FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY, 1958 - MID-1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000300020005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 6, 1965
• Content Type: IS

/2/ C_
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6 December 1965
OCT No. 3089/65
Copy No. 139
INTELLIGENCE STUDY
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON THE
VENEZUELAN COMMUNLST PARTY, 1958 - MID-1965
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
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GROUP
Excluded horn automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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FOREWORD
Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Vene-
zuelan Communist Party, 1958 - mid-1965 is the
first in OCIts series of Intelligence Studies to deal
with a free world Communist party. OCI Intelli-
gence Studies are aimed at situations where study
and analysis in some depth seems likely to clarify
the nature of long-standing US security problems,
to give timely warning about anemerging problem,
or to assist the policy maker in considering ways
of coping with any such problems. These research
papers appear on no definite schedule but rather
as a suitable subject happens to coincide with the
availability of the special manpower resources re-
quired.
Comments should be directed to the Office of
Current Intelligence.
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CONTENTS
P7011,10472A000300020005-2
Page
FOREWORD
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL
POLITICS 1
The Two Phases of the PCV's Program 2
The Conflict Within the PCV leadership 18
II. THE FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCV 29
Castroism and the PCV 29
The Soviet Attitude Toward the PCV 33
Communist China and the Venezuelan Armed
Struggle 39
Attitudes of Other Communist Parties 42
The Algerian Example and the PCV 45
III. THE PCV'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION 47
The PCV's Rationale of Its Program 47
The PCV and the Sino-Soviet Dispute 51
The Outlook for the Party 56
Figures Photographs
1 Douglas Bravo 5
2 Pompeyo Marquez 6
3 Gustavo Machado 10
4 Guillermo Garcia Ponce 14
5 Fabricio Ojeda 19
6 Domingo Alberto Rangel 20
7 Jesus Faria 21
Graphic
8 Excerpts from Party Documents. follows page 46
Map
9 Venezuela follows page 58
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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To study the past seven and a half years of the
Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) is to examine one
of the largest and most influential Communist parties
in Latin America during a critical period in the his-
tory of both the party and the country. To study
the PCVI
is also to cast new light on the
Larger question ox the position of free world Commu-
nist parties in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute.
In the case of the PCV, at least, the evidence seems
quite clear that the party's course during these years
was determined far more by domestic events and by ef-
forts to seize local political opportunities and ex-
ploit the prestige of Fidel Castro than by any exter-
nal direction.
During nearly all this time, the central issue
of party policy was the armed struggle (lucha armada)
vs. political maneuvering (via pacifica) as the ap-
proved strategy for achieving power. Throughout 1958
the party generally followed the "national front" tac-
tic, exploiting the widespread public acceptance it
enjoyed for its help in overthrowing the Ierez Jime-
nez dictatorship in January of that year. After the
Communists were eliminated from the coalition govern-
ment, the PCV drifted toward the lucha armada strategy,
at first with the main emphasis on urban terrorism,
but after late 1963 on guerrilla warfare and the con-
cept of a "prolonged struggle" in the countryside.
Arrests of many of the top party leaders from 1962
on increased the influence of younger "hard-liners."
The PCV sustained heavy losses from its resort to
violence, however, and as of mid-1965 it seemed to
be moving toward its earlier strategy by again plac-
ing greater effort on overt political programs, though
without abandoning the primacy of the armed struggle.
The party has, indeed, engaged in both legal and sub-
versive activities in various forms throughout all
phases of the cycle.
For its revolutionary theory, the ICV appears
to have relied heavily on the doctrine and experience
of a number of foreign Communist parties and leftist
movements. The Cuban example clearly dominates all
other pieces in this patchwork of borrowings, and
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waS probably the essential inspiration. Since the
mi sile crisis of 1962 and the decline of Castro's
popularity in the hemisphere, however, the PCV has
attempted to demonstrate to the Venezuelan public
an1 to its fraternal parties that its revolutionary
pr gram is nationalistic, spontaneous, and unique--
not a carbon copy of Cuba's or any other country's.
It seeks to prove that its "national liberation" is
a Special contribution to ,Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
DeSpite the camouflage of theoretical jargon, it
is clear that the PCV in the period 1958-65 has been
guided primarily by pragmatic considerations.
The Sino-Soviet dispute did not perceptibly at-
tell the path the PCV had chosen to follow, but it
introduced embarrassing complications for the party.
Th controversy threatened to widen the differences
between soft-liners and hard-liners in the party apd
in the Marxist Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR),
it close ally. The danger to unity was so great
that the PCV eventually felt forced, despite a con
tinuing sympathy with the USSR, to stand as a neutral
between the two disputants. This was a neutrality
not easily justified to many PCV members, not easily
understood in Moscow, and often interpreted by other
free world Communist parties--and perhaps in Peking--
as leaning toward the Chinese. This refusal to line
up With either side, despite its embarrassments,
helped the PCV to hold itself and its alliance to-
gether.
The future course of the PCV in either the do-
mes ic or the foreign sphere cannot be predicted with
acc racy. There is deep dissension in the party as
a r sult of the years of armed struggle and the
cen plans to renew emphasis on legal political activ-
ity; the young "hard-line" leaders of both the PCV '
and its MIR ally are not effectively controlled by
the Communist hierarchy. If Moscow and Peking be-
come formal competitors for authority in the world Com-
munist movement, and if the PCV decides to abandon .
the armed struggle, there is bound to be a radical
reshuffling of loyalties, leaders, and members in
Communist and pro-Communist parties in Venezuela.
Under these conditions, Peking will probably not
lack an organized following in the country. In any,
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event, Moscow, though still the PCV's primary source
of guidance and aid, can probably no longer rely on
the party's automatic obedience when PCV leaders con-
sider that their immediate interests indicate non-
compliance.
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I. THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY
IN NATIONAL POLITICS
This study is designed to identify and evaluate
the intricate domestic and foreign influences which
came to bear on the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), its
programs, and itsleaders during the period from the
fall of the Perez Jimenez' rightist dictatorship in
January 1958 to about mid-1965. The major emphasis
is on the PCV's estimates of its opportunities at
critical junctures in the domestic political scene,
divisions among its leaders and collaborators, and
the impact of Castroism and the Sino-Soviet dispute
on the party's decisions.
The PCV program for these years divides into two
general phases. During the first, from 1958 to early
1962, the party placed primary stress on the use of
overt, legal, political action, variously defined in
Communist parlance as the "mass struggle," via pacif-
ica, or via parliamentaria. During the secolia-pEase,
Which is-gTill in progress but showing some signs of
decline, the party resorted to the armed struggle
(lucha armada), which the Venezuelan Communists usu-
ally describe as the "superior" method of seeking
power. The first phase merged only gradually into
the second, and during this twilight period, it was
indeed difficult to determine whether the PCV was
placing greater emphasis on mass or armed struggle.
Furthermore, in neither of the two phases did
the party absolutely reject tactics characteristic
of the other. During the period of legal political
action, "hard-line" leaders were actively planning
revolutionary activities; during the period of vio-
lent action "soft-line" leaders were advocating and
employing various legal or mass activities. Within
each of the two basic strategies, moreover, the PCV
adopted various modifications in both theory and
practice in accordance with its own appraisal of
party prospects. Generally speaking, the dominance
of each phase seems to have been closely related to
the nature of the opportunities which the PCV saw
in current political developments.
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The Two Phases of the PCV's Program
The PCV reached the climax of its power and in-
floence during the first two years after the over-
throw of Perez Jimenez in January 1958. The party
was then the largest in Latin America in relation to
national population and ranked third (after Argen-
tina and Brazil) in total estimated membership.
Several conditions worked in favor of the PCV1
during the early post-dictatorship era and contrib
uted immeasurably to the party's extensive political
assets. First, there was a protracted public reac.'.
ti n against governmental authority as an aftermath
to many years of strong-arm rule. The political cli-
mate, especially in Caracas, was volatile and the '
environment offered wide leeway for Communist maneLi-
vers and agitation. The discredited security forces
of Perez Jimenez had been dismantled in toto and the
reorganized police were ill trained and poorly equipped,
intimidated by mob action, and had only limited caia-
bilities for maintaining law and order.
The provisional junta (January 1958 - February
1959), which was headed by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal
during most of the term, restored the PCV's legal Sta-
tus and followed a policy toward Communism which ranged
fro complacency to outright sympathy. Larrazabal'
too no action while in office to control Communist
activities, even after ?the PCV exploited the demon-
str tions against Vice President Nixon at the time of
his official visit to Venezuela in the spring of 1058.
The PCV's nomination of Larrazabal as its presidential
can idate was a measure of Communist endorsement and
applreciation of the junta's policy toward the part5t.
From any standpoint, the PCV could scarcely have
asked for a more favorable political ambiance than
the one which prevailed in the months after the down-
falil of Perez Jimenez. All the major parties--the
Dem cratic Action (AD), Democratic Republican union
(UR ), and COPEI, a Christian Democratic party--were
lefitist in orientation. The AD and URD had programs
witi a strong Marxist seasoning, and factions within
the .r ranks were avowedly Marxist; the URD in partic-
ulai had close ties with the PCV. Even the anti-Com-
munist COPEI found little distinction between the
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"evils" of capitalism and Communism. Conservative
and moderate groupings were discredited and unable
to exert any countervailing force on the left.
In addition, the PCV had gained widespread
public recognition--and concomitant respectability
and acceptance--for its contribution to the civil-
ian movement which helped overthrow the dictator.
The national Patriotic Junta, which had directed
the activity of the clandestine civilian organiza-
tion against the Perez dictatorship, included rep-
resentatives of the AD, URD, COPEI, and PCV, and
was in effect a ready-made "united front" which the
Communists exploited effectively. The Communists
also played a vociferous role in the counterpart
united front for organized labor, which was estab-
lished in 1958, and were represented on the national
electoral board.
To take advantage of the favorable political
conditions, the PCV either had, or developed rapidly,
a number of specific assets. The PCV had a strong
position in student, educational, and other intel-
lectual circles (journalists, artists, and profes-
sional groups) and a labor following which was sec-
ond only to AD among all Venezuelan parties. It
had an almost unlimited access to public information
media which enabled the party to publicize and mag-
nify disproportionately its "patriotic service"
against the dictatorship and its defense of the
provisional regime against the rightist military
and other "reactionaries." When the junta faced
military threats in July and September 1958, for ex-
ample, the PCV ostentatiously sounded the alarm and
posed as the principal defender of democracy. Com-
munist influence in information media also served to
nourish the pronounced anti-US sentiment which came
to the surface after Perez' overthrow.
The only major setback to the PCV and its bright
prospects along the via pacifica, the legal path to
power, was the collarige of the concept of a united
political front with Communist participation. This
came when the three major parties, realizing the prob-
lems in US relations that would be caused by their
continuing alliance with the Communists, signed the
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Puno Fijo Pact in October 1958. This agreement was
designed to establish a common, "minimum" governmental
program and a coalition regime regardless of the out-
com of the presidential election. The Communists '
wer expressly excluded from the agreement and ipsci
facto from the future coalition, at least at the cab-
inet level.
Nevertheless, the PCV could find comfort in the
resnits of the national elections a few weeks later.
Polling the highest percentage (6.2 percent) of the,
total vote in its 27-year history, the party won nine
seats in the Congress, four positions in the municipal
council of Caracas--focal point of political life-
andisome positions in other municipal councils and
in tate legislatures. There was good reason to be-
that the party could retain the large number of
positions at the middle and lower levels of govern-
ment which its members and sympathizers reportedly
held in the ministries of labor and education, in the
public universities, and in the school system. More-
over, under Venezuela's emerging multiparty system,,
the PCV had a great deal of bargaining power because
of its close ties with the important URD party; an
estimated membership of 30,000 to 35,000; an esti-
mated additional 125,000 sympathizers; the best dis-
ciplined political organization in the country; and
strbng influence over volatile student groups at Cen-
tral University. Significantly, this strength was
concentrated largely in the capital where the strong-
est national party--AD--was weakest.
