) Chairman Vice Chairman Standing Committee Members *Pham Xuan Thai, aka Xuan Thai *Dang Tran Thi *Dinh Ba Thi *Huynh Van Tam *Le Thanh Nam *Nguyen Minh Phuong *Tran Hoai Nam *Tran Van Thanh Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Fd1MKelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP~00472A000300030001-5 LIBERATION PEASANTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NONG DAN GIAI PHONG) Chairman *Nguyen Huu The Member Tu Lap LIBERATION YOUTH ASSOCIATION (HOI THANH NIEN GIAI PHONG) Chairman Vice Chairman Secretary General Deputy Secretary General Members *Tran Bach Dang Nguyen Van Chon Nguyen Van Yen Cao Van Tai Anh Theo Cao Van Sau Cao Xuan Bo Do Duy Lien Ho Bao Hon Ho Phong Huynh Van Tuan *Le Phuong *Le Quang Chanh Minh Tanh Nguyen Dong Ha *Nguyen Thi Binh Nguyen Van Phuc Nguyen Van Tai Nguyen Van Tan Nguyen Xuan Thuy *Thanh Hai, aka Luu Thanh Hai Tran Tien Dung Tran Tri Dung Tran Van An Tran Van Thuan Trinh Van Thanh LIBERATION: WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG) Chairman, Standing Committee *Nguyen Thi Binh *Mi Doan *Le Thi Rieng *Thanh Loan Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 'w w Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG)(cont.) Standing Committee Members *Nguyen Thi Thanh *Nguyen Thi Tu Phung Van Cung (Mrs.) Tran Thi Lieu *Bui Thi Me Buu Hoa Do Duy Lien Hai Lua Ho Thi Buu, aka Ho Thi Buoi *Ma Thi Chu Ngoc Dung (see *Nguyen Ngoc Dung) *Nguyen Thi Chon Nguyen Thi. Duoc, aka Nam Ly Nguyen Thi Ha Nguyen Thi Hoa Nguyen Thi Sang Thua Hoa Tran Thi Dan Tran Thi Dau Tran Thi Dinh Tran Thi My Tran Thi Tu Tran Thi Trung Truong Thi Hue LIBERATION STUDENTS AND PUPILS ASSOCIATION (HOI LIEN HIEP SINH VIEN HOC SINH GIAI PHONG) Chairman *Tran Buu Kiern LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE GIAI *Ly Van Sau *Nguyen Ngoc Dung *Nguyen Thi Binh Tran Van An Tu Le Viet Hung PHONG) Chairman *Tran Huu Trang Van Tung Tran Hieu Minh Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved FolRelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP7100472A000300030001-5 LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE CIAO PHONG) (cont.) ? Secretary General Secretariat Members Ly Van Sam Giang Nam Pham Minh Hoa Bui Kinh Lang Bui Xuan Lang Ly Van Phung Nguyen Hien Nguyen Van Vinh Pharr Van Hoa Phan The *Thanh HAi *Thanh Loan Thanh Quy Minh Trieu Van Truong Binh Tong Truong Thanh Tung Long Van Nam ASSOCIATION OF FORMER RESISTANTS Secretary General *Tran Bach Dang PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NRA BAO IEU NUOC VA DAN CHU) Chairman Vice Chairman *Tam Duc *Nguyen Van llieu Nhi Muc Secretary General Thanh Nho Deputy Secretary General *Nguyen Thi Chon *Thanh Huong *Duong Dinh Tao Hieu Chan Hoang Xuan Ba *Nguyen Thi Binh *Nguyen Van Tai. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NHA BAO YEU NUOC VA DAN CHU) (cont.) *Phan Lac Tuyen *Rochom Thep Thach Thien Chi Tu Chung SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC BUDDHISTS ASSOCIATION (TRUNG UONG HOI LUC HOA) Chairman *Thien Hao Members *Hung Tu Giac Hao SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC TEACHERS ASSOCIATION Chairman *Le Van Huan *Biti Thi Me *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong *Nguyen Thanh Long Secretary General Le Thuoc HIGHLAND PEOPLE'S AUTONOMY MOVEMENT (UY BAN DAN TOC TU TRI TAY NGUYEN) Chairman *Y Binh Aleo *Mi Doan *Rochom Briu *Rochom Thep *Xat nbers Ba Quan Rochom Ban LIBERATION RED CROSS (HOI HONG TRAP TI GIAI PHONG) President *Phung Van Cung Chairman, Executive Committee Vu Ngoc Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved Foelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP70472A000300030001-5 COMMITTEE FOR AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY (UY BAN DOAN KET A PHI) Chairman *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong Vice Chairman *Thien Hao Secretary General *Huynh Cuong Members *Huynh Van Nghia *Huynh Van Tam *Le Thanh Nam *Ma Thi Chu Ngo Tan Dao *Nguyen Van Tien *Rochom Briu *Tran Hoai Nam COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE LATIN-AMERICAN PEOPLE (UY BAN DOAN KET DAN TOC MY LA TIN) Chairman *Le Van Huan Member Chau Hoang Nam COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF WORLD PEACE (UY BAN BAO VE HOA BINH THE GIOI) Chairman *Phung Van Cung Members *Ma Thi Chu *Ho Hue Ba MILITARY AND CIVIL MEDICAL COUNCIL Director *Phung Van Cung Member *Ho Thu LIBERATION ARMY AND POPULAR ARMED FORCES (GIAI PHONG QUAN VAN CAC LUC LUONG VO TRANG NHAN DAN) Deputy Commander *Nguyen Thi Dinh Sau Hoang, aka Cao Dan Chiem, aka Dom, aka Sau Cia, aka Sau Rau *Tran Nam Trung Nguyen Van Luong Nguyen Van Huu Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Aft Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A Ob300030001-5 PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (DANG NHAN DAN CACH MANG VIET NAM) Chairman Nguyen Van Muoi, aka Muoi Cuc Secretary General Nguyen Trung Thua Executive Committee Member *Vo Chi Cong Member, Youth Group Nguyen Chi Trung RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY (DANG XA HOI CAP TIEN) Secretary General Deputy Secretary General Member, Standing Committee DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DANG DAN CHU) Chairman Secretary General Secretary Central Committee Members LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY Deputy Director Director, East German Bureau LIBERATION BROADCASTING Director Deputy Director *Nguyen Van Hieu *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong Ngo Ngoc Sang *Huynh Tan Phat *Nguyen Thanh Long *Duong Van Le Ho Kim Son Nguyen Van Lan *Tran Buu Kiem Tran Van Huong *Ung Ngoc Ky Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved For-Release 2000/05/12 CIA-RDP1t00472A000300030001-5 ASSOCIATION OF WRITERS AND ARTISTS OF THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH AREA Chairman Vo Hoai Linh, aka Hoai Linh, aka Truong Vinh Tong Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh, aka Phong Anh *Thanh Loan Regional Organization SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH ZONE Chairman Vice Chairmen Ngoc Tung Pham Huy Tran Chinh Truc, *Tran Huu Trang Tran Tan Thanh Tran Thanh Dat Tran Van Choi, aka Chin Choi, aka Tran Van Chau Vu Hien Thinh *Huynh Tan Phat *Le Van Tha Phan Trong Dan Phuoc Thang *Tran Huu Trang Secretary General *Nguyen Van Tai Assistant Secretary General Nguyen Dong Ha Members Doan Cong Chanh Hoang Hai Hoang Minh Dao Lu Sanh Loc Ngoc Dinh Nguyen Thi Phan Nguyen Van Cung Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh, aka Phong Anh Thanh Tam Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 EASTERN REGION ZONE Chairman Vice Chairmen *Nguyen Thanh Long *Hung 'I'u Lien Van Chan, aka Le Van Chan Nguyen Kien Quoc Nguyen Van Chi Tran Van Son Secretary General Nguyen Dinh Nho *Huynh Thanh Mung Le Sac Nghi Vo Thanh Nguon *Vo Van Mon Ho Chi Tieng, aka Ho Chi Tong Luu Ki.et Nguyen Bach Tuyet Nguyen Duc Quang Nguyen The Phuong, aka Nguyen Thi Phuong Nguyen Van Hung, aka Nguyen Van Trung Nguyen Van Nong Nguyen Van Xuan Nguyen Viet Hong Sorc Phrum Thieu Nhu Thuy Tran Van Binh Truong Thang Vo Van Voi, aka Vo Van Doi Waifa Sam, aka Wai A Sam Bui Duc Tam, aka Bui Duc Tan Cao Van Sau *Ho Hue Ba Le Hong Thang Luc Ta Soc Ngoc Binh Thang Nguyen 'T'hai Binh Nguyen Thi Dinh Nguyen Thien Tu, aka Huynh Thien Tu Nguyen. Trung Xuat Nguyen Van Chin Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Approved FolWRelease 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP700472A000300030001-5 CENTRAL REGION ZONE (cont.) WESTERN REGION ZONE Chairman Vice Chairmen *Nguyen Van Ngoi *Thien Hao *Duong Van Vinh Tran Van Binh, aka Bay Thang Tran Thanh Dai Secretary General Commissar (Current Affairs) Commissar (Interprovincial Committee) Commissar (Central Commit- tee) commissioner, Standing Com- mittee Adviser Members Ngo Tan Dao, aka Ngo Dai Dao Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly *Nguyen Van Nhon *Huynh Cuong Ma Ha Thong, aka Muoi Thong Le Van Phien *Bui Thi Me, aka Thi Me Khiet Le Minh Thanh, aka Minh Tan Le Thi Toi Nguyen Thi Sang Pham Cong Chanh Pham Minh Ly, aka Muoi Ly Pharr Van Be Phan Huu Phuoc, aka Thanh Quynh Phan Van Nam, aka Thuc Nguyen, aka Luc Tran Van Phan Tran Van Thuan A- 13 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5 Next 41 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000300030001-5