By January 1959, when the Castro regime came tb
power in Cuba and when Communist China was beginning
to rake a greater interest in Latin American parties,
the PCV's outlook pointed clearly along the via pa-
cif ca as the only logical and practical mea-63-
pur ue its objectives. Probably no other party in
the hemisphere, except the Chilean, had better pros-
pects for infiltrating government and political groups
and wielding a substantial influence on national pol-
icies.
con
las
to
cid
During the first four central committee plenums
ened after the overthrow of Perez Jimenez--the
of which was held in January 1959 just prior
visit by Fidel Castro to Caracas--the party de'-
d unconditionally on a policy of mass or legal
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action. This policy sought to retain united political
and labor fronts and prolong the favorable atmosphere
which prevailed under the provisional government.
Even after the PCV's exclusion from the government
coalition under the Punto Fijo Pact and the defeat of
its presidential candidate by the AD's Romulo Betan-
court in the election of December 1958, the central
committee confirmed (in the plenum of January 1959)
that the party's priority tasks were the "broadening
of the national coalition"--that is, to include the
Communists--and the maintenance of cordial relations
with all major political groups.
It is true that during this same period the PCV
decided to retain and streamline its clandestine ap-
paratus and to develop a paramilitary force forcapa-
billties for carrying out both urban terrorism and
guerrilla warfare. The primary mission of the covert
organizations at this time, however, was to defend
in prospective alliance with other civilian groups
against a possible rightist coup attempt and to conduct
clandestine party func-
tions in the event such a
coup were successful and
the PCV again outlawed.
The secondary objective
was "to support the PCV in
its struggle for power."
By January 1959, Douglas
Bravo, at present one of
the ranking guerrilla com-
manders, was relieved of
other party duties to as-
sume full-time organiza-
tional and training re-
sponsibilities for the
paramilitary force, which
Initially numbered about
200 to 300. The party ap-
plied tight internal secu-
rity regulations to this
aspect of its program, ap-
parently limiting knowl-
edge of subversive
DOUGLAS BRAVO
Member of PCV and, as of May 1965, of
the military commission coordinating PCV
and guerrilla activities. Figure 1.
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Amok
PCV
mitt
pr in
in 1
POMP EY() MARQUEZ
member since 1939, central com-
e member since 1946, one of three
Ipal Communist leaders until arrest
64. Figure 2.
activity to only a few
top party leaders and
others directly involved.
The recourse to
clandestine methods was
not a departure from
Venezuelan Communist
tradition but rather a
continuation of the
underground activities
directed by Pompeyo Mar-
quez, a PCV national
secretary, after the
party was outlawed by
Perez Jimenez in 1950.
In early 1959, the party
had no serious inten-
tion of risking its
sizable assets for legal
political activity by
resorting to the "na-
tional liberation strug-
gle" against the Betan-
cOrt government, which was inaugurated in Februarfr
of that year. The interest in developing guerrilla
wa fare capabilities was, however, an innovation
an the timing suggested the influence of the Castro
re olution.
Catro's Impact on Venezuelan Politics
The Cuban Revolution had a deep and lasting
impact on Venezuelan politics and particularly on
the PCV, its programs and its collaborators. In
fact, the Cuban upheaval and the aftermath became
so entangledin Venezuelan domestic developments
after 1959 that they cannot be categorized as
strictly foreign influences. As will be seen in
a ater section, the Castro regime had firsthand
co tacts with PCV leaders and gave support in vari-
ou forms to the Venezuelan subversive groups. Be-
yond this, however, the Cuban example exerted a
potent indirect effect on PCV developments by in-
fluencing the whole political climate in Venezuela
and, as various PCV leaders saw it, providing them'
with local opportunities to exploit.
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Probably no other country in Latin America
displayed such widespread public delirium over
Castro's victory as Venezuela. This sentiment
dissipated only gradually and has left permanent
effects on national politics. The PCV evaluated
the early reaction and decided to exploit it to
the maximum, as did most Communist parties in the
hemisphere. The first of Castro's two visits to
Latin American capitals was significantly to Caracas,
and was scheduled almost immediately after he made
his triumphal entry into Havana in early 1959.
His public appearances and provocative revolutionary
speeches aroused frenzied mass adulation and ap-
proval in Venezuela, portending some of the seri-
ous unrest which was to be connected with the
"Cuban issue."
In the months which followed, many Venezuelan
political groups (or factions within them) seized
upon the Castro regime and unconditionally supported
it as a device for building popular support. In
addition to the heroism and radicalism which Castro
seemed to symbolize, Cuba's increasingly vindic-
tive policy toward the United States also appealed
to Venezuelans. The extensive anti-US sentiment
traditional to Venezuela had been pent up during
the years of Perez Jimenez' rule and the pressure
raised to a highly explosive level by the alleged
overly "cordial" attitude shown by the United States
to the dictatorship. Individual political leaders
converted themselves to the worship of Fidelismo
and gave public homage to his style of reforms and
US-baiting. By the end of 1960 frequent mass demon-
strations around some aspect of Castroism had been
held in Venezuela and these usually erupted into
violence on a large scale. Such ferment in itself
tended to sway the radical opposition toward emula-
tion of the successful revolutionary example which
Castro had established.
In 1960, two major political events closely
linked to Castroism influenced the PCV toward the
use of violence and the strategy of "national liber-
ation" via the armed struggle. The more important
of these was the expulsion in April of the Marxist
wing from the AD party, the principal member of the
ruling coalition. This faction subsequently
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reorganized in July as the Leftist Revolutionary
Party (MIR) with the full cooperation of the Com-
munists and the blessing of at least the radical
elements of the URD.
From the outset the MIR was the principal
collaborator of the PCV and it has been the chief
Communist ally in the armed struggle launched in
early 1962. Partly because the MIR was an offshoot
of ,the "respectable" AD, the Communists viewed it
as an excellent platform for launching a "United
op osition front" to President Betancourt's regime;
which was displaying considerable reserve if not
animosity toward Castro. The MIR had a sizable
following in Congress (one senator and 15 congress
Med) and there was reasonto believe that it could
drain away substantial popular support from the AD;
a traditional competitor of the PCV.
Although the MIR espoused Marxist principles
and their application to Venezuela, it was above
all fervently devoted to Castroism and the Cuban
revolution. If some Miristas in recent months
have been sobered by imprisonment and now favor a
return to legal action, the leaders and rank and
file during the party's first three years were al-
most uniformly advocates of the immediate applica-
tion of Castro-type revolutionary methods. More-
over, since its founding, the MIR has exerted con-
stant pressure on the PCV to move toward "the rev-
olution" and Mirista leaders and student elements
have often dragged the Communists into violence
which the MIR elements had instigated. At a later
period, the PCV was to accuse the MIR of trying to
be more Marxist-Leninist, more radical, more rev-
olutionary, and more Communist in general than the
orthodox Communists.
The second development in 1960 which stimulated
the PCV to consider a more radical program was the
withdrawal of the URD from the coalition which, in.
ComMunist eyes, reduced the strength of the "oli-
garchical,pro-imperialist" government to a weakened
AD and the COPEI. Conversely, this event had the
effect of augmenting sharply the strength of the
Communist-backed, pro-Castro opposition. The URD
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cooperated with the PCV on various issues since
the 1940s and its domestic program at that time
coincided with that of the PCV in many fundamental
aspects, such as eventual nationalization of the
private petroleum industry and antipathy toward
private foreign investments. Moreover, the URD
political recipe called for a large ingredient
of anti-US propaganda. The party's foreign pol-
icy objectives otherwise could scarcely be dis-
tinguished from the Communists' in 1960: Urdis-
tas were first of all outspoken champions of
Castroism and favored establishment of diplomatic
relations "with all countries"--viz., the Soviet
bloc nations.
The URD's strong support of Cuba was the ma-
jor reason for the party's withdrawal from the
government in November 1960, although the pretext
was the coalition's firm handling of Castroite
violence in October and November of that year.
Foreign Minister Ignacio Luis Arcaya, top URD
leader in the coalition, had violated his instruc-
tions at the meeting of Inter-American Foreign
Ministers at San Josd in August by refusing to
vote in favor of the resolution condemning inter-
national Communist intervention in the hemisphere
(that is, in Cuba). He resigned shortly there-
after, signaling the URD's decision to exchange
its influence and patronage within the regime for
Castroism. A strong faction within the URD was
led by one-time Communists, Communist sympathiz-
ers, and Castroites who were beginning to push
the party toward radicalism. They were already
cooperating with the PCV and MIR in violent tac-
tics by the end of 1960.
The PCV thus found itself blessed with close
collaborators by the end of the year in contrast
to its relative isolation after the Punto Fijo
Pact of late 1958. The Communists were heavily
indebted to the Castro regime for these political
bonanzas.
The Third Congress of the PCV in March 1961,
the first such "supreme" party gathering since the
late 1940s, marked a critical juncture along the
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road to violence. The
meeting pointed up the
mounting pressure from
at least a strong minor-
ity of the middle and
lower level leaders for!
the "revolutionary" line,
but Gustavo Machado, a
national secretary rep--
resenting the more cau-
tious, old guard lead-
ership, gave the key
speech which served to
moderate the final de-
cisions. He pointed out
that conditions were not
ripe for the overthrow
of President Betancourt'
by force, as demonstrated
GUSTAVO MACHADO by party experience to
One of founders of PCV in 1931, import- that point; that condi?
ant Member until arrest in 1963; followed
lead of CPSU. Figure 3. tions suggested the for'.-
mation of a "democratic
patriotic front" rather.
than a "national liberation (revolutionary) front'.."
The politburo's reported warning to the congress
to avoid imprudent action was provoked by the
clamor of some delegates for an explanation of
why the PCV was not "going forward in the path
of Castro."
The principal resolution of the congress am-
biguously called for the "overthrow of the policies
ot President Betancourt," rather than his ouster'
b3fr force. The fuzzy wording was designed, on the
one hand, to appease the elements of the party and
its MIR and URD collaborators favoring the lucha
armada; and, on the other, to keep the party within
the limits of legality and thus avoid stronger goV-
enmental suppression. Representatives of the URD
and MIR who were present At the sessions appealed
for "continuing unity of the leftists." The tactic
o "overthrowing the policies" of the incumbent re-
g me proved sufficiently flexible to serve the pui-
p ses of the hard-liners--the advocates of armed ,
s ruggle--who subsequently claimed that they were.
f llowing faithfully the dictates of the Third Con-
g ess, theoretical supreme authority of the PCV.
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Meanwhile, after the Meeting of Foreign Minis
ters at San Jos?Cuban-Venezuelan relations dete-
riorated sharply. This was a result of Venezuela's
having finally voted in support of the resolution
condemning extracontinental intervention--after its
URD-member foreign minister violated his instruc-
tions and abstained--and the withdrawal of the Cas-
troite URD from the government. In July 1961,
Guevara publicly described Betancourt as a captive
of a psuedo-democratic administration and volunteered
to instruct Venezuela as a sister nation regarding
"some of Cuba's experiences in the revolutionary
field." Foreign Minister Roa's similar accusation
that Betancourt was a tool of the US State Depart-
ment and the CIA climaxed a long series of Cuban
propaganda blasts and was the occasion for the de-
finitive break in relations between the two coun-
tries in November.
Extensive urban violence erupted around this
action, as had occurred sporadically during pre-
vious months, reflecting the hardening of politi-
cal forces into pro- and anti-Castro groupings.
By late 1961, the party found itself engaged in a
campaign of intensifying violence, centered
largely in Caracas and its environs, in cooperation
with the MIR and other extremists. Its paramili-
tary and student elements were deeply committed
in this effort.
Other domestic developments accelerated the
decision of some PCV leaders to commit their party
to the "armed struggle." The defection of the
"ARS" faction of the AD in early 1962 further weak-
ened the government's political base. Meanwhile,
largely undisciplined and uncontrolled Communist
and Mirista student elements--the most fervent
Castroites in Venezuela--the extremist leaders of
the MIR and URD, and the pro-revolutionary minor-
ity of the PCV had virtually transformed a strat-
egy of violence into a fait accompli by the end of
1961. The PCV leadership faced the choice of
going along with a tide of events which it did not
altogether control, or risking a split in its own
ranks, the loss of support of its own students,
and the alienation of its extremist partners by
adhering to "legality."
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The government crackdown on Communist activi-
ti s, from late 1960 on, made the final decision
ea ier. President Bentancourt was systematically
we ding out all Communists and some sympathizers
fr m government and teaching positions, and, per-
has more important, removing them from posts in
the Venezuelan Labor Confederation. The last ac---
tin was cutting off the party's leaders from a
ma'n source of mass support. The over-all effect
of
in
at
of
in
these measures was to reduce the PCVs assets
the legal or mass struggle and to enhance the
ractiveness of the armed strUggle. By the end .
1961, the party had far less to lose by -resort-,
to violence than two years earlier.
The climax came in early 1962, in connection
with the Inter-American Meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters at Punta del Este, which suspended Cuba from
the OAS. At that time, the PCV and MIR, exploit-
ing the dissidence of the "ARS" faction in the AD,.
attempted to oust President Betancourt 's coalition'
and/or provoke a military take-over. Although the
PC/ had rejected the MIR's proposal to launch a
full-scale revolution as late as December 1961,
beause conditions were not yet "ripe," the party
was already involved in such a strategy for all
practical purposes. The discovery of the first
of several clandestine Communist-MIR training
ca ps for guerrillas in eastern Venezuela in Jan-
ua y 1962 made clear that the armed struggle phase
of the party program had actually begun. A few .
weeks later the politburo ordered the paramilitary
leaders to expand their forces and appointed a
national command to direct urban and guerrilla
paramilitary operations.
During the final stage of the mass struggle,
the moderate leadership appeared to lose effec-
tiVe control over the party. The aggressive lead-
ers and student elements advocating revolution
partly preempted direction by their activities.
Whether the majority of the central committee
or politburo was swept along by the momentum of
events or actually ordered them is a moot ques-
ti n. Centralized guidance of terrorism seemed to
break down and the "radicals" took charge. In
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the meanwhile, some members of the central commit-
tee probably accepted the tide of events reluctantly;
others silently acquiesced; and still others may
have reversed their position to join the promoters
of the armed struggle as prospects for the ouster
of Betancourt seemed to improve.
In any event, sharp disagreement on the party's
strategy and tactics characterized the central com-
mittee plenums of August and October 1961, as well
as the Third Congress. Continuing to the present,
this dissension has not yet produced an open breach
in the party organization--as has been true of the
MIR--but has deeply divided the party rank and file
and the leadership.
The Communist and leftist-backed military up-
risings at Carupano and Puerto Cabello in May and
June 1962 may or may not have been endorsed in ad-
vance by the politburo and central committee, but
they directly involved top leaders of the party.
The Carupano revolt led to the "suspension of the
political activities" of the PCV and MIR--a euphe-
mism for being outlawed. The two events committed
the PCV irrevocably to the primacy of the armed
struggle and also signaled a considerable expan-
sion of guerrilla actions.
The central committee plenum of December 1962
placed the formal seal of approval on the armed
struggle, but only by a minority of the full com-
mittee. The reported vote of 17 to 1 indicates
that only about 25 percent of the membership (en-
larged at the Third Congress) was in attendance.
The armed struggle phase of the PCV program
has passed through two fundamental stages marked
by tactical modifications. As of mid-1965 it seems
to be entering a third. The first comprehended
the period from early 1962 through the elections
of December 1963. This stage emphasized urban
terrorism--especially in Caracas--supplemented by
sporadic guerrilla action designed to divert and
weaken the government security forces. The immedi-
ate objectives were to disrupt the electoral pro-
cess and overthrow Betancourt. At times the Com-
munists and their allies seemed close to attaining
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on or both of these objectives. Although some
patty leaders had theorized and warned that the
reyolution would probably be "prolonged," this
stage also reflected widespread optimism in party
ra0ks that a quick victory was in the offing.
cl
cl
pl
ex
to
In
Con
gr
ob
ti
fr
ure
plo
sub
gan
for
and
The first stage of armed struggle did not ex-
de extensive mass action, but assigned it a
any secondary role. The PCV continued to ex-
it what legality it still had by negotiating
ensively with the opposition political parties
Amity" arrangements in the electoral campaign.
addition, the PCV and MIR representatives in
gress worked effectively with other opposition
ups--URD, AD Opposition (ARS), and others--to
truct government efforts to obtain more effec-
e legislation to enforce law and order and to
strate the application of strong security meas-
s. Communist and MIR congressmen also ex-
ited their congressional immunity to promote
versive action. In addition, the PCV propa-
dized against the "repressions" of the regime,
a restoration of full legal status to the PCV
MIR, and for a grant of amnesty to the growing
numbers of Mirista and
Communist political pris-
oners.
PCV c
1954,
from 1
GUILLERMO GARCIA PONCE
ntral committee and politburo since
ctive in paramilitary organization Many within the PCV
62 until arrest in 1963.
Fig 4. itself considered the
By early 1964 it was
clear that the campaign
of urban violence and
"militant abstention"
from the election--de-
signed to intimidate
voters and keep them
from the polls--had
fallen short of its goals.
A large electoral turn-
out had voted the AD can-
didate, Raul Leoni, into
the presidency and Betan-
court had effected a peace-
ful transfer of power to
him in March 1964.
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tactic a miserable failure. Most of the top lead-
ers were in prison, including many of the princi-
pal advocates of the armed struggle, such as Pom-
pey? Marquez and Guillermo Garcia Ponce. Several
student and other young leaders had been killed
or captured during the guerrilla and terrorist
campaigns. The same was true of Mirista leaders.
In addition, the URD was on the verge of expelling
the Castroite-Marxist wing from its ranks after
discovering from the election results that this
group had not in fact enhanced the party's elec-
toral appeal.
There were still other serious battle scars.
The party's membership and sympathizer strength
had fallen probably as much as 50 percent. Public
opinion had turned hostile toward the Communists
and the MIR as a result of indiscriminate bombings,
murders of policemen, and pointless acts of terror
ism, such as the massacre in September 1963 of
passengers and national guardsmen aboard an excur
sion train. The PCV's national organization, its
strong labor support, and its propaganda apparatus
had also been decimated. It had achieved little
with its attempt to develop the National Libera-
tion Front (FLN) as a united front to guide the
revolution politically and to control effectively
the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN),
the PCV-MIR paramilitary forces. The FLN and FALN
merely formalized the factious PCV-MIR alliance
under new titles, but failed to attract any other
opposition political elements, except a handful
of military defectors and common criminals. More-
over, the MIR had proved to be increasingly inde-
pendent and impulsive as a revolutionary bedfellow.
On the other hand, the so-called hard-line fac-
tion of the PCV was firmly in charge of party pol-
icies and had successfully intimidated or squelched
the soft-liners, even though the latter could now
point to actual Communist reverses to support the
"accuracy" of their position. The party had gleaned
a number of practical lessons from its experience
with urban and rural violence. Although the guer-
rillas had little peasant support, the paramilitary
units in both country and city were intact and con-
stituted a potential threat to political stability
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and a psychological barb to the Leoni government.
Fially, the armed struggle was an irreversible
path which offered no retreat without risk of a
poSsible breach in PCV ranks, a probable falling
out with the MIR, and complete discredit of the
PO/ before the Venezuelan public.
The first major modification of the revolu-
tionary phase of the program was adopted in 1964
and ratified by the makeshift central committee
plenum in the spring of the year. The supremacy
of the armed struggle was reaffirmed. As in the
pat, "other forms of struggle" were subordinated
but not excluded. In contrast to the initial em-
phasis on a quick victory through urban warfare,
the party officially adopted the line that the
VOlezuelan revolution would be a "prolonged strug
gle" of indefinite duration and insisted that it
was a nationally manufactured product- not a "me-
chanical transplant" of any foreign experience.
Tactics also shifted. Within the "superior
for of armed struggle," guerrilla warfare and
de elopment of a supporting peasant base were to
reCeive priority attention, while urban paramili-
tary action was relegated to a supporting, com-
plementary role. A new effort was to be made to
incorporate all opposition forces, regardless of
ideology, in the FLN, which was theoretically the
supreme political organ of the revolution and di?
reCtor of the military campaigns of the FALN.
It decisions were to be made effective throughout
the nation and especially over the military com-
mands. The PCV also decided to intensify its ef-
forts to penetrate the Venezuelan Armed Forces
(FAV) and encourage further defection and dissen-
si n within their ranks. The failure to attain
a uick victory through urban terrorism necessi-
talted these adjustments. The controlling hard-
line faction within the PCV was forced to 4'ational-
iz its strategy for internal party consumption;
it had to present a new line of action within the
arOed struggle or admit its errors in choosing
this path to power. While facing up to its tac-
tical--rather than strategic--miscues in pursu-
in revolution, the PCV tried to portray the
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electoral outcome as additional proof that social-
ism could not be achieved except through violence.
The armed struggle was allegedly provoked by the
suppressive measures of "thOoligarchy," which had
crushed all hope of the "democratic popular" forces
for traversing the via pacifica.
The revolutionary phase of the Communist pro-
gram has not altered substantially since the plenum
of 1964. The conduct of guerrilla campaigns and
the strengthening of guerrilla forces have been
stressed in relation to sporadic urban terrorism
during this period. The Communists have allocated
the bulk of their sizable funds to keeping the
Communist and MIR guerrilla forces alive and cap-
able of making occasional strikes in various parts
of the country.
But the party, taking advantage of changes in
the situation under the Leoni government, appears
as of mid-1965 to be tending toward renewed empha-
sis on the mass struggle, as foreshadowed by the
central committee plenum in the spring of 1964.
Hence, it may be at the verge of a second modifi-
cation in the revolutionary phase of its program.
Leoni's coalition government, which includes the
AD and two relatively untested partners--the URD
and the National Democratic Front (FND)--appears
weaker than its predecessor and more inclined
toward appeasing leftist pressures.
The PCV views the potential and actual strains
in the coalition as offering a fertile field for
exploitation. The party is not only maintaining
its associations with several leftist groups which
remained intact after the 1963 elections but has
also been conducting liaison during 1965 with cer-
tain leaders of all three coalition parties and
with elements of COPEI. Perhaps with excessive
optimism, it has interpreted as highly favorable
the prospects for "united" action to promote cer-
tain issues and objectives, such as release of po-
litical prisoners, rehabilitation of the PCV and
MIR, and popular demonstrations against increases
in the cost of living and unemployment.
Perhaps influenced by these factors, the cen-
tral committee plenum of April 1965 determined
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that the "great majority" of the Venezuelan people
is, not at war and hence "war is not today the domi-
nant factor in the country." The party, it decided,
mut therefore amplify the program with the "most
va ied forms of struggLe, of which the armed strug-
gl is the superior one, but not the only one by
anr means." The PCV should open its arms to the
pe ple and generate a "new mentality" for revolu-
ti n. The FALN would continue to be the instru-
me t to coordinate and incorporate the masses into
th armed struggle, in order to transform it into.
"tie truly dominant form of struggle." The central
th me and objective in expanding forms of the mass
st uggle would be attainment of a "government of
deMocratic peace," embracing all political groups
opposed to the "Betancourt gorilla clique."
Essentially the PCV, while retaining the pri-
macy of the "revolution" in theory and practice,
waS seeking to extend its freedom for overt po-
litical action--that is, attempting to reconcile
twO irreconcilable tactics,
one 01 its purposes was to appease the soft-line
fafrtion in the PCV, which had long resented the
methods and the results of the hard-line directors.
But the new call for "a government of democratic
peace" aroused the fears and ire of the hard-line
MIR faction, which adamantly opposes any modifica-
tin of the revolutionary strategy. The PCV has
crled to make the line on a "government of demo-
tic peace" more palatable to the MIR by insist-
in that the guerrillas are in the field, that
th ir actions speak to the Venezuelan people, and
hence require no special propaganda.
The PCV program as of mid-1965 seemed to be
drifting. Whatever new direction the party chooses,
it faces serious problems.
The Conflict Within the PCV Leadership
Sharp and enduring
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divisions arose in the PCV over the issue of the
lucha armada, as advocated by the hard-liners, vs.
the via pacifica, as advocated by the soft-liners;
but 1T?is overly simplified and partly misleading
to think of the Venezuelan Communist leaders as
divided entirely into hard-liners and soft-liners,
or to consider these two terms as equivalent to
"pro-Chinese" and "pro-Soviet." Among the PCV
leaders a large number--possibly the majority--
vacillated, had reservations about one or both
programs, or altered their stand on this criti-
cal issue after 1960. Factors determining the
party's position included not only these leaders'
changing estimates of the relative efficacy of
the two programs for achieving power, but also
personal rivalries among leaders and pressures
from the PCV's allies.
The young leaders among the PCV's collabora-
tors--the Marxist wing of AD (which later became
the MIR) and the URD--had considerable influence
in pushing the Communists into violence. Innately
radical by orientation and attracted to sensational
methods, many of them had played prominent parts
in the clandestine ci-
vilian movement which
ousted Perez Jimenez.
They lost their posi-
tions, fame, and pub-
licity shortly after
the old guard leaders
of the AD and URD re-
turned to Venezuela
from exile. Frustrated
and resentful when rel-
egated to secondary
roles in their parties,
these Castroite lead-
ers were prepared to
defect with their fol-
lowers and take any
short cut for regain-
ing prestige and power.
For them, the step
from legal action to
insurrection was not
a diffcult one. Castro
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FALN guerrilla leader in Portuguesa
State (1965). Figure 5.
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and his success provided
a powerful concrete ex-
ample and stimulus.
Among the better
known of such young
(and then) non-Commu-
nist leaders were:
Fabricio Ojeda of the
URD, head of the Pa-
triotic Junta, congress-
man, and ultimately an
honorary officer in the
Cuban revolutionary armed
forces; Simon Saez Merida
of the AD, acting AD
secretary general during
the dictatorship, mem-
ber of the Patriotic
DOWN ALBERTI:0%04n Junta, and ultimately
Leader of oft-line faction on MIR, a top hard-line leader
arrested in 1963. Figure 6. of the MIR; and Domingo
I Alberto Rangel of AD,
leader of his party's
Marxist faction, first secretary general of the
MIR, and devotee of Castro.
I
In the PCV itself there was also something of
a divisi n between older, more moderate leaders
at the t p and aggressive younger men eager to gain
more power within the party. After the arrest of
most of the top Communists during 1963, control of
the party fell by default to those few central com-
mittee members who remained at large and to the
directorsIl of the youth and guerrilla movements.
The PCV became a radically different organization,
as regardj leadership, from that existing at the
time of tie Third Party Congress in March 1961;
those tak ng over were those who had staked their
persona/ utures and political careers on the suc-
cess of t e resort to violence. On the other
hand, fewof the jailed leaders--including the
moderate old guard--were completely uninvolved in
the stratc4y of the lucha armada.
When the Third Congress opened, the PCV already
had a str ng and apparently growing nucleus of
leaders wh wanted to adopt the revolutionary line,
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and their position was strengthened by the PCV and
MIR youth and the hard-liners in URD and MIR. But
only a minority of the central committee, as com-
posed at that time, can be unqualifiedly catalogued
as hard or soft-line.
Ultimately, a dynamic, aggressive faction of
the PCV won control of the party and apparently
was able to attract the support of those who vacil-
lated on the issue of the armed struggle. At a
critical point in Venezuelan politics, the old
guard apparently failed to inspire confidence and
firm guidance. Leaders like Gustavo Machado, Pedro
Ortega Diaz, and Jesus Faria had become wearied by
the years of violence, exile, and imprisonment
through which they had passed and probably shrank
from further intraparty controversy.
Pompeyo Marquez, clan-
destine leader and princi-
pal architect and theorist
of the armed struggle, ap-
pears to have been the
most powerful single per-
sonality in the hard-line
camp. He is believed to
have had the support of
such leaders as Teodoro
Petkoff, Douglas Bravo,
and Guillermo Garcia Ponce
German Lairet, Eloy Torres
Alberto Lovera, Alonso
Ojeda Olaechea, and Rafael
E. Martinez. All these
were or became exponents
of revolution. Jesus
Faria was reportedly the
only top, leader at the
central committee'plenum of
December 1962 who voted
against the "superior form"
of struggle. Others who
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JESUS FARIA
PCV member since 1936, secretary general
and one of three main leaders from 1958
until arrest in 1963. Figure 7.
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apparently had serious reservations about violence,
either after the electoral fiasco of December 1963
or after the Third Congress, ?were Gustavo Machado,
Augusto Leon Arocha, Pedro Ortega Diaz, Hector
Mujica, Servando Garcia Ponce, and Hernani Porto-
carrera.
The antagonism between hard and soft-line fac-
tions crystallized before the presidential election
of Decemller 1963 and the major defeat it entailed
for the tactic of violence. The available Communist
"white papers" for and against the revolutionary
strategy were essentially diatribes containing mu-
tual acc sations that the other side was "wrong"
in judgi g Venezuelan conditions and the strength
of the e emy. On the other hand, both factions
seemed tc recognize that "revolutionary strategy,"
once initiated, left little face-saving means of
retreat for the party.
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The policy of the hard line was staunchly de-
fended by student and guerrilla leaders. They
merely Mouthed the thoughts of Marquez. According
to Alfredo Maneiro, a top guerrilla field commander,
"no one" doubted that the proper path was the armed
strugg10--the question was whether time and con-
ditions were ripe. Maneiro claimed that the very
survival of the FALN guerrilla forces in Venezuela
after three years of fighting proved the "right-
ness" of the decision. Similarly, guerrilla leader
Douglas ravo defended the strategy during an inter-
view wit a journalist who allegedly penetrated
into his retreat in the mountains of Falcon State.
Bravo ex lained that "events" and the example of
Castro d termined the ineluctable path to revo-
lution i Venezuela. Once embarked on this path,
"we disc vered that retreat was impossible." Bravo
admitted that although there was a "radicalization"
in the hart of the party, "certain directors,
among th m the oldest, remained skeptical about the
fate of he guerrillas and even questioned their
necessit ."
The Soft Liners' Activity
The soft-liners seemed to lose all effective
voice in party councils after late 1962 but appar-
ently ciscussed policy among themselves and the
means to rectify the serious "errors" of party
"adventu ism." They complained bitterly about the
heavy-handed, railroad tactics of the hard-line
leaders. They also sought the company of the soft-
line faction of the MIR to share in their misery.
The PCV soft-line faction condemned the armed
struggle as the reckless distortion of the true
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national liberation" in Venezuela by a "capricious"
and irresponsible group of MIR and PCV leaders and
youth elements. These elements, they charged,
"ruthlessly suppressed" all opinion opposed to the
"erroneous path toward the debacle." The "messi-
anic figure of Castro" loomed in the background to
inspire the "subjective drunkenness" of the mili-
tant Communists. In addition, the soft-liners be-
lieved that the mass struggle was shunted aside by
the PCV, partly to prevent "the hotheads of the
MIR" frompre-empting the Venezuelan revolution.
The soft-liners variously(brandedthe era of
violence with epithets, such as "total defeat,"
"fiasco," and the product of "petty bourgeois ca-
price." They noted that the armed struggle had
resulted in the loss of the party's assets in the
legal sphere and the imprisonment of its most ex-
perienced leaders. They also alleged that "the
debacle of the revolutionary movement was acceler-
ated once its direction fell into hands even more
inexpert and ignorant than the predecessors."
According to a soft-line historical view of this
period, the Communists wound up in 1965 "without
a party, unions, and popular masses." The author
recognized, however, that valuable experience had
been gained through the armed struggle and con-
ceded that the "small flame" of the revolutionary
struggle and the "impotent guerrilla nuclei" had
to be kept alive.
Soft-liners did not hesitate to denounce or
criticize the armed struggle program before lead-
ers of the CPSU when opportunities presented them-
selves. For example, it was a soft-line repre-
sentative--Servando Garica Ponce, TASS representa-
tive in Caracas--who planted the famous "interview"
of MIR soft-liner Americo Chacon, which appeared
in the Soviet party paper Pravda in July 1964.
Chacon roundly criticized the errors of the armed
struggle strategy in Venezuela and called for a
return to the mass struggle; his statements ade-
quately parroted the feelings of his counterparts
in the PCV. Carlos Augusto Leon, central committee
member and one of the leading soft-liners, prob-
ably complained about the revolutionary program
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ting Moscow in 1964. A few months later,
ela, he briefed two visiting TASS corre-
on the egregious distortions made about
gth of the guerrilla movement. He appar-
ed his presentation would reach influential
oscow.
The latest evolution of the PCV program, which
places renewed emphasis on various forms of mass
action centered around attaining a "government of
democratic peace," indicates in part an effort to-
ward .ra,prochement between the factions of party
leadership. This new line probably had the endorse-
ment of many of the imprisoned senior leaders of
the par-07, including Pompeyo Marquez, principal de-
signer of the revolutionary strategy. Writing from
prison Ter the pseudonym of "Carlos Valencia" in
April 19 5, Marquez made statements with definite
soft-line flavor:
All the objective conditions exist
to attain a government of democratic
peace, which comprehends full amnesty,
the total enforcement of the constitu-
tio ; defense of freedom of expression,
reh bilitation of the PCV and MIR, and
put ing in operation the measures which
fav r the masses and the development of
the independence of the nation.
Concentrating all efforts in this
dir ction; uniting all those who, in
one form or another, may favor a strug-
gle for these objectives; placing the
great masses in motion, utilizing all
the forms of struggle with boldness,
fir ness, and perseverance in order to
win over to the national trends all the
fac ors of power, are tasks which cannot
be voided under any pretext. And ones
whi h the revolutionaries are capable
of promoting with success.
This is the most impressive method
of reaking the continuismo of the Betan-
court policy; of ending a period of pre-
emi ence of a regime which has turned its
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back on Venezuela and the great national
majorities.
Privately, Alberto Lovera, the top leader of
the PCV paramilitary forces, noted that "the immense
majority" of the central committee had endorsed the
tactic of working for a "government of democratic
peace."
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II. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCV
During the period since 1958, the PCV has been
subject to a number of influences and pressures from
abroad. While maintaining the traditional link with
Moscow, the party has apparently sought or welcomed
material and propaganda support from all international
Communist sources and has been willing to say the
right thing at the right place to obtain it. Of the
varied foreign influences exerted on the PC'!, those
from Cuba have certainly been the most important.
The Cuban ingredient, indeed, is indispensable to
render the recent history of the party rational and
comprehensible.
Castroism and the PCV
The impact of Cuban events on Venezuelan public
opinion has already been noted; this impact was par-
ticularly heavy on the PCV. Without the Cuban revo-
lution and the magnetic personal appeal of Castro,
it is unlikely that the moderate majority of the
politburo and the central committee would have chosen
the armed struggle as the "inevitable" route to power.
The emotional attraction of Castro's example is well
illustrated by the PCV's willingness to attempt an
artificial transplant of his Sierra Maestra experience
and undertake guerrilla warfare with inadequately
trained leaders, little peasant support, and only
limited knowledge of local terrain and other condi-
tions. The connection of course can be seen in finer
detail in the beards and berets, fatigues and cigars,
pockets stuffed with clip pencils, and other Castroite
accessories copied by the city-dwelling Venezuelan
guerrilla leaders, many of whom were professional
university students in Caracas. Certainly neighbor-
ing Colombia, where the Communists had been involved
in rural violence for many years and at one period
in extensive guerrilla operations, had never been
such an inspiration to the PCV.
The importance of the Cuban example was ac-
knowledgedby both factions within the PCV. In the
view of a soft-liner, the "Cuban example" and "the
messianic figure of Castro" fired the imagination
of "the masses, the petty bourgeois, and the party
hotheads" and created the climate for insurrection.
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Douglas Bravo, the guerrilla leader, noted the same
effects. When explaining the PCV's resort to the
armed struggle, he ranked the Cuban example first
among causes and the virtual sine qua non of the
Venezuelan national liberation movement:
First, just one year after the abor-
tive Venezuelan revolution of 23 January
1958, Cuba strikes like a thunderbolt
against legalism and skepticism. The vic-
tory of an anti-imperialist revolution is
possible in South America, not in 20 or 30
years, but now. That is the bomb about
which one cannot talk enough, although, on
the ther hand, one always does talk too
much about Cuba when he wants to describe
a revolution in South America based on the
Cuban model.
What made the Cuban example especially potent
was the evident fact that Castro had won against tre-
mendous military odds in an area "at the doorstep"
of the United States. Nor did the PCV overlook the
point that Castro's success won him extensive mili-
tary, political)and economic support from the USSR
and other Communist powers. Such aid implied an
express endorsement of Castro 's methods for achiev-
ing power and suggested that similar bounty might
be forthcoming to others following in his path.
The Castro regime worked actively by various
means to strengthen its appeal in Venezuela. After
mid-1959, a steady stream of Communists, Miristas,
and other leftists traveled to Cuba--some of them
frequentl --to be feted and indoctrinated at the
fountainh ad of regional revolution. Marquez, Ojeda,
Rangel, M rtinez, Bravo, Gallegos, Lovera and many
others wh became the prominent figures in the armed
struggle Made their pilgrimages to Havana.
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Apart from this direct revolutionary stimulus
to Venezuelan leaders, the controlled Havana radio
and press after about mid-1960 kept up a relentless
barrage of anti-Betancourt propaganda which directly
encouraged Venezuelan extremists to violence. The
message from Havana was loud, clear, and consistent,
with variations on a single theme: it called for
Venezuelan patriots to rise up and rid themselves
of Betancourt, the lackey of imperialism, and to
use bullets rather than ballots to reach their goals.
Venezuelan leftists were advised not to wait for
revolutionary conditions to ripen, but to make their
own conditions without delay, as Castro had done.
This propaganda, which included the frequent pro-
nouncements of top Cuban officials, left no doubt
that Venezuela was the leading target of Castro's
program for exporting socialist-type upheavals in
the hemisphere.
Once the armed struggle was well under way,
Cuban propaganda publicized and exaggerated the
"successes" of the FLN/FALN operations and gave un-
conditional guarantee of the solidarity of Cuba
with the "popular struggle" in Venezuela. Che
Guevara, whose book on guerrilla warfare was a
best seller among the Venezuelan revolutionaries
and whose articles were circulated within the PCV,
made a typical pronouncement in late 1964:
The Venezuelan patriots to the east and
west of Caracas have liberated areas....
Let us always remember that the presence
of a living, combative Cuba is an example
which gives hope and moves all men of the
entire world who struggle for their liber-
ation, particularly the patriots of our
continent who speak our language.
Cuba also gave more tangible assistance to the
PCV, but with the implicit condition that overt revo-
lutionary activity be undertaken. Probably the most
important type of Cuban aid was the training of cadres
in sabotage, use of explosives, and tactics of urban
and guerrilla warfare. An estimated 400 Venezuelans
had completed courses in these subjects by the end
of 1964 and had returned to their country to provide
leadership and "technical" skill for the revolution
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there. Cuban financial grants, primarily but not
exclusively through the PCV, cannot be estimated
accuratel but were vital to the FALN because the
guerrillas could not "live off the land." One Cuban
defector estimated that direct support to the FLN/
FALN from mid-1960 to the end of 1964 was about $1
million. All forms of Cuban subsidies to the PCV,
MIR, and LN/FALN since 1960, including propaganda
support, training, and travel,expenditures, may, how-
ever, amount to several millions of dollars. There
have been many reported attempts by Cuba to trans-
port arms to Venezuela direct or through other coun-
tries--Algeria, Colombia, and British Guiana--but
the three-ton arms cache discovered by the Venezuelan
Government in November 1963 is the only sizable ship-
ment on which there is confirmation of Cuban origin.
Sinc the Havana Conference of Latin American
Communist parties in November 1964, Cuban policy to-
ward the SJenezuelan armed struggle has been modified
to some degree. For example, there are indications
that Cuba is reluctant to train large numbers of
Venezuela s in guerrilla operations, as it has in
the past, and that it will not risk compromise by
direct sh*pment of arms from Cuban ports. These
changes h ve possibly been adopted under the con-
tinuing pressure of the USSR.
On the other hand, Castro has staked his pres-
tige and bid for leadership of the Communist revo-
lution in the hemisphere largely on the success of
the Venezuelan venture and may still be supplying
substantial sums of money to the PCV for distribu-
tion to the FALN guerrillas. Cuba also is probably
financing the FLN/FALN "diplomatic" missions in
Havana and possibly Venezuelan revolutionary agents
in Paris, London, and Rome--and backing their efforts
to obtain foreign support. Cuban propaganda in be-
half of the Venezuelan armed struggle continues with-
out abateMent and is partly systematized through
special pro-Venezuelan organizations and radio pro-
grams in Havana. Moreover, Cuban officials, as late
as the end of 1964, had not altered their view that
success for the Venezuelan revolution would come in
the not too distant future. In any event, their
estimate Nirs far more optimistic than that of the
PCV leaders, although the latter apparently did not
try to destroy these illusions.
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The PCV remains highly sensitive to the opinion
of Castro and other Cuban officials. For example,
the party made special efforts to justify to the
Cubans in the spring of 1965 its program for a "gov-
ernment of democratic peace" and other aspects of
the mass struggle, as set forth in the central com-
mittee plenum of that date. Moreover, when the PCV
learned that a derogatory rumor had reached Castro's
ears about an alleged split of the party into three
factions--one for peaceful methods, one for concilia-
tion and compromise with the ruling forces, and one
inflexibly backing armed struggle--the party hierarchy
immediately took steps to rectify this "falsehood."
The Soviet Attitude Toward the PCV
The attitude of the CPSU toward the traditionally
pro-Soviet PCV after it became committed to the armed
struggle was largely governed by broad considerations
of Soviet foreign policy; by the relations and loy-
alties of Communist parties throughout the world; and
by the Chinese challenge to Moscow's primacy in deter-
mining the strategy of the international Communist
movement. Moscow's policy was affected largely by
its recognition of the predominant influence of the
United States in Latin America. Soviet leaders seemed
well aware--and even more keenly so after October 1962
--that to endorse an openly aggressive course in Latin
America invited a response from the US and also risked
destructive attack from strong "indigenous forces of
reaction" such as the military.
The abmiguous and vaguely defined Soviet policy
toward the PCV, at least until the end of 1964, was
closely related to Soviet problems in dealing with
the Castro regime. Moscow's support for Latin Ameri-
can Communists has to some degree always been measured
against the USSR's most important goal of assuring
the political and economic viability of Cuba. After
the missile crisis and the threat which it posed to
world peace, the USSR apparently wanted to avoid ad-
ditional confrontations with the United States over
the Cuban issue. It also wanted to avoid any inter-
national incidents which might be provoked by,Castro's
free-wheeling attempts to support revolution in the
rest of Latin America. Castro's deep involvement in
the Venezuelan armed struggle probably suggested
to the CPSU that he was most likely to be compro-
mised in this area. At the same time, Moscow and Peking
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were competing for Castro's affections and the Krem-
lin could notpress him too hard without running the
risk of lOsing him to the Chinese.
Aftei? the discovery in November 1963 of the
Cuban arm g cache in Venezuela--the very type of
"boat-rocking" the Kremlin was seeking to avoid--
Soviet leaders probably stepped up efforts to con-
vince Castro to iron out his own economic difficulties
and curb his support for militant groups outside Cuba.
Khrushche repbrtedly insisted at one point that Cuba
stop traiiliing Venezuelans in guerrilla warfare and
stop risking its own self-preservation by other types
of interv ntionist activity. The Cubans chafed under
these pre sures, but apparently conformed to them in
some degree. At any rate, the Soviet effort to in-
terdict Castro's foreign adventurism may also re-
flect a measure of CPSU skepticism about the wisdom
of the national liberation movement in Venezuela.
MoscOw's difficulties in controlling Castro,
his vacillation in the Sino-Soviet dispute, his in-
volvement in the Venezuelan revolution, and Chinese
accusatio s that Moscow opposed the use of violence
in areas 4ominated by "imperialism" left the CPSU
little ro m for maneuver in dealings with the PCV.
The Chinese would certainly have pounced on any So-
viet pretre on the PCV to return to the mass struggle
or any So iet criticism of the armed struggle in Vene-
zuela as a case in point for their "revisionist" charges
against Khrushchev. Thus the Soviet appraisal of the
Venezuelan armed struggle was submerged in the Cuban
and Chinege dilemmas.
Alth ugh the PCV is believed to have dispatched
a high-le el leader to Moscow to "explain" the bases
for the Venezuelan revolution after its adoption by
the party in 1962, there apparently was no consulta-
tion with CPSU leaders in advance. Despite the
neutralist stance adopted by the PCV in the Sino-
Soviet digpute, Moscow was probably fully aware that
the Venez
rather th
"pro-Chin
that the
disrupt t
the Commu
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elan armed struggle was largely of Castroite
n Chinese inspiration,and that the PCV was not
se" in orientation. There are indications
SU--at least before the PCV's failure to
e elections of December 1963--estimated
1st and pro-Communist paramilitary forces
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to be stronger than they were and to have a reason-
able chance to overthrow the Betancourt regime.
The ambiguous attitude of Moscow toward the
PCV's domestic program--at least through 1963--con-
trasts sharply with its heavy-handed pressure to
align the Venezuelan party behind the CPSU in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. On the latter issue, Khrush-
chev himself reportedly attempted to extract com-
pliance from one of the top Venezuelan Communist
leaders in early 1963.
Some specific Soviet actions reflect an acquies-
cence in the armed struggle, if not positive approval.
For example, the USSR provided training for at least
one small group of Venezuelans in paramilitary opera-
tions, although this assistance was probably designed
to match similar Chinese training and to undercut any
possible Chinese allegations that the USSR opposed
the national liberation in Venezuela.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the CPSU
furnished any sizable financial aid to the PCV for
carrying out the revolution prior to 1964.
Trends in Soviet propaganda on the PCV, FLN,
FALN, and the armed struggle in general reflect the
changing and ambiguous Soviet attitudes toward the
Venezuelan party and program. Initially, the Soviet
media praised the "popular" struggle in Venezuela;
but in early 1964 there was a shift in tone, content,
and volume of the propaganda related to the PCV.
These modifications may have been connected with the
failure of the party to disrupt the elections, the
discovery of the Cuban arms cache, and the PCV's
continuing insistence on neutrality in the Sino-
Soviet rift. In addition, the Venezuelan revolu-
tion was creating the impression among some Latin
American parties that the PCV was following a "pro-
Chinese" line.
At this point, the soft-line leaders of the
PCV--who professed absolute loyalty to the CPSU and
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branded the hard-liners "pro-Chinese"--found a more
favorabl reception in Moscow for their denunciations
of the s rategy of armed struggle.
It as in July 1964 that Pravda published the
statements of a leading Venezuelan soft-liner, Americo
Chacon, roundly denouncing the armed struggle and
appealing for a return to the via pacifica. In ad-
dition to this sharp rebuke, Pravda published in Sep-
tember similar statements against the program of vio-
lence by 1Miguel Otero Silva, ex-Communist and publisher.
A few weeks later, Eduardo Gallegos Mancera, a PCV sec-
retary fOr international relations, received a chilly
reception in Moscow. In contrast, he had been feted
during visits to Peking and Hanoi that summer, and
his pro-Chinese revolutionary statements received ex-
tensive publicity in these two capitals. Moreover,
Gallegos' published comments in Moscow were stripped
of the militant revolutionary content and stressed
the PCV's attempts to restore peace to Venezuela.
But even these criticisms by the CPSU of the Vene-
zuelan party and the armed struggle were essentially
indirect in their approach.
Khru hchev's ouster and the Havana Conference of
Latin Ame ican parties--which was directed and con-
trolled, hough perhaps not initiated, by Moscow--
brought a out a perceptible adjustment in CPSU atti-
tudes toward the PCV. Soviet policy began to assume
a clear-cut form compared to its previous vagueness
and ambigOty. Similarly, the priorities of Soviet
objective S in relation to the parties in Latin America
seemed to have changed. The new Soviet line no longer
sought ex ress public commitment by Communist parties
to the US R in the rift with China. Instead, the CPSU
apparentl was attempting to counter Chinese influence
by preven ing schisms in orthodox parties, checking
the multi lication of pro-Chinese organizations, and
restoring a measure of its former influence over Latin
American Party programs, particularly its guidance
over revolutionary movements in progress. A high-
level representative of the CPSU in early 1965 pro-
fessed to frecognize the right of fraternal parties
to pursue their own independent "patriotic" programs
based on t eir own evaluation of conditions, and even
to voice o casional disagreement to Moscow, as the
Italian pa ty has done. He also conceded that violence
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in promoting the "national liberation" was still a
valid concept in underdeveloped areas, even in Latin
America to a certain extent.
The Havana meeting of Latin American parties in
late November 1964 was essentially al\rapprochement or
gentlemen's agreement among the CPSU, the Cubans,and
the other orthodox parties in the hemisphere. The de-
cisions set forth new guidelines for revolutions as
well as for regional and other international support
for these revolutions. The CPSU accepted the armed
struggles where they were in progress and urged Com-
munist organizations to exercise greater control over
these movements; it seemed to recognize that the clock
could not be turned back on these movements without
serious-to-disastrous effects on the parties involved.
The Venezuelan liberation movement was specifically
singled out for the seal of regional and Soviet ap-
proval, possibly because Castro had given it top
priority in his subversive campaigns and despite the
skepticism of certain fraternal parties in the area.
The joint communiqud on the final resolutions
of the Havana conference, released simultaneously
from Moscow and Havana in early 1965, called for
hemisphere support for the Venezuelan armed struggle.
Among other things, it also called for a campaign to
obtain the release of political prisoners. That Pom-
pey? Marquez, architect of the Venezuelan "prolonged
struggle," was the third among a few prominent pris-
oners listed by name in this resolution, suggests that
Moscow did not view his influential leadership as
hopelessly Chinese in orientation.
Conforming to the decisions taken at Havana and
subsequently "edited" in Moscow, the CPSU in the
spring of 1965 informed the PCV that it would "re-
double its efforts" to promote the liberation of
Venezuela and would encourage other fraternal parties
to do the same. The top leader of the Venezuelan
paramilitary forces, one of two identified Venezue-
lan delegates at the Havana meeting, was in Moscow
shortly thereafter and personally requested moral
and financial backing from CPSU officials. He sub-
sequently admitted that the Venezuelan guerrilla
movement depended on "outside aid" and expressed
confidence that it would not be cut off. The sub-
stantial sums of money reaching the PCV from abroad
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in early 1965 to finance the FLN/FALN operations
were possibly supplied in part, and perhaps mainly,
by Moscow through carefully concealed channels.
The belated blessing which Moscow gave to the
Venezuelab armed struggle in late 1964 seems in the
nature of a reluctant but gracious recognition of an
accomplis ed fact over which Moscow had little in-
fluence. In any event the CPSU's relations with the
PCV after late 1961 fell far short of whole-hearted
enthusias0 and support of the PCV program. The con-
ciliatory l moves by Moscow in early 1965 appear an
attempt tO restore subtly a measure of guidance and
control oVer the PCV which was weakened by the PCV's
unique tet of its autonomy in the Sino-Soviet rift.
In ally event, given the advantages of hindsight,
the CPSU robably came to harbor some serious reser-
vations oii the resort to the armed struggle in Vene-
zuela and Castro's role in it, apart from the poten-
tial repercussions on Cuba's own security of a Cuban
intervention in Venezuelan affairs. Efforts of the
Italian C mmunist Party to encourage the PCV to
moderate its program toward emphasis on rebuilding
mass supp rt may have been encouraged--if not ini-
tiated--b3i the CPSU. Moscow is not likely to have
viewed with indifference the decimation of the ex-
tensive aSsets for the "mass struggle" of one of the
largest and most influential parties in Latin America
--and in a country where "imperialist" capital in-
vestment is highly concentrated. Even though Moscow
had no diplomatic mission and no cultural and economic
stake of any size in Caracas, it had reason to regret
that Castro did not attempt to cultivate friendly
relations with Venezuela and to refrain from inter-
vening in Venezuela's internal affairs. Had Cuba
followed t ese two policies, Venezuela rather than
the USSR m ght have ended up supplying most of Cuban
oil import requirements and Cuba might have remained
a member (in poor standing) of the OAS and unfettered
by the reictions of an OAS boycott. The cost of
Cuba's tangling with the Venezuelan Government and
supporting the Venezuelan armed struggle was borne
indirectly by Moscow.
The aticle of Vadim Listov in,. the May 1965 issue
of New Times may also suggest the CPSU's preference
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for the traditional united front strategy in Latin
America. Listov noted that the Dominican crisis
demonstrated the efficacy of broad, united leftist
fronts in the area as a means for loosening the grip
of "imperialism." Two years earlier the same Soviet
journalist was writing praise of the revolutionary
armed struggle in Venezuela under the direction of
the FLN/FALN.
In sum, Moscow's approach to the diffuse and
varied conditions under which Communist parties op-
erate in Latin America had been quite pragmatic, and
largely responsive to internal conditions beyond
Soviet control. The Russians probably recognize
their present inability to control the policies of
the Latin American left and the unlikelihood of their
achieving such control. Moscow's effort to exert in-
fluence over Latin American insurgent groups has been
tempered by its experiences in Afro-Asia, e.g., the
Congo. As a general rule, the Russians have encouraged
rebel factions to adopt less militant revolutionary
programs and to concentrate instead on political ac-
tion in collaboration with other "progressive forces."
This attitude reflects Moscow's view that prevalent
political conditions in Latin America demonstrate
that the "united front" tactic holds out the promise
of more success in more countries than any other
course.
At the same time, the USSR's political and eco-
nomic stake in the continent is relatively small and
it stands to lose little by providing insurgents with
some assistance as long as it does not risk running
seriously afoul of the US. The USSR considers such
support as the only alternative to a complete loss
of control and influence over "progressive forces."
In Venezuela, the Soviet's action in supplying some
of the funds for the prosecution of the FLN/FALN's
campaign of rural guerrilla warfare was largely moti-
vated by the hope of regaining some leverage over
the future direction of the effort in Venezuela.
Communist China and the Venezuelan Armed Struggle
The PCV's program and rationale for the armed
struggle, particularly after the party placed em-
phasis on rural rather than urban warfare, seems on
the surface to have been patterned closely after
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Chineserevolutionary doctrine. Chinese encourage-
ment of ,wars of national liberation in underdeveloped
areas had not completely neglected the Venezuelans.
Three kV leaders, including Pompeyo Marquez, were
among the Latin American representatives in Peking
in 1959.1 Mao had lectured this group on Chinese revo-
lutionary experience and emphasized its applicability
to the Latin American area, pointing out that the Cu-
ban upheaval demonstrated that the "imperialist paper
tiger" c6uld be defeated in its own "backyard." Other
Venezuelan Communists have traveled to China and some
have been trained there in subsequent years.
1
But the Chinese have not exercised a pronounced
influence on the path which the PCV has chosen to
follow snce 1959. In fact, it is unusual that the
hard-linkfaction of the PCV did not turn more to
China to reinforce its arguments in justification
of the aitmed struggle and to obtain tangible forms
of assistance from this source. It must have been
aware tht the Ecuadorean Communists were given
generous Chinese aid on one occasion for the prepara-
tory sta of revolution.
Alth
Communist
miration
soft line
not in an
molds.
par ison,
parties,
"armed st
rate pro-
Colombian
ugh many PCV leaders are versed in Chinese
history and probably have considerable ad-
or Chinese "achievements," the hard and
Venezuelan Communists, respectively, do
sense fit into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet
ot thus far, at any rate. By way of com-
everal other Latin American Communist
ost of which have not yet engaged in the
uggle," have fragmented and developed sepa-
hinese and pro-Soviet organizations. The
Communist Party is a recent example.
In a general way, the PCV has been influenced
by Chinese doctrine on revolutionary strategy--doc-
trine which in practical application is not easily
differentiited from Cuban theory--but apparently to
no greater degree than most Latin American parties.
The Venezu lan Communist definition of armed revo-
lution as the "superior form of struggle" is identi-
cal to thel Chinese line and probably of Chinese in-
spiration. I PCV leaders have also studied the major
works of Chinese apostles like Mao and Liu Shao-chi,
and apparently applied some of these ideas ex post
facto to their own experiences in the domestic
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environment.
The PCV leaders see some parallels between
their experience and that of the Chinese, but mostly
in retrospect. The important guerrilla leader,
Douglas Bravo, has observed that Venezuela will pass
through Mao's three stages of guerrilla struggle.
Moreover, Venezuelan Communists are told to follow
certain Chinese tactics; the guerrillas, for example,
are advised to adhere to Mao's instruction and be
"like fish in the water." Chinese theory, example,
and influence did not stimulate the PCV to action,
however. The Venezuelan party emphasized a non-
Chinese tactic by initially adopting urban terror-
ism in the search for a quick victory, and turned
to guerrilla warfare and the "prolonged struggle"
in the countryside only after this effort failed.
It might be noted, however, that this approach was
also non-Cuban in origin and dictated by the fact that
the PCV,had an urban apparatus and urban support
but little peasant backing. When pointing to the
need to revitalize urban terrorist units as an es-
sential complement to guerrilla warfare, a PCV para-
military leader recently stated, "This is not China."
Geographical remoteness, the PCV's traditional
tie to Moscow, limitations on Chinese resources
available for subversive activities in Latin America,
?and the problems in channeling aid without an estab-
lished diplomatic mission in the hemisphere (except
in Cuba) are factors limiting Chinese influence on
the PCV. The Chinese are known to have trained at
least three groups of Venezuelan Communists in guer-
rilla warfare, but are not believed to have provided
any other direct support in sizable amounts for the
armed struggle in Venezuela as of mid-1965. A party
leader claimed in August, however, that he had re-
ceived a Chinese commitment to supply substantial
monetary aid.
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Despite their nominal impact on the PCV, the
Chinese Communists have consistently regarded the
Venezuelan armed struggle with unqualified approval.
They haVe also displayed a continuing interest in
Venezuelan political, economic, and social develop-
ments. Chinese propaganda media have praised the
"popular revolution" in Venezuela and its leadership
in glowing terms.
An
article in the April 1965 issue of Peking Review
singled out the Venezuelan and Colombian parties
as the two in Latin America which have "taken the
path of the armed struggle" to prove the axiom that
"political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
In late 1963, the secretary general of the CCP, while
lecturing a group of Latin American trainees, noted
that Venezuela was a country which could be a focal
point fOr coordinating revolutionary activities in
the hemisphere./
CCP approval of the PCV path and the
trend of violence in Venezuela was also demonstrated
in August 1964 by the lavish treatment given to visit-
ing PCV leader Eduardo Gallegos Mancera.
ttitudes of Other Communist Parties
Several of the pro-Soviet Latin American Com-
munist Parties have apparently viewed the armed
struggle in Venezuela with misgivings. Some may
have registered strong disapproval. There is little
available information to appraise the attitudes of
individUal parties and leaders toward the PCV during
this period. Except for the Cuban party and the
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Colombian Communist Party, the PCV's liaison with
fraternal organizations in the area has been only
limited and sporadic. The resentment of several
Latin American Communist parties against Cuba for
promoting subversive activities in their countries
through other than "orthodox" channels may, however,
have rubbed off on the PCV.
At the "Continental Congress in Support of the
Cuban Revolution," held in Brasilia in 1963, the PCV
is believed to have faced sharp criticism for pursu-
ing "Chinese deviationist" policies from representa-
tives of some pro-Soviet parties in attendance. Prob-
ably on orders from his party, Alberto Lovera, the
PCV delegate to Brasilia, traveled to certain South
American capitals after the meeting to explain the
PCV program of armed struggle to fraternal organiza-
tions. Although his itinerary is not known, he did
confer in Santiago with the secretary general of the
Chilean Communist Party, who reportedly declined to
extend public "solidarity" to the PCV. About one
year earlier, the( Brazilian Communist Party had re-
portedly criticized the PCV for launching guerrilla
warfare without mass support--a criticism presumably
forwarded in writing to the PCV central committee
in Caracas.
The Havana meeting of Latin American Communist
parties in late 1964 adopted a resolution calling
for hemispheric solidarity and support for the
Venezuelan armed struggle. This resolution was not
passed with spontaneous enthusiasm, however. Al-
berto Lovera, one of the Venezuelan delegates, de-
scribed the attitudes among Latin American parties
as not precisely an "acquiescence in" but rather a
"forced tolerance toward the armed path." Although
he noted that other Latin American party representa-
tives gained a far better understanding of the PCV
program after his bilateral discussions with them
at Havana, he also admitted that they were not com-
pletely satisfied with his explanations. Moreover,
the delegates at Havana were not prepared to give a
blanket endorsement to the Venezuelan thesis that
"the only path of the Communist movement in Latin
America is war."
Lovera's commentary on what happened behind
the scenes at Havana suggests that the resolutions
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as applied to the armed struggle in Latin America were
to a large degree a compromise between Moscow and
the pro-Soviet parties on the one hand and Cuba and
those parties which were already involved in revo-
lution on the other.
The Itali
an Communist Party's Role
One other Communist party which has shown an
active interest in the Venezuelan situation is the
Italian ommunist Party (PCI). In recent years, the
PCI has naintained contacts with both the hard-line
and soft-line factions of the Venezuelan party,
which has had its own representatives in Rome, at
least for extensive periods. Aristo Ciruzzi, an
official of the PCI foreign relations bureau, has
made two known trips to Caracas in the past two
years, ahd has stated that his party is a main chan-
nel of communication between the Castro regime and
the PCV.
The PCI has taken the presumably self-chosen
role of mentor to the Venezuelan party and go-be-
tween for the CPSU. Ciruzzi claims that the latter
role has the consent of Moscow, though he does not
assert that the CPSU requested the services. Two
incident S during the past year, however, suggest
that Mos ow may have given more than tacit consent
to the Italian effort. One was the dispatch of
Ciruzzi to Caracas in late 1964 to obtain more ac-
curate i formation on the true status of the PCV
than was available in Rome--a trip which followed
shortly fter the Havana conference. The other in-
cident w s the confiscation of a sizable sum of money
from an talian Communist who entered Venezuela in
April 19 5.
The CI's standing with the Venezuelan party was
probably enhanced by the Italian party's known posi-
tion on 1he Sino-Soviet dispute in defense of the
equality of all Communist parties and the exclusive
right of each to interpret the proper path to social-
ism within its own "jurisdiction." The PCI's avowed
purpose is to encourage the Venezuelan party to re-
build its popular base by resuming gradually a pro-
gram of mass struggle and by reducing the emphasis
on the armed struggle.
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The Italian party had no perceptible impact on
the Venezuelan Communist program before early 1964;
but it is a reasonable surmise that the PCV's search
for a "government of democratic peace," as set forth
in the central committee plenum of April 1965, may
conform to what the Italians--possibly speaking for
the Soviets--have in mind for the party's future.
The ICI's ability to influence the Venezuelan party
is of course limited unless the Italian guidance is
known to echo Moscow's views and unless some tangible
assistance is held out as inducement.
The Algerian Example and the PCV
As a successful, socialist-oriented uprising
against a colonial power, the Algerian example ex-
erted an influence on the PCV comparable, in a lim-
ited way, to the Cuban revolution. PCV leaders ap-
parently found the Algerian armed struggle more com-
prehensible, realistic, and applicable to their own
environment than that of China; they probably believed
that the settlement of the Algerian conflict would
have similarities to their own "inevitable victory
against imperialism." Venezuelan Communists dissected
the Algerian example of the "prolonged struggle,"
which also combined both urban and rural violence,
and were duly impressed by what they found.
Castro's close ties with the Ben Bella regime
probably intensified the PCV's interest. In late
1962, Castro reportedly advised Venezuelan Communists
that Algeria should be the PCV "supply base for war
materials." Prior to Ben Bella's ouster, the Cubans
were believed to be exploring the possibilities of
channeling aid to the Venezuelans through Algeria.
The MIR was also seeking help from this source.
Algeria also appears to have provided the model
for the establishment of the FLN and FALN in Vene-
zuela as a "united front" political-military struc-
ture. Both the titles and objectives of these
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organizations, which the PCV and MIR superimposed
on the armed struggle, were directly adapted from
Algerian l prototypes. The FL N was designed to be a
supreme Political authority directing and coordinat-
ing the armed movement (FALN) but sufficiently
flexible ideologically to allow for the incorpora-
tion of 411 "patriotic" groups in the liberation
movement. As early as the Third Congress in 1961,
the PCV -lad reportedly contemplated forming such a
front after the Algerian model as soon as condi-
tions "ripened."
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HI. THE PCV s INTERNATIONAL POSITION
The PCV's primary concern during the period
under review has continued to be with domestic
developments, not with international Communist
party affairs. But it has shown itself conscious
of the larger world also--partly in the rationale
it adopted to justify its move from the via pacifica
to the lucha armada, and partly in the ONItion it
has taken reaFarig the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The PCV's Rationale of its Program
In its shift from the mass struggle to the
armed struggle the PCV, as has been noted in some
detail earlier in this paper, was motivated by a
variety of considerations in which calculations of
immediate advantage and other opportunistic factors
played a more significant part than ideology. The
victorious hard-line faction nevertheless attempted
to concoct a kind of theory and philosophy of revolu-
tion after the strategy was well advanced. The pur-
pose was twofold: first, to justify the program
to dissenters, weak-hearted temporizers and adamant
opponents within its own ranks and those of its allies;
second, to explain the armed struggle to a larger
public, including the international Communist family.
The last audience was particularly important in
view of the PCV's position of neutrality in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. In a general sense, the relative
timing of action and philosophical justification
followed that of Cuba. Castro formulated his theory
of revolution and exported it to the hemisphere
after his successful performance.
Pompey() Marquez, the veteran PCV agitator and
clandestine leader, was also the intellectual theorist
of the lucha armada. Other Communist writers in
the hard-line camp and guerrilla leaders, like
Douglas Bravo, repeated his ideas faithfully with no
25X1 innovations; the hard-line faction of the MIR did
the same. I
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JSome
of his thoughts on revolution and those or other Com-
munists appeared in Communist and non-Communist
public information media, foreign and domestic.
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Many of these articles on revolution were drafted
after the party suffered reverses in the strategy
of armed struggle.
The central theme of the ex post facto philos+
ophy of revolution in Venezuela was its "inevitabil-
L
ity." The hard-ainersmaintained that the "progres-
sive forceg'ha exhausted every means of avoiding
rev lution and violence, but "the oligarchy" and
"imperialist forces" had closed all approaches to .
the via pacifica. The alternative to perpetual "s0-
misSiori to colonialism" was the path of revolution.'1
Even this inflexible premise was flexible. Mar-
quez did not denounce the "delusion of the electoral
fare" until the PCV and MIR had failed in their ef7
forts to work out a united electoral front on satiS-
factory terms with one or more of the legal opposiH
tiori parties for the December 1963 elections. He
onl then asserted that "the struggle is raised to;
a 1 ftier plane. Victory must be sought through
pro esses where heroism, courage, and the combative
decisions form the elemental principles to unite
our people for conquest."
Marquez reinforced the thesis of "inevitable
revolution" with the doctrine of "inevitable vic-
tory" after the reverses in the 1963 elections.
Thi $ idea seemed to be related to boosting morale
amo g the militants. In their doctrine the Commu-
nis s also stressed the rationalization that the
sup ressive measures of the oligarchic ruling groups
had provoked the revolution of "self-defense" againSt
annihilation of the "democratic forces." This argu:-
ment was almost identical to one long used by the
nei hboring Colombian Communist Party, which had
op-
posd with force efforts to re-establishgovernmental
aut ority over Communist-controlled rural enclaves
on grounds of "autodefense." The PCV claimed that
the Betancourt regime had embarked on
a violent counterrevolution against the
Venezuelan people.... The people are forced
to respond with revolutionary war in or-
der to advance along the road which leads
to the conquest of their independence and
sovereignty. This is a just war, Justice is
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on the side of our people. Victory will
inexorably be on their side, too.
After December 1963 Marquez, who apparently
had always doubted the chances for a quick vic-
tory, emphasized that the armed struggle would
be "prolonged." "Prolonged" was not precisely
defined, although wide variations in the length
of the Cuban, Algerian, and Chinese revolutions
were pointed out to explain the difficulty of
setting any deadline. Furthermore, the party not
only acknowledged the prolonged nature of the revo-
lution, but asserted that it would be "fierce and
brutal" for a very obvious reason derived from a
modified Chinese Communist proverb: The monopolis-
tic and oligarchic forces would not readily relin-
quish Venezuela, "the most priceless jewel in the
imperial Yankee crown. Imperialism and oligarchism
are indeed paper tigers but only strategically
speaking. Tactically speaking, they are tigers.
Cuba was a principal source of inspiration of
PCV doctrine on revolution. The writings and
speeches of Castro and Che Guevara and the Second
Declaration of Havana (February 1962) were quoted
25X1 extensivelyl as having unquestioned
validity. For example, the PCV endorsed the Cuban
premise: "In America and in the rest of the world,
the revolution will win out, but revolutionaries
will not be able to sit in the doorsteps of their
homes and watch the cadaver of imperialism pass by."
Similarly the PCV swallowed the Cuban gospel that:
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wherever Yankee monopoly is strongest and
oligarchies most brutal in repressing the
people, the revolutionary explosion of the
people becomes inevitable.... The cardinal
idea has been adopted by the Venezuelan
revolutionary forces as follows: The armed
struggle does not exclude but presupposes
the utilization of all other forms of strug-
gle; the armed struggle is a unitary work
in which all forces of the revolutionary front
should participate; the armed struggle is a
work of the masses....
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During the second phase of violence, the hard_:
lin4 faction de-emphasized Cuban doctrines--partly
bec use of the decline of Castro's prestige and
par ly to muffle the charges of enemies in and
out ide the party that the revolutionaries had
bliiidly attempted to copy the Castro model.
Its aim was to convince the Venezuelan public that
th7rmed struggle was "made in Venezuela by Vene-
zue ans" and nationalistically inspired. Commu-
nis apologists now stress the line that the PCV
is 1ully aware of the revolutionary experience of
all socialist countries and has distilled all ele-
men s adaptable to Venezuela. But the local lucha ,
armada is presented as a special phenomenon?irTW-IT
mec anical reproduction of the Soviet, Chinese, Cu-
ban Algerian, Vietnamese or any other revolutionary
fi
struggle.
This "philosophical approach" has recently beep
app ied to guerrilla warfare by Alberto Lovera, the
top Communist leader in charge of paramilitay opera-
tions. "I believe," he stated to party members in
ear .y 1965, "that now is the time.. .to transform our
own experience into concrete facts.... The books of
Ch andothers /Uil guerrilla warfarer are very good
but now is the Time we develop our 5Wn doctrines
froM our own experience."
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The PCV and the Sino-Soviet Dispute
The PCV has been traditionally loyal to Moscow
and subservient to its dictates on international
policies and issues. Prior to the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute, the party is not known to have balked at any
directive issuing from the CPSU and it has followed
faithfully Soviet propaganda guidelines on world af-
fairs. Most senior leaders of the PCV have received
their formal training and political indoctrination
in the USSR. Many are indebted to the CPSU for travel,
scholarships for their 'children, medical care,
and other types of Communist fringe benefits. Until
Castro came to power, the party looked almost ex-
clusively to Moscow for ideological guidance and
tangible support in various forms.
Although Castro and the Sino-Soviet dispute have
at least temporarily upset the foreign orientation
of both the "heart" and the "stomach" of the PCV,
the party's international roots are still in Moscow.
Both the hard and soft-line factions have sought Mos-
cow's favor as the armed struggle has run its course
in Venezuela; and the hard-liners have made concerted
efforts to couch the PCV's "neutral" stand in the
Sino-Soviet dispute in terms palatable to the CPSU.
As noted previously, the CPSU has probably been
concerned that other free world parties, particularly
those in the Western Hemisphere, have viewed the PCV's
"neutralism" and program of armed struggle as an em-
brace in fact of Chinese "sectarianism." The Chinese
themselves apparently interpret PCV neutrality as
favorable to their position, and it has been. On
the surface, at least, the PCV seems to have been
applying much of the Chinese doctrine in practice;
and some of the PCV's rationale for its program ap-
proaches the Chinese view that peaceful coexistence
threatens the revolutionary spirit of Communists in
underdeveloped areas dominated by "colonialism."
Chinese satisfaction with the trend of events in Vene-
zuela was indicated by the statement of an official
of the New China News Agency in 1963, ranking the PCV
as the only party in Latin America on the Chinese
side of the fence.
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The influence of Cuba on the PCV is again re-
fleOted in its neutral position in the dispute.
Although the party found comforting support in the
independent lines of the Italians and Rumanians,
it tasically leaned on Cuban theories and held
tig t to Cuban coattails to avoid isolation in the
hemisphere. Whether the PCV would have stood up
alone for neutralism without Cuban company is a
moot question.
The PCV expanded the rationale of armed strug-
gle..-aimed primarily for domestic consumption--into
a m re comprehensive apology for its neutralism in
the Sino-Soviet controversy. The position was based
lar ely on such irrefutable sources as the Second
Declaration of Havana in February 1962, the 1960
Declaration of Moscow, and even a few quotations
froM Khrushchev. The party cited these materials
to uphold the equality and autonomy of Communist
parties and the right of each one to be the inter-
preter of local conditions and arbiter of the proper
path to socialism within its sphere. Within these
majOr points, the PCV sporadically expressed con-
cerr over the disunity within the international Com-
munist family, the hope that all difficulties would"
be ettled amicably through discussion, and the con-
viction that any action which aggravated points of
difference between Moscow and Peking should be avoided
at All cost.
The PCV's rationale appears for the most part
pro--Soviet in terminology but also reflects resent-
men of pressures applied on the party after 1963.
The Venezuelan Communists,1
25X1 had preferred to follow the
via paci ica an us avoid at all cost the unneces-
sar s e ng of blood of the working class. But 1
the party found that the Betancourt regime had "cloSed
eve y door to peaceful struggle," and consequently 1
the people's vanguard was forced into the national
lib ration by the brutal counterrevolution of the
imperialist-backed oligarchy. In accordance with
the 11960 Declaration of Moscow, the Third PCV Con-
gress, and similar infallible sources, which set
forth the doctrine of equality of all Communist par,-
tie, revolutionary wars against imperialism are
"not only tolerable but inevitable."
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The PCV further asserted that its own national
liberation and other anti-imperialist armed strug-
gles in no way rejected the priority objective of
avoiding a third world war. Moreover, the central
committee of the PCV insisted that "peaceful coex-
istence does not imply in any way the attenuation
of revolutionary struggles of peoples." Unlike the
Chinese, however, the Venezuelans did not denounce
the doctrine of peaceful coexistence:
It must be perfectly clear that the strug-
gle of the colonial and semicolonial peo-
ples for their independence and against all
forms of colonialism and neocolonialism,
following the path which corresponds to
the concrete conditions of each country,
as experience' shows to this point, does
not contradict the maintenance of world
peace and peaceful coexistence. On the
contrary, these struggles have been valu-
able contributions to the weakening of belli-
cose forces and to fortifying the peace
camp. Cuba and Algiers are eloquent exam-
ples which 'require no additional comment.
On more than one
occasion, however, at home and abroad, PCV leaders
have felt compelled to explain--apparently in re-
sponse to charges by other fraternal organizations
--that the party was not following any foreign mas-
ter. For example, as late as November 1964, Eduardo
Gallegos, in a statement published by the Italian
Communist daily L'Unita, reiterated that the Vene-
zuelan armed struggle and orientation were strictly
national products:
This is our line--not the Chinese, not the
Soviet, not the Cuban; and we demand respect
for it, just as we respect whatever line
is adopted by any of the other parties; the
Chilean, for example.
In an open letter dated September 1964 and printed
in Venezuela, the politburo similarly denied a pub-
lic allegation that its tactics were determined by
Moscow or feking. ,.. "Our party is jealous of its
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demonstrated and reiterated autonomy in the elabora-
tion of its political line."
The widening breach between Moscow and Peking
after 1962 gradually forced some type of response
and/or alignment upon the other Communist parties.
The issue confronted the PCV with difficult choices,
which posed practical dangers to the hard-line fac-
tion committed to revolution and tied in alliance
with the MIR. The MIR in turn was badly split into
hard and soft-line camps, thus complicating the
dilemma. Under these circumstances, the PCV's en-
dorsement of Moscow might have produced an open
split within its own ranks, defection among extremiSt
youth elements, and possibly serious repercussions"
within the leadership of the paramilitary forces.
The factious and uncontrollable MIR hard-liners
would very probably have been alienated.
The nuances of ideological positions in the
Sino-Soviet controversy were apparently not under-
stood in Communist and MIR ranks. Siding with Mos-
cow carried the implied condemnation of local revo-
lutions and of the hard-liner PCV faction for pro-
moting this strategy in Venezuela. Moreover, many.'
of the soft-liners in both the PCV and MIR by early
1961 were seeking to limit the armed struggle and .
were attempting to tag the hard-liners as "Maoists"
Had] the Sino-Soviet dispute not had a direct bear-
ing on these domestic Communist issues, the PCV
mig t have declared its support of Moscow with
lit le hesitation. The question of publicly and
exp essly backing the Chinese and criticizing the
Sov ets in the dispute was not even considered.
PCV leaders attempted to restrict intraparty
dis ussion of the Sino-Soviet dispute to the ex-
ten feasible, apparently in order to avoid misin-
ter retations, and reportedly ordered cessation of
suc discussion in ?arty circles in ear
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In its public propaganda, the PCV carefully avoided
mention of the international controversy and refrained
from criticizing either the CCP or the CPSU.
The period of evasion and temporizing ended
after the East German Party Congress in Berlin in
early 1963. At this meeting the Soviet delegates
pushed through a resolution which favored their
position in the dispute, and only Cuba and Vene-
zuela, among the 17 Latin American parties repre-
sented, refused to sign. Jesus Faria, chief Vene-
zuelan delegate, consistently pro-Soviet and an
opponent of the armed struggle in his country, re-
portedly resisted strong Soviet pressures to ad-
here to the resolution--pressure which Khrushchev
himself may have applied.
After the Berlin gathering, the PCV was
clearly in the "neutralist" group of parties in re-
lation to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The party is
believed, however, to have dispatched high-level
emissaries to Moscow on at least one occasion prior
to Khrushchev's ouster to obtain a better under-
standing of its position.
It was
about this time that Pravda published the statements
of Americo Chacon, calling fora return to the mass
struggle in Venezuela.
Soviet pressure apparently in part provoked the
PCV to take a stand in defense of its autonomy and
independence in relations with other Communist par-
ties, a unique step in the annals of party history.
In addition to Cuban support, the PCV also turned to
examples of autonomous and independent leanings of
other parties. For example, it translated and pub-
lished verbatim in Principios, the party's theoretical
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journal, the text of the Rumanian party declaration
of April 1964. The document, inter alia, criticized
Chinese polemics, defended the independence and
equality of each party as the just norm of inter-
party relations, and insisted on nonintervention in
the internal affairs of other parties. According
to the Rumanian thesis, there cannot exist a "par-
ent party" and an "offspring party." The PCV also
endorsed similar autonomous doctrines of the Italian
ComMunist Party and the ideas contained in the me-
morial of Palmiro Togliatti.
To mid-1965, the PCV managed to maintain its
balance on the precarious tightrope created by the
Sing-Soviet dispute. It had avoided an open split
within its own ranks and an open break with the
hard-line MIR. The decisions of the Moscow-backed
Havana meeting of Latin American parties in 1964,
whidh endorsed the Venezuelan liberation movement,
had apparently been preceded by an easing of CPSU
preSsure on the party with reference to the Sino-
Soviet dispute. Moscow had probably also loosened
its purse strings to support the paramilitary opera-
tions in Venezuela. Thus the party had managed to
assert its "independence" without retaliation from
the CPSU and without provoking propaganda attacks
from Peking. At the same time, PCV loyalties re-
mained in Moscow, rather than shifting to Peking;
and
sen
aid
party leaders continued to demonstrate their
itivity to Moscow's views and to seek tangible
there.
The Outlook for the Party
The picture that emerges from this analysis of
the PCV is one of a political party primarily con-
cerned with the conquest of power on the national
scene and only secondarily with ideological ortho-
doxy or any other consideration extending beyond
Ven zuela's borders. The party conflict between
the rival strategies of mass struggle and armed
struggle was in fact decided mainly on pragmatic
grounds; but the PCV, like most political parties,
was naturally anxious to avoid unnecessary aliena-
tion of any important segment of its support, and
was correspondingly insistent on the ideological
correctness of its course--though even in its phil-
osophical justifications of the armed struggle the
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note of Venezuelan nationalism was evident. If dur-
ing any of this period there was a really critical
influence on the party from abroad, it came not from
Moscow or Peking but from Havana as the emotional
appeal of Castroism. And Castroism was potent not
merely because it inspired the PCV leadership but
because it spoke to a broad segment of Venezuelan
public opinion and so conditioned the national po-
litical environment to which the PCV leadership re-
sponded.
Down to the latter half of 1965, at least, the
PCV managed the difficult feat of holding itself to-
gether as a national entity, accepting all the as-
sistance it could get from abroad, and getting it-
self as little involved as possible in international
Communist disputes. Partly as a result of the armed
struggle, its needs for foreign help were generally
high, and "neutrality" in international Communist
disputes provided a convenient formula both for ac-
cepting aid from any source and for trying to keep
foreign disputes from splitting the Venezuelan party.
The future course of the party is impossible to
predict with accuracy. The PCV has suffered grave
dangers to unity within the past seven years and dis-
sension within the party is now deeply embedded as
a result of the lucha armada phase. As of mid-1965,
the PCV's plans to renew emphasis on legal political
activity in pursuit of a "government of democratic
peace" were causing serious friction with the MIR
hard-line faction. The young leaders of both the
PCV and MIR are not effectively controlled by the
Communist hierarchy and have tied their futures to
the success of the armed struggle. The MIR has ap-
parently conducted liaison with the pro-Chinese fac-
tion of the Colombian Communist Party, which defected
in mid-1965 and established a separate organization.
Thus, within the ranks of the PCV and the MIR are
large factions determined to continue the armed rev-
olution. They are the embryo of a relatively strong
pro-Chinese party in Venezuela.
If Moscow and Peking become formal competitors
for authority in the guidance of the world Communist
movement, and if the PCV decides on gradual abandon-
ment of the armed struggle, there is bound to be a
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radical reshuffling of loyalties, leaders, and mem-
ber S in Communist and pro-Communist parties in Vene-
zue a. Should these eventualities materialize, Pe-
kin is not likely to wind up without an organized
following in the country. In any event Moscow can ,
pro ably no longer rely upon the blind and automatic
obe ience of the PCV when the party considers its
imm diate interests threatened by international Com-
munist issues.
Appro4ed For Release 2
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